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No. of bitstreams: 1 TeseSK.pdf: 4983553 bytes, checksum: 07e162ddc09c2b9535ea3eb301215708 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-28 / Não recebi financiamento / This thesis addresses the relationship between mallaportionment and legislative behavior, precisely, the effects of overrepresentation on legislative outcomes, It is well established that overrepresented subnational units benefit disproportionately from resources distributed by the central government. Explanations for this fact are based on a model of legislative bargaining over distributive projects. Therefore, the focus of this investigation is the legislative coalitions. However, this model assumes legislators who are elected in single-member districts, where there is a one-to-one correspondence between the legislator and the district. In these systems, defining the interest of the district is straightforward and the legislator can easily claim credit for defending it. The same is not true in multi-member districts where interests that successfully seek representation are varied and legislators elected from the same district can claim to represent different constituencies. So, the goal of this research is to prove the applicability of the legislative bargaining mechanism in a multi-member district electoral system. The central assumption is that in multi member electoral districts, legislative coalitions cut-across the apportionment cleavage and wash out the impact that overrepresentation might have had under a single-member electoral structure. I test this claim by comparing legislative coalitions in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and the Senate between 1989 and 2014 and examined the pattern of transferences of federal funds of the central government to subnational units of the country. While both Brazilian houses are symmetric in their power, elections for the former are based on proportional representation electoral systems in large districts and for the later on majority rules in one or two-member districts. I performed three types of descriptive statistical analyses: voting unit analysis; dyadic analysis and winning coalitions analysis. The results showed that the relation between the higher volume of fiscal transferences and overrepresentation is stronger in the Senate. In turn, it was demonstrated that, although the effects of overrepresentation on the coalitions is also higher in the Senate; in general, the impact of malapportionment in the congress is discreet. Thus, denying the expectations disseminated by the literature, the legislative bargain for distributive projects is not, necessarily, the underlying mechanism to distortion in the discretionary distribution of social resources which favors the overrepresented units. / A tese trata do impacto da sobrerrepresentação no comportamento legislativo com o foco na formação de coalizões. Está bem estabelecido que as unidades subnacionais sobrerrepresentadas são desproporcionalmente beneficiadas por recursos distribuídos pelo governo central. As explicações para este fato são baseadas no modelo distributivista de barganhas legislativas. Entretanto, o modelo considera legisladoras e legisladores eleitos em distritos uninominais. O objetivo desta pesquisa foi testar a aplicabilidade do modelo de barganhas legislativas por projetos distributivista em um sistema eleitoral de distritos plurinominais e; analisar o peso da desproporcionalidade de representação distrital nas coalizões legislativas. A hipótese central foi que os efeitos da sobrerrepresentação distrital dependem do tipo de sistema eleitoral. Em sistemas eleitorais de distritos uninominais há a correspondência de um para um entre legisladora (legislador) e o distrito e a definição dos interesses do distrito é, relativamente, mais clara. Nesse caso, a(o) parlamentar pode facilmente reivindicar o crédito por defendê-los e esperar obter reconhecimento de seu distrito eleitoral por causa disso, isto é, obter retorno em forma de votos. O mesmo não é verdadeiro para sistemas eleitorais de distritos plurinominais, onde os interesses bem sucedidos na busca por representação são variados e as(os) legisladores que se elegeram por um mesmo distrito podem reivindicar a representação de diferentes círculos eleitorais. Sistemas eleitorais de distritos plurinominais incentivam a formação de coalizões que atravessam distritos eleitorais. Esta condição rompe com a representação enraizada nos limites dos distritos eleitorais e atenua o impacto que a sobrerrepresentação teria sob uma estrutura eleitoral de um só membro. Testei esta afirmação comparando as coalizões legislativas na Câmara e no Senado do Brasil entre 1989 e 2014 e, também, examinando o padrão das transferências de fundos federais do governo central para as unidades subnacionais do país. Ambas as casas legislativas brasileiras são simétricas quanto ao poder, mas as eleições para a primeira são baseadas em sistema de representação proporcional em distritos de grande magnitude e para a segunda sobre a regra majoritária em distritos de um ou dois membros. Realizei três tipos de análises estatísticas descritivas: análise da coesão do voto; análise de votos iguais de duplas de parlamentares e análise da participação em coalizões vitoriosas. A hipótese secundária é que legisladoras (legisladores) de distritos sobrerrepresentados têm menor propensão a votar conjuntamente e são menos cruciais para o resultado das votações legislativas, do que quando elas e eles são analisados levando em conta outros atributos, tais como filiação partidária e coalizão do governo. Os resultados mostraram que no Senado a relação entre maior volume de transferências fiscais e a sobrerrepresentação é mais forte. Mas, embora no geral, os efeitos da sobrerrepresentação sobre as coalizões seja também maior no Senado, o impacto da representação desproporcional nas votações nas duas casas legislativas é discreto em relação aos outros fatores examinados. Entre eles a participação na coalizão do governo se destaca como determinante do comportamento legislativo nas votações. Portanto, contrariando as expectativas divulgadas na literatura, a barganha legislativa por projetos distributivos não é o mecanismo subjacente à distorção na distribuição discricionária de recursos fiscais que favorece unidades sobrerrepresentadas.

本研究共包含三篇論文，首先修正von Hagen and Hepp(2000)所建立模型分析政府的財源轉移之風險分散與重分配動態效果。整體而言，補助與協助收入或統籌分配款所產生的所得與稅收風險分散或重分配效果相當有限，且各分區(北、中、南與全區)的結論差異甚大，顯示財源轉移發揮的效率不足。統籌分配款對於改善稅收的風險分散與重分配上，效果優於補助與協助收入。各縣市取得的補助與協助收入或統籌分配款高於長期所得與稅收風險分散與重分配所應對應的額度，造成資源浪費。就全區而言，前幾期稅收(所得)風險分散變化，可作為短期調整補助與協助收入(統籌分配款)的依據；統籌分配款與稅收的風險分散、補助與協助收入或統籌分配款與稅收重分配均存在雙向因果關係。 其次，在分析勞動者的休閒時間選擇時，本文修正跨期選擇模型，考慮勞動者持有投資組合與採取避險措施，並面對租稅問題下，以導出休閒時間方程式。實證上採用混合估計法針對12種樣本產業及兩種不同休閒時間衡量方式進行估計，結果顯示不同休閒時間衡量方式，影響估計結果甚鉅；金融市場的變化與波動攸關休閒時間變動：國內外利率、匯率與遠期匯率等與投資組合報酬相關的變數，在多數情況下顯著地影響休閒時間變動，且各變數對於休閒時間的影響程度，在工業中的次級產業大於服務業中的次產業。此外，採行周休二日制度確實改變制度採行前後的休閒時間，惟在三個工業次產業上則不明顯。 最後，修正Bo and Sterken (2002) 所建立的最適動態模型，分析公司價值不確定與租稅措施對海運廠商投資的影響，經由最大化公司價值導出影響台灣海運公司投資的三種不確定來源與避險措施，並進行實證估計。實證結果顯示，不確定的衡量方式攸關投資函數的估計結果，以指數加權移動平均標準差衡量不確定時，其估計結果優於以GARCH(1,1)衡量不確定，隱含廠商較在乎可預期波動對投資的影響。一般而言，廠商利率與原油價格的波動增加，均不利於公司投資，其中以原油價格不確定對於投資的影響最大，其效果約略與廠商利率相當。其次，影響海運公司投資最重要的三項因素均分別為BDI、負債與廠商利率，顯示價格與債務規模的重要性更甚於利率。此外，三種公司價值不確定來源對投資的影響，在多數個別公司之間並無顯著的差異，有助於採行總體財金政策以刺激投資。 / This dissertation contains three articles. First I revise the models set up by von Hagen and Hepp (2000) to analyze the dynamic effects of the Aid and Assistance and central government’s Tax Redistribution Fund on income (or tax) risk sharing and redistribution. For all the counties in Taiwan area the effects are tiny, but those are diverse among the counties in each Taiwan sub-area. The Aid and Assistance and central government’s Tax Redistribution Fund actually obtained by each county are larger than the amounts required to maintain long-term risk sharing and redistribution effects. These all imply that fiscal transfer is inefficiency. The effects of the central government’s Tax Redistribution Fund on risk sharing and redistribution are larger than those of Aid and Assistance. The central government can adjust the Aid and Assistance based on the change of earlier-period ax (income) risk sharing effect. Moreover, the existence of significant short-run interaction between the central government’s Tax Redistribution Fund and tax risk sharing, the Aid and Assistance and tax redistribution. Secondly, I revise intertemporal choice model by considering portfolio selection, hedging and taxation problems to derive economic agent’s leisure time equation. In empirical study, we focus on twelve sample industries and two different leisure time measurements, then adopt pooled estimation to estimate leisure time equation. Empirical results show that different measurement of leisure time influences estimation outcomes tremendously. Furthermore, the financial variables affecting portfolio return, including domestic and foreign interest rates, exchange rate and forward rate almost have remarkable effect on leisure time. Finally, the effect of each explanatory variable on leisure time is larger in industry than in service industry. Finally, I revise the optimal intertemporal model, constructed by Bo and Sterken (2002), by maximizing corporate value to derive three uncertainty sources and hedging influencing shipping-firm investment. Empirical evidences show that it is relevant for the estimation results to adopt which methods to measure the uncertainty. The outcomes derived from taking the Exponential Weighted Moving Average model to measure uncertainty are better than those from adopting the GARCH(1,1) model. Generally, as the volatilities in firm’s interest rate and crude oil price increase, firm investment decreases and the effect of crude oil price uncertainty on investment, the largest among the four effects, is nearly equal to that of firm interest rate on investment. Furthermore, BDI, debt and firm interest rate are the most important variables influencing firm investment. Finally, the effects of three uncertainty sources on investment are almost indifferent among the ten shipping-firms.

Environmental positive externalities from public provision, such as the benefits yielded from the public measure of nature conservation, are often not internalized. Potential sub-optimal public service provision can be expected from such a condition, leading to inefficiency, if the benefits at a greater territorial scale are not acknowledged. This holds particularly true for intergovernmental fiscal relations in a decentralizing multi-tiered governmental system. Moreover, in developing countries the fiscal capacities to perform measures of ecological public functions are limited with their fiscal needs for these functions often appearing to outweigh their fiscal capacities. Research at the interface of the economic theory of fiscal federalism, the sustainability concept, and policies related to conservation and the environment is relatively new. Furthermore, in the literature on environmental federalism the emphasis tends to be comparatively less on the benefits of positive environmental externalities. The essential contribution of this study is an extension of this research field that is still in its infancy by applying the specific case of Indonesia as the context, on account of this tropical country‟s ecological significance as well as its recent developments during the fiscal decentralization process. The overall aim of this study is to assess the possibilities of ecological fiscal transfers as a set of instruments in the public sector to internalize environmental externalities. To this end, the study traces the development as well as the current state of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Indonesia in terms of ecological purposes. On the basis of this knowledge, the study offers new policy perspectives by proposing a number of policy options for ecological fiscal transfers in the context of the functioning fiscal transfer system and institutions between the national and the subnational (province and local) governments as well as among jurisdictions at the same governmental level. The incorporation of an explicit ecological indicator into general-purpose transfers is the first option. The second option is derived from a revenue-sharing arrangement. In this arrangement, two sub-options are proposed: first, shared revenues from taxes are distributed on the basis of the ecological indicator and, second, shared revenues from natural resources are earmarked for environmental purposes. Finally, the third option suggests an extension of existing specific-purpose transfers for the environment. The potential and limitations of the respective options are addressed. Additionally, a short treatment is given to the discourse on the possible mobilization of fiscal resources in the context of tropical deforestation and global climate change. The research concentrates mainly on the first option, namely the incorporation of an ecological indicator into the structure of general-purpose transfer allocation. In order to substantiate an explicit ecological dimension in the transfer, it extends the present area-based approach by introducing a protected area indicator while maintaining the remaining socio-economic indicators in the fiscal need calculation. The parameter values of area-related indicators are adjusted and subject to the properties of the existing formula. The simulation at the provincial level yields the following results. First, more provinces lose rather than gain from the introduced ecological fiscal transfer when compared to the fiscal transfer that they received in the reference fiscal year. Second, on average the winning provinces obtain a higher level of transfer from the introduction of an ecological indicator in the fiscal need calculation. The extent of the average decreases for the losing provinces, however, it is lower compared to the extent of the average gain by their winning counterparts. In terms of spatial configurations of the general-purpose transfer with an ecological indicator, provinces in Papua would benefit most from the new fiscal regime whereas provinces in Java and Sulawesi, with a few exceptions, would suffer a transfer reduction. Kalimantan and Sumatera show a mixed pattern of winning and losing provinces. The analysis on the equalization effects of the general-purpose transfers makes the following important contributions. It suggests that, first, the transfers are equalizing and, second, the introduction of the protected area indicator into the structure of these transfers plays a significant role in the equalizing effect, particularly in the presence of provinces with a very high fiscal capacity and when the area variable is also controlled. All of these new insights are imperative in the design of fiscal policy which intends to integrate explicit ecological aspects into the instruments of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Since a formula-based fiscal transfer distribution is intrinsically zero-sum, the aforementioned configuration of winning and losing jurisdictions is conceivable. Among other future perspectives, it is the task of further research to explore ecological fiscal transfer instruments and associated measures that on the one hand seek to induce the losing provinces to join their winning counterparts and, on the other hand, are still subject to the requirements of the rational fiscal transfer mechanism.

Environmental positive externalities from public provision, such as the benefits yielded from the public measure of nature conservation, are often not internalized. Potential sub-optimal public service provision can be expected from such a condition, leading to inefficiency, if the benefits at a greater territorial scale are not acknowledged. This holds particularly true for intergovernmental fiscal relations in a decentralizing multi-tiered governmental system. Moreover, in developing countries the fiscal capacities to perform measures of ecological public functions are limited with their fiscal needs for these functions often appearing to outweigh their fiscal capacities. Research at the interface of the economic theory of fiscal federalism, the sustainability concept, and policies related to conservation and the environment is relatively new. Furthermore, in the literature on environmental federalism the emphasis tends to be comparatively less on the benefits of positive environmental externalities. The essential contribution of this study is an extension of this research field that is still in its infancy by applying the specific case of Indonesia as the context, on account of this tropical country‟s ecological significance as well as its recent developments during the fiscal decentralization process. The overall aim of this study is to assess the possibilities of ecological fiscal transfers as a set of instruments in the public sector to internalize environmental externalities. To this end, the study traces the development as well as the current state of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Indonesia in terms of ecological purposes. On the basis of this knowledge, the study offers new policy perspectives by proposing a number of policy options for ecological fiscal transfers in the context of the functioning fiscal transfer system and institutions between the national and the subnational (province and local) governments as well as among jurisdictions at the same governmental level. The incorporation of an explicit ecological indicator into general-purpose transfers is the first option. The second option is derived from a revenue-sharing arrangement. In this arrangement, two sub-options are proposed: first, shared revenues from taxes are distributed on the basis of the ecological indicator and, second, shared revenues from natural resources are earmarked for environmental purposes. Finally, the third option suggests an extension of existing specific-purpose transfers for the environment. The potential and limitations of the respective options are addressed. Additionally, a short treatment is given to the discourse on the possible mobilization of fiscal resources in the context of tropical deforestation and global climate change. The research concentrates mainly on the first option, namely the incorporation of an ecological indicator into the structure of general-purpose transfer allocation. In order to substantiate an explicit ecological dimension in the transfer, it extends the present area-based approach by introducing a protected area indicator while maintaining the remaining socio-economic indicators in the fiscal need calculation. The parameter values of area-related indicators are adjusted and subject to the properties of the existing formula. The simulation at the provincial level yields the following results. First, more provinces lose rather than gain from the introduced ecological fiscal transfer when compared to the fiscal transfer that they received in the reference fiscal year. Second, on average the winning provinces obtain a higher level of transfer from the introduction of an ecological indicator in the fiscal need calculation. The extent of the average decreases for the losing provinces, however, it is lower compared to the extent of the average gain by their winning counterparts. In terms of spatial configurations of the general-purpose transfer with an ecological indicator, provinces in Papua would benefit most from the new fiscal regime whereas provinces in Java and Sulawesi, with a few exceptions, would suffer a transfer reduction. Kalimantan and Sumatera show a mixed pattern of winning and losing provinces. The analysis on the equalization effects of the general-purpose transfers makes the following important contributions. It suggests that, first, the transfers are equalizing and, second, the introduction of the protected area indicator into the structure of these transfers plays a significant role in the equalizing effect, particularly in the presence of provinces with a very high fiscal capacity and when the area variable is also controlled. All of these new insights are imperative in the design of fiscal policy which intends to integrate explicit ecological aspects into the instruments of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Since a formula-based fiscal transfer distribution is intrinsically zero-sum, the aforementioned configuration of winning and losing jurisdictions is conceivable. Among other future perspectives, it is the task of further research to explore ecological fiscal transfer instruments and associated measures that on the one hand seek to induce the losing provinces to join their winning counterparts and, on the other hand, are still subject to the requirements of the rational fiscal transfer mechanism.