Esta dissertação analisa os padrões de atuação dos representantes políticos brasileiros responsáveis pela concessão de benefícios tributários referentes ao PIS, à COFINS e à CSLL a setores e atividades econômicas do país durante os governos de Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) e de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010). O objetivo principal é contribuir com a literatura da ciência política brasileira que analisa a conexão eleitoral e o papel dos Poderes Executivo e Legislativo na formulação de políticas públicas. A hipótese central é que a formulação desta política está submetida à agenda da coalizão governista e não pode ser atribuída aos anseios individuais dos políticos brasileiros, devido ao padrão de concentração de poderes no interior do processo legislativo. Com ênfase qualitativa, adotaram-se os dispositivos legais que concedem e delimitam o acesso aos benefícios tributários como principal unidade de análise do conteúdo legislativo. As conclusões apontam para a não existência de uma conexão eleitoral baseada na atividade individual do representante político, já que outras variáveis - para além do sistema eleitoral - influenciam tanto o comportamento dos representantes brasileiros quanto a aquisição de benefícios por parte de setores e atividades da economia nacional. Ao invés de ser individualmente concretizada, nossa análise aponta no sentido de dizer que a relação entre Estado e grupos de interesse no Brasil é partidariamente construída. / This thesis analyzes the standard procedure of the political representatives in Brazil who are responsible for the granting of tax benefits related to PIS, COFINS and CSLL to economic sectors and activities in the country during the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010). The main objective is to contribute to the political science literature that examines the Brazilian electoral connection and the role of executive and legislative branches in formulating public policy. The central hypothesis is that the formulation of these policies is subject to the agenda of the governing coalition and can not be attributed to the individual desires of Brazilian politicians, due to the pattern of concentration of powers within the legislative process. With a mixed methods design, we have adopted the legal provisions that grant and restrict access to tax benefits as the main unit of analysis. The conclusions point to the absence of an electoral connection based on the individual activity of the political representative, since other variables beyond the electoral system influence the behavior of the Brazilian representatives as well as the acquisition of benefits by sectors and activities of the national economy. Instead of being individually built, our analysis indicates that the relationship between state and interest groups in Brazil is built on party behavior.

Este trabalho é um estudo comparado do impacto do sistema eleitoral e do poder de agenda sobre a produção legislativa sancionada de origem parlamentar in 22 democracias. Investiga-se a hipótese de que sistemas centrados no candidato incentivam os deputados a produzirem iniciativas legislativas paroquiais, isto é, normas que conferem benefícios locais. Alternativamente, considero a hipótese de que os parlamentares são influenciados mais pelas pressões vindas dos grupos organizados, independentemente do grau de personalização que o sistema eleitoral proporciona. Isso significa que, em termos de políticas públicas, prevalecerão normas de tipo distributivo a caráter difuso também em sistemas centrados no candidato. Como alternativa à idéia da conexão eleitoral, será considerada a hipótese de que a produção legislativa è função do tipo de organização dos trabalhos parlamentares. Os dados evidenciam que a tese do voto pessoal não é explicativa. Uma indicação empírica importante é que são os grupos a exercer uma influência significativa sobre a produção legislativa. O trabalho fornece também evidências de que é o tipo de controle da agenda que melhor elucida o formato da produção legislativa dos deputados. / This dissertation is a comparative study on the impact of electoral systems and agenda powers on the approved bills proposed by members of the Congress in 22 democracies. I examine the hypothesis that candidate centered systems bring incentives to MPs to adopt pork barrel politics, i.e. conferring special benefits to narrow constituencies. An alternative hypothesis considers that MPs are much more influenced by organized groups? lobbies, independently of personal vote. According to this perspective, even if the electoral system is candidate- centered, distributive laws that do not to concentrate benefits territorially will be predominant. As opposed to the electoral connection perspective, I consider the hypothesis that legislative results are a product of the legislature organization. Data confirm that the personal vote perspective is not exaustive. A relevant empirical indication is that the major impact on legislative output is provided by groups. This study also argues that procedural agenda control has a significant impact on the legislative output.

This thesis is divided into three parts. The first one evaluates the institution of compulsory vote, providing new estimates for the effects of the obligation to vote on individuals. The identification strategy relies on the Brazilian dual voting system - voluntary and compulsory - the exposure being determined by the date of birth. Using RD and IV approaches and data from a self-collected survey, we find that the compulsory legislation leads to a significant increase in voter turnout. These changes are followed by a sizable increase in the probability that individuals will express preference for a political party, but not by an increase in political knowledge among the population. Moreover, we find that the first compulsory voting experience permanently affects individuals\' preferences. The second part of the thesis empirically analyses episodes of sovereign debt default. Some of the salient features of the theoretical literature on sovereign debt, including its prediction that almost all defaults should arise in \"Bad Times\", are at odds with the data: over 38% of defaults actually occur in \"Good Times\", as measured by an HP filter. We explore the specific characteristics of each type of default and present econometric evidence that failures to repay foreign debt in good times can, usually, be rationalized by three components: (i) changes in the political environment, (ii) hikes in global interest rates and (iii) instances in which good HP times actually take place under quite poor economic conditions. We also present some suggestive indications that the duration of the episodes does not vary substantially with the type of default that precedes them, but with the environment in which they occur, drawing some important implications for the understanding of economies\' post-default market access. The third part of the thesis looks at the issue of campaign contributions in exchange for political favors (the so called \"pay-to-play\" scheme). I proposes a simple game to model the incentives of political parties and firms from public-revenue-intensive sectors, and test the implications of this model using data on campaign contributions and public contracts from Brazil. The data confirms the pay-to-play hypothesis. / Esta tese se divide em três partes. A primeira parte avalia a instituição do voto compulsório, proporcionando novas estimativas para os efeitos da obrigação de votar sobre os indivíduos. A estratégia de identificação se baseia no sistema dual em vigor no Brasil - voluntário e compulsório - sendo a exposição determinada pela data de nascimento. Usando as metodologias de RD e VI, e dados de uma pesquisa coletada especificamente para este estudo, concluímos que esta legislação leva a um aumento significante na participação política através do voto. Este aumento é acompanhado por uma elevação considerável na probabilidade de os cidadãos expressarem preferência por um partido político, mas não no seu nível de conhecimento sobre política. Além disto, concluímos que a primeira experiência de voto afeta permanentemente as preferências dos indivíduos. A segunda parte da tese analisa empiricamente episódios de calote da dívida soberana. Alguns dos aspectos fundamentais da literatura teórica sobre o assunto, incluindo a previsão de que quase todos os calotes deveriam ocorrer em \"Períodos Ruins\", não são confirmados pelos dados: mais de 38% dos calotes ocorrem em \"Períodos Bons\", sob a definição do filtro HP. Exploramos as características de cada tipo de calote e apresentamos evidência econométrica de que calotes na dívida externa em períodos bons em geral podem ser explicados por três componentes: (i) mudanças no ambiente político, (ii) aumentos nas taxas de juros internacionais e (iii) instâncias em que o filtro HP classifica um período como bom ainda que a real situação econômica seja bastante negativa. Por fim, apresentamos alguns resultados que sugerem que a duração do episódio de calote não depende substancialmente do tipo de calote em questão, mas sim do ambiente em que o calote ocorre. Tal resultado abre caminho para novas pesquisas sobre o acesso a mercados internacionais de crédito após calotes. A terceira parte da tese trata da questão de contribuições de campanha em troca de favores políticos (esquema conhecido como \"pay-to-play\"). Eu proponho um jogo simples para modelar os incentivos de partidos políticos e firmas de setores intensos em receitas públicas, e testo as implicações deste modelo usando dados de doações de campanhas e contratos públicos do Brasil. Os dados confirmam a hipótese de pay-to-play.

Esta dissertação analisa a ação política dos grupos de interesse ao longo do processo de regulação da propaganda de alimentos desencadeado pela Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária (Anvisa) em 2005. Ao descrever as estratégias e articulações políticas dos grupos de interesse público e dos grupos de interesse empresariais, atenção especial foi dada ao lobby do empresariado, de modo a aferir se sua ação foi bem-sucedida no sentido de minimizar ou anular a polêmica e conflituosa regulação proposta por aquela agência, cujos efeitos incidiam diretamente sobre as atividades do setor privado. O estudo compreendeu um acompanhamento detalhado de cada etapa do processo decisório, buscando observar quais arenas políticas são acionadas por esses grupos para a consecução de seus objetivos. Para a condução desta pesquisa, amparamo-nos no exame exaustivo de documentos relacionados à regulação proposta, oriundos dos três Poderes bem como dos grupos de interesse, e em entrevistas aprofundadas com os principais atores políticos envolvidos com a temática. A análise evidenciou que os grupos de interesse da sociedade civil e do empresariado possuem diferentes estratégias de ação, as quais refletem seus distintos recursos e acesso desigual aos principais canais de poder político. Da mesma forma, pudemos observar que, a despeito do poder econômico incontrastável dos dois setores afetados, indústria de alimento e de publicidade, sua ação política não foi capaz de impedir a Anvisa de prosseguir com o regulamento proposto, o que nos sugere importante autonomia política da agência. Não obstante, encontramos evidências de que a pressão do empresariado foi capaz de mitigar em grande medida a regulação da Anvisa, pois a norma foi alterada consideravelmente entre a consulta pública de 2006 e sua promulgação em 2010. Além disso, alterações organizacionais e no comando da Anvisa em 2012, alinhadas aos interesses dos grupos empresariais, dão conta de mudanças mais profundas na agência, as quais parecem ter redefinido as próprias bases do relacionamento com o empresariado. Sob essa ótica, o lobby do empresariado, embora não totalmente bem-sucedido na regulação aqui estudada, teria sido eficaz na reestruturação das relações com a Anvisa de agora em diante. / This dissertation analyzes the political action of interest groups throughout the process of food propaganda regulation triggered by the National Health Surveillance Agency (Anvisa) in 2005. By describing the strategies and political articulations of the public interest groups and the business interest groups, special attention has been given to the business lobbying, in order to assess whether its action has been successful in minimizing or overturning the controversial and conflicting regulation proposed by the agency, which effects would affect directly private sector activities. The study enclosed a detailed follow-up of each stage of the decision-making process, seeking to observe which political arenas are activated by these groups in order to accomplish its goals. For the conduction of this research, we have done a comprehensive examination of the documents related to the proposed regulation, which were produced by the three branches of government and the interest groups, and in-depth interviews with the main political players involved in this issue. The analysis made clear that civil society and business groups have different action strategies, which reflect their distinct resources and unequal access to the main political power channels. Likewise, we were able to observe that, despite the irresistible economic power of the two affected sectors, food and advertising industry, its political action was not able to prevent Anvisa from carrying on the proposed regulation, which shows us the important political autonomy of the agency. Nevertheless, we found evidences that the pressure exerted by business groups was able to mitigate, to a large extent, Anvisas regulation, as the rule was considerably altered from the public comment period in 2006 until its promulgation in 2010. Besides, alterations in the structure and in the command of Anvisa in 2012, which are aligned with business interests, indicate deeper changes in the agency, which seem to have redefined the very bases of the relationship with businessmen. Under this point of view, business lobbying, although not entirely successful in the regulation herein studied, would have been effective in restructuring the relations with Anvisa from now on.

A presente dissertação objetiva analisar o debate acerca da ratificação do Tratado de Comércio entre Brasil e EUA, em 1935. Observamos, na historiografia acerca do episódio, que os grupos em disputa foram designados como os representantes da indústria (contrários ao tratado) versus os da agroexportação, (favoráveis ao tratado). Contudo, foi possível verificar, a partir da análise da documentação, que quase nenhuma das manifestações em defesa do tratado foi encaminhada por representantes diretos das frações de classe ligadas às atividades agroexportadoras, sejam os deputados classistas representantes da Lavoura, ou as associações de classe ligadas a ela. Assim, buscamos averiguar a conformação concreta de tais grupos. Propusemos, então, a hipótese de que os defensores do tratado fariam parte de uma elite formada e educada em um período de hegemonia do pensamento liberal, segundo o qual o caráter da economia brasileira seria essencialmente agrário e a indústria ocuparia papel secundário. Concluímos que a defesa do tratado foi feita por membros da burocracia estatal e da elite política, em nome de uma ideologia particular, afinada em vários aspectos com os interesses das elites agrárias, mas não diretamente motivada pela defesa destes, tendo ainda como elemento central considerações de cunho geopolítico e estratégico. Uma lógica própria, ligada aos interesses da própria burocracia estatal, teria sido a matriz ideológica que norteou sua ação política. Finalmente, interpretamos a atuação das lideranças industriais na defesa do Tratado, como um momento importante no processo de constituição dessa fração de classe e como ator político autoconsciente na construção de um consenso em torno de um projeto nacional fundamentado na industrialização, como via de desenvolvimento nacional. / This dissertation aims to analyze the debate over the parliamentary ratification of the Treaty of Trade between Brazil and USA, in 1935. We have observed in the historiography that addresses the episode, that the disputing groups were designated as the \"industry representatives\" (contrary to the treaty) versus the \"agro-export\" supporters (favorable to the treaty). However, we have been able to find, by way of the analysis of the documents concerning such debate, that almost none of the statements in defense of the Treaty was given by direct representatives of the class fractions linked to agro-export activities, such as the class members of the National Congress, representing agricultural interests, or associations connected to it. Thus, we sought to determine the specific conformation of such groups. Therefore we proposed the hypothesis that the proponents of the Treaty would be part of an elite, trained and educated in a period of hegemony of liberal thinking, whereby the character of the Brazilian economy and the industry would be represented as essentially agrarian and industry occupied a secondary role. We concluded that the defense Treaty was made mainly by members of the state bureaucracy and the political elite, on behalf of a particular ideology tuned in several respects with the interests of the agrarian elites, but not directly motivated by their promotion, having also as a central element geopolitical considerations of strategic nature. Its own logic, linked to the interests of the state bureaucracy itself, would have been the ideological matrix that guided their political action. Finally, we interpret the role of industrial leaders in upholding the Treaty as an important moment in the constitution of this class fraction as a self-conscious political actor in building a consensus around a national project, based on industrialization as a means for national development.

En prenant pour objet d’étude la Confédération paysanne, cette thèse se propose d’examiner les évolutions des formes et modes de représentation des intérêts agricoles sous l’effet de l’intégration européenne. Sur la base d’une enquête de terrain croisant plusieurs méthodes (archives, entretiens, observations, questionnaire), l’étude de ce syndicat mêle l’analyse du processus d’européanisation et la sociologie des groupes d’intérêt européens à la sociologie du militantisme agricole et des mobilisations collectives. En adoptant une approche attentive aux logiques organisationnelles, configurationnelles et dispositionnelles, cette recherche rend compte de deux dimensions. La première éclaire la reconfiguration de l’action syndicale au travers de l’analyse de l’espace de la représentation agricole européenne et des modalités pratiques de l’investissement militant sur la scène politique européenne. La seconde souligne la manière dont la Politique agricole commune « travaille » la Confédération paysanne en affectant l’économie des rapports de force syndicaux internes et externes, ainsi que le travail de production des orientations syndicales, mais également le répertoire d’action syndical. Cette recherche met ainsi en évidence les processus de socialisation et de politisation comme vecteurs de la dynamique d’européanisation. / Focusing on the Confédération paysanne, this research studies the changes in forms and modes of farmers’ interests representation under the effect of European integration. Drawing upon an extensive, multi-method fieldwork (archives, interviews, observations and questionnaire), the thesis intertwines a study of the Europeanization process, sociology of interest groups in the European Union and sociology of farmers’ unions as well as social movements. Not only emphasizing on organizational and configurational logics but also on social dispositions, this work reports two dimensions. The first throws light on the reconfiguration of farmers’ unions actions by analyzing the field of European farmers’ representation and the way unionists integrate the European political space. The second stresses on how the Common Agricultural Policy influences and affects both the internal and external balance of power, the union’s guidelines production and the repertoire of collective actions. Thereby, this study accurately reveals that the Europeanization dynamics rest on the socialization and politicization processes.

Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the “Medellin Cartel.” In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study’s findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government’s push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.

The aim of this Master thesis is to find out whether the lobbying carried out by Amnesty International France as NGO is different from the lobbying carried out by professional lobbying organizations, which means the organizations which promote primarily the interests of its own members. From the general theory of lobbying and theory of lobbying of NGOS the tools for creating pressure on politics was chosen and factors which could influence usage of these tools were identified. Then it was verified if these tools are really used by Amnesty International France and by which factors the tools are picked up. Expected result of this research was that lobbing of Amnesty International France as NGO is specific because of different circumstances, reasons and goals of lobbying from the professional lobbying. From the results of interpretation of Amnesty International France's documents and interviews with persons involved in the lobbying strategy imply that this NGO really choose some different tools from professional lobbying and is influenced by different factors. But there are also similarities.

The goal of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of the legislative framework governing public procurement in the Czech Republic. Using data from interviews, applying Game Theory and the Principal-A|gent model, and using the Goal Tree tool I show that individual actors behave rationally. Before submitting a tender they evaluate not only expected profits, but also possible corruption, threat of penalties. I also identify several practices used by actors in order to to manipulate public procurement. After evaluating actors' behaviour, developments inf public procurement legislation and of possible penalties, and drawing on extensive literature search I draw up recommendations for public policy. These t would help improve public procurement in the country, their efficiency, effectiveness and economy, without violating key public procurement principles (non-discrimination, equal treatment, transparency and proportionality). If adopted they would contribute to reducing the level of corruption in the Czech Republic.

Le travail qui suit propose de prendre au sérieux l’argumentation et la crédibilité en politique. Plutôt que d’analyser des débats partisans hautement médiatisés je m’intéresse aux interventions d’une population de groupes d’intérêt dans les consultations du Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement (BAPE), un forum environnemental relativement méconnu. Ce choix repose sur l’idée que le processus d’élaboration des politiques publiques est à la fois fragmenté et sectoriel, au cours duquel les décisions sont constamment reformulées par une diversité d’acteurs avertis, plus ou moins experts dans leur domaine. Ce type de forum constitue une porte d’entrée intéressante pour les groupes d’intérêt qui cherchent à influencer la formulation des politiques publiques. De plus en plus, les gouvernements mettent en place des dispositifs de consultation investis par les groupes d’intérêt, souvent plus au fait des problèmes et des solutions existantes sur des enjeux nichés et complexes. Comme le suggère la littérature sur les groupes d’intérêt, l’expertise de ces derniers joue un rôle crucial dans leur influence. Mais plutôt que de mesurer l’expertise par les caractéristiques organisationnelles des groupes, je propose une avenue différente en mesurant leur argumentation directement. Dans un contexte de démocratisation de l’expertise, je suggère que les groupes d’intérêt ont avantage à mobiliser une stratégie spécifique, le mimétisme expert, qui repose sur l’utilisation de procédés argumentatifs empruntés aux experts scientifiques tels que la traçabilité analytique, le traitement de l’incertitude et la transformation de données. La thèse s’articule autour de trois questions : qu’est-ce qui rend un groupe d’intérêt crédible ? La participation dans un forum favorise-t-elle l’apprentissage d’une stratégie argumentative ? L’information produite par une coalition d’intérêts influence-t-elle la prise de décision ? Pour y répondre, j’ai constitué une base de données originale de 1853 mémoires produits par 1378 groupes d’intérêt dans le cadre de 108 consultations du BAPE, dont la mission est d’évaluer l’impact environnemental et social de projets industriels. Après avoir mené des consultations, le BAPE produit des rapports dans lesquels des recommandations sur les projets évalués sont émises au gouvernement. Les consultations sont pilotées par des panels de commissaires qui, appuyés par des analystes, citent de manière systématique les participants des consultations dans leurs rapports et leur octroient ainsi une crédibilité relative. La thèse dresse un portrait plutôt positif du processus d’élaboration des politiques publiques. Premièrement, la sophistication argumentative des groupes d’intérêt, en particulier le mimétisme expert, joue un rôle crucial dans la crédibilité qu’on leur accorde, notamment en ce qui concerne les groupes d’intérêt public comme les groupes de citoyens ou les associations environnementales. Cette relation entre argumentation et crédibilité tient malgré qu’on neutralise les effets de variables invariantes dans le temps, non observables, telles que la réputation ou le prestige. Deuxièmement, en examinant les trajectoires de participation des groupes d’intérêt qui ont participé plusieurs fois aux consultations publiques du BAPE, je montre que l’apprentissage stratégique dont les groupes font preuve est médié par le travail informationnel des commissaires. Les rendements marginaux de l’argumentation sont décroissants, ce qui indique que les commissaires ne sont pas particulièrement réceptifs à l’apprentissage stratégique et privilégient les interventions argumentées et ponctuelles, qui informent leurs décisions. Troisièmement, l’information produite par les groupes d’intérêt lors des consultations influence les recommandations émises par le BAPE au gouvernement. En distinguant trois modes de traitement de l’information par les commissaires, je montre que leur réactivité est à deux vitesses : alors que le degré d’acceptabilité sociale du projet auprès des groupes d’intérêt influence les commissaires à autoriser ou non les projets qu’ils évaluent, les recommandations qu’ils émettent, qui indiquent un degré plus ou moins grand de contrainte réglementaire, reposent avant tout sur la réceptivité des commissaires à la diversité des sources d’information. Globalement, ces résultats montrent que l’argumentation et la crédibilité, des notions peu explorées en science politique, peuvent jouer un rôle important dans l’influence des acteurs de la société civile qui participent à l’élaboration des politiques publiques. Ces résultats montrent également que les forums comme le BAPE, des dispositifs de consultation à petite échelle, peuvent favoriser une certaine réactivité démocratique grâce à leur capacité de traiter des informations complexes. / The following work proposes to take argumentation and credibility in politics seriously. Rather than analyzing highly publicized partisan debates, I am interested in the argumentation of a population of interest groups in the consultations of the Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement (BAPE), a relatively unknown environmental forum. This choice is based on the idea that the policy process is both fragmented and sectoral, in which decision-making is constantly reformulated by a variety of knowledgeable players, more or less experts in their field. This type of forum is an interesting gateway for interest groups seeking to influence policymaking. Increasingly, governments are setting up consultation mechanisms invested by interest groups, often more aware of existing problems and solutions on nested, complex issues. As the interest groups literature suggests, their expertise plays a crucial role in influencing them. But rather than defining expertise by organizational characteristics, I propose a different avenue by measuring their argument directly. In a context of democratization of expertise, I suggest that interest groups have an advantage in mobilizing a specific argumentative strategy, expert mimicry, which is based on the use of argumentative procedures borrowed from scientific experts such as analytical tractability, quantification and data processing. The thesis revolves around three questions: what makes an interest group credible? Does participation in a forum encourage the learning of an argumentative vii strategy? Does the information produced by a coalition of interests influence decisionmaking? To answer this, I created an original database of 1,853 briefs produced by 1,378 interest groups as part of 108 BAPE consultations, whose mission is to assess the environmental and social impact of industrial projects. After conducting consultations, BAPE produces reports in which recommendations on the projects evaluated are made to the government. The consultations are led by panels of commissioners who, supported by a team of analysts, systematically quote the participants of the consultations in their reports and thus give them relative credibility. The thesis paints a rather positive portrait of the process of public policy making. First, the interest groups’ argumentation, and expert mimicry in particular, plays a crucial role in the credibility they are granted, particularly with regard to public interest groups such as citizens' groups or environmental associations. This relationship between argumentation and credibility holds despite the fact that we neutralize time-invariant, non-observable variables effects, such as reputation or prestige. Second, by examining the participation trajectories of interest groups, I show that argumentative, strategic learning is mediated by the work of the commissioners. The marginal returns to argumentation are decreasing, which indicates that the commissioners are not particularly receptive to strategic learning and prefer reasoned, ad hoc interventions, to inform their decisions. Third, the information produced by interest groups during the consultations influences BAPE’s recommendations made to the government. By distinguishing three types of information processing by the commissioners, I show that viii their reactivity is twofold: while the degree of social acceptability of the project influences the commissioners to authorize or not the projects, the recommendations they make, which indicate a greater or lesser degree of regulatory constraint, are based on the responsiveness of the commissioners to the diversity of information cues. Overall, these results show that argumentation and credibility, concepts little explored in political science, can play an important role in the influence of civil society actors who participate in the formulation of public policies. These results also show that small-scale consultation mechanisms like the BAPE can foster democratic reactivity thanks to their capacity to process complex information.