A proposta da tese é explorar como a interação entre abertura política, redemocratização e mudança no contrato social contribuíram para o aumento do tamanho do governo e do gasto no Brasil. Dessa forma, a tese sugere a persistência de um padrão de política fiscal que prevaleceu após a Constituição Federal de 1988, encontrado no governo central e nos governos subnacionais, cujo padrão é formado por: i) pressão pelo aumento do tamanho do governo; ii) crescimento da despesa corrente em relação ao investimento; iii) comportamento pró-cíclico do gasto e presença do efeito voracidade. A hipótese explorada na tese é que o padrão de política fiscal possui como origem o equilíbrio que emergiu com a abertura política e a redemocratização na década de 1980, onde foram incorporadas as demandas por bens públicos (educação, saúde, proteção social, por exemplo) e a maior ênfase pelas políticas redistributivas, oriundas do aprofundamento da democracia e da presença do sufrágio universal. Ao mesmo tempo, o equilíbrio sugere a necessidade de acomodar os grupos de interesse (elites empresariais e do funcionalismo público, por exemplo) que aparelham o estado e buscam defender e ampliar seus privilégios, especialmente em relação aos benefícios tributários, acesso aos recursos orçamentários e prioridade no direcionamento do gasto do governo. Assim, a viabilidade do equilíbrio depende do crescimento do tamanho do governo que serve para minimizar os conflitos entre grupos de interesse, também preservar a paz social e a estabilidade política. No entanto, o equilíbrio contribui para fortalecer a percepção de ilusão fiscal sobre as limitações e as restrições de curto e longo prazo que a política fiscal está submetida, eclipsando como são distribuídos os custos e os benefícios das ações do governo. A contribuição da tese é aprofundar a discussão sobre como o funcionamento de uma democracia iliberal (nova democracia ou democracia não consolidada) e a alteração no contrato social em um ambiente de instituições frágeis são capazes de influir sobre o tamanho do governo e o comportamento do gasto no curto e longo prazo. Além disso, a tese busca explorar quais seriam os problemas fiscais, as potenciais fragilidades, os canais e mecanismos de transmissão que relacionam uma democracia não consolidada e os problemas fiscais, tomando como estudo de caso a experiência brasileira. / The main objective of this thesis is to explore the interaction between the democratization process and change of social contract on government size and public spending in Brazil. The hypothesis of the thesis is the persistence of a fiscal policy pattern, present in both central government and subnational governments, composed of the following characteristics: i) increased pressure for increasing government size; ii) growth of current expenditure in relation to investment; and iii) procyclical and voracity effect. This fiscal policy pattern has its origin in the democratization process in the 1980s, with demands of society for public goods (education, health, social security, for example) and redistribution policies, stemming from the deepening of democracy and the presence of universal suffrage. Alongside, the emerging equilibrium suggests the need to accommodate interest groups (business elites and civil servant, for example) that equip the state and seek to defend and expand their privileges, especially in relation to tax benefits, access to budgetary resources and defense of priority in spending. So, the viability of this balance depends on the growth of government size that serves to minimize conflicts between interest groups, also preserving social and politics stability. However, the equilibrium contributes to strengthening the fiscal illusion about the short and long-term limitation of the budget and fiscal policy. The contribution of the thesis is to deepen the discussion about how the functioning of an illiberal democracy (or new democracy) and the change in the social contract in an environment of weak institutions can influence government size and the behavior of spending in the short and long term. In addition, the thesis seeks to explore what the fiscal problems, potential weaknesses and channels of transmission that relate to illiberal democracy and fiscal problems are, taking Brazil as a case study.

Esta pesquisa busca analisar as dinâmicas espaciais a partir de conceitos e concepções oriundos da Geografia e das Ciências Jurídicas. Discutir a parcela de autonomia que é atribuída aos Municípios dentro do federalismo fiscal à luz do período atual. A forma como se organiza a federação brasileira constitui um arranjo político e fiscal que confere a cada ente autonomia, característica essa que produz no território consequências positivas e negativas. O federalismo brasileiro possui uma trajetória de avanços e retrocessos em um movimento pendular, ora um modelo de Estado mais centralizador, ora um modelo mais descentralizado. Com o advento da Constituição Federal de 1988 houve um novo ciclo de descentralização em que os municípios são reconhecidos como entes federados autônomos recebendo parcela constitucional de competência para instituir e cobrar tributos. Essa possibilidade assume características específicas causando distorções como as trazidas pela guerra fiscal municipal. Os conflitos e as tensões no âmbito fiscal têm suas repercussões e efeitos nas mais diversas dimensões, entre elas no território. O federalismo fiscal surge na guerra fiscal como um componente eminentemente territorial, a compreensão dessa dinâmica e as suas nuances no território constitui o nosso objetivo. / This research seeks to analyze the spatial dynamics using concepts and ideas resulting from the Geography and Legal Sciences and discuss the amount of autonomy that is allocated to the municipalities within the fiscal federalism in the light of the current period. The way it organizes the Brazilian federation is a political and fiscal arrangement that gives each entity autonomy, a characteristic that produces negative and positive consequences in the territory. Brazilian federalism has a path of progress and setbacks in a pendulum motion, or in a more centralized state model, or in a more decentralized model. With the advent of the Federal Constitution of 1988 there was a new decentralization cycle in which municipalities are recognized as autonomous entities receiving federal constitutional portion of the power to impose and collect taxes. This possibility takes on specific characteristics causing distortions as brought by the municipal tax war. Conflicts and tensions in the tax field have its repercussions and effects on several dimensions, including in the territory. Fiscal Federalism arises in the fiscal war as an eminently territorial component, understanding this dynamic and its nuances in the territory is our goal.

A federação é uma forma de Estado adotada modernamente por mais de trinta Países, e consiste numa divisão territorial do poder entre um governo central e governos locais. No Brasil, esta divisão contempla um poder local-estadual e um poder local-municipal. A federação é assimétrica quando aos entes de mesmo nível (local-estadual ou local-municipal) são atribuídos diferentes regimes jurídicos, para compensar ou equilibrar suas diversidades. O chamado federalismo fiscal estuda as receitas e despesas dos entes que integram um Estado federal. No Brasil, sempre se adotou a simetria entre os municípios. Após a análise da posição do município brasileiro na questão fiscal (receitas, encargos e formas de redistribuição de recursos), identificam-se quatro pontos passíveis de mudança normativa, para seu aperfeiçoamento: brecha vertical, guerra fiscal, critérios para criação de municípios e regiões metropolitanas. As propostas formuladas na tese são: a mudança do paradigma da simetria, instituindo-se um regime especial para os municípios com população inferior a dez mil habitantes; a proibição de que sejam criados novos municípios com este porte; novos critérios e procedimentos para criação de municípios; instituição de um conselho de municípios, junto ao Senado Federal; nova forma de rateio do fundo de participação dos municípios, com a criação do fundo de participação das regiões metropolitanas; a serem criadas pela União e geridas através de conselhos formados pelos municípios e Estados-membros participantes, na proporção de sua população, área e economia. / The federation is a form of state, nowadays adopted for more than thirty countries, and consists of a territorial division of power between central government and local governments. In Brazil, this division includes a local-state power and a local-municipal power. The federation is asymmetric when the peer entities (local or municipal) are assigned different legal regimes to offset or balance their diversity. The so-called "fiscal federalism" studies the income and expenses of entities that make up a federal state. In Brazil, where it adopted the symmetry between the municipalities. After analyzing the position of the municipality in question in tax (income, expenses and forms of redistribution of resources), it identifies four points that could change rules for its improvement: vertical gap, the fiscal war, criteria for founding new municipalities and metropolitan regions. The proposals made in the thesis are: a paradigm shift symmetry, by introducing a special scheme for municipalities with populations of less than ten thousand inhabitants that the prohibition of new municipalities are created with this size, new criteria and procedures for creating municipalities, establishment of a municipal council, by the Senate; new apportionment fund participation of municipalities, with the creation of metropolitan regions fund, to be created by the Union and managed by councils of the municipalities and participating States, in proportion to its population, area and economy.

Normative economic theory provides justification for at least partially centralized renewable energy provision due to the large, positive externalities associated with renewable energy production. However, the United States is one of the few countries without centralized renewable energy policy. Instead, the federal government actively chooses decentralized renewable energy provision by using fiscal transfers to support subnational renewable energy development. This dissertation explores why U.S. legislators choose decentralized renewable energy provision by asking two primary questions. First, what is the motivation for using federal fiscal transfers for decentralized renewable energy output considering what we know about positive spillovers and market failure associated with decentralized renewable energy production? Second, do fiscal transfers for decentralized renewable energy provision increase renewable energy production at the local level? The theoretical model proposed in Chapter Four posits why policymakers choose decentralized renewable energy provision. The chapter argues that the current political price associated with a specific policy issue affects legislators’ choices regarding good provision. I hypothesize that when the political price associated with vying for centralized good provision is high, legislators are incentivized to choose decentralized good provision. Chapter Five applies this theory to empirically evaluate the choice to decentralize renewable energy provision. The chapter examines whether the current political price of renewable energy policy affects the likelihood of a legislator proposing decentralized funding for renewable energy provision. I hypothesize that legislators will propose funding to support decentralized renewable energy development when the political price associated with renewable energy policies is high at a given time. The results show that when the political price of renewable energy policy is low, a policymaker is less likely to use grants to support renewable energy projects, finding support for the hypothesis. Chapter Six empirically evaluates the effectiveness of renewable energy grants at the local level to further understand the theoretical model proposed in Chapter Four. I hypothesize that receiving a renewable energy grant increases renewable energy output at the local level. The results support this hypothesis by showing that receiving a renewable energy grant is associated with significant and positive increases in solar energy production. These findings provide further insight into legislative decision-making and the role of renewable energy grants in renewable energy development in the U.S.

This paper gives a review on the theoretical foundation for fiscal decentralisation and a status quo analysis of the intergovernmental relations in Mongolia. It consists of two parts. Part I briefly reviews the theories of fiscal decentralisation and its impact on the nations’ welfare considering the major challenges for a transition economy. Part II of the paper describes the general structure and scope of the government and examines the current fiscal autonomy in Mongolia focusing on the four main areas of intergovernmental relations. This paper concludes that local governments in Mongolia are still far away from having the political, administrative and fiscal autonomy. New approaches for the assignments of expenditures and revenues in Mongolia are urgently needed.

The paper tries to shed some light on the problems of centralization and decentralization within an economic union and the federal member states. Integration and decentralization are not opposite policy strategies but both meaningful if the single public goods and services supplies are analyzed in more detail. Both strategies doubtlessly have advantages, which can be realized if the manifold possibilities are combined in an efficient approach of good governance. Best practice approaches in inter- or supra-national integration, fiscal federalism and taxation do exist and have to be successfully implemented. Obviously such a modern fiscal policy has to be accompanied by an appropriate monetary policy, which in an economic union has to be carried out by an independent central bank as one of the necessary countervailing powers in a democratic setting. A modern fiscal policy strategy efficiently controls budget deficits, which naturally have to be limited to finance reliable public investments. Such strategy has to be safeguarded through modern methods of budgeting and fiscal planning. Modern public management with a clear code of conduct for the government officials ensures corruption free administration.

Fiscal federalism has been an important topic among public finance theorists in the last four decades. There is a series of arguments that decentralization of governments enhances growth by improving allocation efficiency. However, the empirical studies have shown mixed results for industrialized and developing countries and some of them have demonstrated that there might be a threshold level of economic development below which decentralization is not effective. Developing and transition countries have developed a variety of forms of fiscal decentralization as a possible strategy to achieve effective and efficient governmental structures. A generalized principle of decentralization due to the country specific circumstances does not exist. Therefore, decentralization has taken place in different forms in various countries at different times, and even exactly the same extent of decentralization may have had different impacts under different conditions. The purpose of this study is to investigate the current state of the fiscal decentralization in Mongolia and to develop policy recommendations for the efficient and effective intergovernmental fiscal relations system for Mongolia. Within this perspective the analysis concentrates on the scope and structure of the public sector, the expenditure and revenue assignment as well as on the design of the intergovernmental transfer and sub-national borrowing. The study is based on data for twenty-one provinces and the capital city of Mongolia for the period from 2000 to 2009. As a former socialist country Mongolia has had a highly centralized governmental sector. The result of the analysis below revealed that the Mongolia has introduced a number of decentralization measures, which followed a top down approach and were slowly implemented without any integrated decentralization strategy in the last decade. As a result Mongolia became de-concentrated state with fiscal centralization. The revenue assignment is lacking a very important element, for instance significant revenue autonomy given to sub-national governments, which is vital for the efficient service delivery at the local level. According to the current assignments of the expenditure and revenue responsibilities most of the provinces are unable to provide a certain national standard of public goods supply. Hence, intergovernmental transfers from the central jurisdiction to the sub-national jurisdictions play an important role for the equalization of the vertical and horizontal imbalances in Mongolia. The critical problem associated with intergovernmental transfers is that there is not a stable, predictable and transparent system of transfer allocation. The amount of transfers to sub-national governments is determined largely by political decisions on ad hoc basis and disregards local differences in needs and fiscal capacity. Thus a fiscal equalization system based on the fiscal needs of the provinces should be implemented. The equalization transfers will at least partly offset the regional disparities in revenues and enable the sub-national governments to provide a national minimum standard of local public goods. / Der Fiskalische Föderalismus ist in den letzten vier Dekaden eines der wichtigsten Themen der finanzwissenschaftlichen Theorie. Dabei wird häufig argumentiert, dass eine Dezentralisierung der öffentlichen Aufgaben nicht nur die Wachstumschancen eines Landes erhöhen kann, sondern darüber hinaus auch der Allokationseffizienz förderlich ist. Allerdings zeigen empirische Untersuchungen für die Industrie- und Entwicklungsländern keine einheitlichen Ergebnisse; es wird aber deutlich, dass es einen Schwellenwert in Bezug auf den Entwicklungsstand gibt, unterhalb dessen eine Dezentralisierung erst wirksam wird. So haben einige Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer eine Vielzahl von Formen der steuerlichen Dezentralisierung als eine mögliche Strategie gewählt, um wirksame und effiziente dezentrale staatliche Strukturen zu entwickeln, wobei es einen allgemeinen Lösungsansatz hinsichtlich der Dezentralisierung allerdings nicht gibt. Vielmehr sind die besonderen kulturellen, wirtschaftlichen und geografischen Bedingungen des einzelnen Landes in angemessener Weise zu berücksichtigen. Die gefundenen Lösungen weisen daher eine relativ große Variationsbreite auf. Ziel dieser Studie ist es, den aktuellen Stand der steuerlichen Dezentralisierung in der Mongolei zu untersuchen und Empfehlungen für ein effizientes und effektives System der zwischenstaatlichen Finanzbeziehungen in der Mongolei zu entwickeln. Dabei konzentriert sich die Analyse auf Umfang und Struktur des öffentlichen Sektors, also die Aufgaben und Ausgaben sowie die öffentlichen Einnahmen. Außerdem wird auf die Zuordnung von Aufgaben und Einnahmen sowie auf die Gestaltung der zwischenstaatlichen Transfer und die subnationale Kreditaufnahme eingegangen. Die Studie basiert auf Daten der zwanzig Provinzen und der Hauptstadt der Mongolei für den Zeitraum 2000 bis 2009. Als ehemals sozialistisches Land verfügt die Mongolei über einen stark zentralisierten staatlichen Sektor. Aus der detaillierten Analyse folgt, dass die Mongolei eine Reihe von Maßnahmen zur Neustrukturierung der gebietskörperschaftlichen Ebenen ohne eine klare Dezentralisierungsstrategie durchgesetzt hat, die einen Top-Down-Ansatz verfolgten. Im Ergebnis wurde die Mongolei zu einem Staat mit einer starken Konzentration des Steueraufkommens auf der zentralstaatlichen Ebene. Dabei fehlt der Einnahmenzuordnung vor allem ein sehr wichtiges Element, nämlich eine Einnahmenautonomie auf der Ebene der untergeordneten Gebietskörperschaften, welche zum einen die Aufkommenssituation der lokalen und regionalen Gebietskörperschaften verbessert und ihnen damit erst eine eigenständige Aufgabenerfüllung ermöglicht. Bei der derzeitigen Aufgaben- und Steuerverteilung sind die meisten Provinzen nicht in der Lage, einen bestimmten nationalen Mindeststandard an öffentlichen Güter und Dienstleistungen bereitzustellen. Die Staatstätigkeit auf den untergeordneten Ebenen folgt überwiegend der Auftragsverwaltung und wird folglich im Wesentlichen über Finanzhilfen des Zentralstaats finanziert. Das entscheidende Problem der zwischenstaatlichen Transfers liegt darin begründet, dass es für die zentralstaatlichen Finanzhilfen an die untergeordneten Gebietskörperschaften kein stabiles, berechenbares und transparentes System der Steuerverteilung gibt. Die Höhe der Transferzahlungen an die sub-nationalen Regierungen ist weitgehend von politischen ad hoc Entscheidungen abhängig, welche in der Regel die lokalen und regionalen Finanzbedarfe missachten. Damit werden die Unterschiede zwischen Finanzbedarf und Finanzkraft auf der Ebene der untergeordneten Gebietskörperschaften nicht angemessen ausgeglichen. Es wird daher eine formelbasierte Steuerverteilung vorgeschlagen, welche die starken Schwankungen der Transferhöhe im Zeitverlauf vermeidet und die es den untergeordneten Gebietskörperschaften ermöglicht, einen vorgegebenen Mindeststandard an öffentlichen Gütern und Dienstleistungen ihren Bürgerinnen und Bürgern auch anbieten zu können.

Fiscal federalism has been an important topic among public finance theorists in the last four decades. There is a series of arguments that decentralization of governments enhances growth by improving allocation efficiency. However, the empirical studies have shown mixed results for industrialized and developing countries and some of them have demonstrated that there might be a threshold level of economic development below which decentralization is not effective. Developing and transition countries have developed a variety of forms of fiscal decentralization as a possible strategy to achieve effective and efficient governmental structures. A generalized principle of decentralization due to the country specific circumstances does not exist. Therefore, decentralization has taken place in different forms in various countries at different times, and even exactly the same extent of decentralization may have had different impacts under different conditions. The purpose of this study is to investigate the current state of the fiscal decentralization in Mongolia and to develop policy recommendations for the efficient and effective intergovernmental fiscal relations system for Mongolia. Within this perspective the analysis concentrates on the scope and structure of the public sector, the expenditure and revenue assignment as well as on the design of the intergovernmental transfer and sub-national borrowing. The study is based on data for twenty-one provinces and the capital city of Mongolia for the period from 2000 to 2009. As a former socialist country Mongolia has had a highly centralized governmental sector. The result of the analysis below revealed that the Mongolia has introduced a number of decentralization measures, which followed a top down approach and were slowly implemented without any integrated decentralization strategy in the last decade. As a result Mongolia became de-concentrated state with fiscal centralization. The revenue assignment is lacking a very important element, for instance significant revenue autonomy given to sub-national governments, which is vital for the efficient service delivery at the local level. According to the current assignments of the expenditure and revenue responsibilities most of the provinces are unable to provide a certain national standard of public goods supply. Hence, intergovernmental transfers from the central jurisdiction to the sub-national jurisdictions play an important role for the equalization of the vertical and horizontal imbalances in Mongolia. The critical problem associated with intergovernmental transfers is that there is not a stable, predictable and transparent system of transfer allocation. The amount of transfers to sub-national governments is determined largely by political decisions on ad hoc basis and disregards local differences in needs and fiscal capacity. Thus a fiscal equalization system based on the fiscal needs of the provinces should be implemented. The equalization transfers will at least partly offset the regional disparities in revenues and enable the sub-national governments to provide a national minimum standard of local public goods. / Der Fiskalische Föderalismus ist in den letzten vier Dekaden eines der wichtigsten Themen der finanzwissenschaftlichen Theorie. Dabei wird häufig argumentiert, dass eine Dezentralisierung der öffentlichen Aufgaben nicht nur die Wachstumschancen eines Landes erhöhen kann, sondern darüber hinaus auch der Allokationseffizienz förderlich ist. Allerdings zeigen empirische Untersuchungen für die Industrie- und Entwicklungsländern keine einheitlichen Ergebnisse; es wird aber deutlich, dass es einen Schwellenwert in Bezug auf den Entwicklungsstand gibt, unterhalb dessen eine Dezentralisierung erst wirksam wird. So haben einige Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer eine Vielzahl von Formen der steuerlichen Dezentralisierung als eine mögliche Strategie gewählt, um wirksame und effiziente dezentrale staatliche Strukturen zu entwickeln, wobei es einen allgemeinen Lösungsansatz hinsichtlich der Dezentralisierung allerdings nicht gibt. Vielmehr sind die besonderen kulturellen, wirtschaftlichen und geografischen Bedingungen des einzelnen Landes in angemessener Weise zu berücksichtigen. Die gefundenen Lösungen weisen daher eine relativ große Variationsbreite auf. Ziel dieser Studie ist es, den aktuellen Stand der steuerlichen Dezentralisierung in der Mongolei zu untersuchen und Empfehlungen für ein effizientes und effektives System der zwischenstaatlichen Finanzbeziehungen in der Mongolei zu entwickeln. Dabei konzentriert sich die Analyse auf Umfang und Struktur des öffentlichen Sektors, also die Aufgaben und Ausgaben sowie die öffentlichen Einnahmen. Außerdem wird auf die Zuordnung von Aufgaben und Einnahmen sowie auf die Gestaltung der zwischenstaatlichen Transfer und die subnationale Kreditaufnahme eingegangen. Die Studie basiert auf Daten der zwanzig Provinzen und der Hauptstadt der Mongolei für den Zeitraum 2000 bis 2009. Als ehemals sozialistisches Land verfügt die Mongolei über einen stark zentralisierten staatlichen Sektor. Aus der detaillierten Analyse folgt, dass die Mongolei eine Reihe von Maßnahmen zur Neustrukturierung der gebietskörperschaftlichen Ebenen ohne eine klare Dezentralisierungsstrategie durchgesetzt hat, die einen Top-Down-Ansatz verfolgten. Im Ergebnis wurde die Mongolei zu einem Staat mit einer starken Konzentration des Steueraufkommens auf der zentralstaatlichen Ebene. Dabei fehlt der Einnahmenzuordnung vor allem ein sehr wichtiges Element, nämlich eine Einnahmenautonomie auf der Ebene der untergeordneten Gebietskörperschaften, welche zum einen die Aufkommenssituation der lokalen und regionalen Gebietskörperschaften verbessert und ihnen damit erst eine eigenständige Aufgabenerfüllung ermöglicht. Bei der derzeitigen Aufgaben- und Steuerverteilung sind die meisten Provinzen nicht in der Lage, einen bestimmten nationalen Mindeststandard an öffentlichen Güter und Dienstleistungen bereitzustellen. Die Staatstätigkeit auf den untergeordneten Ebenen folgt überwiegend der Auftragsverwaltung und wird folglich im Wesentlichen über Finanzhilfen des Zentralstaats finanziert. Das entscheidende Problem der zwischenstaatlichen Transfers liegt darin begründet, dass es für die zentralstaatlichen Finanzhilfen an die untergeordneten Gebietskörperschaften kein stabiles, berechenbares und transparentes System der Steuerverteilung gibt. Die Höhe der Transferzahlungen an die sub-nationalen Regierungen ist weitgehend von politischen ad hoc Entscheidungen abhängig, welche in der Regel die lokalen und regionalen Finanzbedarfe missachten. Damit werden die Unterschiede zwischen Finanzbedarf und Finanzkraft auf der Ebene der untergeordneten Gebietskörperschaften nicht angemessen ausgeglichen. Es wird daher eine formelbasierte Steuerverteilung vorgeschlagen, welche die starken Schwankungen der Transferhöhe im Zeitverlauf vermeidet und die es den untergeordneten Gebietskörperschaften ermöglicht, einen vorgegebenen Mindeststandard an öffentlichen Gütern und Dienstleistungen ihren Bürgerinnen und Bürgern auch anbieten zu können.

This thesis contributes to the fields of Public Economics and Development Economics by studying human capital formation under three scenarios. Each scenario is represented in an individual paper between Chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis. Chapter 2 examines the effect of child care financing, through human capital formation, on growth and welfare. There is an extensive literature on the benefits of child care affordability on labour market participation. The overall inference that can be drawn is that the availability and affordability of appropriate child care may enhance parental time spent outside the home in furthering their economic opportunities. In another front, the endogenous growth literature exemplifies the merits of subsidizing human capital in generating growth. Again, other contributions demonstrate the negative implications of taxes on the returns from human capital on long run growth and welfare. This paper assesses the long run welfare implications of child care subsidies financed by proportional income taxes when human capital serves as the engine of growth. More specifically, using an overlapping-generations framework (OLG) with endogenous labour choice, we study the implications of a distortionary wage income tax on growth and welfare. When the revenues from proportional income taxes are channelled towards improving economic opportunities for both work and schooling investments in the form of child care subsidies, long run physical and human capital stock may increase. A higher level of growth may ensue leading to higher welfare. Chapter 3 answers the question of how child care subsidization works in the interest of skill formation, and specifically, whether child care subsidization policies can work to the effect of human capital subsidies. Ample studies have highlighted the significance of early childhood learning through child care in determining the child’s longer-term outcomes. The general conclusion has been that the quality of life for a child, higher earnings during later life, as well as the contributions the child makes to society as an adult can be traced back to exposures during the first few years of life. Early childhood education obtained through child care has been found to play a pivotal role in the human capital base amongst children that can benefit them in the long run. Based on this premise, the paper develops a simple Overlapping Generations Model (OLG) to find out the implications of early learning on future investments in human capital. It is shown that higher costs of child care will reduce skill investments of parents. Also, for some positive child care cost, higher human capital obtained through early childhood education can induce further skill investments amongst individuals with a higher willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally. Finally, intervention that can internalize the intra-generational human capital externalities arising from parental time spent outside the home - for which care/early learning is required to be purchased for the child - can unambiguously lead to higher skill investments by all individuals. Chapter 3 therefore proposes policy intervention, such as child care subsidization, as the effect of such will be akin to a human capital subsidy. The objective of Chapter 4 is to understand the implications of inter-regional mobility on higher educational investments of individuals and to study in detail the impact of mobility on government spending for education under two particular scenarios – one in which human capital externalities are non-localized and spill over to other regions (e.g. in the form of R&D), and another in which the externalities are localized and remain within the region. It is shown that mobility enhances private investments in education, and all else equal, welfare should be higher with increased migration. The impacts on government educational expenditures are studied and some policy implications are drawn. In general, with non-localized externalities, all public expenditures decline under full-migration. Finally under localized externalities, the paper finds that governments will increase their financing of education to increasingly mobile individuals only when agglomeration benefits outweigh congestion costs from increases in regional population.

The ad hoc Offshore Accords signed between the Martin Government, and each Newfoundland and Nova Scotia have fundamentally altered the landscape of regional redistribution in Canada. The fallout from the Accords has had an immediate impact on the functioning of the Equalization Program and the political factors that inform debate over future reforms. This thesis examines the factors that led to the February 2005 Offshore Accords. It also examines the case of Saskatchewan's treatment under the Equalization Program