Cyber-crime, terrorism and hacking is a topic discussed widely and many independent groups as for example Wikileaks and Anonymous are often taken into consideration when discussing cyber-crime. When researching cybercrime and  it is important to first research the legal background as to the purpose of the creation of the internet, and to what extend state control is an issue in the matter of both cybercrime being carried out and the establishment of cyber activist groups. How shall the law be interpreted in the case of internet hacking and under what category do these fit, terrorists, cybercriminals or hackers.

There is an ongoing struggle in the digital public sphere over the signification of “Anonymous.” Anonymous exists at the intersection of multiple discursive networks battling for control of the internet including governments, private corporations, non-governmental organizations, individual citizens and multi-lateral institutions. In this dissertation, I propose to document and analyze the battle for signification and re-signification of “Anonymous” between the American network state and hacktivist networks that deploy the moniker Anonymous. Internally, I argue that Anonymous is a meme complex used by counterpublic networks of satire and/or dissent. Anonymous originated in a digital civic space: the image board 4chan. The tactics of Anonymous reflect the creative culture of 4chan. On 4chan, participants share, alter, create and exchange memes. Anonymous networks practice “image politics” and operate on a logic of mass inclusion that treats the cyberspace as a location of direct action as well as organization. Externally, Anonymous highlights the contradictory nature of American responses to hacktivism. While there is universal rejection of Anonymous within the American network state, the State Department rhetorically supports hacktivism in places such as Egypt while the FBI, US Cyber Command, and NSA label domestic hacktivists as terrorists. The outcome of the rhetorical battle over Anonymous has implications for the future of free speech and protest in cyberspace. Domestic penalties for cyberactivists are severe, and the preservation of the rhetorical space for digital protest is under threat.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

In the age of the Internet, extreme groups have seen resurgence in the way they can communicate and recruit through the new medium whether they are white supremacists or hacktivists. Examining the history and modern behaviors of both white supremacy groups and Anonymous, this paper aims to research and answer how the different groups use the Internet to influence identities and if the methods to do so differ from the old ones and through the use of several concepts, mainly the Echo Chamber and the Filter Bubble, narrow down the effects that leads to a person joining an extreme group.

À en croire Chris Hables Gray nous sommes tous devenus des cyborg citizen. La science-fiction regorge de ces corps fantasmés de cyborgs aux allures de dieux antiques parcourant les espaces intersidéraux ou bien voyageant dans le temps. Toujours plus beaux, performants, rapides et intelligents que l'homo sapiens sapiens, les êtres humains du futur sont généralement divisés en deux catégories : ceux qui ont évolué et ceux qui sont toujours aussi limités que l'homme actuel, « obsolètes » pour employer le mot de néo-mutants comme Lukas Zpira ou Stélarc. Tantôt machine anthropomorphe aux airs de dieu omnipotent, tantôt cerveau synthétique omniscient, l'I.A. renvoie en partie à « la fin », au double sens du terme, de l'humanité. Le cyborg, la fin de l’homme ou un homme meilleur ? Ces « intentions mélioristes » qui laissent sceptique un David Le Breton sont perceptibles dans le cinéma, la littérature ou le jeu vidéo. Le corps s’altère. Humain, trop humain, surhumain, posthumain ? Au travers des progrès scientifiques, tant de la génétique que des technologies de l'information, le corps humain lambda se retrouve trié sur le volet à la naissance par des politiques eugénistes dissimulées sous des propos de luttes contre les maladies à la manière d'un Bienvenue à Gattaca, puis propulsé dans les mondes virtuels, pénétrant des royaumes, jusqu'à présent fictifs, sur une base quotidienne par le biais des technologies qui l'entourent. Le rêve des body hacktivistes est une hétérotopie futuriste, où chacun est libre de choisir sa mutation et où La Mouche de David Cronenberg pourrait côtoyer un Na'vi d'Avatar sans que personne ne s’étonne de ces corps de freaks qui ne sont plus simplement des corps de cyborgs à l'aspect humain mais des corps de monstres à l'esprit humain. Ces biocyborgs sont paradoxalement plus humains que nous. Quelle part restera-t-il de notre corps charnel dans le corps futur ? Y-a-t-il encore une place pour l'homo sapiens sapiens dans le futur ou bien sera-t-il forcé d'abandonner son corps ? À en croire Paul Virilio ou Jean Baudrillard, la disparition du corps est inévitable. Après avoir mis en évidence l’histoire et la généalogie du cyborg, du mythe fictionnel à sa réalisation actuelle, cette thèse se demandera « qu’est-ce que vivre en cyborgs aujourd’hui ? » / According to Chris Hable Gray we all are cyborg citizen now. Science-fiction is full of fantasy bodies looking like ancient gods wandering through space and time, always more beautiful, capable of more performances, faster and smarter than homo sapiens sapiens, generally beings of the future belong to two types: those who evolved and those that remained as limited as present humans, « obsolete » to quote the word of neo-mutants like Lukas Zpira or Stélarc. Some are anthropomorphic almighty god-like machines, others all-knowing synthetic brains, A.I. partly refers to « the end » of Humankind in its double meaning. Is the cyborg the end of man or a better human? Those intended enhancements which puzzled David Le Breton are seen in films, literature or video games. The body alters itself. Human, too human, superhuman, posthuman? Through scientific progress both in genetic and in mass media, the everyday human body finds himself screened at birth by eugenic policies hidden under motives like fight against diseases, as depicted in Gattaca and then thrown into virtual worlds on a daily base, entering kingdoms, fictive so far, using the surrounding technologies. The Body Hacktivist's dream is a futuristic heterotopia, where everyone is free to choose his mutation and where the David Cronenberg's Fly could walk alongside a Na'vi from Avatars surprising no one by their freaks bodies, ultimately: not cyborg bodies looking like humans but freak bodies implanted with human souls. Those biocyborgs are paradoxically more human than we are. What part of our carnal body will remain? Does homo sapiens sapiens have a future or will he need to shed away his body ? If we follow Paul Virilio or Jean Baudrillard, the vanishing of the body is inescapable. After bringing out the history and genealogy of the cyborg, from fictional myth to actual realisation, this thesis will endeavour to show “what is living as a cyborg nowadays?”

This thesis aims to discuss the Surveillance Society discourse, especially in relation with political analysis in a historical framework by means of new technologies. This study also analyzes the use of so-called revolutionary information and telecommunication technologies for data recording and tracking is analyzed, which is used to regulate the order of the system by the power holders. The limits of thought are traced to Foucault and Lyon. To this context an attempt is made to show that surveillance/ monitoring is growing as a result of the developments in information and communication technologies. Dataveillance is being carried out by Internet, ID cards, and bank credit cards. Focus is on awareness as a midway between paranoia and utopic futurism against surveillance suppression.

Submitted by Leonardo Cavalcante (leo.ocavalcante@gmail.com) on 2018-04-06T19:36:10Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Arquivototal.pdf: 2079200 bytes, checksum: 06b2527ecca826172c32b42bb3ef3e3c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-06T19:36:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Arquivototal.pdf: 2079200 bytes, checksum: 06b2527ecca826172c32b42bb3ef3e3c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-21 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The maxim that says "information is power" takes on a larger and more complex dimension when experienced in the era of the spread of Internet access and the revolution of microcomputing. In this sense, we understand the hacktivist, as a political actor because of the possibilities of activism that are tied to their technical expertise. For this study, we conducted eight interviews, among researchers and hacktivists. We used A. Samuel (2004) to bring typologies of practices and definitions of hacktivism, M. Castells (2003, 2013), to instruct the research about internet legislation, M. Machado (2013, 2015) and S. Silveira (2010, 2015), who approach and research hacktivism in Brazil, and e F. Malini e H. Antoun (2013), with the definition about narrative hacker. Our research is centralized on the hacktivists organizations media, such as WikiLeaks and Mídia Ninja, focusing on two specific cases in which the organizations acted as narrative hackers: during the economic crisis in Iceland in 2008 and during the June Journeys of 2013, in Brazil, respectively. We verify that the two cases of hacking preceded and stressed the debate about digital rights and internet access, resulting in digital rights laws in their respective countries. / A máxima que diz ―informação é poder‖ toma uma dimensão maior e mais complexa quando vivenciada na era da propagação do acesso à internet e da revolução da microinformática. Neste sentido, entendemos o hacktivista, como um ator político em razão das possibilidades de ativismo que estão atreladas à sua perícia técnica. Para este estudo, realizamos oito entrevistas, dentre pesquisadores e hacktivistas e como escopo teórico utilizamos A. Samuel (2004), para trazer tipologias de práticas e definições de hacktivismo, M. Castells (2003, 2013), para tratar das pesquisas sobre legislação na internet, M. Machado (2013, 2015) e S. Silveira (2010, 2015), que abordam e pesquisam o hacktivismo no Brasil, e F. Malini e H. Antoun (2013), com sua definição de hacker de narrativas. Nossa pesquisa fica centrada nas organizações midiáticas hacktivistas, tais como WikiLeaks e Mídia Ninja, focando em dois casos específicos nos quais as organizações atuaram como hacker de narrativas: durante a crise econômica da Islândia em 2008 e durante as Jornadas de Junho de 2013, no Brasil, respectivamente. Constatamos que os dois hackeamentos predisseram e tensionaram o debate acerca de direitos digitais e acesso à internet, resultando em legislações sobre direitos digitais nos respectivos países.

abstract: The current study examines the role that context plays in hackers' perceptions of the risks and payoffs characterizing a hacktivist attack. Hacktivism (i.e., hacking to convey a moral, ethical, or social justice message) is examined through a general game theoretic framework as a product of costs and benefits, as well as the contextual cues that may sway hackers' estimations of each. In two pilot studies, a bottom-up approach is utilized to identify the key motives underlying (1) past attacks affiliated with a major hacktivist group, Anonymous, and (2) popular slogans utilized by Anonymous in its communication with members, targets, and broader society. Three themes emerge from these analyses, namely: (1) the prevalence of first-person plural pronouns (i.e., we, our) in Anonymous slogans; (2) the prevalence of language inducing status or power; and (3) the importance of social injustice in triggering Anonymous activity. The present research therefore examines whether these three contextual factors activate participants' (1) sense of deindividuation, or the loss of an individual's personal self in the context of a group or collective; and (2) motive for self-serving power or society-serving social justice. Results suggest that participants' estimations of attack likelihood stemmed solely from expected payoffs, rather than their interplay with subjective risks. As expected, the use of we language led to a decrease in subjective risks, possibly due to primed effects of deindividuation. In line with game theory, the joint appearance of both power and justice motives resulted in (1) lower subjective risks, (2) higher payoffs, and (3) higher attack likelihood overall. Implications for policymakers and the understanding and prevention of hacktivism are discussed, as are the possible ramifications of deindividuation and power for the broader population of Internet users around the world. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Psychology 2015

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2017-03-17T15:47:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 anacarolinaestoranipolessadasilva.pdf: 3934146 bytes, checksum: 2ea80032b4d6680f45a112ec16b3501a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-03-18T12:15:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 anacarolinaestoranipolessadasilva.pdf: 3934146 bytes, checksum: 2ea80032b4d6680f45a112ec16b3501a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-18T12:15:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 anacarolinaestoranipolessadasilva.pdf: 3934146 bytes, checksum: 2ea80032b4d6680f45a112ec16b3501a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-09-27 / Este trabalho apresenta a construção, as influências políticas e sociais sofridas pela Cultura Hacker em suas duas principais raízes (divididas em dois capítulos): por meio da exploração de linhas telefônicas desde 1878 até sua evolução para o phreaking por volta da década de 1960. Posteriormente, o phreaking foi absorvido por movimentos de contracultura nos Estados Unidos, se tornando uma forma de protesto contra a guerra do Vietnã a partir da década de 1970, período ao qual a prática foi popularizada gerando grandes prejuízos a empresas de telefonia, se tornando assim, um problema social. A segunda raiz da Cultura Hacker está relacionada ao surgimento dos primeiros computadores por volta do final da Guerra Mundial, inicialmente restrita ao meio acadêmico e ao setor militar, com forte influência da Guerra Fria e do chamado mito pós-nuclear, até começar a emergir para a população em geral na metade da década de 1970, em função do início das vendas dos computadores pessoais, que fez com que o phreaking e o hacking de computador convergissem durante este período. Buscando apresentar uma perspectiva diferenciada, pesquisamos os desafios para a construção da Cultura hacker no Brasil, colocando o país dentro de um contexto que se desenvolvia em diversos países do mundo no final da década de 1980. Com o desenvolvimento da rede mundial de computadores no início da década de 1990, o número de usuários da internet passou a crescer de maneira vertiginosa e entre 1994 e 1996, surge o hacktivismo - ativismo feito por hackers - que buscavam garantir o anonimato e a liberdade de expressão e do próprio ciberespaço. Na terceira parte do trabalho, analisamos a forma ao qual o Anonymous ampliou os limites do hacktivismo, apresentando quais são os principais motivos que desencadeiam suas ações, baseando suas atividades na ideia de Cidade por Projetos idealizada por Luc Boltanski e Eve Chiapello. / This work presents the construction, the political and social influences underwent by the Hacker Culture in its two main branches (divided in two chapters): through the exploration of telephone lines since 1878 until its evolution to phreaking around the decade of 1960. Afterwards, the Phreaking was absorbed by counter-cultural movements in the United States, becoming a protest tool against the Vietnam War after 1970, period on which this practice rose on popularity, causing a great loss to phone companies, becoming, thus, a social problem. The second branch of the Hacker Culture is related to the development of the first computers by the end of the First World War, initially restricted to scientific and military organizations with great influence of the Cold War and the so-called “post-nuclear myth”, until it starts to spread out to the rest of the population during the second half of 1970, due to the sales of personal computers, which made such practices like Phreaking and Hacking to converge during this period. In order to present a differentiated approach, we researched the challenges related to the construction of the Hacker Culture in Brazil, introducing the country in a context that developed itself in many other countries in the end of 1980. With the growth of the World Wide Web in the beginning of the 1990, the number of internet users started to skyrocket and, between 1994 and 1996, comes up the hacker-activism – that was an activism made by hackers in order to ensure anonymity and the their own freedom of expression, along with the freedom of the cyberspace. In the third part of the work, we analyze how the group Anonymous expanded the limits of this “hacktivism”, showing what the reasons that initiated its actions are, basing its activities on the idea of the “Projective City”, designed by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello.

This thesis investigates if Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks constitute a valid form ofcivil disobedience online. For this purpose a multi-dimensional framework is established,drawing on Brownlee’s paradigm case and classical theory of civil disobedience. Threedifferent examples of DDoS attacks are then examined using this framework - the attacksfrom the Electronic Disturbance Theater in support of the Zapatista movement;Anonymous’ Operation Payback; Electrohippies’ attack against the World TradeOrganization. Following the framework, none of these DDoS attacks are able to constitute acivilly disobedient act online. The thesis then goes on and identifies four key issues, drawingon the results from the examples: The loss of 'individual presence', no inimitable feature ofDDoS attacks, impeding free speech and the danger of western imperialism. It concludes thatDDoS attacks cannot and should not be seen as a form of civil disobedience online. Thethesis further proposes that online actions, in order to be seen as civilly disobedient actsonline, need two additional features: An 'individual presence' of the protesters online tocompensate for the remoteness of cyberspace and an inimitable feature in order to berecognizable by society. Further research should investigate with this extended framework ifthere are valid forms of civil disobedience online.