The purpose of this project is to develop a confluent interdisciplinary unit for use by other teachers. Confluent education focuses on teaching the affective and cognitive domains in a seamless approach in which the education of both domains are part of the objectives in the lessons. Includes lesson plans.

Thesis (M. Diac. (Spelterapie)) / Die navorser het met hierdie intervensiestudie hanteringsriglyne vanuit ʼn Gestaltperspektief vir ouers met ʼn eiesinnige kleuter ontwikkel. Om bogenoemde te bereik, is slegs die eerste drie fases, asook Stap 1 van Fase 4 van Rothman en Thomas se Design & Development-model voltooi. Fase 1, naamlik die probleemanalise en projekbeplanning, het gefokus op die identifisering en betrek van respondente, die verkryging van toegang tot en samewerking van respondente, ʼn behoeftebepaling van die populasie, die analisering van die geïdentifiseerde probleem en die bepaling van die doelstellings en doelwitte. Deur die bestudering van bestaande literatuur en natuurlike voorbeelde, sowel as die identifisering van funksionele elemente van suksesvolle modelle is Fase 2, naamlik die insameling en sintese van data, suksesvol voltooi. Tydens Fase 3, naamlik die ontwerpfase, is ʼn waarnemingsisteem ontwikkel en prosedures vir die intervensie gespesifiseer. Deur die ontwikkeling van ʼn prototipe is Stap 1 van Fase 4, naamlik vroeë ontwerp en ontwikkeling, voltooi. Gevolgtrekkings en aanbevelings is vanuit die bevindinge gemaak. / Social Work

No description available.

Gestalt Work for the Actor is a documentary about Dr. Renee Vincent's Gestalt acting exercise. Students are trained to recall powerful emotions and then employ the conjured passions into performance. This documentary examines the Gestalt acting exercise and what benefits it affords actors. The accompanying production book explains the production processes: preproduction, production, and postproduction, as well as the theoretical approaches used in the documentary.

This thesis examines the relation between philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 1940s writings on seeing and seeing aspects and Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler’s theory of perception as set out in his Gestalt Psychology (1929). I argue that much of the existing literature on the Wittgenstein-Köhler relation distorts Köhler’s ideas and thus also Wittgenstein’s engagement with Köhler’s ideas. This double distortion underrates Köhler’s insights, misconstrues Wittgenstein’s complaints against Köhler, and masks points of contact between the two concerning the nature and description of human perceptual experience. In my view, Wittgenstein sympathizes with Köhler’s call to reflect on basic psychological categories such as “experience”, his respect for the “naïve” experience of the layperson, his method of “rediscovering” pervasive features of experience that escape our notice, and his efforts to identify intellectual prejudices that stymie inquiry. But a warning emerges from Wittgenstein’s discussions of seeing and seeing aspects: It is especially difficult to command a clear view of 'seeing' and its interrelations with other everyday, psychological concepts. I argue that Wittgenstein’s far-reaching criticism of Köhler is that the latter's account of visual “organization” overextends an analogy between seeing and seeing aspects and pushes aside other justifiable comparisons, for example between seeing and thinking and seeing and imagining. A consequence of Wittgenstein's criticism is that Kohler falls short of his aim to depict faithfully naïve visual experience. Moreover, despite Kohler's commitment to battling prejudices, the latter's emphasis on similarities between seeing and seeing aspects to the exclusion of their differences is a form of intellectual prejudice. For Wittgenstein various comparisons are justifiable by appeal to the interrelations between ‘seeing’ and other psychological concepts. A perspicuous view of the concept 'seeing' involves steady appreciation of the multitude of justifiable, criss-crossing comparisons. So although Wittgenstein does not deny Köhler’s claim that organization is a feature of visual experience rather than thinking, he does not unqualifiedly endorse it either. We have conceptual grounds for various ways of speaking about our experiences of aspects.

This thesis examines the relation between philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 1940s writings on seeing and seeing aspects and Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler’s theory of perception as set out in his Gestalt Psychology (1929). I argue that much of the existing literature on the Wittgenstein-Köhler relation distorts Köhler’s ideas and thus also Wittgenstein’s engagement with Köhler’s ideas. This double distortion underrates Köhler’s insights, misconstrues Wittgenstein’s complaints against Köhler, and masks points of contact between the two concerning the nature and description of human perceptual experience. In my view, Wittgenstein sympathizes with Köhler’s call to reflect on basic psychological categories such as “experience”, his respect for the “naïve” experience of the layperson, his method of “rediscovering” pervasive features of experience that escape our notice, and his efforts to identify intellectual prejudices that stymie inquiry. But a warning emerges from Wittgenstein’s discussions of seeing and seeing aspects: It is especially difficult to command a clear view of 'seeing' and its interrelations with other everyday, psychological concepts. I argue that Wittgenstein’s far-reaching criticism of Köhler is that the latter's account of visual “organization” overextends an analogy between seeing and seeing aspects and pushes aside other justifiable comparisons, for example between seeing and thinking and seeing and imagining. A consequence of Wittgenstein's criticism is that Kohler falls short of his aim to depict faithfully naïve visual experience. Moreover, despite Kohler's commitment to battling prejudices, the latter's emphasis on similarities between seeing and seeing aspects to the exclusion of their differences is a form of intellectual prejudice. For Wittgenstein various comparisons are justifiable by appeal to the interrelations between ‘seeing’ and other psychological concepts. A perspicuous view of the concept 'seeing' involves steady appreciation of the multitude of justifiable, criss-crossing comparisons. So although Wittgenstein does not deny Köhler’s claim that organization is a feature of visual experience rather than thinking, he does not unqualifiedly endorse it either. We have conceptual grounds for various ways of speaking about our experiences of aspects.

Thesis (M.F.A.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 1992. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 48).

Nous nous opposons dans cette thèse à la tentative de Maurice Merleau-Ponty pour réduire toute forme de "qualia" à des prédicats structuraux, tentative par laquelle nous comprenons l'ontologie de la « chair » qu'il nous semble mettre en place dès ses premiers travaux sur « l'expression ». Nous visons cependant à travers lui plus généralement toute théorie « structurale» de la sensation, désignant par là toute théorie qui soutient qu'on ne peut pas déterminer relationnellement un contenu de sensation sans le modifier intrinsèquement. La tâche est cependant rendue difficile par le grand nombre de faits empiriques que Merleau-Ponty convoque à l'appui de sa théorie structurale. En particulier, il s'appuie sur l'interprétation structurale de ces faits qui avait déjà été réalisée avant lui par Kurt Koffka au sein de la psychologie de la forme. Nous commençons donc par examiner cette interprétation et les faits sur lesquels elle repose, en montrant qu'ils ne peuvent paraître corroborer une théorie structurale que si l'on confond « abstraire » et « séparer réellement » une qualité de son contexte. Nous convoquons alors William James à l'appui de ces conclusions, en rappelant qu'il avait déjà montré contre les théories néo-hégéliennes de son époque l'illégitimité de leur prétention à se réclamer de faits psychologiques similaires, et qu'il avait soutenu contre eux une théorie de la connaissance par accointance que nous cherchons à reprendre à notre compte, pour esquisser une défense de l'introspection pure et simple. / We are trying here to object to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's attempt to reduce qua/ia to structural predicates, which is the way we understand his ontology of the "flesh", as he seems to us to develop it already in his first works on "expression". We are more generally objecting through him to any kind of "structural" theory concerning sensation, meaning by this any theory which claims that one cannot attribute a relation to a sensorial content without intrinsically altering it. Our task is complicated by the great number of empirical facts that Merleau-Ponty calls for to prove his structural theory. He notably finds great help in the structural interpretation Kurt Koffka had already laid down for these facts as a Gestalt psychologist. Consequently, we begin with the examination of this theory and of the facts that support it, showing that they cannot seem to corroborate a structural theory unless one confuses "abstraction" and "real separation" of a qua/e from its context. We then call for William James to support these conclusions, reminding that he had already showed the illegitimacy of the claim by the neo-Hegelian writers of his time to find empirical proof for their own structural theories in similar psychological data. He had also suggested a "knowledge by acquaintance" theory against those writers that we are trying to use in defense for introspection pure and simple.

Este trabalho investiga e discute as possíveis razões que levaram a Gestalt-terapia a ter a imagem de uma abordagem frágil, sem consistência teórica e, portanto, mais fácil de ser exercida, vez que não exigiria do profissional uma capacitação teórica ou a necessidade de estudos mais aprofundados. A autora, definindo-se como herdeira desta abordagem, resgata sua origem e concepção, apontando a importância dos pais, Fritz e Laura Perls, considerando suas crenças, mitos e valores pessoais e a influência, direta ou indireta, destes nos seus legados. Tal busca, referendada e constituída junto ao contexto da época da criação da Gestalt-terapia, objetiva compreender o cenário social e cultural e suas respectivas exigências, com vistas a inserí-la e aos seus conceitos num panorama maior que lhes conceda sentido. A pesquisa contou com entrevistas de três gestalt- terapeutas brasileiros da atualidade, considerados também herdeiros, e, por esta referência, irmãos da autora. Seus depoimentos foram registrados, tendo-se o intuito de, com esse diálogo, observar a compreensão que têm da Gestalt-terapia enquanto corpo teórico, como também suas percepções sobre as possíveis causas para a mal-dição desta abordagem, qual seja sua carência de fundamentação teórica. O estudo aponta ser necessário à formação do gestalt- terapeuta um referencial teórico-prático que revele e considere as influências sofridas pela abordagem, e explicite os construtos e conceitos por ela utilizados. É ainda de fundamental importância que se faça a distinção do que é a Gestalt-terapia daquilo que se constitui como o jeito de ser do seu pai, Fritz Perls / This paper researches on the possible reasons which made the Gestalt-therapy show a fragile approach image, with no theoretical basis, and therefore easier to be dealt with since it wouldnt demand a deep knowledge from the professional Gestalt-therapist. The author, here defining herself as heiress to this approach, rescues the Gestalt-therapys origin and concepts pointing out to the importance of its founders, Fritz and Laura Perls . She considers their beliefs, myths and personal values as well as their direct or indirect influence on the Gestalt-therapys destiny. This study, wich focus on the Gestalt-therapy very beginning, aims to clearly understand the social-cultural aspect and its demands, with the purpose of analysing the Gestalt-therapy and its concepts in a much broader context that makes it meaningful. This research is made up of interviews with three current Brazilian Gestalttherapists, who are also considered heirs, hence this autors brothers. The main goal for interviewing those therapists was not only to analyse their individual comprehension about Gestalt-therapy itself as theory but also to have their own opinion about the possible causes for todays superficial approach of this therapy. This study highlits that a Gestalt-therapist needs theoretical and practical pillars that reveal and consider not only the influence undertaken by such a light Gestalttherapy approach but also that clarifies the concepts which this therapy makes use of. It is still paramount that one distinguishes between what Gestalt-therapy actually is from something that merely makes up its fathers (Fritz Perls) way of being

The present essay aims to elucidate Merleau-Ponty's attitude towards science in his early published works. Being a phenomenologist, he refuses to understand science as a tool to discover general natural laws valid once for all and for everyone which are supposedly to be found in the reality inaccessible to our so called naive experience. However, he esteems the gestalt psychology because in his eyes this scientific field founds its conceptions on the lived-world without mistaking these very conceptions as only reality when compared the lived-world itself. We aim to apprehend Merleau-Ponty's attitude relative to these two types of scientific approach as a dialogue through which he establishes his own thinking. The research starts with Husserl's discovery of the lived-world, or, in other words, of the original soil of our experience preceding all philosophical reflexion as well as all scientific construction. This effort ought to helps us with understanding the reasons of Merleau-Ponty's critique of causal thinking and realistic science. In the next step, we will present the notions of "behavior" and "form" used in the framework of gestalt psychology. This elucidation will gradually lead us to the outlines of the manner in which Merleau-Ponty extends this psychological concept to the field of philosophy. Last...