Die deutsche Energiewirtschaft befindet sich im Umbruch. Ein neuer staatlicher Ordnungsrahmen wurde geschaffen. Zentrales Element für die Regulierung der Stromnetze ist die „Anreizregulierung“ ‒ simulierter Wettbewerb, zentral gesteuert von der Bundesnetzagentur, um missbräuchliches Verhalten auszuschließen. Ausgehend von der Entwicklung des Energiemarktes seit dem 19. Jahrhundert analysiert Kai Kleinwächter die unterschiedlichen Interessen der Bundes- und Länderregierungen, der Stadtwerke sowie der großen Energiekonzerne bei der Einführung dieses Steuerungsinstrumentes. Bewertet werden auch die politischen Machtpotenziale der Akteure sowie ihr Einfluss auf den Gesetzgebungsprozess.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Economics / Dennis L. Weisman / This empirical dissertation consists of three essays on mergers and regulation in the U.S. telecommunications industry. An abstract for each of the three essays follows. Essay 1: This study has attempted to measure the productivity growth associated with 25 incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) over the period 1996-2005 using a Malmquist productivity index. The average efficiency scores for our sample companies have not changed significantly between 1996 and 2005, which indicates that the average ILECs shows no measurable improvement in terms of optimizing their input-output combinations over time. We find some empirical evidence of a positive merger effect, although this effect diminishes over time. In addition, we find that non-merged firms underperform in terms of average productivity growth. Essay 2: This study analyzes the merger effects for 25 ILECs over the period 1996-2005 using stochastic frontier analysis with a time-varying inefficiency model. In addition, we conduct a comparison of indices between the stochastic frontier analysis and the Malmquist index method. The empirical results indicate that the sample of telecommunications firms has experienced deterioration in average productivity growth following the mergers. In addition, both approaches suggest that firms that do not merge underperform in terms of average productivity growth. Essay 3: This essay investigates whether the substitution of price cap regulation (PCR), along with other regulatory regimes, for traditional rate of return regulation (RRR) has had a measurable effect on productivity growth in the U.S. telecommunications industry. A stochastic frontier approach, which differs from previous studies, is employed to compute efficiency change, technological progress, and productivity growth for 25 LECs over the period 1988-1998. By examining the relationship between the change in productivity growth and regulatory regime variables, while controlling for other effects, we find that PCR and other regulatory regimes have a positive effect on productivity growth. However, only PCR has a significant and positive effect in both contemporaneous and lagged model specifications.

This dissertation investigates two broad management accounting questions in the context of electric utility industry: How do regulators for electricity industry use the information generated from accounting systems to make pricing decisions? What are the economic consequences of these decisions? In Chapter 2, I review regulatory reforms and discuss existing issues of using DEA models for efficiency benchmarking in four aspects. Suggestions are given for improving the use of DEA models based on the review and discussion. In Chapter 3, I empirically investigate the effect of incentive regulation with DEA benchmarking on operational efficiency using a panel of electricity distribution firms in Brazil. In Chapter 4, I examine the effect of restructuring and retail competition on cost reduction using a sample of US investor-owned electric utilities. The effects of privatization, industrial restructuring, incentive regulation and benchmarking are effectively disentangled from one another using the research setting in Brazil and US electricity industry. In Chapter 5, I combine the idea of activity based costing and data envelopment analysis to further develop a detailed benchmarking model for incentive regulation. / Business Administration/Accounting

A partir do processo de liberalização do setor de energia em diversos países e, em particular, no Brasil, na década de 90, mecanismos de regulação por incentivos têm sido implementados como forma de assegurar a eficiência produtiva e alocativa do setor. Entretanto, a relação entre o desenvolvimento teórico destes mecanismos e sua aplicação não tem sido amplamente analisada. Neste sentido, este trabalho tem por objetivo avaliar os efeitos da regulação por incentivos na eficiência e produtividade do setor de transmissão de energia elétrica no Brasil entre os anos de 2002 e 2014. O método Malmquist-DEA foi aplicado para avaliar a evolução da eficiência relativa e da produtividade das empresas transmissoras mais representativas do mercado nacional entre os anos de 2002 e 2014. Os resultados permitem constatar comportamentos diferentes entre as empresas e colocaram em evidência os efeitos da desverticalização e principalmente da privatização de algumas empresas do setor. Em termos gerais, o setor de transmissão apresentou um pequeno aumento do Índice Malmquist médio para o período analisado influenciado principalmente pelo acréscimo de produtividade verificados em 2007 e 2014 em relação aos anos anteriores. Em contrapartida a maioria das empresas (6 de um total de 8) apresentaram decréscimo na produtividade média no período analisado. Adicionalmente, os resultados corroboram o modelo teórico dos efeitos da regulação por incentivos para promover o aumento da eficiência do setor de energia brasileiro. Apesar deste aumento de eficiência em algumas empresas do setor, observa-se que ainda há muitas oportunidades de melhorias operacionais, eficiência produtiva, e apropriação de tecnologia por parte das empresas reguladas. O trabalho também apresenta implicações relevantes para os gestores de empresas e para os órgãos reguladores, com o intuito de aumentar a eficiência e a produtividade das empresas brasileiras do setor de transmissão de energia elétrica. / Since the process of liberalization of the energy sector in several countries, and particularly in Brazil in the 1990s, incentive regulation mechanisms have been implemented as a means of ensuring the productive and allocative efficiency of the sector. However, the relationship between the theoretical development of these mechanisms and their application has not been widely analyzed. In this sense, the objective of this work is to evaluate the effects of incentive regulation on the efficiency and productivity of the electric power transmission sector in Brazil between 2002 and 2014. The Malmquist-DEA method was applied to evaluate the evolution of relative efficiency and the productivity of the most representative transmission companies in the national market between 2002 and 2014. The results show different behaviors between companies and highlighted the effects of the de-verticalization and mainly the privatization of some companies in the sector. In general terms, the transmission sector showed a small increase in the average Malmquist Index for the period analyzed, mainly influenced by the increase in productivity in 2007 and 2014 in relation to previous years. In contrast, the majority of companies (6 out of 8) had a decrease in average productivity in the period analyzed. Additionally, the results corroborate the theoretical model of the effects of regulation by incentives to promote the increase of the efficiency of the Brazilian energy sector. Despite this increase in efficiency in some companies in the sector, it is observed that there are still many opportunities for operational improvements, productive efficiency, and the appropriation of technology by regulated companies. The work also has relevant implications for business managers and regulatory bodies, with the aim of increasing the efficiency and productivity of Brazilian companies in the electricity transmission sector.

In this thesis current questions regarding the functionality of liberalized electricity markets are studied addressing different topics of interest in two main directions: market power and competition policy on electricity wholesale markets, and network investments and incentive regulation. The former is studied based on the case of the German electricity market with respect to ex-post market power analysis and ex-ante remedy development. First an optimization model is designed to obtain the competitive benchmark which can be compared to the observed market outcomes between 2004 and 2006. In a second step the horizontal breaking up of dominant firms (divestiture) is simulated applying equilibrium techniques (the classical Cournot approach and the Supply Function Equilibrium approach). The later issue of transmission capacity investment is addressed by highlighting the complexity of network investments in electricity markets and by analyzing a regulatory mechanism with a two part tariff approach. The technical characteristics of power flows are combined with economic criteria and tested for different network settings.

A partir do processo de liberalização do setor de energia em diversos países e, em particular, no Brasil, na década de 90, mecanismos de regulação por incentivos têm sido implementados como forma de assegurar a eficiência produtiva e alocativa do setor. Entretanto, a relação entre o desenvolvimento teórico destes mecanismos e sua aplicação não tem sido amplamente analisada. Neste sentido, este trabalho tem por objetivo avaliar os efeitos da regulação por incentivos na eficiência e produtividade do setor de transmissão de energia elétrica no Brasil entre os anos de 2002 e 2014. O método Malmquist-DEA foi aplicado para avaliar a evolução da eficiência relativa e da produtividade das empresas transmissoras mais representativas do mercado nacional entre os anos de 2002 e 2014. Os resultados permitem constatar comportamentos diferentes entre as empresas e colocaram em evidência os efeitos da desverticalização e principalmente da privatização de algumas empresas do setor. Em termos gerais, o setor de transmissão apresentou um pequeno aumento do Índice Malmquist médio para o período analisado influenciado principalmente pelo acréscimo de produtividade verificados em 2007 e 2014 em relação aos anos anteriores. Em contrapartida a maioria das empresas (6 de um total de 8) apresentaram decréscimo na produtividade média no período analisado. Adicionalmente, os resultados corroboram o modelo teórico dos efeitos da regulação por incentivos para promover o aumento da eficiência do setor de energia brasileiro. Apesar deste aumento de eficiência em algumas empresas do setor, observa-se que ainda há muitas oportunidades de melhorias operacionais, eficiência produtiva, e apropriação de tecnologia por parte das empresas reguladas. O trabalho também apresenta implicações relevantes para os gestores de empresas e para os órgãos reguladores, com o intuito de aumentar a eficiência e a produtividade das empresas brasileiras do setor de transmissão de energia elétrica. / Since the process of liberalization of the energy sector in several countries, and particularly in Brazil in the 1990s, incentive regulation mechanisms have been implemented as a means of ensuring the productive and allocative efficiency of the sector. However, the relationship between the theoretical development of these mechanisms and their application has not been widely analyzed. In this sense, the objective of this work is to evaluate the effects of incentive regulation on the efficiency and productivity of the electric power transmission sector in Brazil between 2002 and 2014. The Malmquist-DEA method was applied to evaluate the evolution of relative efficiency and the productivity of the most representative transmission companies in the national market between 2002 and 2014. The results show different behaviors between companies and highlighted the effects of the de-verticalization and mainly the privatization of some companies in the sector. In general terms, the transmission sector showed a small increase in the average Malmquist Index for the period analyzed, mainly influenced by the increase in productivity in 2007 and 2014 in relation to previous years. In contrast, the majority of companies (6 out of 8) had a decrease in average productivity in the period analyzed. Additionally, the results corroborate the theoretical model of the effects of regulation by incentives to promote the increase of the efficiency of the Brazilian energy sector. Despite this increase in efficiency in some companies in the sector, it is observed that there are still many opportunities for operational improvements, productive efficiency, and the appropriation of technology by regulated companies. The work also has relevant implications for business managers and regulatory bodies, with the aim of increasing the efficiency and productivity of Brazilian companies in the electricity transmission sector.

Submitted by Regio Martins (regio@fgvmail.br) on 2011-03-16T22:17:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis.pdf: 1258015 bytes, checksum: 511b0226f85ea587ab4fb0f330be47c6 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Virginio Machado(andrea.machado@fgv.br) on 2011-03-18T12:45:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis.pdf: 1258015 bytes, checksum: 511b0226f85ea587ab4fb0f330be47c6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-03-31T18:04:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis.pdf: 1258015 bytes, checksum: 511b0226f85ea587ab4fb0f330be47c6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-30 / In this thesis, we investigate some aspects of the interplay between economic regulation and the risk of the regulated firm. In the first chapter, the main goal is to understand the implications a mainstream regulatory model (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) have on the systematic risk of the firm. We generalize the model in order to incorporate aggregate risk, and find that the optimal regulatory contract must be severely constrained in order to reproduce real-world systematic risk levels. We also consider the optimal profit-sharing mechanism, with an endogenous sharing rate, to explore the relationship between contract power and beta. We find results compatible with the available evidence that high-powered regimes impose more risk to the firm. In the second chapter, a joint work with Daniel Lima from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), we start from the observation that regulated firms are subject to some regulatory practices that potentially affect the symmetry of the distribution of their future profits. If these practices are anticipated by investors in the stock market, the pattern of asymmetry in the empirical distribution of stock returns may differ among regulated and non-regulated companies. We review some recently proposed asymmetry measures that are robust to the empirical regularities of return data and use them to investigate whether there are meaningful differences in the distribution of asymmetry between these two groups of companies. In the third and last chapter, three different approaches to the capital asset pricing model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) are tested with recent Brazilian data and estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) as a unifying procedure. We find that ex-post stock returns generally exhibit statistically significant coskewness with the market portfolio, and hence are sensitive to squared market returns. However, while the theoretical ground for the preference for skewness is well established and fairly intuitive, we did not find supporting evidence that investors require a premium for supporting this risk factor in Brazil. / Essa tese investiga alguns aspectos da relação entre regulação econômica e risco da empresa regulada. No primeiro capítulo, o objetivo é entender as implicações do modelo tradicional de regulação por incentivos (Laffont e Tirole, 1993) sobre o risco sistemático da firma. Generalizamos o modelo de forma a incorporar risco agregado ao lucro da atividade, e descobrimos que o contrato ótimo deve ser severamente restringido para que reproduza betas (CAPM) próximos aos observados em setores regulados. Usamos um caso particular do modelo, de regulação por repartição de lucro (profit-sharing regulation), para avaliar a relação entre a potência do contrato e o nível de risco não diversificável. Encontramos resultados compatíveis com a evidência disponível, de que regimes com alta potência impõem mais risco sobre a firma. No segundo capítulo, escrito em co-autoria com Daniel Lima da Universidade da Califórnia em San Diego (UCSD), partimos da constatação de que empresas reguladas podem estar sujeitas a práticas regulatórias que potencialmente afetam a simetria da distribuição de seus lucros futuros. Se essas práticas forem antecipadas pelos investidores no mercado secundário de ações, poderemos identificar diferenças no padrão da assimetria da distribuição empírica de retornos das empresas reguladas com relação às não-reguladas. Nesse capítulo revisamos alguns métodos de mensuração de assimetria propostos recentemente na literatura, que são robustos à características comuns em séries de retornos financeiros (caudas pesadas e correlação serial), e investigamos se existem diferenças significativas na distribuição de assimetria entre empresas reguladas e não-reguladas. No terceiro e último capítulo, três diferentes abordagens empíricas do modelo de apreçamento de ativos de Kraus e Litzenberger (1976) são testadas com dados do mercado brasileiro de ações. Descobrimos que a distribuição empírica de retornos costuma exibir co-assimetria significativa com relação à carteira de mercado, e que portanto os retornos das ações são sensíveis à volatilidade (retornos quadráticos) do mercado. No entanto, apesar da base teórica para a preferência por retornos assimétricos esteja bem estabelecida e seja bastante intuitiva, não encontramos evidência que suporte a hipótese de que os investidores requeiram um prêmio para aceitar esse tipo de risco no mercado local.

In this thesis current questions regarding the functionality of liberalized electricity markets are studied addressing different topics of interest in two main directions: market power and competition policy on electricity wholesale markets, and network investments and incentive regulation. The former is studied based on the case of the German electricity market with respect to ex-post market power analysis and ex-ante remedy development. First an optimization model is designed to obtain the competitive benchmark which can be compared to the observed market outcomes between 2004 and 2006. In a second step the horizontal breaking up of dominant firms (divestiture) is simulated applying equilibrium techniques (the classical Cournot approach and the Supply Function Equilibrium approach). The later issue of transmission capacity investment is addressed by highlighting the complexity of network investments in electricity markets and by analyzing a regulatory mechanism with a two part tariff approach. The technical characteristics of power flows are combined with economic criteria and tested for different network settings.

The Swedish energy markets inspectorate (Ei) regulates the Swedish DSOs revenue cap, to ensure reasonable prices, efficiency, and quality of supply towards the end users. In combination with directives from the European Union and Sweden's environmental goal, Ei implemented efficient grid utilization to the DSOs revenue cap in 2016. The efficient grid utilization can be divided into two incentives: load flow and network losses. Criticism regarding the load flow incentive, and the indicator used to calculate it, has been raised from the industry. The purpose of this degree project was to investigate the possibilities of a new indicator that also could be affected by the DSOs actions. The project identified four main indicators to test, weighted load factor, utilization factor, adjusted utilization factor and a utilization factor that incorporates all local production units. The indicators were calculated with data from a regional and local grid, provided by the Swedish DSO Ellevio. Other parameter changes such as peaks and seasonal based calculations were also tested. To see the impact DSOs could have on the indicator, with today's regulations, was detected to be through load shaving and shifting, demand side management (DSM). MATLAB was used to test the impact DSM had on the indicators. Further, a load prediction for the years 2023–2035, based on provided historical data, was executed to test the indicators long-term outcome. The project concluded that the regional grid had little to non-impact on the indicators with DSM whilst the local grid resulted in high increased outcome for most indicators. The project continues to conclude to separate indicators for the regional and local grid, to better represent the two grids characteristic and purpose in Swedish society. The adjusted utilization factor was proposed for the regional grid, due to its non-negative impact from installing renewable energy resources, and the weighted load factor for the local grid due to being highly affected by DSM. Lastly, the project concluded that the indicator needs to be changed and further developed for regional DSOs, for them to have the opportunity to affect it.

[pt] Em dezembro de 2021, a ANEEL homologou uma nova metodologia para estabelecimento das Perdas Não Técnicas (PNT) regulatórias para o segmento de distribuição de energia elétrica. Pela primeira vez no histórico da regulamentação das perdas comerciais, a ANEEL estabeleceu tratamento específico para concessionárias que atuassem em regiões com presença de Áreas com Severas Restrições Operativas (ASRO). As ASRO, ou simplesmente Áreas de Risco, são locais dominados pelo poder paralelo – tráfico e/ou milícia – onde o Estado pleno de direito é cerceado. Sendo mais claro, sequer a polícia consegue atuar com efetividade nestas regiões. Acontece que nesta revisão metodológica, válida a partir de janeiro de 2022, o tratamento dispensado às ASRO é limitado, raso e com elevado grau de discricionariedade. Além disso, os modelos econométricos obtidos pelo Regulador sofrem de inconsistências metodológicas. Estes dois fatores em comunhão ocasionam, por consequência, no estabelecimento de metas/alvos regulatórios ineficientes em muitos casos, em especial para concessionárias que atuam na presença de ASRO. Este trabalho se dedica a buscar cobrir esta lacuna metodológica, isto é, propõe-se o desenvolvimento de metodologia baseada em dados em painel para o estabelecimento de metas regulatórias de PNT em concessões de distribuição de energia elétrica que tenham presença de ASRO. Para tanto, propõe-se a desagregação do alvo regulatório entre áreas de risco e áreas normais, por meio do recálculo do Índice de Complexidade da concessão. / [en] In December 2021, ANEEL approved a new methodology for establishing regulatory Non-Technical Losses (NTL) for the power distribution segment. For the first time in the history of regulating commercial losses, ANEEL established specific treatment for concessionaires that operate in regions with the presence of Areas with Severe Operating Restrictions (ASRO). ASROs, or simply Risk Areas, are gang-controlled territories – drug trafficking and/or militia – where the rule of law is curtailed. To be more specific, not even the official police can act effectively in these regions. To be clearer, not even the police can act effectively in these regions. It turns out that in this methodological review, valid from January 2022, the treatment given to ASROs is limited, shallow and with a high degree of discretion. Furthermore, the econometric models obtained by the Regulator present methodological inconsistencies. These two factors together lead, consequently, to the establishment of inefficient regulatory targets in many cases, especially for concessionaires that operate in the presence of ASROs. This work seeks to fill this methodological gap, that is, it proposes the development of a methodology based on panel data for the establishment of PNT regulatory targets in electricity distribution concessions that have ASRO. To this end, it is proposed to disaggregate the regulatory target between risk areas and normal areas, by recalculating the Complexity Index of the original concession.