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Texte remanié de: Diss.--Fachbereich Historisch-Philologische Wissenschaften--Göttingen--Georg-August-Universität, 1990. / Bibliogr. p. 377-382.

The aim of this master’s thesis is to investigate how Paul Feyerabend’s anarchistic theory of knowledge can help our understanding of bibliographical classification and to analyse how epistemological assumptions are manifested in bibliographic classification. Paul Feyerabend’s anarchistic theory of knowledge and science is the theoretical approach of this thesis. The first part of the thesis consists of an introduction to bibliographical classification and epistemology. The second part of the thesis focuses on certain epistemological positions, such as empiricism, rationalism, idealism, realism, pragmatism and positivism, and how these positions are manifested in classification. The implications of each epistemological position is analysed with Feyerabend’s theoretical framework. The third, and final part of the thesis, examines how bibliographical classification can be improved by a pluralistic and relativistic attitude towards epistemology and classification. The findings are that bibliographical classification is influenced by a number of different epistemologies and that they effect several different aspects of classification such as: 1) the method in which the system is constructed, 2) which classes or categories that are included in the system, 3) in what way the ‘subject’ or ‘content’ of a document is established, 4) how different forms of knowledge is treated and valued within the system, and 5) how the system is evaluated. Another finding is that no classification system, which is founded on epistemological positions, can be said to be neutral or objective, and that all such classifications are influenced by political, cultural and social presumptions. / Uppsatsnivå: D

The thesis puts more emphasis on Scientific methodology,discuss Philosopher of Science--Paul Feyerabend's thinking. It discusses if science is a rational statement or not and has some reflections on how we think of Scientific methodology. In this reserch we can make a conclusion that Paul Feyerabend think Science doesn't have a so-called position.What we called "Science" today also follow a normal methodology.He suggest that we should get rid of the normal methodology and support the scientists do their reserch freely by using suitalbe methodology so human beings can devolop more knowledge probability

Diss.--University of bristol, 1993. / Contient en annexe un choix de documents en moyen haut allemand. Bibliogr. p. [204]-227.

La inconmensurabilidad ha ocasionado innumerables controversias y debates. En estos parece ser unánime la interpretación de tal doctrina como una objeción contra la objetividad, el realismo y el progreso científico. Ahora bien, este marco hermenéutico es estrecho para poder comprender la intención de Paul Feyerabend al formular su doctrina de la inconmensurabilidad. Pues este no pretendió cuestionar nunca dichas nociones en cuanto tales sino únicamente mostrar cuán vano resulta ser el intento del neo-positivismo y del racionalismo popperiano por definirlas. En un sentido positivo sostenemos que la inconmensurabilidad en Paul Feyerabend impide o evita retomar, a la hora de definir aquellas nociones, las dialécticas propias del positivismo lógico o del racionalismo crítico. Nuestra intención en este trabajo es exponer su tesis de la inconmensurabilidad como un cuestionamiento a un modo particular de concebir la racionalidad científica y sus consecuentes nociones de objetividad, progreso y realismo científico

In a short dialogue, philosopher Paul Feyerabend made some remarks regarding the interpretation of Plato’s theory of writing in the Phaedrus, which boil down to the suggestion that written works are didactically valuable when having the right kind of resemblance to “live exchanges”, adding that Plato in this respect resembles modern philosophies of science. In the present thesis, I flesh out and vindicate Feyerabend’s suggestions by a thematic reading of Phaedrus 274c–278b and a subsequent comparison of the interpreted theory with a few relevant modern philosophies of science.  My reading focuses on Plato’s philosophical use of the words ζῆν ‘live’, εἴδωλον ‘idol/image/representation/eidōlon’ and παιδιά ‘play’. Through them I show how Plato constructs a three-tiered value ranking of didactic processes, with live exchanges as the best, traditional monographs in the style of Lysias’ written speech as the worst, and Plato’s own original conception of “playful” writing in the middle: “a kind of eidōlon” of a live exchange that nevertheless does not pretend to be the real thing. Plato’s three tiers correspond well to the modern distinction between everyday scientific work, scientific papers and the different suggestions for in-betweens, such as the one made by Peter Medawar or the one contained in the so-called strong programme of David Bloor. I also identify four characteristics of Plato’s theory, including its emphasis on imitative learning, the necessity of the prescribed didactics, non-propositionality and reflexivity, which are found in the modern philosophies of the just-mentioned authors, as well as in that of Ludwik Fleck.

Submitted by Cássia Santos (cassia.bcufg@gmail.com) on 2017-03-28T11:36:55Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Ari Simplício Soares Silva - 2016.pdf: 1854600 bytes, checksum: 1ca3f719220ae228bb96452792b89ea7 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2017-03-28T13:53:01Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Ari Simplício Soares Silva - 2016.pdf: 1854600 bytes, checksum: 1ca3f719220ae228bb96452792b89ea7 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-28T13:53:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Ari Simplício Soares Silva - 2016.pdf: 1854600 bytes, checksum: 1ca3f719220ae228bb96452792b89ea7 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The Austrian philosopher Paul K. Feyerabend, from his portrayal of the nature of science called Epistemological Anarchism, has become one of the most influential and controversial epistemologists of the last century. And, given the growing attention given to the contributions of epistemology to science teaching, a problem arises before us: that of the invisibility of feyerabend’s contributions to think about scientific education in the Brazilian context. Thus, we conducted a study of the Feyerabend works, seeking to relate its representation of science, education and science teaching. To better understand the reasons for this invisibility, in the light of Roger Chartier theoretical framework, we have developed a study on the struggle of representations about the nature of science and its implications for scientific education. / O filósofo austríaco Paul K. Feyerabend, a partir de sua representação acerca da natureza da ciência denominada Anarquismo Epistemológico, transformou-se num dos mais influentes e polêmicos epistemólogos do século passado. E, tendo em vista a crescente atenção dada às contribuições da epistemologia para com o ensino de ciências, surge diante de nós um problema: o da invisibilidade das contribuições feyerabendianas para se pensar a educação científica no contexto brasileiro. Sendo assim, realizamos um estudo da obra feyerabendiana, buscando relacionar sua representação da ciência, a educação e o ensino de ciências. Para melhor compreender os motivos dessa invisibilidade, sob a luz do referencial teórico de Roger Chartier, desenvolvemos um estudo sobre a luta de representações acerca da natureza da ciência e suas implicações para a educação científica.

De 1913 à 1916, le psychiatre suisse C. G. Jung (1875-1961) vit des visions intenses qu’il décide de noter au brouillon dans les Cahiers noirs, puis au propre dans un codex moyenâgeux, calligraphié et peint, appelé Liber novus (1915-1930). Jung n’en achève jamais l’écriture et ne le publie pas mais témoigne à plusieurs reprises de son importance dans l’élaboration de ses connaissances sur la psyché. Il est publié en 2009 en allemand et anglais, et en 2011 en français sous le titre Le Livre Rouge. Notre travail consiste en l’analyse épistémologique de l’expérience de Jung, de la création du Livre Rouge et de son utilisation dans sa carrière, à travers le prisme d’outils épistémologiques variés dont les thèses de Paul Karl Feyerabend (1924-1994), tenant de l’anarchisme épistémologique. Nous tentons ainsi d’expliquer et de comprendre une science qui se crée. / From 1913 to 1916, the Swiss psychiatrist C. G. Jung (1875-1961) lived intense visions that he decided to note in drafts in the Black Books, then in a medieval codex, calligraphied and painted, called Liber novus (1915-1930). Jung never finished its writing and did not publish it but he testified at several times its importance in the development of his knowledge about the psyche. The book is published in 2009 in German and English and in 2011 in French under the title The Red Book. Our work consists of the epistemological analysis ot Jung’s experience of The Red Book’s creation and its use in his career, through the various epistemological tools, including the theories of Paul Karl Feyerabend (1924-1994), creator of the epistemological anarchism. We try to explain and understand a science that is being create.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2015-05-28T14:32:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Luiz Davi Mazzei .pdf: 793792 bytes, checksum: 4b2e144e136353e4c3ab7238c81cbe9f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-28T14:32:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luiz Davi Mazzei .pdf: 793792 bytes, checksum: 4b2e144e136353e4c3ab7238c81cbe9f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Nenhuma / Esta tese analisa a posição de dois filósofos, Paul Feyerabend e Marcelo Dascal, representativos do pensamento filosófico ocidental do final do século XX e início do século XXI, sobre a racionalidade. A questão da racionalidade é tema recorrente na filosofia da ciência, desde Aristóteles até os filósofos contemporâneos. Paul Feyerabend faz críticas à ideia de uma racionalidade única e, especialmente, ao racionalismo crítico como a versão mais recente dos racionalismos subjacentes à concepção de ciência. Marcelo Dascal também critica a ideia de que haja uma única forma de racionalidade da ciência. Embora ambos critiquem o racionalismo, exibem uma divergência marcante: enquanto Feyerabend, em sua critica desfralda a bandeira do irracionalismo em oposição ao racionalismo, Dascal amplia o entendimento de racionalidade, distinguindo duas racionalidades: a ideia da racionalidade como tradicionalmente entendida, baseada na demonstração – denominada por ele racionalidade hard– e a ideia de racionalidade que dá conta do provável, do possível e de nossas escolhas entre alternativas – a racionalidade soft.A última dá suporte à sua teoria das controvérsias (que inclui a tipologia: ‘discussão’, ‘disputa’ e ‘controvérsia’), vista por Dascal como motor do desenvolvimento científico. A tese proposta é a de que se Feyerabend houvesse conhecido o conceito de racionalidade soft de Dascal, poderia não ter recorrido ao irracionalismo e tampouco teria ficado preso à dicotomia racionalidade hard-irracionalidade, tendo sido ele um crítico das dicotomias, assim como Dascal o é. Em apoio à tese proposta, examinam-se os argumentos dos filósofos em torno a pontos temáticos centrais, reconhecendo como possível um debate imaginário entre os dois filósofos, sob a forma de uma controvérsia. A análise desses argumentos parte das críticas que ambos fazem ao racionalismo e as implicações dessa crítica para a visão de ciência de cada filósofo. As interações polêmicas (‘discussão’, ‘disputa’ e ‘controvérsia’) de Dascal e as ‘trocas abertas’ e ‘trocas fechadas’ de Feyerabend revelam pontos de uma plataforma comum de análise. As trocas guiadas, tal como as discussões, se desenvolvem a partir do compartilhamento de pressupostos e da adoção, em comum acordo, das regras que irão orientar o debate. As trocas abertas, assim como as controvérsias, permitem a exploração de alternativas, as regras não são fixadas a priori, mas vão se construindo ao longo do debate. O contexto tem influencia nesse tipo de interação ao mesmo tempo em que é influenciado por ela. O modelo das controvérsias ou das trocas abertas apoia-se em uma posição filosófica pragmática, fugindo das conotações geralmente atribuídas a essa posição e tem implicações éticas que transcendem o âmbito da ciência. Esse modelo baseia-se em um modelo dialético novo, em uma dialética da tolerância, aberta à exploração de alternativas e pautada no respeito ao outro, à sua capacidade cognitiva e de deliberação para realizar um empreendimento comum. / This thesis analyses the arguments on Rationality of two philosophers, Paul Feyerabend and Marcelo Dascal, who represent ideas of western philosophy in the late 20th century and beginning of the 21th century. The argument of Rationality has been a recurrent idea regarding the Philosophy of Science, from Aristotle up to current date. On his work, Paul Feyerabend criticizes both concepts of a single rationality and the critical rationality as a contemporary version of the rationalities underlying the conception of science. As Paul Feyerabend, Marcelo Dascal also criticizes the notion of the existence of a single idea for science rationalism, but both of them diverge. While Feyerabend defends the idea of irrationalism as opposed to rationalism, Dascal expands the understanding of rationality, distinguishing two modes: the traditional, based on demonstration, called hard rationality and the idea of rationality based on the probable, and our choices between both alternatives, called soft rationality. The latter supports of his theory of controversies (including the typology: ‘discussion’, ‘dispute’ and ‘controversy’), is seen by Dascal as the engine of scientific development. The thesis proposes that, if Feyerabend have had known the concept of Dascal’s soft rationality, he might not have had to resort to irrationalism and would not have been stuck to the dichotomy of the hard rationality - irrationality. In support of the thesis, the central themes from the arguments of both philosophers are examined, recognizing a possible imaginary debate between them, under the shape of a controversy. The analysis of the arguments is based on their critique of rationalism and their implications to a vision of science. Dascal’s interactions (‘discussion’, ‘dispute’ and ‘controversy’) and Feyerabend’s ‘open exchange’ and ‘closed exchange’ reveals a common platform for analysis. The exchanges, as well as discussions, develop based on sharing the assumptions and rules that oriented the debate. The open exchanges, as well as the controversies, allowed the exploration of alternatives, the rules were not a priori, but evolved with the debate. The context influenced that type of interaction andwas also influenced by it. The controversy model or the open exchanges model is based on a pragmatic philosophy, avoiding the usual notions attached to this position and implies ethics that are beyond the realms of science. This model is based on a new dialectic, on dialectic of tolerance and it opens to explore alternatives based on respect and common understanding.