It is not uncommon to place universal human rights and Sharia against each other and assumethey are inherently different. However, this essay explores the alignment of Sharia anduniversal human rights, with a focus on Saudi Arabia and Iran which are governed by Sharia.A literature review is utilized when examining the theories and thoughts of scholars AbdullahiAhmed An-Na'im and Asma Barlas. These theories are then placed on the context of Sharia inSaudi Arabia and Iran, and the alignment and misalignment with universal human rights willbe examined.The theoretical framework of the essay is based on universalism and open universalism thathave worked as tools in understanding human rights as a universal foundation. The findingsindicate that the compatibility of Sharia with universal human rights standards is heavilydependent on how Sharia is interpreted. To better extract human rights out of Sharia, areinterpretation of Sharia is necessary. This reinterpretation would allow for the reevaluationof the Qur’anic scriptures that are consistent with the values and demands of the present age.This is not to say that Sharia needs to be bended and chipped away at to fit in with modernhuman rights standards, rather Sharia needs to be reinterpreted as the traditionalinterpretations are heavily influenced by the patriarchal social structures of the seventhcentury.

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This is an essay that compares the epistemological theories of skepticism and foundationalism in two different ways. The first comparison is to look at the logic behind both theories. Skepticism is a theoretically strong theory, that presents counter arguments towards any theory positioning itself as positive. We’ll also look at foundationalism, and the rationale of assuming foundational propositions for knowledge. Despite it being difficult to defend against the arguments of skepticism, it seems to be close to what we perceive knowledge to be in everyday situations. Skepticism as a theory does not allow us to know. But within it can still be built a theory about something else, close to knowledge, that can be achieved. Foundationalism, as well, does not allow for knowledge with total certainty. The common rationale between both theories seems to be some sort of fallibilism — an uncertainty about knowledge. However, foundationalism and skepticism seem to have opposite functions in our quest for sharpening our theory of knowledge. Skepticism acts as an ideal, a counter argument that constantly challenges every theory about what knowledge is, demanding to be defeated. Foundationalism acts as a grounding force, challenging our theories of knowledge to stay somewhat close to what has generally considered to be the action of knowing.

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This paper aims to explore the phenomena of “fake news” and to see what kind of threat that it poses – mainly focused on epistemic damage. It will also explore different measures that can be taken in order to lessen this effect. In order to discuss the term, one must begin exploring it as not being a new phenomenon but also see what effect the introduction of digital social media platforms has had on the spread and damage caused. The paper also discusses what can be regarded as a trusted source of knowledge by covering the assurance theory of testimony and how it fits in an online context. If one can trust information based on a person stepping in as a guarantee for the knowledge – when can they be said to have done this?The paper will also cover the popularisation of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-generative tools that can help create falsified images, video and audio content that can be claimed to be evidence and how this has a negative effect as an epistemic threat. The conclusion of this paper is that a more level-headed approach, applying some form of common sense, to sharing and evaluating information being news is the best approach to counter the epistemic harm that otherwise can be caused by fake news. This could be done by starting to value ones’ view of themselves as part of the chain of testimony and to cultivate the trust that others put in them.

This paper examines the relationship between literature and philosophy, with special regards to how literature can contribute to deepen the understanding in philosophical matters. This is executed by a comparison between how a work of fiction, versus works of philosophy, can tackle the issue of personhood. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is being compared with philosopher Lynne Rudder Baker’s Persons and Bodies and Jacques Maritain’s The Person and the Common Good in order to map out how literature can contribute to the philosophical discourse regarding personhood. The paper finalizes that the main character in Frankenstein, “the monster” displays several issues that may show up when trying to define what it means to be a person, and where the line is to be drawn between a person and a non-person. The paper thus serves a two-folded purpose: to expand and challenge the traditional philosophical methodology, and find new understanding within the subject of personhood.

Using the events in Sweden in the autumn of 2015 as a practical example, this paper examines the question of whether there are circumstances when it is morally permissible for rich, democratic states to close their borders to asylum-seekers. To lay a common ground, the author starts by looking at the right of asylum-seekers, who a refugee is, and what obligations a host country have towards them. Thus, after looking at general human rights, and how they apply to the right to seek asylum, the author turns to the question of who a refugee is, and the difference between refugees according to the 1951 Geneva Convention, and people who are in need of subsidiary protection, before choosing to use UNHCR’s wider definition of a refugee. While acknowledging that refugees have specific rights that other persons in need of protection do not, all asylum-seekers are entitled to not be sent back to a place of danger (which is the principle of non-refoulement). Though both groups are entitled to stay on in the country, the temporary status for those in need of subsidiary protection raises some questions about integration and their standing in society and therefore the question of membership rights is discussed before the author returns to the events in Sweden in 2015 and argues that there are circumstances when it is morally acceptable for a country to close its borders to refugees, but that there are limitations when this can be done and for how long. Finally, it is argued that a system that prevents countries from having to – or choosing to – close their borders to refugees is needed. The author discusses whether the grounds for such a system could be found in the work that UNHCR does, and if the DAC agreement can be used as a model for fair distribution.

Den här uppsatsen kommer att behandla fenomenet moralisk slump (moral luck). Uppsatsen är till största del av undersökande karaktär och till dels av argumenterande karaktär. Uppsatsen huvudfrågor är vad moralisk slump är för någonting, vad det finns för olika typer av respons kring problemet med moralisk slump och slutligen vad jag anser är den mest trovärdiga lösningen på problemet med moralisk slump. Uppsatsen utgångspunkt ligger I Nagels och Williams berömda artiklar som anses vara startskottet för den moderna debatten angående moralisk slump, även om området i sig har diskuterats sen länge. Utifrån detta undersöks flera olika teorier i detalj som fungerar som svar på framför allt den utmaning som Nagel målade upp i sin artikel. Svaren som redogörs för kan kategoriseras i två breda kategorier, de som förnekar att slumpen kan orsaka en moralisk skillnad och de som accepterar slumpens betydelse för moral.

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