While the multilateral trading system views human and labour rights issues as outside of its remit, states increasingly incorporate regulation in these areas into their bilateral reciprocal preferential trade agreements, "HR-PTAs. This dissertation investigates the emergence of HR-PTAs, testing alternative explanations derived from conventional "public interest" and "private interest" theories of regulation against a new theory of "symbolic regulation." According to the public interest theory of regulation, regulation is motivated by benevolent legislators' commitment to correcting market or social problems. The private interest theory of regulation instead views regulation as the result of private interest groups capturing the regulatory apparatus in order to regulate in their own self-interest. Unlike its counterparts, the symbolic theory of regulation suggests that regulation may also be created for the primary purpose of reassuring regulatory advocates that their demands have been heard, rather than to regulate a given issue area. This dissertation argues that for the states behind them, HR-PTAs are primarily a symbolic form of regulation. Legislators create HR-PTAs to appease domestic human and labour rights organizations, while defending their trade interests through the non-enforcement of their provisions. Using longitudinal network analysis to analyse original data from 415 preferential trade agreements in force from 1989 to 2009, paired with case study evidence from the EU, US, and Canada, this dissertation finds support for the symbolic regulation explanation of HR-PTAs. It shows that a state's commitment to HR-PTAs depends less on the public interest or the desires of private interest groups than on its need to accommodate human and labour rights advocates. Symbolic regulation however should not be dismissed. It sets precedents, creates policy space, facilitates softer forms of cooperation, and can fuel political accountability politics. When this occurs, states may use HR-PTAs or other forms of symbolic regulation to achieve their seeming purpose.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of an ideology of Socialism Russia appeared on a new stage of its development. The political system, its institutions and mechanisms were changed considerably. In this new system appeared new economic, political, social and other factors, conditions and processes which contribute to the formation of the foreign policy of Russia. Thus the research is dealing with such an important component of the foreign policy formation as specific factors and processes occurring within the state. The aim of the paper is to determine the most significant of those factors, find out the reason of their influence and to reveal their weak and strong positions.

Esta tese analisa a formulação e a implementação da política econômica no Brasil durante as administrações de Jânio Quadros e João Goulart (1961-1964). O objetivo principal é compreender as razões da incapacidade do governo brasileiro para enfrentar os problemas econômicos do período, tais como a inflação e os desequilíbrios no balanço de pagamentos. Explora-se o modo pelo qual determinados grupos sociais, principalmente empresários, trabalhadores e representantes de Estados estrangeiros, interferiram nos resultados da política econômica. Por meio do uso de um amplo conjunto de fontes, abrangendo relatórios empresariais de caráter confidencial, periódicos operários, jornais comerciais e documentos dos governos brasileiro, britânico e norte-americano, conclui-se que as reações dos grupos de interesse foram fundamentais para explicar o fracasso dos planos econômicos do início dos anos 1960, apesar de cada período ter apresentado especificidades importantes. Enquanto na administração Quadros as atitudes dos empresários desempenharam um papel decisivo, na fase final da presidência de João Goulart o foco residiu no agudo conflito distributivo entre capital e trabalho, que levou ao abandono do Plano Trienal de Celso Furtado. As conclusões são relevantes na medida em que estudiosos reconhecem que a intensificação das dificuldades econômicas desse contexto tiveram um impacto decisivo na derrubada do regime político democrático em 1964, abrindo caminho para os 21 anos de regime militar no Brasil. / This thesis analyses the formulation and implementation of economic policy in Brazil during the administrations of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (1961-1964). The main objective is to understand why the Brazilian government was unable to tackle the countrys most urgent economic problems, such as rising inflation and a mounting balance of payments crisis. To do so, the study explores the way social groups, including entrepreneurs, workers, and representatives of foreign nation states, influenced economic policy outcomes. Making use of a wide range of data from confidential employers reports, labor periodicals and commercial newspapers, through to official government sources from Brazil, the U.K. and U.S. the thesis concludes that interest groups reactions are fundamental to explaining why economic programs failed in the early 1960s. While during the administration of Jânio Quadros employers attitudes played a major role, in the final phase of João Goularts presidency, a great distributional struggle broke out between capital and labor, setting the stage for the collapse of Celso Furtados Three-Year Plan. The findings are of great relevance given scholars general recognition that the inadequacy of the Brazilian government in tackling economic problems had a decisive impact on the fall of democracy in 1964, in turn paving the way for a 21-year military dictatorship.

Na realidade hodierna, faz-se necessária a análise dos grupos de interesse e, especificamente, de suas ações no âmbito político, por meio de pressão, que refletem o papel da sociedade civil organizada, através de microcosmos de atuação, na realização das aspirações populares, em seus diversos setores da vida, tratando-se de instrumentos de manifestação, canalização e consecução de aspirações coletivas. Nas sociedades complexas e heterogêneas, com a emergência de múltiplos anseios advindos da civilização industrial, por vezes conflitantes, denota-se a insuficiência do Estado em atender igualitariamente a todas as demandas, razão pela qual o cidadão não pode se limitar à figura do eleitor, com atuação periódica pelo voto, devendo assumir postura atuante no núcleo governamental. Os grupos de pressão compõem, assim, uma via da intitulada democracia participativa, com nítido papel contramajoritário, refletindo forças sociais que não encontraram respaldo na estrutura representativa clássica e contribuindo para a otimização do processo decisório institucional, ao aproximar o agente público das realidades dos titulares do poder e conferir legitimidade às medidas em cuja elaboração seus destinatários puderam intervir. A ação coletiva encontra-se alicerçada em preceitos constitucionais, como o direito de petição e as liberdades de reunião e de associação, efetivando-se um mecanismo complementar de comunicação entre representante e representado, de modo a alcançar padrões satisfatórios de governança mediante controle vertical, com responsabilidade e eficiência; atentando-se, para tanto, que as pressões grupais não podem ser exercidas através de meios ilícitos de persuasão nem devem ter como objeto pleitos manifestamente ilegais. A necessidade de se coibir as patologias da atividade denominada de lobby, imputando medidas corretivas aos seus desvios e estabelecendo os limites da sua legalidade, eis que se trata de fato relevante do qual o Direito não pode se furtar de reconhecer e normatizar, resulta no foco principal do estudo desenvolvido, pelo qual se pretendeu demarcar as questões primordiais a serem abordadas por ocasião da aprovação de uma lei de regulamentação, que, a despeito dos modelos no Direito Estrangeiro, deve encontrar solução para as particularidades pátrias. / In modern-day, it is necessary to examine interest groups and, specifically, their actions within the political sphere, through the exertion of pressure mechanisms, which reflect the role of organized civil society, across the various microcosms of action, in securing the popular aspirations of the broader population in all sectors of life by means of instruments designed to express, channel, and achieve those collective aspirations. In complex and heterogeneous societies, the States inability, due to the emergence of the multiple, often conflicting, demands of industrial civilization, to meet all of these demands on equal terms and bases is manifest, as a consequence of which citizens cannot limit themselves to the role of mere voters, participating in periodic elections, but must assume an active role at the center of government. In this light, pressure groups constitute a legitimate avenue of participatory democracy, with a distinct counter-majority role, intended to represent social forces without backing from the traditional representative structures and contribute toward the optimization of institutional decision-making by drawing public officials closer to the realities of societys true powerbrokers and conferring legitimacy on those measures which can be developed with the participation of the intended target audience. Collective action is founded on constitutional principles, such as the right to petition and the freedom of assembly and association, thus providing a complementary channel of communication between representatives and constituents, as a means to ensure satisfactory standards of governance through vertical control, accomplished in a responsible and effective manner; while underscoring, in turn, that pressure mechanisms cannot be exercised through unlawful means of persuasion or for the purpose of securing manifestly illegal claims. The need to prohibit the pathologies of lobbying activities through the imposition of corrective measures for misconduct and the establishment of legal limits is the primary focus of this study, which seeks to frame the key question to be addressed upon passage of a law regulating the related activities, one which, notwithstanding the existing models set out Foreign Laws, must offer solutions suited to the countrys national specificities.

Esta tese analisa a formulação e a implementação da política econômica no Brasil durante as administrações de Jânio Quadros e João Goulart (1961-1964). O objetivo principal é compreender as razões da incapacidade do governo brasileiro para enfrentar os problemas econômicos do período, tais como a inflação e os desequilíbrios no balanço de pagamentos. Explora-se o modo pelo qual determinados grupos sociais, principalmente empresários, trabalhadores e representantes de Estados estrangeiros, interferiram nos resultados da política econômica. Por meio do uso de um amplo conjunto de fontes, abrangendo relatórios empresariais de caráter confidencial, periódicos operários, jornais comerciais e documentos dos governos brasileiro, britânico e norte-americano, conclui-se que as reações dos grupos de interesse foram fundamentais para explicar o fracasso dos planos econômicos do início dos anos 1960, apesar de cada período ter apresentado especificidades importantes. Enquanto na administração Quadros as atitudes dos empresários desempenharam um papel decisivo, na fase final da presidência de João Goulart o foco residiu no agudo conflito distributivo entre capital e trabalho, que levou ao abandono do Plano Trienal de Celso Furtado. As conclusões são relevantes na medida em que estudiosos reconhecem que a intensificação das dificuldades econômicas desse contexto tiveram um impacto decisivo na derrubada do regime político democrático em 1964, abrindo caminho para os 21 anos de regime militar no Brasil. / This thesis analyses the formulation and implementation of economic policy in Brazil during the administrations of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (1961-1964). The main objective is to understand why the Brazilian government was unable to tackle the countrys most urgent economic problems, such as rising inflation and a mounting balance of payments crisis. To do so, the study explores the way social groups, including entrepreneurs, workers, and representatives of foreign nation states, influenced economic policy outcomes. Making use of a wide range of data from confidential employers reports, labor periodicals and commercial newspapers, through to official government sources from Brazil, the U.K. and U.S. the thesis concludes that interest groups reactions are fundamental to explaining why economic programs failed in the early 1960s. While during the administration of Jânio Quadros employers attitudes played a major role, in the final phase of João Goularts presidency, a great distributional struggle broke out between capital and labor, setting the stage for the collapse of Celso Furtados Three-Year Plan. The findings are of great relevance given scholars general recognition that the inadequacy of the Brazilian government in tackling economic problems had a decisive impact on the fall of democracy in 1964, in turn paving the way for a 21-year military dictatorship.

Sue-and-settle is the name applied to a federal agency’s use of litigation to create policy outside of the normal regulatory process. This paper discusses the impact that the sue-and-settle policy has had on Congress, the judiciary, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Specifically, this paper will discuss the issues caused by the perception of collusion within the sue-and-settle policy. First, this paper examines whether a relationship occurs between the litigants. The paper then discusses whether the relationship between the litigants in sue-and-settle cases tends to be collusive or not. The second part of the paper examines how Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the judiciary are viewed because of the continued perception of collusion in the agency’s settlements. Overall, this paper finds that, the impacts of the sue-and-settle policy, and the perception of collusion, has affected Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the judiciary by increasing regulation, distorting the purpose of the courts, and resulting in a lost value for the regulatory process.

Freshmen Interest Groups (FIG) programs 'peer support systems for entering students at a public university in the northeast' were believed to contribute to positive retention outcomes, but had not been evaluated to determine their impact on student retention. The rationale for this project study was the absence of formal evaluations to determine retention program effectiveness. The results are important to enrollment management staff and academic program coordinators whose job responsibilities are tied to student retention. Bean's nine themes of college student retention provided the conceptual framework for this study. Research questions considered the likelihood that retention and persistence to graduation outcomes are based on FIG participation, and the likelihood of retention when controlling for the nine themes. Regression analysis examined existing data on a sample of 4,098 students who started at the local campus and should have returned for the 3rd semester. Results showed that participation in the FIG increased the odds of retention by a factor of 1.37, and the odds of persistence by a factor of 1.74. Five of the nine themes 'students' intentions, first-year GPA, housing status, school of enrollment, and ethnicity' had a significant impact on the likelihood of students' retention at the study site. The project study results informed an evaluation report which presents findings and offers recommendations to the administration at the study site. Understanding and promoting student retention and success is of utmost importance to those striving to affect social change through education, and a clear understanding of opportunities to support the development of responsible, productive, and prepared students have both local and far-reaching social change implications.

L'un des éléments qui caractérisent le processus de mondialisation de l'économie est le développement de la logistique du fret comme secteur stratégique pour déterminer les avantages concurrentiels des régions urbaines. Cette étude analyse le lien entre l'évolution du marché, la réorganisation de l'Etat et le développement des infrastructures logistiques urbaines. Le point d'entrée de cette analyse est l'étude des politiques qui ont produit et gouverné au fil du temps deux marchés alimentaires de gros européens : le MIN Rungis et les Marchés Généraux de Milan. Leur comparaison explique comment les changements structurels ont influencé leur évolution et pourquoi aujourd'hui deux marchés de gros qui étaient initialement très similaires d'un point de vue analytique différent, ont deux policy outcome très différents. En utilisant une approche théorique et méthodologique basée sur les contributions du néo-institutionnalisme historique et de l'économie politique urbaine, le rôle des groupes d'intérêts, des acteurs politiques, des règles politiques et du marché est éclairé. Ces facteurs sont liés entre eux pour expliquer la policy conversion observée pour le MIN Rungis et la policy drift dans le cas de Milan. Enfin, les processus politiques qui ont mené à ces résultats sont expliqués en termes de mécanismes causaux. L'analyse met en évidence le rôle central des règles de politique locale et du contexte politique dans la détermination de la capacité des groupes d'intérêt locaux à influencer les processus décisionnels, et l'effet de leur mobilisation sur le développement de ces infrastructures urbaines. / One of the elements that characterize the process of economic globalization is the development of freight logistics as a strategic sector to determine the competitive advantages of urban regions. This study analyses the link between market changes, state reorganisation and the development of urban logistics infrastructures. The entry point for this analysis is the study of the policies that have produced and governed over time two European wholesale food markets: the MIN Rungis and the General Markets of Milan. Their comparison explains how structural changes have influenced their evolution and why today two wholesale markets, which were initially very similar from an analytical point of view, have nowadays two very different policy outcomes. Using a theoretical and methodological approach based on the contributions of historical neo-institutionalism and urban political economy, the role of interest groups, political actors, political rules and the market is clarified. These factors are interrelated to explain the policy conversion observed for MIN Rungis and the policy drift in the case of Milan. Finally, the policy processes that led to these results are explained in terms of causal mechanisms. The analysis highlights the central role of local policy rules and political context in determining the ability of local interest groups to influence decision-making processes, and the effect of their mobilization on the development of these urban infrastructures.

<p>The Capturetheory wants to give an alternative explanation for the need of regulation. From this point if view the government does not have enough information to make an optimal regulation. There is a possibility for different interest groups to take advantage of the political arena by rent- seeking behaviour. An industry may be willing to be regulated to protect itself from competition. The objective of this paper is to account for the pros and cons of the theory of regulatory capture and also if it can be applied to the Swedish market of pharmaceuticals. The theory of regulatory capture is first and foremost a theory of the motives behind regulation. The Swedish market for pharmaceuticals has been analysed by looking into the underlying force of both the pharmaceutical industry and that of the State. There is room for the regulatory agencies to be captured by the industry because of the information provided to them by the industry. The concluding findings show that the Capture theory can applied to the Swedish market for pharmaceuticals.</p>

This dissertation studies public institutional arrangements on the Swedish salt market 1720-1862. Crucial issues are how an why these arrangements emerged and were changed as well as they were used. The arrangements were erected in order to realize economic and social goals. In this respect, the policy persued by the Swedish government differed from those of most other governments, where policies concerning salt primarily meant tax policies. Government policies in Sweden were firstly external and had a long-term orientation. The aim was to import as much salt as possible to Sweden. The government also pursued a short-term policy in order to cope with short-term shorages. Overall, these policies were successful. Contrary to what has been stated in earlier Swedish research, the protectionist shipping policies did not lead to shortages of salt and high saltprices. Instead, the Swedish shipping and freight manufacture was stimulated, and Sweden became independent of foreign merchant fleets. The mercantilist aim of building a large merchant fleet, independent of potential enemy nations, was achieved without any negative effects on prices or supply on the Swedish salt market. Shortages of salt were not caused by a generally low yearly supply of salt. On the contrary, Sweden consistently had a surplus of salt and re-exported every year salt to other countries. The shortages of salt was rather regional and temporary, due to unexpected shocks on the supply side (wars, buccaneering, shipwrecks, persistent head winds, crises of production) and on the demand side (abundant fishing, cattle diseases and forced slaughter etc.). Costly and slow transports and communication meant that unexpected shortages could not be solved through trade. To solve these problems different institutional arrangements were created. These arrangements emerged in an evolutionary process of institutional change characterized by significant random elements. Severe shortages caused large changes in relative prices which acted as triggering factors in the process of institutional formation. Three more elaborated institutional arrangements having welfare purpuses were established, but disappeared in a rather short time. In 1774 a system of State Salt Stores were established in all staple towns. This arrangement proved to be very efficient as an insurance system, and the Salt Stores were frequently used to avert temporary shortages until new cargos of salt had arrived. The active state policy was a prerequisite for the markets to function satisfactory under mercantilism. But public stockpiling came to an end because the need for this insurance services diminished. But new technologies in saltproduction and shipping, increases in security and improved communications, a more efficiently-functioning market structure caused a significant long run decline i saltprices in relation to other prices and wages. Consequently, the need for public arrangements on the saltmarket decreased.