<p>The subject of this thesis is <i>formal axiology</i>, i.e., the discipline that deals with structural and conceptual questions about value. The main focus is on <i>intrinsic</i> or <i>final</i> value. The thesis consists of an introduction and six free-standing essays. The purpose of the introduction is to give a general background to the discussions in the essays. The introduction is divided into five sections. Section 1 outlines the subject matter and sketches the methodological framework. Section 2 discusses the supervenience of value, and how my use of that notion squares with the broader methodological framework. Section 3 defends the concept of intrinsic or final value. Section 4 discusses issues in value typology; particularly how intrinsic value relates to final value. Section 5 summarises the essays and provides some specific backgrounds to their respective themes.</p><p>The six essays are thematically divided into four categories: The first two deal with specific issues concerning analyses of value. Essay 1 is a comparative discussion of competing approaches in this area. Essay 2 discusses, and proposes a solution to, a significant problem for the so called ‘buck-passing’ analysis of value. Essay 3 discusses the ontological nature of the bearers of final value, and defends the view that they are particularised properties, or <i>tropes</i>. Essay 4 defends <i>conditionalism</i> about final value, i.e., the idea that final value may vary according to context. The last two essays focus on some implications of the formal axiological discussion for normative theory: Essay 5 discusses the charge that the buck-passing analysis prematurely resolves the debate between consequentialism and deontology; essay 6 suggests that conditionalism makes possible a reconciliation between consequentialism and moral particularism. </p>

The subject of this thesis is formal axiology, i.e., the discipline that deals with structural and conceptual questions about value. The main focus is on intrinsic or final value. The thesis consists of an introduction and six free-standing essays. The purpose of the introduction is to give a general background to the discussions in the essays. The introduction is divided into five sections. Section 1 outlines the subject matter and sketches the methodological framework. Section 2 discusses the supervenience of value, and how my use of that notion squares with the broader methodological framework. Section 3 defends the concept of intrinsic or final value. Section 4 discusses issues in value typology; particularly how intrinsic value relates to final value. Section 5 summarises the essays and provides some specific backgrounds to their respective themes. The six essays are thematically divided into four categories: The first two deal with specific issues concerning analyses of value. Essay 1 is a comparative discussion of competing approaches in this area. Essay 2 discusses, and proposes a solution to, a significant problem for the so called ‘buck-passing’ analysis of value. Essay 3 discusses the ontological nature of the bearers of final value, and defends the view that they are particularised properties, or tropes. Essay 4 defends conditionalism about final value, i.e., the idea that final value may vary according to context. The last two essays focus on some implications of the formal axiological discussion for normative theory: Essay 5 discusses the charge that the buck-passing analysis prematurely resolves the debate between consequentialism and deontology; essay 6 suggests that conditionalism makes possible a reconciliation between consequentialism and moral particularism.

In this thesis the performances of different approximations are compared for a standard actuarial and financial problem: the estimation of quantiles and conditional tail expectations of the final value of a series of discrete cash flows. To calculate the risk measures such as quantiles and Conditional Tail Expectations, one needs the distribution function of the final wealth. The final value of a series of discrete payments in the considered model is the sum of dependent lognormal random variables. Unfortunately, its distribution function cannot be determined analytically. Thus usually one has to use time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations. Computational time still remains a serious drawback of Monte Carlo simulations, thus several analytical techniques for approximating the distribution function of final wealth are proposed in the frame of this thesis. These are the widely used moment-matching approximations and innovative comonotonic approximations. Moment-matching methods approximate the unknown distribution function by a given one in such a way that some characteristics (in the present case the first two moments) coincide. The ideas of two well-known approximations are described briefly. Analytical formulas for valuing quantiles and Conditional Tail Expectations are derived for both approximations. Recently, a large group of scientists from Catholic University Leuven in Belgium has derived comonotonic upper and comonotonic lower bounds for sums of dependent lognormal random variables. These bounds are bounds in the terms of "convex order". In order to provide the theoretical background for comonotonic approximations several fundamental ordering concepts such as stochastic dominance, stop-loss and convex order and some important relations between them are introduced. The last two concepts are closely related. Both stochastic orders express which of two random variables is the "less dangerous/more attractive" one. The central idea of comonotonic upper bound approximation is to replace the original sum, presenting final wealth, by a new sum, for which the components have the same marginal distributions as the components in the original sum, but with "more dangerous/less attractive" dependence structure. The upper bound, or saying mathematically, convex largest sum is obtained when the components of the sum are the components of comonotonic random vector. Therefore, fundamental concepts of comonotonicity theory which are important for the derivation of convex bounds are introduced. The most wide-spread examples of comonotonicity which emerge in financial context are described. In addition to the upper bound a lower bound can be derived as well. This provides one with a measure of the reliability of the upper bound. The lower bound approach is based on the technique of conditioning. It is obtained by applying Jensen's inequality for conditional expectations to the original sum of dependent random variables. Two slightly different version of conditioning random variable are considered in the context of this thesis. They give rise to two different approaches which are referred to as comonotonic lower bound and comonotonic "maximal variance" lower bound approaches. Special attention is given to the class of distortion risk measures. It is shown that the quantile risk measure as well as Conditional Tail Expectation (under some additional conditions) belong to this class. It is proved that both risk measures being under consideration are additive for a sum of comonotonic random variables, i.e. quantile and Conditional Tail Expectation for a comonotonic upper and lower bounds can easily be obtained by summing the corresponding risk measures of the marginals involved. A special subclass of distortion risk measures which is referred to as class of concave distortion risk measures is also under consideration. It is shown that quantile risk measure is not a concave distortion risk measure while Conditional Tail Expectation (under some additional conditions) is a concave distortion risk measure. A theoretical justification for the fact that "concave" Conditional Tail Expectation preserves convex order relation between random variables is given. It is shown that this property does not necessarily hold for the quantile risk measure, as it is not a concave risk measure. Finally, the accuracy and efficiency of two moment-matching, comonotonic upper bound, comonotonic lower bound and "maximal variance" lower bound approximations are examined for a wide range of parameters by comparing with the results obtained by Monte Carlo simulation. It is justified by numerical results that, generally, in the current situation lower bound approach outperforms other methods. Moreover, the preservation of convex order relation between the convex bounds for the final wealth by Conditional Tail Expectation is demonstrated by numerical results. It is justified numerically that this property does not necessarily hold true for the quantile.

In this thesis the performances of different approximations are compared for a standard actuarial and financial problem: the estimation of quantiles and conditional tail expectations of the final value of a series of discrete cash flows. To calculate the risk measures such as quantiles and Conditional Tail Expectations, one needs the distribution function of the final wealth. The final value of a series of discrete payments in the considered model is the sum of dependent lognormal random variables. Unfortunately, its distribution function cannot be determined analytically. Thus usually one has to use time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations. Computational time still remains a serious drawback of Monte Carlo simulations, thus several analytical techniques for approximating the distribution function of final wealth are proposed in the frame of this thesis. These are the widely used moment-matching approximations and innovative comonotonic approximations. Moment-matching methods approximate the unknown distribution function by a given one in such a way that some characteristics (in the present case the first two moments) coincide. The ideas of two well-known approximations are described briefly. Analytical formulas for valuing quantiles and Conditional Tail Expectations are derived for both approximations. Recently, a large group of scientists from Catholic University Leuven in Belgium has derived comonotonic upper and comonotonic lower bounds for sums of dependent lognormal random variables. These bounds are bounds in the terms of "convex order". In order to provide the theoretical background for comonotonic approximations several fundamental ordering concepts such as stochastic dominance, stop-loss and convex order and some important relations between them are introduced. The last two concepts are closely related. Both stochastic orders express which of two random variables is the "less dangerous/more attractive" one. The central idea of comonotonic upper bound approximation is to replace the original sum, presenting final wealth, by a new sum, for which the components have the same marginal distributions as the components in the original sum, but with "more dangerous/less attractive" dependence structure. The upper bound, or saying mathematically, convex largest sum is obtained when the components of the sum are the components of comonotonic random vector. Therefore, fundamental concepts of comonotonicity theory which are important for the derivation of convex bounds are introduced. The most wide-spread examples of comonotonicity which emerge in financial context are described. In addition to the upper bound a lower bound can be derived as well. This provides one with a measure of the reliability of the upper bound. The lower bound approach is based on the technique of conditioning. It is obtained by applying Jensen's inequality for conditional expectations to the original sum of dependent random variables. Two slightly different version of conditioning random variable are considered in the context of this thesis. They give rise to two different approaches which are referred to as comonotonic lower bound and comonotonic "maximal variance" lower bound approaches. Special attention is given to the class of distortion risk measures. It is shown that the quantile risk measure as well as Conditional Tail Expectation (under some additional conditions) belong to this class. It is proved that both risk measures being under consideration are additive for a sum of comonotonic random variables, i.e. quantile and Conditional Tail Expectation for a comonotonic upper and lower bounds can easily be obtained by summing the corresponding risk measures of the marginals involved. A special subclass of distortion risk measures which is referred to as class of concave distortion risk measures is also under consideration. It is shown that quantile risk measure is not a concave distortion risk measure while Conditional Tail Expectation (under some additional conditions) is a concave distortion risk measure. A theoretical justification for the fact that "concave" Conditional Tail Expectation preserves convex order relation between random variables is given. It is shown that this property does not necessarily hold for the quantile risk measure, as it is not a concave risk measure. Finally, the accuracy and efficiency of two moment-matching, comonotonic upper bound, comonotonic lower bound and "maximal variance" lower bound approximations are examined for a wide range of parameters by comparing with the results obtained by Monte Carlo simulation. It is justified by numerical results that, generally, in the current situation lower bound approach outperforms other methods. Moreover, the preservation of convex order relation between the convex bounds for the final wealth by Conditional Tail Expectation is demonstrated by numerical results. It is justified numerically that this property does not necessarily hold true for the quantile.

<p>The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature-considerism (AN) and non-analogy-based nature-considerism (NN). I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former.</p><p>The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show (i) that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and (ii) that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of (i) its unique complexity, and (ii) its indispensability (to all moral agents). I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them.</p><p>Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region.</p>

The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature-considerism (AN) and non-analogy-based nature-considerism (NN). I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former. The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show (i) that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and (ii) that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of (i) its unique complexity, and (ii) its indispensability (to all moral agents). I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them. Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region.

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