Counterinsurgency is still believed to be of relevance in modern time and affect military organizations. Kilcullen and Galula, two theorists who have been of high relevance for the development of strategies for population-centric counterinsurgency used in the modern era. In 2010, Operation Moshtarak was conducted with Field Manual 3-24, which is based on these theorists. Despite this, there is a discrepancy if the operation was conducted with a population-centric counterinsurgency and if Kilcullen and Galula theories can be applied in a modern era. The purpose of this study is to examine why operation Moshtarak, which was supposed to implement the aspects of population centric counterinsurgency resulted in failure. The study uses a qualitative case study and even though the theories didn’t reach the expected elucidatory level, the results of the study indicate that the initial steps of the operation demonstrate that population-centric counterinsurgency were used, but after the initial successes in the expulsion of insurgents, problems arised for the coalition. The study also indicates that more research is necessary to understand the outcome of the case and the relevance of these theories.

Insurgencies have been a nuisance for modern armies to deal with for centuries and recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Northern Ireland supports that claim. Counterinsurgency theories present different solutions for the same problems and old proven theories get challenged by modern ones. Researchers therefore differ in their opinions whether the classical proven theories are still relevant to guide modern counterinsurgency. A lot of modern counterinsurgency doctrines are still heavily based on these classical theories which leads to the purpose of this study, to investigate if an old theory still can explain the outcome of modern counterinsurgency operations. A fitting theory for this goal is the British theorist Thompsons which’s influence still can be observed in modern counterinsurgency doctrines. The study’s findings indicate that an old theory such as Thompsons still contributes to explain the outcome of modern counterinsurgency operations. The analysis illuminates that the greater extent of observance according to the principles of the theory will result in a more successful counterinsurgency overall. Though further research is required to consolidate these affirmations.

Transboundary water treaties are often expected to prevent conflicts over waters from shared rivers. However, empirical evidence shows that some upstream countries continue to experience conflict after signing a water treaty. This study explains why some upstream countries experience high post-treaty transboundary water conflict levels while others do not. Departing from theories on the character of states, I argue that weaker upstream countries are more likely to experience post-treaty transboundary water conflict than stronger upstream states. This is because a weak upstream state has fewer capabilities, which creates an imbalance of power with its downstream riparian neighbor and presents a zero-sum game condition. As a result, the upstream state is more likely to experience a high level of conflict after signing an agreement. The hypothesis is tested on two transboundary river cases, the Helmand River Basin and the Indus River Basin, using a structured, focused comparison method. The data is collected through secondary sources, including books, journals, news articles, and reports, government records. The results of the study mainly support the theoretical arguments. It shows a significant relationship between the character of the upstream state and the level of post-treaty transboundary water conflict in the upstream state.