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The principal claim of this thesis is that Hobbes neither argues for, nor is committed to, psychological egoism. More positively, I construct a reading of Hobbes which gives a non-egoistic theory of character the role of supporting his political theory. In so doing I present a Hobbes whose mechanistic psychology and account of self-preservation are neutral with respect to the character of men in civil life. I deny that there are any compelling reasons to treat Hobbesian individuals as predisposed to some form of egoism. What I refer to as a "theory of character" is what Hobbes treats under the headings of "dispositions" and "manners". I conclude that Hobbes has ample room within his psychology for civic virtues and for motivations at odds with psychological egoism. Contrary to Gauthier, who argues that Hobbes is committed to psychological egoism because of details in his mechanistic psychology, I contend that the mechanistic basis of the psychology is what disallows any ascription of egoism to Hobbes. I do this without following either McNeilly or Gert: the former of whom believes that Hobbes' materialism is irrelevant to the remainder of his philosophy, and the latter of whom believes that the materialism is destructive of any motivational theory at all. Disagreeing with all three, I argue for a positive and constructive relationship between Hobbes' materialism and psychology. In particular I claim that one aspect of Hobbes' materialism - the account of endeavour or conatus - constitutes a general theory of dispositions, one implication of which is that human dispositions are not fixed in any way that would be necessary to create the character of the egoist. So, far from being the reason why Hobbesian individuals are egoists, his materialism provides what I take to be the best reason for thinking that they are not. To argue that Hobbesian individuals are not egoistic, and to base that claim on features of his materialism is one thing; but of course the reason alluded to - features of his materialism - is arcane to say the least. There are other reasons available to support the same conclusion, and these reasons are far more accessible than the first. These reasons derive from descriptions Hobbes gives of the character of the best kind of men (those whom I use the term "magnanimous" to refer to). I consider the range of character traits in question, and conclude that Hobbes was certainly impressed by older chivalric and martial virtues, despite being a strong proponent of a more civilian code of virtues. My method for looking into these qualities of character assumes a particular point of view. The point of view in question is historical: I consider what Hobbes says about character in terms of the social context centring on the Jacobean and Caroline aristocracy. My strategy here is designed to do two things. Firstly, I wish to support the claim that Hobbes discusses character traits for which there are no obvious egoistic interpretation. And secondly, I wish to shed some light on why Hobbes was so exercised by the social impact of certain motives; particularly those connected with power, honour, and worth. The material I cover is precisely that which interested Macpherson. However, unlike him I do not believe that Hobbes1 analysis of social interactions was one unwittingly suffused with details taken from early English capitalism. Rather, my argument is that Hobbes' conception of the pitfalls in the path of civility was largely based on his understanding of aristocratic character. Following Keith Thomas I suggest that Hobbes was a critic of the culture for which honour was the dominant concern; although in some respects a sympathetic critic. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Thesis advisor: Susan M. Shell / The 21st century has witnessed jarring set-backs in the spread of the liberal democracy around the globe, as well as domestic challenges to the liberal form of government where it has been long established. By interrogating the root principles of the liberal theory of progress, this study aims to account for both the overwhelming success of the liberal progress in the latter half of the twentieth century, as well as its mounting failures in the early twenty-first century. It is argued that the liberal theory of progress rests on an unstable synthesis of two competing modern political philosophies, which are identified as ideology and the philosophy of history. The latter offers a theory of mankind’s historical development toward reason, while the former provides a blueprint for the construction of the rational state. Before these modern philosophies were synthesized in the liberal theory of progress, they emerged in opposition to one another, in the works of Thomas Hobbes and Giambattista Vico. The first chapter introduces the political philosophy of Hobbes’ Leviathan, and examines Hobbes’s teaching about nature and art, power and public opinion, culture and civil religion. On this basis, the Leviathan is shown to inaugurate the ideological form of politics, of which liberalism is one example. Chapter two defines ideology and traces its history, demonstrating the common source of all modern ideologies in a foundational egalitarianism that replaces the natural politics of rule. Chapter three addresses the modern philosophy of history, inaugurated by Vico’s New Science. An account of the genesis of this philosophy is presented and contrasted with Leo Strauss’ account. The fourth chapter considers Vico’s political teaching and his opposition to the modern theories of natural law, including especially that of Hobbes. Rejecting the view that Vico should be characterized as an enemy of the Enlightenment, this chapter examines his teaching about the historicity of human nature as reflected in religion, justice, poetry, philosophy and the political cycle of human history, and concludes with a discussion of the “barbarism of reflection,” in which all progress is said to comes to an end. These studies of Hobbes and Vico indicate the points of greatest tension within the liberal theory of progress, and prepare the way for a future critical study of liberal theory of progress in Kant and his successors. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

O presente estudo, que antecede a tradução, procura mostrar como a arte retórica de Thomas Hobbes está presente em toda sua filosofia. Esta presença vai além da utilização de tropos e figuras, conduz o pensamento hobbesiano em suas idéias acerca do homem, das suas paixões, de seu movere, do Estado e de sua manutenção. A arte retórica parece figurar também em sua filosofia natural. O método, que fundamenta todo seu pensamento, deita suas raízes na arte retórica de Aristóteles. O comentário ressalta, sobretudo, a relevância dos textos sobre retórica de Thomas Hobbes para a história da filosofia política moderna, até então pouco pesquisados. / This study, which precedes the translation, intended to show how the art of rhetoric Thomas Hobbes is present throughout his philosophy. This presence goes beyond the use of tropes and figures, leads the hobbesian thought in their ideas about the man, in their passions, in its movere, in the state and its maintenance. The rhetoric art seems also to figure in its natural philosophy. The method, which is the base upon all its thinking, lay down their roots in the rhetoric art of Aristotle. The commentary stands out, over all, the relevance of texts on rhetoric of Thomas Hobbes in the history of modern political philosophy, so far little studied.

Dentre os debates a respeito da filosofia política de Hobbes, as relações entre lei de natureza e lei civil são objeto de grande controvérsia. Principalmente dois pontos são discutidos em relação à lei de natureza. O primeiro corresponde à sua imperatividade: a lei de natureza tem força de comando no estado de natureza ou é mera recomendação? O segundo corresponde à sua relação com a lei civil: são ambas a mesma coisa, são contrárias, são complementares? Com vistas a responder a esses questionamentos, a presente dissertação investiga três utilizações do conceito de lei de natureza por Hobbes como preceito da razão, como comando de Deus e como lei moral , duas utilizações do conceito de lei civil como comando do soberano e como medida das ações dos súditos , bem como as relações que Hobbes estabelece entre os dois conceitos. / Among the discussions concerning Hobbes political philosophy, the relations between the law of nature and the civil law raise great controversy. Two points related to the law of nature remain unsolved. The first one deals with its imperative character: does the law of nature have the force of a true command in the state of nature or is it a mere recommendation? The second point deals with its relation with the civil law: are they the same, are they contradictory, are they complementary? Aiming to answer these questions, this work analyses three different uses of the law of nature concept as a rational precept, as a command of God and as moral law , two uses of the civil law concept as a command of the sovereign and as a rule for the subjects actions , as well as the relations that Hobbes states between those two concepts.

[pt] Hobbes parece ser um dos autores mais controversos da Teoria Política Moderna. Desenvolveu ele um modelo de natureza humana, que trouxe para dentro da discussão filosófica uma física mecanicista cunhada em pleno século XVII e, ao mesmo tempo, uma noção de desejo ou conatus herdada de discussões renascentistas. Unindo estas duas noções, a partir de seu conceito de liberdade, produziu um sistema filosófico em que figura a progressão corpo – homem – Estado (ou corpo político). Nessa dissertação, pretende-se situar, dentro da discussão acerca da natureza humana no corpo filosófico da obra de Hobbes, os conflitos político-religiosos de que este participava e também que este atiçava, sempre tendo em mente o contexto inglês revolucionário (especialmente, o da Revolução Puritana de 1640) e o europeu do século XVII, buscando-se uma interpretação que una o viés doutrinário e aquele histórico de sua obra. Por meio da utilização da obra de consagrados historiadores ingleses e de novos intérpretes do pensamento hobbesiano, procura-se amenizar a visão negativa acerca de Hobbes, situando-o não mais como um ultra conservador absolutista, mas como um moderno/iluminista moderado, em busca de um ponto de equilíbrio para sua nova filosofia e de meio de solução para o conturbado contexto político inglês, que só poderão ser alcançados por meio da aceitação de sua visão da natureza humana. / [en] Hobbes seems to be one of the most controversial autors in Modern Political Theory. He developed a model of human nature which introduced in filosofical discussion a mecanicist physics that he created in the seventeeth century and also, at the same time, a concept of desire or conatus which he inherited from the Renaissance. Joining these two concept on his concept of liberty, he produced a filosofical system in which there is a progression from body – man – state (political body). This dissertation is intended to situate, within the discussion of human nature in Hobbes’ philosophical works, the political and religious conflict in which he took part and also the ones that he provocated, always having in mind the british revolutionary context (specially, the Puritan Revolution of 1640) and the seventeenth century Europe, in search for an interpretation that combines the doutrinary and historical views of his works. Through the study of traditional british historians and new interpreters of Hobbes’ works, this research tries to ease the negative vision of Hobbes, situating him not as a conservative supporter of absolutism, but as a moderate modern/iluminst, in search for a point of equilibrium for his new philosophy e for means to solve the problems of the complicated british political context. Both can only be found through acceptance of his point of view about human nature.

Diss.--Fachbereich Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaften--Frankfurt am Main--Johann Goethe-Universität, 2006. / Bibliogr. p. 181-195.

Thesis (Diplomarbeit)--Universität München. / Includes bibliographical references (p.[181]-200).

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009-03-09Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T18:30:00Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 silva_ha_me_mar.pdf: 378202 bytes, checksum: 9abb262e0fec5c54d799d07aed4c8757 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O objetivo desse trabalho é entender a presença da ciência hobbesiana de matriz mecânicofisica na constituição das paixões humanas no interior da filosofia de Thomas Hobbes, em outras palavras, trata-se de compreender em que medida a filosofia natural pode auxiliar na melhor compreensão da filosofia política. A partir disso, procurar entender o posicionamento de alguns intérpretes que são críticos dessa abordagem. E finalmente, dessa consideração da relação entre ciência e moral, mostrar o papel que duas paixões em especial, a saber, o medo e a esperança, possuem no processo que afasta a guerra de todos e constrói a paz política. / This work aims at understanding the presence of a mechanically and physically-based hobbesian science the constitution of human passions within the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. In other words, we look for understanding how the natural philosophy can enable a better comprehension of political philosophy. As a consequence, we intend to understand the positions taken by some interpreters who are critical of such approach. Finally, from the considerations regarding the relationship between moral and science, we try to show the roles which two passions in particular, i.e., fear and hope, play in the process of natural war abandonment and of political peace construction.

Dentre os debates a respeito da filosofia política de Hobbes, as relações entre lei de natureza e lei civil são objeto de grande controvérsia. Principalmente dois pontos são discutidos em relação à lei de natureza. O primeiro corresponde à sua imperatividade: a lei de natureza tem força de comando no estado de natureza ou é mera recomendação? O segundo corresponde à sua relação com a lei civil: são ambas a mesma coisa, são contrárias, são complementares? Com vistas a responder a esses questionamentos, a presente dissertação investiga três utilizações do conceito de lei de natureza por Hobbes como preceito da razão, como comando de Deus e como lei moral , duas utilizações do conceito de lei civil como comando do soberano e como medida das ações dos súditos , bem como as relações que Hobbes estabelece entre os dois conceitos. / Among the discussions concerning Hobbes political philosophy, the relations between the law of nature and the civil law raise great controversy. Two points related to the law of nature remain unsolved. The first one deals with its imperative character: does the law of nature have the force of a true command in the state of nature or is it a mere recommendation? The second point deals with its relation with the civil law: are they the same, are they contradictory, are they complementary? Aiming to answer these questions, this work analyses three different uses of the law of nature concept as a rational precept, as a command of God and as moral law , two uses of the civil law concept as a command of the sovereign and as a rule for the subjects actions , as well as the relations that Hobbes states between those two concepts.