In this thesis, the problem of partitioning a network into interconnected sub-networks is addressed. The goal is to achieve a partitioning which satisfies a set of specific engineering constraints, imposed in this case, by the requirements of the decomposed state-estimation (DSE) in electrical power systems. The network-partitioning problem is classified as NP-hard problem. Although many heuristic algorithms have been proposed for its solution, these often lack directness and computational simplicity. In this thesis, three new partitioning techniques are described which (i) satisfy the DSE constraints, and (ii) simplify the NP-hard problem by using the natural graph properties of a network. The first technique is based on partitioning a spanning tree optimally using the natural property of the spanning tree branches. As with existing heuristic techniques, information on the partitioning is obtained only at the end of the partitioning process. The study of the DSE constraints leads to define conditions of an ideal balanced partitioning. This enables data on the balanced partitioning to be obtained, including the numbers of boundary nodes and cut-edges. The second partitioning technique is designed to obtain these data for a given network, by finding the minimum covering set of nodes with maximum nodal degree. Further simplification is then possible if additional graph-theoretical properties are used. A new natural property entitled the 'edge state phenomenon' is defined. The edge state phenomenon may be exploited to generate new network properties. In the third partitioning technique, two of these, the 'network external closed path' and the 'open internal paths', are used to identify the balanced partitioning, and hence to partition the network. Examples of the application of all three methods to network partitioning are provided.

This thesis evaluates the integrated information theory (IIT) by looking at how it may answer some central problems of consciousness that the author thinks any theory of consciousness should be able to explain. The problems concerned are the mind-body problem, the hard problem, the explanatory gap, the binding problem, and the problem of objectively detecting consciousness. The IIT is a computational theory of consciousness thought to explain the rise of consciousness. First the mongrel term consciousness is defined to give a clear idea of what is meant by consciousness in this thesis; followed by a presentation of the IIT, its origin, main ideas, and some implications of the theory. Thereafter the problems of consciousness will be presented, and the explanation the IIT gives will be investigated. In the discussion, some not perviously—in the thesis—discussed issues regarding the theory will be lifted. The author finds the IIT to hold explanations to each of the problems discussed. Whether the explanations are satisfying is questionable.

In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.

Le « problème difficile » de la conscience (Chalmers 1996) ou la question de pourquoi nos états mentaux sont dotés d’une certaine qualité subjective met en évidence l’existence d’un « écart explicatif » (Levine 1983) entre l'expérience vécue du sujet et les structures physiques et fonctionnelles du cerveau (ou de l’organisme dans son ensemble). Parmi les plusieurs solutions envisagées pour le trancher, le monisme neutre s’érige comme une option attirante entre les extrêmes du physicalisme et le dualisme. Dérivé initialement de la pensée de Bertrand Russell (1927), le monisme neutre part d’une simple constatation : dans notre conception scientifique de la matière, il y a un écart conceptuel important entre le rôle causal qu’on lui reconnait, et ses propriétés intrinsèques, fondamentales, qu’on ignore complètement. En d’autres mots, on sait que la matière se comporte de telle ou telle façon, mais on ne comprend pas pourquoi il en est ainsi. En ce sens, la nature fondamentale de la matière ne serait ni de l’ordre physique ni de l’ordre mental, mais quelque chose de neutre duquel émergeraient les propriétés physiques et mentales. L‘objectif de notre mémoire est d’expliquer en détail les antécédents, l’origine, le développement, l’évolution et les perspectives de cette solution en la comparant, notamment, avec d’autres postures monistes et neutralistes. Au passage, nous allons aussi évaluer certaines des objections qui ont été formulées à son égard. On s’attardera enfin sur quelques formulations contemporaines inspirées de la thèse russellienne dans le but de réfléchir sur leur plausibilité. / The “hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers 1996) or the question on why our mental states are endowed with a certain subjective quality renders evident the existence of an “explanatory gap” (Levine 1983) between the experience lived by the subject and the brain’s physical and functional structures (or the organism’s altogether). Among the many solutions devised to solve it, Neutral Monism stands as an appealing alternative between the extremes of physicalism and dualism. Initially derived from Bertrand Russell’s thought (1927), Neutral Monism departs from this starting fact: within our scientific conception of matter, there is an important conceptual gap between the causal role thereof and its hitherto unknown intrinsic, fundamental properties. In other words, we know that matter behaves in such and such a way, but we do not know why it is so. In the light of these facts, the fundamental nature of matter is neither physical nor mental, but it identifies to a neutral stuff from which would emerge both the physical and mental properties. In that sense, this research focuses on spelling out the antecedents, origin, development, evolution and prospects of this solution, comparing it with other monist and neutralist positions. As research develops, we shall assess some of the objections raised against it. Finally, we shall consider some contemporary formulations inspired by the Russellian thesis in order to reflect upon their plausibility.

Since the advent of human consciousness all manner of theoreticians from mystics to philosophers, and linguists to scientists have considered why and how it is that an individuated self seems to occupy or indwell a physical body. There is a common experiential sense, in other words, in which personal consciousness and our bodies are felt to be two different things. Two broad areas of opinion attempting to explain this apparent bifurcation are defined for the purpose of addressing this problem: Essentialists who variously maintain that there are non-physical properties inherent to all forms and functions of physicality; and Physicalists who claim that the extant universe as a multiplicity of complex material processes is the only reality. The respective natures of body and mind and the ways in which they relate has yielded an extraordinary variety of hypotheses within and between these two broad categories. In this thesis the dilemma is called the Hard Problem and it focuses particularly on the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Recently, Ken Wilber has constructed an Integral Philosophy which attempts a synergistic gradation of all possible genres of experience and knowledge into one cohesive scheme representing the total Reality. The culminating point of Wilber’s theory claims resolution of the Hard Problem, indeed of all appearances of duality, in the realisation of consummate emptiness in mystical consciousness. Wilber’s proposal therefore tenders a version of Essentialism since it implies that an Absolute principle is inherent to all existence. The problem explored in this study considers whether the epistemological architecture of Wilber’s Philosophy is coherent and consistent. Following a critical appraisal of Wilber’s system it is proposed that epistemological coherence is more likely to be achieved by retaining the ontology of consciousness and matter to only one kind. In this way the scientific protocols which Wilber imports to validate his truth-claims are protected from ontological confusion. Whether this non-dual Physicalism is adequate as a means of explaining consciousness, and particularly mystical consciousness, is moot. Perhaps there remains an inalienable quality in mysticism which will always elude our ability to apprehend it. / Christian Sprituality, Church History & Missiology / D. Th. (Christian Spirituality)

No description available.

Since the advent of human consciousness all manner of theoreticians from mystics to philosophers, and linguists to scientists have considered why and how it is that an individuated self seems to occupy or indwell a physical body. There is a common experiential sense, in other words, in which personal consciousness and our bodies are felt to be two different things. Two broad areas of opinion attempting to explain this apparent bifurcation are defined for the purpose of addressing this problem: Essentialists who variously maintain that there are non-physical properties inherent to all forms and functions of physicality; and Physicalists who claim that the extant universe as a multiplicity of complex material processes is the only reality. The respective natures of body and mind and the ways in which they relate has yielded an extraordinary variety of hypotheses within and between these two broad categories. In this thesis the dilemma is called the Hard Problem and it focuses particularly on the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Recently, Ken Wilber has constructed an Integral Philosophy which attempts a synergistic gradation of all possible genres of experience and knowledge into one cohesive scheme representing the total Reality. The culminating point of Wilber’s theory claims resolution of the Hard Problem, indeed of all appearances of duality, in the realisation of consummate emptiness in mystical consciousness. Wilber’s proposal therefore tenders a version of Essentialism since it implies that an Absolute principle is inherent to all existence. The problem explored in this study considers whether the epistemological architecture of Wilber’s Philosophy is coherent and consistent. Following a critical appraisal of Wilber’s system it is proposed that epistemological coherence is more likely to be achieved by retaining the ontology of consciousness and matter to only one kind. In this way the scientific protocols which Wilber imports to validate his truth-claims are protected from ontological confusion. Whether this non-dual Physicalism is adequate as a means of explaining consciousness, and particularly mystical consciousness, is moot. Perhaps there remains an inalienable quality in mysticism which will always elude our ability to apprehend it. / Christian Sprituality, Church History and Missiology / D. Th. (Christian Spirituality)

Thesis (Ph.D. (Statistics)) -- University of Limpopo, 2017 / Operations Research (OR) is a scientific method for developing quantitatively well-grounded recommendations for decision making. While it is true that it uses a variety of mathematical techniques, OR has a much broader scope. It is in fact a systematic approach to solving problems, which uses one or more analytical tools in the process of analysis. Over the years, OR has evolved through different stages. This study is motivated by new real-world challenges needed for efficiency and innovation in line with the aims and objectives of OR – the science of better, as classified by the OR Society of the United Kingdom. New real-world challenges are encountered on a daily basis from problems arising in the fields of water, energy, agriculture, mining, tourism, IT development, natural phenomena, transport, climate change, economic and other societal requirements. To counter all these challenges, new techniques ought to be developed. The growth of global markets and the resulting increase in competition have highlighted the need for OR techniques to be improved. These developments, among other reasons, are an indication that new techniques are needed to improve the day-to-day running of organisations, regardless of size, type and location. The principal aim of this study is to modify and develop new OR techniques that can be used to solve emerging problems encountered in the areas of linear programming, integer programming, mixed integer programming, network routing and travelling salesman problems. Distribution models, resource allocation models, travelling salesman problem, general linear mixed integer ii programming and other network problems that occur in real life, have been modelled mathematically in this thesis. Most of these models belong to the NP-hard (non-deterministic polynomial) class of difficult problems. In other words, these types of problems cannot be solved in polynomial time (P). No general purpose algorithm for these problems is known. The thesis is divided into two major areas namely: (1) network models and (2) resource allocation and distribution models. Under network models, five new techniques have been developed: the minimum weight algorithm for a non-directed network, maximum reliability route in both non-directed and directed acyclic network, minimum spanning tree with index less than two, routing through 0k0 specified nodes, and a new heuristic to the travelling salesman problem. Under the resource allocation and distribution models section, four new models have been developed, and these are: a unified approach to solve transportation and assignment problems, a transportation branch and bound algorithm for the generalised assignment problem, a new hybrid search method over the extreme points for solving a large-scale LP model with non-negative coefficients, and a heuristic for a mixed integer program using the characteristic equation approach. In most of the nine approaches developed in the thesis, efforts were done to compare the effectiveness of the new approaches to existing techniques. Improvements in the new techniques in solving problems were noted. However, it was difficult to compare some of the new techniques to the existing ones because computational packages of the new techniques need to be developed first. This aspect will be subject matter of future research on developing these techniques further. It was concluded with strong evidence, that development of new OR techniques is a must if we are to encounter the emerging problems faced by the world today. Key words: NP-hard problem, Network models, Reliability, Heuristic, Largescale LP, Characteristic equation, Algorithm.

Le « problème difficile » de la conscience est un des problèmes centraux de la philosophie de l’esprit. Faisant écho au problème corps-esprit de Descartes, le problème difficile met en évidence les difficultés épistémologiques et ontologiques de la thèse physicaliste qui cherche à réduire l’expérience subjective à un caractère physique et fonctionnel. Ce mémoire propose une réponse potentielle au problème difficile de la conscience selon l’approche énactive, plus précisément selon une variante de l’approche énactive que nous appelons parfois l’énactivisme autopoïétique. L’énactivisme autopoïétique se présente comme une approche alternative aux tendances dominantes en sciences cognitives dites « limitées au cerveau. » Contrairement au courant cognitiviste, l’énactivisme autopoïétique propose une conception de l'esprit centrée sur l'activité incarnée de l'organisme. Au coeur de cette conception de l’esprit incarné se trouve le concept d’autopoïèse, une théorie de la vie organique et de l’autonomie biologique définie selon l'activité de donation de sens des organismes vivants. Ce concept est au centre de la solution au problème difficile de l'énactivisme autopoïétique, car il révèle les profondes similitudes entre la vie et l'esprit. / The “hard problem” of consciousness is one of the central problems of philosophy of the mind. Echoing Descartes’s mind-body problem, the hard problem highlights the epistemological and ontological difficulties of physicalism in its attempt to reduce subjective experience to a physical and functional character. This thesis proposes a potential answer to the hard problem of consciousness by the enactive approach, more specifically a variant of the enactive approach that we sometimes call autopoietic enactivism. Autopoietic enactivism presents itself as an alternative approach to “brain-bound” approaches in cognitive science. In contrast to the cognitivist trend, autopoietic enactivism presents a conception of the mind centred around the embodied activity of an organism. At the heart of this embodied conception of the mind lies the concept of autopoiesis, a theory of organic life and biological autonomy defined by the sense-making activity of living organisms. This concept is central to autopoietic enactivism’s solution to the hard problem, as it reveals the deep similarities between both life and mind.

Le physicalisme explique scientifiquement le problème de la conscience et peut se définir comme étant le problème résiduel de toutes les tentatives de réduction. Le physicalisme, dès lors, doit-il être toujours considéré comme la position métaphysique dominante et comme la méthodologie incontournable de toute théorie de la conscience ? Les tenants d’un physicalisme matérialiste radical réfutent le caractère irréductible du ressenti de conscience sur les processus neurobiolologiques. Cependant, éliminer la réalité idéelle du ressenti subjectif de l’expérience consciente semble n’aboutir qu’à l’échec du physicalisme dans sa vision matérialiste radicale car la seule analyse structurelle et perceptuelle des caractères phénoménaux d’un organisme ne peut traiter de manière explicite le caractère subjectif de l’expérience consciente. Les philosophes non réductionnistes et les dualistes postulent, donc, le dépassement du physicalisme à travers un néo-dualisme moderne. Dès lors, le ressenti de conscience doit-il être considéré comme un simple dépassement du physicalisme ou devons-nous le considérer comme étant au-delà du physicalisme ? La question essentielle qui se posera tout au long de notre thèse sur le ressenti de conscience est de savoir pourquoi le ressenti de conscience existe et pas seulement comment il existe ? Le pourquoi du ressenti de conscience nous entraine à travers le rôle imparti dans l’émergence de la conscience que représente le fossé explicatif physico-psychique sur ce que l’on nomme le « hard problem of consciousness ». / Physicalism scientifically explains the problem of consciousness and can be defined as the residual problem of all attempts of reduction. So, can physicalism always be considered as the supreme metaphysical stance and the unavoidable methodology of all theory of consciousness ? The supporters of a radical materialistic methodology deny the ireductible character of the perception of consciousness. So, they rule out any mental causality and any dualist vision of consciousness through the elimination of the perception of consciousness as a conscious experience and they argue that any physical effect is only terminated by the physical aspect.However, ruling out the ideal reality from the subjective perception seems only to result in the failure of physicalim in its radical materialistic vision, because the structural and perceptual of the phenomenal characters of an organism only cannot explicitly deal with the subjective character of a conscious experience.The non reductionist philosophers and the dualists assume the concept exceeding of physicalism through a modern neo-dualism. The basic issue of our dissertation is to know why the perception of consciousness exists and not only why it exists. The reasons of the perception of consciousness carries us, through the part played in the emergence of consciousness by the physico-psychic explanatory gap, to what is called "the hard problem of consciousness".So, in our dissertation, we shall try to rebut the conclusions of eliminativist physicalism and assume the emergence of the dualism of properties and a modern neo-dualism through the two key questions.