Thesis (M. of Military Art and Science)--U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007. / The original document contains color images. Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on May 27, 2008). Includes bibliographic references.

Thesis (Master of Military Art and Science)-Army Command and General Staff College, 2007. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 12, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

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In 533, Justinian I ordered the conquest of the former Roman provinces of Africa, which had been lost to the Vandals a century earlier. The 'reconquest' has been regarded, by contemporaries and modern scholars alike, as one of the defining successes of the reign. However, despite the evident achievements of the campaign, Roman victory over the Vandals marked little more than the beginning of the Eastern Roman Empire's attempt to consolidate its position in Africa. The unanticipated threat posed by hostilities from the Berber tribes would continue until 548. Roman-Berber relations, unlike other aspects of Justinian's foreign relations, have received comparatively little attention, and this study aims to reassess the establishment of Roman authority in Africa and the Eastern Roman Empire's response to the Berber threat. In particular, it considers whether this response should be seen as a series of ad hoc reactions to immediate circumstances, or whether it is possible to identify a coherent Roman policy vis-à-vis the Berbers. The major conclusions of this study fall in two areas. First, it argues that Roman objectives in Africa were far more limited than has generally been supposed, with the empire's territorial ambitions not extending beyond key coastal positions which offered strategic and commercial advantages, and from which the empire could project its limited authority into the interior. Second, this study concludes that the Eastern Roman Empire's actions with respect to the Berber tribes lacked coherence. Attempts to implement a system of client rulers were unsuccessful, partly as a result of the competition between individual Berber leaders as they sought to establish independent polities within the frontiers of the former Roman Empire; and partly as a result of an increasing lack of resources, as well as the instability caused by constantly changing leadership within the African civil and military administrations, which prevented the development of coherent long term strategies for addressing the Berber threat.

Civil Affairs and its more robust sibling, Military Government, were military organisations designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during the Second World War. In so doing, they enabled formation commanders to focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian problems. Using the battle of Normandy as a case study, this research assesses the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs during operations. This contrasts with previous studies that concentrate on aspects of social and diplomatic history. If the need for Civil Affairs was generally axiomatic, there was much debate as to the extent and method of delivery required. Civil Affairs quickly recognised that in dealing with direct problems such as “disorganisation, disease and unrest” it was necessary for seemingly indirect aspects of civilian life to be maintained. Various forms of bureaucratic friction resulted and several Civil Affairs approaches were used, before the model for the North West Europe campaign was agreed. Nevertheless, the organisation employed in Normandy was arguably the most extensive and best prepared of the war. However, it also had to deal with many different civilian problems and in trying military circumstances. Consequently, the battle is fertile ground for the examination of the extent and nature of the organisation’s operational utility. Using primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that Civil Affairs was militarily both useful and necessary. Furthermore, it was able to provide wider diplomatic and political benefits as well as serving core military needs. The research concludes by acknowledging that whilst mistakes were made, the various improvements made to Civil Affairs in preparation for, together with the lessons learnt during, Normandy stood the organisation in good stead for the significantly larger problems encountered later in the war.

Civil Affairs and its more robust sibling, Military Government, were military organisations designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during the Second World War. In so doing, they enabled formation commanders to focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian problems. Using the battle of Normandy as a case study, this research assesses the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs during operations. This contrasts with previous studies that concentrate on aspects of social and diplomatic history. If the need for Civil Affairs was generally axiomatic, there was much debate as to the extent and method of delivery required. Civil Affairs quickly recognised that in dealing with direct problems such as “disorganisation, disease and unrest” it was necessary for seemingly indirect aspects of civilian life to be maintained. Various forms of bureaucratic friction resulted and several Civil Affairs approaches were used, before the model for the North West Europe campaign was agreed. Nevertheless, the organisation employed in Normandy was arguably the most extensive and best prepared of the war. However, it also had to deal with many different civilian problems and in trying military circumstances. Consequently, the battle is fertile ground for the examination of the extent and nature of the organisation’s operational utility. Using primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that Civil Affairs was militarily both useful and necessary. Furthermore, it was able to provide wider diplomatic and political benefits as well as serving core military needs. The research concludes by acknowledging that whilst mistakes were made, the various improvements made to Civil Affairs in preparation for, together with the lessons learnt during, Normandy stood the organisation in good stead for the significantly larger problems encountered later in the war.

D.Litt. et Phil. (Historical Studies) / Refer to full text

Joaquín de Arredondo was the most powerful and influential person in northeastern New Spain from 1811 to 1821. His rise to prominence began in 1811 when the Spanish military officer and a small royalist army suppressed Miguel Hidalgo’s revolution in the province of Nuevo Santander. This prompted the Spanish government to promote Arredondo to Commandant General of the Eastern Internal Provinces, making him the foremost civil and military authority in northeastern New Spain. Arredondo’s tenure as commandant general proved difficult, as he had to deal with insurgents, invaders from the United States, hostile Indians, pirates, and smugglers. Because warfare in Europe siphoned much needed military and financial support, and disagreements with New Spain’s leadership resulted in reductions of the commandant general’s authority, Arredondo confronted these threats with little assistance from the Spanish government. In spite of these obstacles, he maintained royalist control of New Spain from 1811 to 1821, and, in doing so, changed the course of Texas, Mexican, and United States history. In 1813, he defeated insurgents and American invaders at the Battle of Medina, and from 1817 to 1820, his forces stopped Xavier Mina’s attempt to bring independence to New Spain, prevented French exiles from establishing a colony in Texas, and defeated James Long’s filibustering expedition from the United States. Although unable to sustain Spanish rule in 1821, Arredondo’s approval of Moses Austin’s petition to settle families from the United States in Texas in 1820 and his role in the development of Antonio López de Santa Anna, meant the officer continued to influence Mexico. Perhaps Arredondo’s greatest importance is that the study of his life provides a means to learn about an internationally contested region during one of the most turbulent eras in North American history.

This study examines several of the Confederate military operations in Texas from the years 1861 to 1865, including early defensive moves, the Battle of Galveston and the Battle of Sabine Pass.

he title above comprises elements of the strategic studies concept 'foundations of military force'. Military force has been the final arbiter between the political entities of mankind throughout all ages. The prevalence of this social scourge has left a footprint in every dispensation of man's efforts at civilisation. Regrettably, warfare was and remains one of the core characteristics of human nature. The artefacts of antiquity are catalogued in archaeological periods. In nearly every instance each layer of human settlement is separated by the effects of warfare. Rather than a sub-discipline on the periphery it is demonstrated herein that military archaeology, refined with the post-World War Two scientific discipline of polemology, can and ought to be moved onto the centre stage of archaeology. The application of core polemological concepts to IA IIa accurately describes the unfolding of the United Monarchy's capacity to pursue political goals commensurate with its evolutionary war potential. / Religious Studies & Arabic / M.A. (Biblical Studies)