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The premise of this dissertation is straight-forward – the U.S., as hegemon, acts unilaterally given the power disparity between it and the rest of the world. In solving the puzzle of why presidents make the “wrong” decision to act alone, I organize international conflict literature along traditional lines – international and domestic explanations – and use Gilpin’s (1981) hegemonic stability theory to test a theory of unilateral use of force decision making. In order to overcome a lack of scientific study on unilateralism, I devise a definition and coding rules for unilateral use of force, develop a sequential model of presidential use of force decision making, and construct a new, alternative measure of military power, a Composite Indicator of Military Revolutions (CIMR). I then use three methods – a statistical test with a heckman probit model, an experiment, and case studies – to test U.S. crisis behavior since 1937. I find that presidents are realists and make an expected utility calculation to act unilaterally or multilaterally after their decision to use force. The unilateral decision, in particular, positively correlates with a wide military gap vis-à-vis an opponent, an opponent located in the Western hemisphere, and a national security threat.

The thesis deals with analysis of China with respect to its potential hegemony which is defined by three various attributes. Firstly, the economic attribute examines the economic performance of the country, formed by GDP level and its several components. Concerning foreign trade, the most essential part is the country's import situation. As for the financial attribute, it is observed how elements of hegemony interact with the usage of China's currency as the world's key currency and the effects of developed financial or capital markets. The last attribute is concerned with the diplomatic position of the country, determined by the level of military expenditures and its voting power within various international institutions.

This thesis explores the role the U.S. plays in the developmental process of international nonproliferation regime. The argument of this thesis is mainly based on the power-based perspective, which assumes that the U.S., the first country to obtain nuclear technology, profoundly influences the creation and persistence of the nonproliferation regime. First of all, I discuss the debate on the theories of international regime in order to highlight the applicability of power-based approach in the research of nonproliferation regime. Secondly, I examine both the nuclear policy of the U.S. and the developmental history of nonproliferation regime, so as to explain the former¡¦s impacts over the latter. Finally, I evaluate the different means and postures of the U.S. when she confronts different violators. Through this inquiry, I attempt to expose the flaw of the nonproliferation regime: the proliferation problem is still not totally suspended even after the establishment of the nonproliferation regime. The main factor of the flaw is, nonetheless, resulted from the U.S.¡¦ misapplication of her nuclear hegemonic power and her selective proliferation policy towards different violators, although she had positively contributed to the creation and persistence of the nonproliferation regime.

The thesis deals with comparing China and United States in terms of their potential hegemonic status. A country can be considered as a hegemonic country only if it fulfills various attributes. Its economic leadership is defined by consistency of inner market and by generated imports. Those are supported by advanced financial market and national currency, which is also considered as a world currency. Institutional scope is summarized by privileged position of its army and it defines hegemonic country as a center of innovation and technological progress.

The U.S. has enjoyed global hegemonic power for over 70 years and even more so after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, some political scientists argue that it is descending and the evidence lies in the increasing power of China. An imbalance of power in the international structure has the ability to result in different outcomes. The realist theory suggests that a conflict between the U.S. and China is unavoidable, the liberal theory suggests that the economic dependency between the two makes conflict less possible, while the constructivist theory suggests that the outcome depends on the reaction of the leaders and social change. This study asks what the reaction of the President of the U.S. is to the rise of China to find out the result of this hegemonic power imbalance. By using discourse analysis, this study has analyzed the remarks of President Trump from the period of January 2017 to November 2017 in search of his reaction to the rise of China. The results of this study show that President Trump divides the world in two parts making the U.S. the protagonist and the rest of the world, including China, the antagonist in his discourse as his reaction. Due to this reaction, Trump takes nationalistic and protectionist measures against China.

本論文旨在探討二十一世紀，美國面臨中國在東亞的經營，如何維持其在東亞的霸權所作的努力。冷戰結束後，美國在國際社會成為碩果僅存的霸權。藉此優勢，美國得以遂其意志，有些甚至非其能力所及。雖然美國可確定是當今唯一的霸權，但中國挾其經濟快速起飛之利，不但在全球各地揮舞其影響力，更試圖擴大外交上的戰果。此外，中國軍事成長之快速，從軍事現代化到太空競賽，足以顯示中國將改變東亞的政治環境及地區安全。因此，中國的崛起對美國霸權，尤其在東亞，被視為一潛在的威脅。美國要如何鞏固其在東亞的霸權領導地位，自然為當前極為迫切的議題。由研究發現，美國所作的努力倍極艱辛、複雜但結果是成功的。 / After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States poses a unique position in the international system. As hegemony, the U.S. has the greatest stake in the existing order. Yet it also takes advantage of its position as the most powerful nation in the world to bend that order to its will and even act outside the limits of the system. It seems to confirm American hegemony, with the U.S. left as the only superpower. With its soaring rise, however, China is looming as a potential challenger to the U.S. hegemony in East Asia. China not only wields radically increasing commercial clout in all regions of the globe, but also tries to achieve diplomatic advantage with respect to the United States. Further, Beijing’s rapid, deep, and wide-ranging modernization in military capabilities ranging from diesel submarines to micro-satellites and the launching of ballistic missile destroying one of its own orbiting weather satellites will enable China to increasingly dominate the East Asian littoral. Therefore, how to maintain American hegemony especially in East Asia has become a pressing issue for the United States. The thesis uses in-depth studies of critical literature and case study to analyze the wrestle between U.S. and China in East Asian Area. From the research one can find that the effort the U.S. has made to maintain its hegemonic leadership in East Asia is hard but successful.

本論文以「美元霸權」為核心，討論美國做為貨幣霸權對於國際金融體系的影響。首先介紹霸權穩定論之理論內涵與發展，經過重新檢視霸權穩定論的思想內涵後，筆者發現霸權穩定論有許多缺陷並提出修正。其次，討論美元霸權在布列敦森林體系瓦解之後的形成與運作。美元霸權的起源是1971年尼克森將美元與黃金脫鉤，之後，經由1974年「石油-美元計價機制」與金融全球化進一步鞏固美元的霸權地位。最後，以「石油金融化」現象為例，說明美國是如何結合「石油-美元計價機制」與「金融全球化」來鞏固美元霸權地位，最後也導致國際金融體系的不穩定。 本文認為，美國將石油市場變成了一個大型賭場。石油價格暴漲暴跌將對世界經濟，尤其是發展中國家帶來不利影響。「石油-美元計價機制」是一種「誘捕」，它強化了從屬國家對美元的依賴。憑著不對稱的金融相互依賴，美國穩居霸權地位。然而，一個穩定的國際金融體系不能只靠主導國家權力的使用，一個階層狀態的國際關係，還必須有從屬國家配合的意願。隨著「二次大戰效應」的消失，美國無法再以國內市場的龐大需求滿足發展中國家的出口導向政策，因此，身為主導國家的美國必須運用國際金融發展的不對稱性，提供從屬國家支持美元霸權的誘因，此種不對稱性的互賴關係也是美元霸權的權力來源。此外，霸權權力具有自我毀滅的傾向。在金融全球化的過程中，政府的權威不斷被削弱，導致政治反應能力遠遠落後於經濟力量的發展。若美國不採取行動管理國際金融體系，取得主導國家的正當性，則衰落是不可避免。