Mindreading is the capacity to attribute psychological states to others and to use those attributions to explain, predict, and understand others’ behaviors. In the past thirty years, mindreading has become the topic of substantial interdisciplinary research and theorizing, with philosophers, psychologists and, more recently, neuroscientists, all contributing to the debate about the nature of the neuropsychological mechanisms that constitute the capacity for mindreading. In this thesis I push this debate forward by using recent results from developmental psychology as the basis for critiques of two prominent views of mindreading. First, I argue that the developmental studies provide evidence of infant mindreading and therefore expose a flaw in José Bermúdez’s view that certain forms of mindreading require language possession. Second, I argue that the evidence of infant mindreading can also be used to undermine Alvin Goldman’s version of Simulation Theory.

Theory of mind involves the ability to take another person’s perspective in thought, emotions and intentions.  There is today a lack of instruments to assess children’s development of Theory of Mind (ToM) in Swedish. ToM is considered by many scientists to be the basis for development of pragmatic competence. The relationship between these two abilities is complex and not fully resolved. Both abilities are important components for the development of social skills.     The purpose of this study was to compare 4 and 5-year olds ToM-ability measured with a Swedish version of Wellman and Liu’s ToM-scale, Sally Anne and Social Emotional Test with estimated pragmatic competence measured with the Children’s Communication Checklist (CCC). To make this possible the study also aims to translate and evaluate a Swedish version of Wellman and Liu’s ToM-scale. In the study 39 children in the age of 4 and 5 years old participated (20 4-year olds and 19 5-year olds).     The present study can point to the relationship between the ToM1 ability false belief and pragmatic abilities, as well as different abilities related to pragmatics (conversational rapport, use of discourse context and prosody). Correlation between prosody and other measures of ToM1 abilities was also observed. The result can be linked to previous research on the relationship between pragmatics and ToM. ToM and pragmatic are two abilities that are linked to each other. But as the result is not entirely conclusive, they may also shed more light to the complexity of these abilities and their relationship.      The result of the evaluation of Wellman and Liu’s ToM-scale shows that most of the children got a result pattern that agreed with the hypothesis of a gradual acquisition of ToM-abilties. However, Swedish 4 year olds did to a greater extent passed questions in a pattern that was not compatible with the gradual acquisition claim than American children did in a previous study. One reason for this result may be cultural differences. More research is needed on a larger selection of subjects and a wider range of age groups before any conclusions can be drawn. However, the translated scale can be used in a qualitative way, to examine which aspects of a ToM a child comprehends.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T20:56:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Eliana Cristina Gallo Penna.pdf: 1169714 bytes, checksum: e8422e015d7aa978fbf384302d1e2d44 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-02-27 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The manifestation of the Theory of Mind in autism is a singular issue, emphasized by the hypothesis that there are deficits in the ability of attributing mental states in autistic children, related to autism specific symptoms. This research is an experimental intervention, which aims to investigate the effects of a procedure, based on the ability of attributing mental states to others in autistic children. It is to guide mothers of autistic children to the use of children's stories telling based on the use of mental terms and explanations of mental states of desires, beliefs, intentions and emotions about the characters in order to foster the ability of understanding other people's mental states. Three children, ages 11 to 16, one boy and two girls students of regular schools from the state of Minas Gerais, participated of this research together with their mothers. The Theory of Mind was assessed in the pretest as well as the posttest, according to The Theory of Mind Scale. The intervention procedure lasted for six months. During this period, there were two group orientation plus fifteen individual ones. The individual orientations were held weekly in the children's homes, shortly after the children's stories telling. The stories, told by their mothers, were video recorded, transcribed and submitted to the SPAD - T software for treatment and categorization of terms of mental states attributing. The results showed that the language used for the mother, according to the guideline containing terms and explanations of mental states, was favoring the manifestation of the Theory of Mind for their children. It was observed in two children that there was a relationship between the mother's language and the performance of false belief tasks. It was observed an increase in the use of emotional terms in the children's speech, and in cognitive terms on the mother s lines. It is considered that the language is a predictor in attributing mental states to other people, also in autistic children. Children with better language skills can evoke mental terms, and are able to hit in the false belief tasks / A manifestação da teoria da mente no autismo é uma questão singular, marcada pela hipótese de que existem déficits na capacidade de atribuição de estados mentais em crianças autistas, relacionados com os sintomas específicos que constituem o autismo. A presente pesquisa é um estudo experimental de intervenção, cujo objetivo é investigar os efeitos de um procedimento, baseado em linguagem, sobre a habilidade de atribuição de estados mentais ao outro, em crianças com autismo. Trata-se de orientar as mães de filhos autistas para o uso de narrativas de histórias infantis, baseadas no uso de termos mentais e explicações dos estados mentais de desejos, crenças, intenções e emoções, dos personagens, com o propósito de favorecer a capacidade de compreensão de estados mentais do outro. Participaram três crianças e suas mães, com idades de 11 e 16 anos, um menino e duas meninas, que frequentavam escolas regulares do estado de Minas Gerais. A teoria da mente foi avaliada no pré-teste e no pós-teste, pela Escala de Teoria da Mente. O procedimento de intervenção teve seis meses de duração. Nesse período, foram realizadas duas orientações coletivas e quinze individuais. As orientações individuais foram realizadas semanalmente, nas casas das crianças, logo após as narrativas de histórias infantis. As narrativas de histórias, realizadas pelas mães, foram videogravadas, transcritas e submetidas ao software SPAD-T, para tratamento e categorização de termos de atribuição de estados mentais. Os resultados demonstraram que a linguagem adotada pelas mães a partir das orientações, contendo termos e explicações sobre os estados mentais, foi favorecedora na manifestação da teoria da mente de seus filhos. Houve uma relação entre a linguagem materna e o desempenho das tarefas de crença falsa, observada em duas crianças. Foi observado o aumento no uso de termos emocionais nas falas das crianças, e de termos cognitivos nas falas maternas. Considera-se que a linguagem é preditora na atribuição de estados mentais ao outro, também em crianças autistas. As crianças que possuem melhores habilidades linguísticas podem evocar termos mentais e obter acerto nas tarefas de crença falsa

Questa tesi di dottorato si divide in tre capitoli. I primi due capitoli riguardano il panorama teorico affrontato e il terzo rappresenta il cuore della ricerca. / This PhD dissertation is divided into three chapters, the first two concerning the theoretical panorama investigated and the third centred on the presentation of the research.

This study was conducted to investigate the processes underlying the relation between executive functioning and false belief knowledge. We explored the hypothesis that children with advanced executive functioning skills are better equipped to capitalize on the experiences that are necessary to learn how to reason about others’ mental states. To examine this possibility, we recruited 3.5-year-old children with age-appropriate variability in executive functioning skills to participate in a training study designed to promote their performance on false belief tasks. We found that individual differences in executive functioning task scores strongly and consistently predicted the extent to which children benefited from false-belief training. Importantly, the relation between executive functioning and false belief improvement remained significant after controlling for age, initial performance on mental state reasoning tasks, language skills, and executive functioning improvement across the testing period. Thus, our results support the hypothesis that executive functioning skills influence the extent to which children are able to capitalize on relevant experience to better predict and understand others’ false-belief-based behaviour. This claim is discussed with respect to possible alternative explanations for our findings, and ensuing implications for understanding the interplay between neuromaturational factors and experience. / Thesis (Master, Psychology) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-28 14:43:16.88

In der vorliegenden Arbeit wurde die Entwicklung der Theory of Mind (ToM) im Rahmen einer kurzlängsschnittlichen Untersuchung im Alter von vier und viereinhalb Jahren in drei verschiedenen kulturellen Kontexten untersucht, in Deutschland, Costa Rica und Kamerun. Vor dem Hintergrund einer sich verdichtenden Befundlage, die auf die Bedeutung der sozialen Umwelt für die Entwicklung der ToM hinweist, wie auch erster kulturvergleichender Untersuchungen, in denen sich zum Teil erhebliche Unterschiede im Entwicklungstempo zeigen, lag der Fokus der vorliegenden Arbeit auf der Analyse kindlicher Entwicklungskontexte für die Entwicklung der ToM. Neben dem Alter und sprachlichem Entwicklungsstand wurden verschiedene familiäre Variablen (z.B. Haushaltszusammensetzung) erfasst, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf der Analyse von Mutter-Kind Gesprächen und hier auf der Bedeutung mütterlicher mentalistischer (z.B. Gedanken, Gefühle, Bedürfnisse) und nicht-mentalistischer Bezüge (z.B. Kausalitäten, Wiederholungen) lag. Von diesen wurde angenommen, dass sie einen förderlichen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung des anhand einer Testbatterie erfassten Verständnisses falscher Sichtweisen nehmen. Während die familiären Kontextvariablen keine konsistenten Zusammenhänge mit dem Verständnis falscher Sichtweisen zeigten, trug zum ersten Messzeitpunkt in allen drei Gruppen das Alter des Kindes signifikant zur Varianzaufklärung dieser Fähigkeit bei. In der costa ricanischen Stichprobe erwies sich darüber hinaus der Sprachentwicklungsstand tendenziell und der aus Sprachentwicklungstand und mentalistischer Sprache der Mutter gebildete Interaktionsterm als weiterer signifikanter Prädiktor. Zum zweiten Messzeitpunkt erwies sich in allen Gruppen der frühere sprachliche Entwicklungsstand des Kindes als signifikanter Prädiktor für die sechs Monate später erfasste ToM Testleistung des Kindes. Die Ergebnisse und weiterführende Fragen werden abschliessend diskutiert.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T20:56:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Simone Ferreira da Silva Domingues.pdf: 360013 bytes, checksum: 0703f8f0b3a1fa8e49c0990d69836f02 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-04-24 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / There are evidences that the conversation and explanation about mind studies influence the capacity to comprehend one s mind which arises as the success in false belief tasks. However, there are still few studies about the theory of mind that may test the hypothesis of precedence concerning linguistic abilities related to the ability of assignment of mind states by applying intervention procedures. The experimental research presented herein is aimed at checking the effects of intervention over the assignment ability of children s mental states of belief. The investigation was done in three phases: pre-test, intervention and post-test. The intervention was based upon the explanation of false belief tasks followed by demonstrations using as aids gestures and objects aside from the explanatatory speech. Forty-four male and female children took part in this research. Their age vary from 3.5 to 4.7 years old and they attend a day care center for low income families in the east area of São Paulo. The attained results were possible through conversation with these children when they could talk about the events which involve mind actions, along with demonstrations and handling the material. Such results indicated that children from the experimental group (GE) partially benefited themselves from the interventional procedure, except in just one task, and it was observed a significant difference in the performance of the experimental group (GE) when compared to the performance of the control group (GC). The activities favored the occurrence of the attribution ability of mind states of belief and the effects remained in the experimental group (GE) after three weeks. The qualitative analysis concerning the behavior of the children from the experimental group during the playful situations applied as interventional procedure show a clear relation between implied participation and afterward advances in the false belief tasks. Therefore, under the intervention, when the children paid more attention and used more answers related to behavior explanations, they presented better results in the false belief tasks. On the other hand, children in whom intervention had no effect shared the lack of attention and did not give any answers related to behavior explanations. These results support the hypothesis pointing to the existence of a relation between the ability of assignment of mind states and the development of language. ABSTRACT There are evidences that the conversation and explanation about mind studies influence the capacity to comprehend one s mind which arises as the success in false belief tasks. However, there are still few studies about the theory of mind that may test the hypothesis of precedence concerning linguistic abilities related to the ability of assignment of mind states by applying intervention procedures. The experimental research presented herein is aimed at checking the effects of intervention over the assignment ability of children s mental states of belief. The investigation was done in three phases: pre-test, intervention and post-test. The intervention was based upon the explanation of false belief tasks followed by demonstrations using as aids gestures and objects aside from the explanatatory speech. Forty-four male and female children took part in this research. Their age vary from 3.5 to 4.7 years old and they attend a day care center for low income families in the east area of São Paulo. The attained results were possible through conversation with these children when they could talk about the events which involve mind actions, along with demonstrations and handling the material. Such results indicated that children from the experimental group (GE) partially benefited themselves from the interventional procedure, except in just one task, and it was observed a significant difference in the performance of the experimental group (GE) when compared to the performance of the control group (GC). The activities favored the occurrence of the attribution ability of mind states of belief and the effects remained in the experimental group (GE) after three weeks. The qualitative analysis concerning the behavior of the children from the experimental group during the playful situations applied as interventional procedure show a clear relation between implied participation and afterward advances in the false belief tasks. Therefore, under the intervention, when the children paid more attention and used more answers related to behavior explanations, they presented better results in the false belief tasks. On the other hand, children in whom intervention had no effect shared the lack of attention and did not give any answers related to behavior explanations. These results support the hypothesis pointing to the existence of a relation between the ability of assignment of mind states and the development of language / Há evidências de que a conversação e a explanação sobre estados mentais têm influência sobre a capacidade de compreensão da mente do outro, manifestada sob a forma de sucesso em tarefas de falsa crença. No entanto, ainda são escassos estudos na área da teoria da mente que testem hipóteses de precedência de habilidades lingüísticas em relação à habilidade de atribuição de estados mentais, utilizando procedimentos de intervenção. A presente pesquisa, do tipo experimental, teve por objetivo verificar os efeitos de uma intervenção sobre a habilidade de atribuição de estados mentais de crença e foi desenvolvida em três fases: pré-teste, intervenção, pós-teste. A intervenção foi baseada na explicação de tarefas de falsa crença e acompanhada por demonstrações com a ajuda de gestos e de objetos, além da fala explicativa. Participaram da pesquisa 44 crianças de ambos os sexos, com idade variando de 3,5 a 4,7 anos, que freqüentavam uma creche situada na zona leste da cidade de São Paulo, que atende crianças provenientes de famílias de baixa renda. Os resultados obtidos através das conversações realizadas com as crianças para falar sobre eventos que implicam ações mentais, juntamente com demonstrações e manipulação do material, indicaram que as crianças do grupo experimental (GE) se beneficiaram, parcialmente, com o procedimento de intervenção e, à exceção de uma única tarefa, foi observada uma diferença significativa no desempenho do grupo experimental (GE) em relação ao desempenho do grupo controle (GC). As atividades favoreceram o surgimento da habilidade de atribuição de estados mentais de crença e os efeitos se mantiveram no grupo experimental (GE), após três semanas. As análises qualitativas do comportamento das crianças do grupo experimental, durante as situações lúdicas utilizadas como procedimento de intervenção, mostraram uma clara relação entre participação implicada e posteriores avanços nas tarefas de falsa crença. Assim, quando na intervenção as crianças demonstravam mais atenção e usavam mais respostas de explicação de conduta, elas apresentavam melhores resultados nas tarefas de falsa crença. Em contrapartida, crianças para as quais a intervenção não teve efeito, tinham em comum a falta de atenção e não deram respostas de explicação de conduta. Esses resultados dão sustentação às hipóteses que apontam para a existência de uma relação entre a habilidade de atribuição de estados mentais e desenvolvimento da linguagem

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T20:58:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Adriana Soares Freitas de Souza.pdf: 2098980 bytes, checksum: 0e5cba009d20fa524b503614f63f02d4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-10-23 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The ability of attributing mental states - desires, intentions and beliefs - to oneself and others has been named theory of mind. Such ability is necessary for the human being to understand and participate in social relations and it can be revealed in false-belief tasks. There are signals that the child s participation in conversational activities about events that involve mind actions may influence the ability of attributing beliefs to others. Thus, the existence of a narrow relation between the theory of mind and language can be accepted. The purpose of the present study was to check the effects of an intervention process in which mental states of beliefs are explained to participants through conversations in ludic situations concerning the ability of understanding the other ones mind. It was accepted the hypothesis that such process contributes to the acquisition of the ability of attributing mental states of beliefs in preschool children. The present research, which is quisi-experimental type, was developed in three steps: a) pre-test: a test of verbal level and the first five tasks in theory of mind from Wellman and Liu scale were performed; b) intervention: four ludic sessions were carried out in which the researcher told stories involving comprehension and attribution of mental states to the characters, i.e., desires, intentions and beliefs to others, based on the tasks from Wellman and Liu scale, by using some language that emphasizes mental verbs; post-test: in post-test 1, on the day after the last intervention, five pre-test tasks were performed; in post-test 2, two weeks later, the same pre-test tasks were performed. The participants were 10 children, 6 boys and 4 girls, whose age range was 4,9 - 5,11 years old; their socioeconomic level is low and they attend a city public school in the state of Bahia. The results showed that the children achieved progress in understanding false-belief after the intervention process. In general, the conversation strategies used in the intervention collaborated on the advancement in the capacity of attributing mental states of beliefs in others. These results support the hypothesis of a relation between the theory of mind and the development of language / A habilidade de atribuir a si próprio e a outra pessoa, estados mentais como desejos, intenções e crenças, tem sido denominada teoria da mente. Essa habilidade é necessária para o ser humano compreender e participar das relações sociais e pode ser revelada em tarefas de crença falsa. Há indícios de que a participação da criança em atividades de conversações sobre eventos que implicam ações mentais pode influenciar na habilidade de atribuição de crença ao outro. Assim, pode-se aceitar a existência de uma estreita relação entre teoria da mente e linguagem. A presente pesquisa teve por objetivo verificar os efeitos de um procedimento de intervenção em que são explicados aos participantes os estados mentais de crença por meio de conversações em situações lúdicas. Aceitou-se a hipótese de que a utilização desse procedimento contribui para a aquisição da habilidade de atribuição de estados mentais de crença em crianças em idade préescolar. A pesquisa, do tipo quase-experimental, foi feita em três fases: a) pré-teste - foram aplicadas uma prova de nível verbal e as cinco primeiras tarefas em teoria da mente da escala de Wellman e Liu; b) intervenção - foram realizadas 4 sessões lúdicas, com narração de histórias que envolviam compreensão e atribuição de estados mentais aos personagens, com ênfase no uso de verbos mentais; c) pósteste - no pós-teste 1, realizado no dia seguinte à última intervenção, foram reaplicadas as cinco tarefas do pré-teste; no pós-teste 2, realizado após duas semanas do pós-teste 1, foram utilizadas as mesmas tarefas. Participaram 10 crianças, sendo 6 meninos e 4 meninas, com idade variando de 4,9 a 5,11 anos, provenientes de famílias de nível socioeconômico baixo, que frequentavam uma escola municipal no interior do Estado da Bahia. Os resultados mostraram que as crianças progrediram na compreensão da crença falsa após o procedimento de intervenção. De modo geral, as estratégias de conversações empregadas na intervenção favoreceram avanço na capacidade de atribuição de estados mentais de crença ao outro. Esses resultados amparam a hipótese de uma relação entre a teoria da mente e o desenvolvimento da linguagem

When should it be permissible to act against someone's expressed wishes in their best interests? In both political philosophy and legal practice, answers to this question often appeal to the concept of autonomy. Broadly, the idea is that if a person is sufficiently self-governing, then their wishes must prevail; but if they are not, then their wishes need not be respected when promoting whatever is good for them. This thesis analyses both philosophical models of autonomy and the practice of judges in England and Wales when implementing the Mental Capacity Act 2005. With regard to the philosophical models, it finds that, despite claims to the contrary, they do not offer a plausible way of assessing whether someone else is autonomous without appealing to values that are not the person's own. With regard to legal practice, it finds that, although judges speak about 'autonomy' in contradictory ways, a coherent account of when they will find that they must respect a person's expressed wishes can be constructed. This first stage of analysis makes a gulf between 'autonomy' in philosophy and law obvious. When philosophers talk about 'autonomy', they are largely concerned with the person's relationship to themselves. When judges talk about 'autonomy', they are largely concerned with the person's relationship to the world. 'Autonomy' in the philosophical sense cannot justify current practice because it does not deal with the same subject matter. Analysis of mental capacity cases does, however, allow the development of an alternative justification for actions against a person's expressed wishes. This justification lies in an evaluation of the entire situation, not of the person. It is not reducible to any model of autonomy, not even 'relational' models. Taken seriously, this justification requires a reorientation of the ethics of mental capacity law: away from overreliance on relatively few abstract 'principles' and towards articulating the difficulty and complexity of real situations. The thesis offers two papers towards the development of this latter mode.

Το ζήτημα της γνώσης φαίνεται να απασχολεί τον Πλάτωνα από τους πρώιμους διαλόγους. Στα περισσότερα έργα της πρώιμης συγγραφικής του περιόδου θέτει στους συνομιλητές του ερωτήματα που αφορούν στην εύρεση της ουσίας εννοιών όπως είναι η αρετή και η δικαιοσύνη. Αυτά τα ερωτήματα παίρνουν συνήθως τη μορφή «τι είναι το χ;» ή «τι είναι χ;». Μπορεί στα πρώτα έργα του Πλάτωνα να προκύπτουν ζητήματα μεθόδου ως προς την απόκτηση της γνώσης της ουσίας των πραγμάτων αλλά δεν προτείνεται μια θεωρία της γνώσης ούτε φαίνεται να απασχολεί τον Πλάτωνα το πώς η γνώση γενικά αποκτάται. Ακόμα, ούτε ενδείξεις για το πως συνδέεται με άλλες λειτουργίες όπως είναι η αίσθηση, η σκέψη και η γνώμη έχουμε. Από τον Μένωνα και έπειτα, όμως, ο Πλάτων καταπιάνεται και με ερωτήματα σχετικά με την ίδια τη γνώση. Η εξέλιξη της σκέψης του προφανώς δημιουργεί την ανάγκη να απαντήσει στο πώς είναι δυνατόν να έχουμε γενικώς γνώση και πώς η γνώση συνδέεται με την αληθή γνώμη (ορθή δόξα). Αυτές οι ερωτήσεις επιδέχονται συστηματικής εξέτασης, στην οποία θα προβούμε όσο γίνεται περισσότερο στο παρόν κείμενο εστιάζοντας σε τρεις διαλόγους που προέρχονται από τις τρεις συγγραφικές περιόδους της πλατωνικής συγγραφής αντίστοιχα. Αυτοί είναι: ο Μένων που συγκαταλέγεται στα έργα της πρώιμης συγγραφικής περιόδου , η Πολιτεία που είναι ένα από τα έργα της μέσης περιόδου και ο Θεαίτητος που θεωρείται έργο της ύστερης συγγραφικής περιόδου του Πλάτωνα. Πρόθεση μας εδώ είναι να αναπτύξουμε όσο το δυνατόν πιο επαρκώς και ολοκληρωμένα τα επιχειρήματα του Πλάτωνα όσον αφορά στη γνώση και στην διάκριση της από την δόξα, που γίνεται σε αυτούς τους διαλόγους, να δούμε σταδιακά την εξέλιξη της σκέψης του όσον αφορά σε αυτά τα ζητήματα και να εξετάσουμε το κατά πόσο ο Πλάτων καταφέρνει να δώσει έναν ορισμό για τη γνώση. / Knowledge is considered by Plato as an important issue and preoccupies him from the very beggining of his philosophical career. In the earlier works however he does not refer to it directly but he is occupied with matters of method and knowledge of the essence of things, such as justice and beauty. The matter of knowledge is becoming more crucial from the Meno and afterwards where Plato grapples with questions considering the essence of knowledge as such. In this paper we are trying to follow Plato's thought from Meno to Theautetus regarding knowledge, focusing in the distinction between knowledge and belief.