This paper defends the claim that videogame playing interaction (VGI) is a distinctive kind of interaction compared with other interactive practices. This claim is not grounded in the fact that videogame playing is a digital experience, nor the claim that videogame playing is a video example of gameplay, but rather in two unique characteristics of videogame playing experiences: the controlled identity of players and the temporal continuity. In my view, both Aaron Smuts (2009) and Dominic Lopes (2001)’s theories on interactivity have omitted to discuss these issues sufficiently. By distinguishing between three kinds of interactions according to involved participants and ranking them in the order from weakest to strongest we find: i) interactions between humans and interactive objects, ii) interactions between humans, iii) videogame playing interactions (VGI). In this paper I reflect on the theoretical framework of interactivity and forecast that the strongest form of interaction should be the interaction between human and artificial intelligence supported by technical devices in which human interactors lose overall authority of the continuous interaction.

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This paper argues for the counter intuitive notion that some prejudice is morally justified. The argument is divided up into three parts: (1) what prejudice is, (2) the role of epistemology and (3) the final moral argument. The first section initially establishes a working definition which allows prejudice to be justified epistemically. The section then continues to demonstrate how prejudice has the logical structure of generic statements and facilitates a more generous view of prejudice and what it often expresses. The first section is concluded by explaining how prejudice is a result of the cognitive process called categorization, and how this cognitive process is inevitable and necessary. The second section addresses relevant epistemology, especially how belief comes to be epistemically justified. The papers argue for the notion of two different thresholds: justified belief and acceptance. This conception of epistemically justified belief is then connected to morality through Rosen’s following principle: “When X does A out of innocent ignorance, then X is guilt-free in that he did A, assuming that A would have been a guilt-free act if things were as X thought.” This bridge thereby allows prejudice to be morally justified through epistemic justification. The last section of the paper presents examples of prejudice and analyzes them by using the premises from the first two first sections. If epistemically justified belief necessarily generates moral justification, these examples illustrate prejudice which is morally justified. Two objections against this conclusion are then addressed. The first objection concerns the types of prejudice illustrated in the examples, and questions whether they really are prejudices. This objection is refuted by referencing the working definition of prejudice. The second objection concerns the harm prejudice impose on society on a larger level. Two versions of this objection are addressed and refuted.

Syftet med detta examensarbete var att undersöka hur islam och muslimer framställdes isvensk nyhetsmedia i samband med Rasmus Paludans provokativa manifestationer, vilka ägderum i Sverige mellan år 2020–2022. Till följd av dessa manifestationer bröt våldsammaupplopp ut på olika platser i Sverige, vilka kallas påskupploppen. Vidare undersöker studienhur dessa framställningar i media påverkar svenskfödda eller förstärker redan förekommandefördomar och stereotyper. Det empiriska material som ligger till grund för studien är artiklarsamt intervjuer, detta för att arbetet inte skulle bli för stort. Metoden som tillämpats i studienhar varit en kvalitativ metod, det vill säga textanalys samt intervjuer. Diskursteorin är detteoretiska ramverk som ligger till grund för studiens genomförande. Resultatet visar att mediai regel har stor påverkan på den sociala strukturen i samhället, medias framställningarförstärker svenskföddas fördomar och stereotypa bilder gentemot muslimer. Media har sedantidigare kritiserats för att påverka perspektiv och föreställningar i samhället, nyhetsmediamåste därför bli mer nyanserad i sin framställning. Slutsatsen är således att mediasframställningar upprätthåller ett perspektiv som kan skapa ett utanförskap genom ett ”vi” och”de”-förhållningssätt.

The aim of this thesis is to characterize and discuss two kinds of influences on the outcome of a toxicological risk assessment. One kind of influence has to do with values and the role played by value-based judgment. Currently, many toxicological risk assessments are characterized by scientific uncertainties. When this is the case, risk assessors are to some extent dependent on assumptions and judgment, and this has consequences for the outcome of the assessment. Another other kind of influence comes from the quality and accuracy of the empirical studies that risk assessments are based on. If toxicological research and testing are affected by systematic errors (bias), this will influence the ensuing risk assessment. In order to improve toxicological risk assessments work must be done both on understanding and dealing with the impact of values and on getting better and more efficient methods for gathering facts. The two papers that make up this licentiate thesis may be seen as a contribution to each of these objectives. Article 1: Values in science and risk assessment It is a widely accepted claim that scientific practice contains valuejudgments, i.e. decisions made on the basis of values. This paper clarifies the concepts involved in this claim and explains its implications for risk assessment. It is explained why values are necessarily a part of science and of risk assessment. A certain type of values that contribute to the aim of science, so-called epistemic values, are identified as rationally justified as basis for judgment in science. It is argued that the aims of pure science and risk assessment differ in some aspects and that consequently pure science’s epistemic values are not sufficient for risk assessment. I suggest how the epistemic values may be supplemented in order to align better with the aim of risk assessment. Article 2: Bias in toxicology In this article, the potential for bias in toxicological research and in the performance of standardized toxicological testing in discussed. Due to the lack of empirical studies of bias in toxicology, very little is known aboutits prevalence and impact. Areas to consider for such studies are pointed out, and it is suggested that such investigations should be given priority. / QC 20101119

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Hannah Arendt has been widely criticized for conceiving a theory of action and the public realm as devoid of any ethical restraints. This paper suggests that such criticism, as well as proponents of Arendt’s theory, fails to deal with her theory on its own terms and argue that her own notion of manifesting principles as the purpose of action, provides an account of political action that is ethically oriented towards our common world. Although such an account does not determine the rectitude of political judgement nor direct action towards ethically preconceived goals, it distinguishes political from practical reasoning as a distinct sphere of normativity that accords with the necessary conditions of Arendt’s theory of action. This paper suggests that the necessary conditions for a valid notion of action and thus a valid political normativity are (1): the performativity of action, (2): the autonomy of action and (3): action as the generative source of our common world. This paper concludes by suggesting that a proper critique or defence of Arendt’s theory of action should proceed by first engaging with the relationship between her notion of principles and the necessary conditions of a political normativity. Such an endeavor would refrain from shackling action according to the precepts of moral philosophy that either deny or downplay the importance of these conditions.

In this paper, I present a cognitive account of aesthetic character of landscape. I develop this in response to Emily Brady, who coined the term to refer to the aesthetic individuality of a landscape, which she argues we ought to conserve. She presents a non-cognitive understanding of aesthetic character, which I argue is flawed on the grounds that it does in fact rely on the perceiver calling on particular knowledge to grasp aesthetic character, fails to explain cases in which aesthetic character is determined by nonperceptual properties and finally does not make a principled distinction between properties that are relevant to aesthetic character and that are not. I argue that a cognitive understanding of aesthetic character does not fail on these accounts. First, it allows us to rely on knowledge to make salient properties relevant to aesthetic character, both for ourselves and reach agreement with others on what a particular landscape’s aesthetic character is like. Second, it accounts for those cases in which aesthetic character is determined by nonperceptual properties, as we access them by knowing about them. Finally, I demonstrate how this cognitive account of aesthetic character works much better in the practical context of landscape conservation.

How do letters differ from other letters, or other symbols? Is it the shape, sound, or use? The metaphysicality and ontology of words has been discussed extensively, but the discussion about letters is far from being conclusive. Due to this I will, by bringing forth a background on words, discuss letters’ origins and metaphysical distinction.  I will examine a Platonist proposal of words, and then theories about shape, sound, meaning and origin. Nurbay Irmak opposes said theories and instead means that it is history that makes words ontologically distinct, which J.T.M. Miller disagrees with. I apply all these theories on the metaphysicality of letters and symbols and explain why they do not work for symbols either. Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore have previously discussed symbols and sign systems, and I will use their conclusions to strengthen my arguments. Lastly, I will argue for and against three of my own theories: Relation, Equivalence and Context. The point of this essay is to examine the metaphysicality of letters and symbols. What is it that makes symbols metaphysically distinct?