[pt] Este trabalho investiga a relação de Foucault com a polêmica temática da pós-modernidade, através do debate Foucault-Habermas. Pós-modernidade é um conceito controverso, possuindo inúmeras leituras e caracterizações. Escolhemos o diálogo com Habermas, não apenas pela importância do filósofo alemão na cristalização desse conceito ao longo da década de 80, mas também porque ele direciona críticas diretas à filosofia foucaultiana. Habermas compreende a modernidade como um projeto inacabado, a ser resgatado e completado pelo desenvolvimento de uma racionalidade comunicativa. Sua teoria da modernidade, então, visa combater a pós-modernidade emergente, marcada pelo irracionalismo e pelo relativismo. Habermas enxerga em Nietzsche o ponto de inflexão para a pósmodernidade. A genealogia nietzschiana, método que será também o de Foucault, figura aos olhos do filósofo alemão como uma espécie de crítica devastadora da razão, que se dá nos limites exteriores da modernidade. Tratar-se-ia de uma crítica da razão enquanto tal, que a desmascara como mera vontade de poder e de dominação. Tentamos mostrar, então, o modo como o filósofo francês tratou do tema da modernidade. Para Foucault, se ela também se caracteriza pelo Iluminismo, é muito mais pela atitude crítica que ele desperta, do que por determinado modelo de racionalidade tido como ideal. O Iluminismo abriu a reflexão filosófica para a investigação de quem nós somos em nosso presente, do que é nossa atualidade, e consolidou o esforço de nos situarmos criticamente contra as racionalidades que nos orientam e que nos governam. Foucault enfatiza, então, a noção de maioridade kantiana: ser moderno é muito simplesmente a recusa de ser tutelado. Deste modo, toda a obra de Foucault complexifica a clássica narrativa Iluminista, que se apresenta nos termos de um progresso das Luzes, de uma luta da razão contra as sombras, do conhecimento contra a ignorância e os preconceitos, etc., mostrando que existem elementos autoritários no seio do próprio projeto da Ilustração. O Iluminismo se inscreveu na história não apenas como movimento de questionamento da autoridade da Igreja, mas também como questionamento de toda e qualquer autoridade. Se a razão moderna se torna uma nova fonte de autoridade, a crítica precisa se radicalizar em uma metacrítica, que possa dar conta das novas racionalidades que nos governam. / [en] This work investigates Foucault s relationship with the polemical thematic of post-modernity through the Foucault-Habermas debate. Postmodernity is a controversial concept, that encamps numerous readings and characterizations. We chose to dialogue with Habermas, not only because of the German philosopher s importance in the crystallization of this concept throughout the 80 s, but also because he criticize Foucault s philosophy directly. Habermas understands modernity as an unfinished project, yet to be rescued and completed by the development of a communicative rationality. His theory of modernity, then, aims to combat emerging postmodernity, marked by irrationalism and relativism. Habermas sees in Nietzsche the inflection point for postmodernity. The nietzschean genealogy, which will also be that of Foucault s, appears to Habermas as a kind of devastating critique of reason, that takes place on the outer limits of modernity: they both unmasks reason as a mere will to power and domination. We then try to show how the French philosopher dealt with the theme of modernity. For Foucault, if modernity is also characterized by the Enlightenment, it is much more for the critical attitude that it evokes, than for a certain model of rationality considered as ideal. Foucault argues that the Enlightenment opened the philosophical reflection for the investigation of who we are in our present, of what is our present, in a way that consolidated the effort to situate ourselves critically against the rationalities that guide us and that govern us. Foucault then emphasizes the kantian notion of adulthood: being modern is very simply the refusal to be tutored. In this sense, the whole work of Foucault complicates the classical Illuminist narrative, which is usually presented in terms of a progress of the Lights, a struggle of reason against the shadows, knowledge against ignorance and prejudices, etc., by showing that there are authoritarian elements inside the Enlightenment movement. The Enlightenment not only represents the movement of questioning the authority of the Church - it represents the questioning of all forms of authority. If modern reason becomes a new source of authority criticism must radicalize itself into a metacritical posture in the order to apprehend the new rationalities that govern us today.

No description available.

This thesis maintains that Jürgen Habermas‘s moral and political theories rely on a modified version of Kant‘s notion of normativity. Taking this as a starting point, it examines this component in light of criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant. The thesis shows that Habermas can answer most of the criticisms that could arise from Hegel‘s critique. That said, Hegel‘s criticism of the will as a tester of maxims does apply to Habermas. This criticism states that Kant cannot connect the universal will of morality and the particular will of the empirical subject because he rules out particular contents as susceptible of being universalized. And it can apply to Habermas because he set strict limits to what can count as a content which may bleed into the justification of moral norms and, following Kenneth Baynes – in his interpretation of Habermas‘s theory –, of legal and political norms. To be justifiable, – according to Habermas – these norms need to embody generalizable interests and they cannot be based on particular interests. However, Habermas infers from this that norms can only be justified with impartial, that is agent-neutral reasons, and cannot be justified with agent-relative reasons. From this, emerges the question whether and to what extent a theory of this sort can successfully include particular contents (for example a particular agents‘ real interests, inclinations and needs). The strict version of the generalizability of norms seems to occlude this possibility. Nonetheless, it is possible to rebut this criticism by slackening the strong version of normative justification that Habermas has built into the theory. By means of an analysis of two elements that he incorporates into his reconstruction of the normative point of view, namely, the concept of ideal role taking and the notion of mutual recognition, it is possible to argue that the loosening of the strict notion of generalizability is a modification that does not contradict and actually coheres with Habermas‘s Kantian concept of moral reason, and this operation fortifies the theory in the face of the Hegelian criticism of the will as a tester of maxims. To develop these issues, this work is divided in two parts with two chapters each part. Part I is an analysis of Habermas‘s notion of moral reason and autonomy and it reconstructs its normative Kantianism. After that, it discusses Hegelian criticisms of Habermas‘s moral theory. Part II focuses on Habermas‘s political Kantianism in Between Facts and Norms and in the debate with Rawls and it examines Hegelian criticisms of that Kantianism.

This thesis examines the “postsecular turn” taken by the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas since 2001, with a particular focus on his political theory. It argues that the postsecular turn was motivated primarily by the limitations of Habermas' philosophical paradigm of postmetaphysical thinking. It then analyses his model of postsecular deliberative democracy, and argues that the model should be rejected due to its reliance on an unworkable procedure of sacred-to-secular translation. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part 1 is an analysis of the place of religion in Habermas' writings on social theory from the 1970s and 1980s. It outlines his original account of religious language, and of the “linguistification of the sacred” which accompanies the transition from traditional to modern societies. Part 2 focuses on Habermas' paradigm of postmetaphysical thinking, and shows that the paradigm creates the conditions for postmetaphysical thinkers to appropriate religious concepts. It also argues that Habermas' inability to address the “anthropic problem” in postmetaphysical terms led to his turn to postsecularism. Part 3 examines the model of postsecular deliberative democracy which Habermas has argued for since 2001. Drawing on the accounts of religious language from Part 1 and of appropriation from Part 2, it concludes that the procedure of sacred-to-secular translation on which the model relies is unworkable.

Abstract not available

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät III--Würzburg--Bayrische Julius-Maximilians Universität, 2000. / Bibliogr. p. 448-456.

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Thesis (MEd (Curriculum Leadership))--University of South Australia, 1995

This dissertation aims to evaluate the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas with reference to the arguments it provides for a theory of radical social democratic politics. Habermas is a German philosopher and social theorist whose broad concern is the defence and elaboration of the 'project of modernity'. This means that he wishes to justify modern, developed societies as viable and worthwhile forms of civilization. He attempts to specify and redeem the claim that these societies represent, potentially, the most advanced and rational way of organizing human life. Habermas is committed, among the various political programs which raise this kind of claim and seek to realize it in practice, to a form of radical social democracy. This tradition of theory and practice pursues the task of human emancipation by means of fundamental reforms to the social, cultural, economic and political institutions of contemporary modern societies. Habermas' work can be understood as one of the most systematic contributions to this tradition. The central question guiding the dissertation concerns the theoretical and political adequacy of this contribution. The dissertation establishes two general criteria for evaluating Habermas' work. The first criterion requires identifying the normative foundations of social democratic politics. It is argued that a 'theory of the rational' is needed to satisfy this. Such a theory must demonstrate that the social structures and political institutions of the modern epoch represent an hitherto unprecedented opportunity for the expression of the human capacity for rationality. The exposition of normative grounds for social democratic politics determines the basis for social criticism and political struggle. A theory of the rational, in other words, informs us of why we are struggling. Nonetheless, such a theory, on its own, cannot provide guidance about how to struggle. The second criterion of evaluation relates to this question of 'how', of what theoretical direction can be given to political practice. The dissertation contends, in this regard, that a 'theory of the irrational' is necessary. It is argued that a theory of the irrational offers a framework for orienting social movements in struggles against those obstacles which stand in the way of a further expansion of rationality. Such a theory seeks to understand the irrationality of human life in an effort to recommend political strategies that can intervene prudently in the current state of affairs. It is maintained that a satisfactory construction of both theories is essential for an adequate comprehension of radical social democratic politics. The dissertation pursues this argument by clarifying the nature of three dimensions of 'critique' within Habermas' oeuvre. Conceptions of critique represent methodological frameworks for formulating theories of the rational and the irrational. Habermas deploys these methods of critique throughout his work. It is argued, however, that his application of critique focuses primarily on providing a theory of the rational. The central thesis is that while he offers the rudiments of a theory of the irrational, this theory is underdeveloped. Since this theory addresses the question of how social movements are to struggle, it is argued that Habermas' approach lacks a practical dimension. The dissertation concludes that his contribution in this regard needs to be elaborated more consistently and in more detail. The dissertation represents an internal analysis of Habermas' work. It seeks to ascertain whether his theory achieves the philosophical and political goals required by the tradition of thought to which it belongs. The dissertation contributes to the critical literature on Habermas' writings in three substantial ways. First, it establishes a framework for understanding how the separate elements of his theory fit together. The identification of general criteria with respect to which a theory of social democracy is to be evaluated means that the political purposes of these various elements can be understood more clearly. The tensions between them can also be illustrated. Second, with the help of this framework, the dissertation expands upon and sharpens longstanding criticisms of Habermas' thinking which have pointed to a missing practical dimension. Third, the dissertation identifies theoretical resources, elaborated by Habermas himself, which it is argued can be used to overcome these problems of impracticality. With this, the dissertation also contributes, in a more indirect way, to the current debate about the meaning of and possibilities for social democratic politics.

This thesis is an exploration of the condition of critical debate in contemporary liberal democracies that is based upon a combined reading of the works of Hannah Arendt and Jurgen Habermas. It begins with an elaboration of the position that Arendt and Habermas identify a similar malaise as afflicting modern liberal democracies, which is argued to result from a shared perception that such democracies fail to create a forum for critical public engagement. The argument that their democratic theories are highly complementary is further developed through an examination of their solutions to this critical failure, for these solutions reflect a sharing of important premises concerning the nature of power and freedom on the parts of Habermas and Arendt. A complementary reading of Arendt and Habermas also allows for a synthesis of their theories that results in a highly coherent picture of the form and processes of an ideal democratic forum. This synthesis of Habermas and Arendt, however, also suggests (or, at least, allows for the theorising of) the emergence of a new genus of political actor who is unlikely to engage in such a forum – a genus hereafter referred to as homo spectaculorum. This thesis, therefore, makes three related claims. The first, and most important, is that it is possible to read Arendt and Habermas together as highly compatible democratic theorists and that their analysis of contemporary political conditions presents a single position from which to view the critical failings of liberal democracies. The second claim is that synthesising Arendt’s and Habermas’s democratic theories enables the theorising of an ideal public space, along with the emergence of homo spectaculorum. The third, and final, claim made in this thesis is that the same conditions that lead to the emergence of homo spectaculorum can be understood to undermine the emancipatory potential otherwise proffered through critical public spaces.