How do homeless people make homes on the street? Over two years of fieldwork in Paris, I observed the daily practices and routines of people who are sleeping rough. How do they earn money through begging? What factors do they consider when finding and making shelters? I followed people through different institutional settings – a homeless day centre, a needle exchange, a centre for people with alcohol problems and ultimately also a homeless shelter – on their way away from the street always documenting the conflicts between their short term – drugs and alcohol – and long term hopes. I observed the ways which they were supported by assistants socials and other institutional actors in their struggle to create spaces of reflective freedom. I argue that their efforts were about home making and as such about making a better life first on and then away from the street.

In this thesis, I offer a complex exploration of positive motivation and life evaluation in two adjacent villages in the Buganda kingdom of Central Uganda. Focusing primarily on the lives of five individuals, I examine the tensions and inconsistencies that arise in the day-to-day pursuit of a good life in these villages and argue that, while individual lives may differ, people everywhere face similar concerns in their desire to live well. Through these individuals, but drawing also on wider ethnographic insights, I explore five core themes, with a trajectory broadly moving from more material to more transcendental concerns. These are: making a living, aspiration, gratification deferral, the source of good things, and the importance of connectedness. Running through the thesis is the assertion that wellbeing is a relational and moral project as people’s efforts to live well are inextricably intertwined. A key underlying question is ‘How can we live well in a socially acceptable way?’ This research contributes to the fledgling field of the anthropology of happiness and wellbeing as well as regional scholarship on, for example, development, livelihoods, aspirations, and ‘modernity’. In addition, it speaks to interdisciplinary wellbeing research and I argue that the nuance and contextualisation offered by anthropological and ethnographic study can both augment and challenge the primarily quantitative research from other disciplines. Furthermore, I make a particular claim for the value of biographical approaches to the study of wellbeing.

The good life, or a flourishing life, is a vision of how people ought to best live their lives. Though this vision is vital to the conduct of psychotherapy, it is generally overlooked, and thus unexamined. The therapist's vision of the good life for the client guides his or her implicit and explicit interventions. Despite this, there is relatively little discussion about this vital topic, and relatively little training into the various approaches to the good life. In this thesis, I argue that this relative lack of examination and training is due to the lack of perceived options regarding conceptions of the good life. As I will show, the seeming diversity of psychotherapy theories is actually uniformly underlain with individualism. I will address this lack of diversity by revealing how abstractionism is the ontology that underlies individualism in order to present a competitor. Ontological relationality is presented as an alternative ontological framework for visions of the good life, along with practical applications and therapeutic implications.

Cette étude est entièrement consacrée à un examen du deuxième chapitre du premier livre des "Politiques" d'Aristote. Elle vise à analyser l'affirmation aristotélicienne selon laquelle l'homme est un animal plus politique que les autres animaux politiques (Pol., I, 1, 1253a7-9). Tous les commentateurs d'Aristote expliquent cette affirmation par référence à la rationalité, ou à la moralité ou encore à la capacité langagière de l'homme. Selon l'idée soutenue dans cette étude, bien que ces traits exclusivement humains ne soient pas impertinents à la forme spécifique que prend la vie politique de l'homme, le plus haut degré de son caractère politique ne peut pas s'expliquer en fonction d'eux. Après un examen détaillés des plusieurs difficultés que l'on rencontre dans les commentaires contemporains des Politiques, 1,2, nous avons développé la thèse que selon Aristote l'homme est le plus politique des animaux politiques parce qu'il est un animal grégaire à multiple communautés. D'après Aristote, l'homme développe cette multiplicité de communautés en vue de l'autosuffisance. Pour pouvoir montrer que cette interprétation est en conformité avec une autre affirmation d'Aristote selon laquelle la polis existe en vue du bien-vivre, nous avons aussi démontré qu'il existe chez le Stagirite des éléments d'une notion de bien-vivre qui relève moins de la moralité que des conditions animales de l'homme et que c'est dans ce dernier sens que l'existence de la polis en vue du bien-vivre doit être comprise. / This dissertation is dedicated to an exclusive study of Aristotle's "Politics", I, 2. It aims at analyzing Aristotle's affirmation that human beings are more political than the other political animals (Pol., I, 1, 1253a7-9). According to the most widely shared views about Aristotle's argument here, human beings would be more political either because they are rational, or because they have a natural capacity for speech or because they are perceptive about questions of morality. According to the idea defended in this study, although these exclusively human features are not impertinent to the specific form that human beings' political life takes, human beings' higher degree of politicalness cannot be explained on the basis of them. After a detailed examination of certain difficulties and shortcomings in contemporary commentaries on Politics, l, 2, we develop the thesis that according to Aristotle, the human being is more political because it is a gregarious animal of multiple communities. For Aristotle, human beings develop this multiplicity of communities for the sake of self-sufficiency. In order to show that this thesis is in conformity with Aristotle's other main idea that the polis exists for the sake of living-well, we demonstrate that elements of a different conception of living-well, based more on human being's animality than its rnorality, are present in Aristotle’s work. Aristotle's affirmation that the polis exists for the sake of living-well must be understood in this rather zoological sense of living-well.

<p>Happiness research is advancing as an academic discipline as well as on the political agenda. An aspect, largely ignored in the field, is what impact an individual’s construction of the good life has on his or her subjective well-being. The purpose of this paper was to investigate how people in different situations in life and with different backgrounds construct the idea of a good life and the importance these constructions may have in explaining subjective well-being. Despite the differences between themselves, the respondents’ constructions of the good life were shown to have a lot in common. Some factors in the good life were shared by the respondents, such as relations to other people, access to food, water and housing, whereas in other aspects, such as money and time, the constructions of the good life differed quite a lot from one another. When evaluating their own lives the respondents used quite different criteria mostly corresponding to their idea of the good life. If this is a general pattern, possible to replicate in other studies, one may in the future be able to draw the conclusion that the construction of the good life has an effect on our subjective well-being.</p>

Happiness research is advancing as an academic discipline as well as on the political agenda. An aspect, largely ignored in the field, is what impact an individual’s construction of the good life has on his or her subjective well-being. The purpose of this paper was to investigate how people in different situations in life and with different backgrounds construct the idea of a good life and the importance these constructions may have in explaining subjective well-being. Despite the differences between themselves, the respondents’ constructions of the good life were shown to have a lot in common. Some factors in the good life were shared by the respondents, such as relations to other people, access to food, water and housing, whereas in other aspects, such as money and time, the constructions of the good life differed quite a lot from one another. When evaluating their own lives the respondents used quite different criteria mostly corresponding to their idea of the good life. If this is a general pattern, possible to replicate in other studies, one may in the future be able to draw the conclusion that the construction of the good life has an effect on our subjective well-being.

Understanding the rational and ethical sense that people make of their actions and experiences requires understanding the lives they are trying to live. The narrative visions of a good life that are dominant in a society thus represent an important aspect of cultural orientation. To gain insight into the form and function of these visions, two studies were conducted. In Study 1, the various criteria by which people judge their lives as good or worthy were examined using multidimensional scaling of responses from four different cultural groups of students: Chinese, East Asian Canadian, South Asian Canadian, and Western European Canadian. The results revealed two underlying structural dimensions on which both criteria and cultural groups could be differentiated. One reflected the locus of criterial goods and the other their morality. The clearest cultural contrast was between Chinese participants, who tended toward the prudential, materialistic, and hedonistic pole of the morality dimension, and South Asians, who tended more toward the spirituality and beneficence pole. In Study 2, the content of personal narratives produced by Chinese and South Asian students was analyzed to examine whether their contrasting orientations to the good life would be reflected in the kinds of life experiences they recounted. Some evidence of correspondence in this regard was found.

Understanding the rational and ethical sense that people make of their actions and experiences requires understanding the lives they are trying to live. The narrative visions of a good life that are dominant in a society thus represent an important aspect of cultural orientation. To gain insight into the form and function of these visions, two studies were conducted. In Study 1, the various criteria by which people judge their lives as good or worthy were examined using multidimensional scaling of responses from four different cultural groups of students: Chinese, East Asian Canadian, South Asian Canadian, and Western European Canadian. The results revealed two underlying structural dimensions on which both criteria and cultural groups could be differentiated. One reflected the locus of criterial goods and the other their morality. The clearest cultural contrast was between Chinese participants, who tended toward the prudential, materialistic, and hedonistic pole of the morality dimension, and South Asians, who tended more toward the spirituality and beneficence pole. In Study 2, the content of personal narratives produced by Chinese and South Asian students was analyzed to examine whether their contrasting orientations to the good life would be reflected in the kinds of life experiences they recounted. Some evidence of correspondence in this regard was found.

What is the meaning of life? This has been one of the major questions of philosophy for centuries / from Socrates to Nietzsche and from Tolstoy to the famous comedy writers&rsquo / group Monty Python. People from diverse intellectual backgrounds asked what the meaning of life is. Although there are doubts that this question is now outdated, meaning of life seems to me still an intriguing subject. In this thesis I argue that life&rsquo / s meaning must be discussed according to two different notions. One of these notions is the content of life where life&rsquo / s meaning can be analyzed according to its coherence with a value system, its achievements or its influence on others. The other is the notion of life&rsquo / s meaning as a mental concept, as an experience. I provide reasons to think life&rsquo / s meaning as a composite mental state and propose its components. My point of view carries subjectivist implications, however by introducing necessary conditions of the formation of the composite mental state that provides a life with meaning I argue that such a mental state attains objectivity.

In this work, I scrutinize Leopold&rsquo / s land ethic and Callicott&rsquo / s interpretation of it both from normative and meta-ethical perspectives by making textual and conceptual analyses. Leopold suggests that an ethic which makes us responsible for the protection of whole nature is evolutionarily possible and ecologically necessary. Callicott tried to buttress Leopold&rsquo / s land ethic by developing a nonanthropocentric axiology and some meta-principles. Moreover, in his view, Leopold&rsquo / s views are not only compatible with nonanthropocentric axiology but also imply it. I show that Leopold did not build the land ethic on nonanthropocentrism and he did not enforce attribution of intrinsic value to nature and its constituents. I argue that weak anthropocentrism is quite compatible with Leopold&rsquo / s views, and it provides a way to maintain normative power of land ethic without being ecofascistic. Furthermore, I discuss that Leopold might not have objected attribution of intrinsic value to nonhuman beings although he primarily referred to instrumental values of nature. Moreover, I argue that Leopold preferred a middle position between the concepts of preservation and conservation. As a man of practical wisdom Leopold has always tried to find middle and practicable ways between opposing extremes to harmonize human realm with nonhuman one and to grow the embryo of the conservationist movement. Finally, I argue that Leopold&rsquo / s land ethic is a human ethic which requires human moral agents to accept responsibility for protecting whole nature in order to attain good life.