Die deutsche Energiewirtschaft befindet sich im Umbruch. Ein neuer staatlicher Ordnungsrahmen wurde geschaffen. Zentrales Element für die Regulierung der Stromnetze ist die „Anreizregulierung“ ‒ simulierter Wettbewerb, zentral gesteuert von der Bundesnetzagentur, um missbräuchliches Verhalten auszuschließen. Ausgehend von der Entwicklung des Energiemarktes seit dem 19. Jahrhundert analysiert Kai Kleinwächter die unterschiedlichen Interessen der Bundes- und Länderregierungen, der Stadtwerke sowie der großen Energiekonzerne bei der Einführung dieses Steuerungsinstrumentes. Bewertet werden auch die politischen Machtpotenziale der Akteure sowie ihr Einfluss auf den Gesetzgebungsprozess.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Economics / Dennis L. Weisman / This empirical dissertation consists of three essays on mergers and regulation in the U.S. telecommunications industry. An abstract for each of the three essays follows. Essay 1: This study has attempted to measure the productivity growth associated with 25 incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) over the period 1996-2005 using a Malmquist productivity index. The average efficiency scores for our sample companies have not changed significantly between 1996 and 2005, which indicates that the average ILECs shows no measurable improvement in terms of optimizing their input-output combinations over time. We find some empirical evidence of a positive merger effect, although this effect diminishes over time. In addition, we find that non-merged firms underperform in terms of average productivity growth. Essay 2: This study analyzes the merger effects for 25 ILECs over the period 1996-2005 using stochastic frontier analysis with a time-varying inefficiency model. In addition, we conduct a comparison of indices between the stochastic frontier analysis and the Malmquist index method. The empirical results indicate that the sample of telecommunications firms has experienced deterioration in average productivity growth following the mergers. In addition, both approaches suggest that firms that do not merge underperform in terms of average productivity growth. Essay 3: This essay investigates whether the substitution of price cap regulation (PCR), along with other regulatory regimes, for traditional rate of return regulation (RRR) has had a measurable effect on productivity growth in the U.S. telecommunications industry. A stochastic frontier approach, which differs from previous studies, is employed to compute efficiency change, technological progress, and productivity growth for 25 LECs over the period 1988-1998. By examining the relationship between the change in productivity growth and regulatory regime variables, while controlling for other effects, we find that PCR and other regulatory regimes have a positive effect on productivity growth. However, only PCR has a significant and positive effect in both contemporaneous and lagged model specifications.

This dissertation investigates two broad management accounting questions in the context of electric utility industry: How do regulators for electricity industry use the information generated from accounting systems to make pricing decisions? What are the economic consequences of these decisions? In Chapter 2, I review regulatory reforms and discuss existing issues of using DEA models for efficiency benchmarking in four aspects. Suggestions are given for improving the use of DEA models based on the review and discussion. In Chapter 3, I empirically investigate the effect of incentive regulation with DEA benchmarking on operational efficiency using a panel of electricity distribution firms in Brazil. In Chapter 4, I examine the effect of restructuring and retail competition on cost reduction using a sample of US investor-owned electric utilities. The effects of privatization, industrial restructuring, incentive regulation and benchmarking are effectively disentangled from one another using the research setting in Brazil and US electricity industry. In Chapter 5, I combine the idea of activity based costing and data envelopment analysis to further develop a detailed benchmarking model for incentive regulation. / Business Administration/Accounting

A partir do processo de liberalização do setor de energia em diversos países e, em particular, no Brasil, na década de 90, mecanismos de regulação por incentivos têm sido implementados como forma de assegurar a eficiência produtiva e alocativa do setor. Entretanto, a relação entre o desenvolvimento teórico destes mecanismos e sua aplicação não tem sido amplamente analisada. Neste sentido, este trabalho tem por objetivo avaliar os efeitos da regulação por incentivos na eficiência e produtividade do setor de transmissão de energia elétrica no Brasil entre os anos de 2002 e 2014. O método Malmquist-DEA foi aplicado para avaliar a evolução da eficiência relativa e da produtividade das empresas transmissoras mais representativas do mercado nacional entre os anos de 2002 e 2014. Os resultados permitem constatar comportamentos diferentes entre as empresas e colocaram em evidência os efeitos da desverticalização e principalmente da privatização de algumas empresas do setor. Em termos gerais, o setor de transmissão apresentou um pequeno aumento do Índice Malmquist médio para o período analisado influenciado principalmente pelo acréscimo de produtividade verificados em 2007 e 2014 em relação aos anos anteriores. Em contrapartida a maioria das empresas (6 de um total de 8) apresentaram decréscimo na produtividade média no período analisado. Adicionalmente, os resultados corroboram o modelo teórico dos efeitos da regulação por incentivos para promover o aumento da eficiência do setor de energia brasileiro. Apesar deste aumento de eficiência em algumas empresas do setor, observa-se que ainda há muitas oportunidades de melhorias operacionais, eficiência produtiva, e apropriação de tecnologia por parte das empresas reguladas. O trabalho também apresenta implicações relevantes para os gestores de empresas e para os órgãos reguladores, com o intuito de aumentar a eficiência e a produtividade das empresas brasileiras do setor de transmissão de energia elétrica. / Since the process of liberalization of the energy sector in several countries, and particularly in Brazil in the 1990s, incentive regulation mechanisms have been implemented as a means of ensuring the productive and allocative efficiency of the sector. However, the relationship between the theoretical development of these mechanisms and their application has not been widely analyzed. In this sense, the objective of this work is to evaluate the effects of incentive regulation on the efficiency and productivity of the electric power transmission sector in Brazil between 2002 and 2014. The Malmquist-DEA method was applied to evaluate the evolution of relative efficiency and the productivity of the most representative transmission companies in the national market between 2002 and 2014. The results show different behaviors between companies and highlighted the effects of the de-verticalization and mainly the privatization of some companies in the sector. In general terms, the transmission sector showed a small increase in the average Malmquist Index for the period analyzed, mainly influenced by the increase in productivity in 2007 and 2014 in relation to previous years. In contrast, the majority of companies (6 out of 8) had a decrease in average productivity in the period analyzed. Additionally, the results corroborate the theoretical model of the effects of regulation by incentives to promote the increase of the efficiency of the Brazilian energy sector. Despite this increase in efficiency in some companies in the sector, it is observed that there are still many opportunities for operational improvements, productive efficiency, and the appropriation of technology by regulated companies. The work also has relevant implications for business managers and regulatory bodies, with the aim of increasing the efficiency and productivity of Brazilian companies in the electricity transmission sector.

In this thesis current questions regarding the functionality of liberalized electricity markets are studied addressing different topics of interest in two main directions: market power and competition policy on electricity wholesale markets, and network investments and incentive regulation. The former is studied based on the case of the German electricity market with respect to ex-post market power analysis and ex-ante remedy development. First an optimization model is designed to obtain the competitive benchmark which can be compared to the observed market outcomes between 2004 and 2006. In a second step the horizontal breaking up of dominant firms (divestiture) is simulated applying equilibrium techniques (the classical Cournot approach and the Supply Function Equilibrium approach). The later issue of transmission capacity investment is addressed by highlighting the complexity of network investments in electricity markets and by analyzing a regulatory mechanism with a two part tariff approach. The technical characteristics of power flows are combined with economic criteria and tested for different network settings.

A partir do processo de liberalização do setor de energia em diversos países e, em particular, no Brasil, na década de 90, mecanismos de regulação por incentivos têm sido implementados como forma de assegurar a eficiência produtiva e alocativa do setor. Entretanto, a relação entre o desenvolvimento teórico destes mecanismos e sua aplicação não tem sido amplamente analisada. Neste sentido, este trabalho tem por objetivo avaliar os efeitos da regulação por incentivos na eficiência e produtividade do setor de transmissão de energia elétrica no Brasil entre os anos de 2002 e 2014. O método Malmquist-DEA foi aplicado para avaliar a evolução da eficiência relativa e da produtividade das empresas transmissoras mais representativas do mercado nacional entre os anos de 2002 e 2014. Os resultados permitem constatar comportamentos diferentes entre as empresas e colocaram em evidência os efeitos da desverticalização e principalmente da privatização de algumas empresas do setor. Em termos gerais, o setor de transmissão apresentou um pequeno aumento do Índice Malmquist médio para o período analisado influenciado principalmente pelo acréscimo de produtividade verificados em 2007 e 2014 em relação aos anos anteriores. Em contrapartida a maioria das empresas (6 de um total de 8) apresentaram decréscimo na produtividade média no período analisado. Adicionalmente, os resultados corroboram o modelo teórico dos efeitos da regulação por incentivos para promover o aumento da eficiência do setor de energia brasileiro. Apesar deste aumento de eficiência em algumas empresas do setor, observa-se que ainda há muitas oportunidades de melhorias operacionais, eficiência produtiva, e apropriação de tecnologia por parte das empresas reguladas. O trabalho também apresenta implicações relevantes para os gestores de empresas e para os órgãos reguladores, com o intuito de aumentar a eficiência e a produtividade das empresas brasileiras do setor de transmissão de energia elétrica. / Since the process of liberalization of the energy sector in several countries, and particularly in Brazil in the 1990s, incentive regulation mechanisms have been implemented as a means of ensuring the productive and allocative efficiency of the sector. However, the relationship between the theoretical development of these mechanisms and their application has not been widely analyzed. In this sense, the objective of this work is to evaluate the effects of incentive regulation on the efficiency and productivity of the electric power transmission sector in Brazil between 2002 and 2014. The Malmquist-DEA method was applied to evaluate the evolution of relative efficiency and the productivity of the most representative transmission companies in the national market between 2002 and 2014. The results show different behaviors between companies and highlighted the effects of the de-verticalization and mainly the privatization of some companies in the sector. In general terms, the transmission sector showed a small increase in the average Malmquist Index for the period analyzed, mainly influenced by the increase in productivity in 2007 and 2014 in relation to previous years. In contrast, the majority of companies (6 out of 8) had a decrease in average productivity in the period analyzed. Additionally, the results corroborate the theoretical model of the effects of regulation by incentives to promote the increase of the efficiency of the Brazilian energy sector. Despite this increase in efficiency in some companies in the sector, it is observed that there are still many opportunities for operational improvements, productive efficiency, and the appropriation of technology by regulated companies. The work also has relevant implications for business managers and regulatory bodies, with the aim of increasing the efficiency and productivity of Brazilian companies in the electricity transmission sector.

Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus drei empirischen Papieren, die verschiedene Anreize von Manager bezüglich einer Beeinflussung der Rechnungslegung untersuchen. Das erste Papier untersucht die Wechselwirkung von Produktmarktregulierung und Rechnungslegung. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Manager frühzeitig neue Rechnungslegungsregeln anwenden, um regulierte Preise in der Versorgungswirtschaft zu beeinflussen. Der zweite Teil der Dissertation befasst sich mit der Frage, inwieweit sich persönliche Eigenschaften von Managern (Selbstüberschätzung) in der Rechnungslegung widerspiegeln. Ihre Fähigkeiten überschätzende Manager haben zu hohe Erwartungen bezüglich der zukünftigen Zahlungsüberschüsse ihres Unternehmens. Das Papier zeigt, dass diese Manager bei Amtsantritt mit einer geringeren Wahrscheinlichkeit das Periodenergebnis negativ beeinflussen (Earnings bath). Das letzte Papier der Dissertation untersucht die Berichterstattung von Unternehmen, die an europäischen, börsenregulierten Aktienmärkten notiert sind. Insbesondere liegt der Fokus auf der freiwilligen Anwendung der International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) und der freiwilligen Veröffentlichung von Quartalsinformationen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Verkauf von Aktien an institutionelle Investoren zum Zeitpunkt des Börsengangs positiv mit der freiwilligen Anwendung der IFRS korreliert, jedoch nicht mit der freiwilligen Veröffentlichung von Quartalsinformationen. / This cumulative doctoral thesis consists of three papers. Each part investigates empirically different aspects of the incentive structure of managers to influence the accounting outcome. The first paper examines the interplay of product market regulation and financial reporting. It shows that managers early adopt a new accounting regime if accounting numbers are used by regulators to set prices in utility industries. The second paper argues that reporting decisions of managers are influenced by personal characteristics (overconfidence). Overconfident managers overestimate their abilities and consequently have upwardly biased expectations concerning future firm cash flows. More specifically, the paper shows that overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in an earnings bath at CEO turnover. The last paper investigates reporting choices of firms in European exchange-regulated markets. In particular, it sheds light on the voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and on the decision to voluntarily provide quarterly financial information. The findings indicate that the likelihood of voluntary IFRS adoption increases with the proportion of stocks sold to institutional investors upon IPO while the likelihood to provide quarterly information does not.

In this thesis current questions regarding the functionality of liberalized electricity markets are studied addressing different topics of interest in two main directions: market power and competition policy on electricity wholesale markets, and network investments and incentive regulation. The former is studied based on the case of the German electricity market with respect to ex-post market power analysis and ex-ante remedy development. First an optimization model is designed to obtain the competitive benchmark which can be compared to the observed market outcomes between 2004 and 2006. In a second step the horizontal breaking up of dominant firms (divestiture) is simulated applying equilibrium techniques (the classical Cournot approach and the Supply Function Equilibrium approach). The later issue of transmission capacity investment is addressed by highlighting the complexity of network investments in electricity markets and by analyzing a regulatory mechanism with a two part tariff approach. The technical characteristics of power flows are combined with economic criteria and tested for different network settings.

[pt] Em dezembro de 2021, a ANEEL homologou uma nova metodologia para estabelecimento das Perdas Não Técnicas (PNT) regulatórias para o segmento de distribuição de energia elétrica. Pela primeira vez no histórico da regulamentação das perdas comerciais, a ANEEL estabeleceu tratamento específico para concessionárias que atuassem em regiões com presença de Áreas com Severas Restrições Operativas (ASRO). As ASRO, ou simplesmente Áreas de Risco, são locais dominados pelo poder paralelo – tráfico e/ou milícia – onde o Estado pleno de direito é cerceado. Sendo mais claro, sequer a polícia consegue atuar com efetividade nestas regiões. Acontece que nesta revisão metodológica, válida a partir de janeiro de 2022, o tratamento dispensado às ASRO é limitado, raso e com elevado grau de discricionariedade. Além disso, os modelos econométricos obtidos pelo Regulador sofrem de inconsistências metodológicas. Estes dois fatores em comunhão ocasionam, por consequência, no estabelecimento de metas/alvos regulatórios ineficientes em muitos casos, em especial para concessionárias que atuam na presença de ASRO. Este trabalho se dedica a buscar cobrir esta lacuna metodológica, isto é, propõe-se o desenvolvimento de metodologia baseada em dados em painel para o estabelecimento de metas regulatórias de PNT em concessões de distribuição de energia elétrica que tenham presença de ASRO. Para tanto, propõe-se a desagregação do alvo regulatório entre áreas de risco e áreas normais, por meio do recálculo do Índice de Complexidade da concessão. / [en] In December 2021, ANEEL approved a new methodology for establishing regulatory Non-Technical Losses (NTL) for the power distribution segment. For the first time in the history of regulating commercial losses, ANEEL established specific treatment for concessionaires that operate in regions with the presence of Areas with Severe Operating Restrictions (ASRO). ASROs, or simply Risk Areas, are gang-controlled territories – drug trafficking and/or militia – where the rule of law is curtailed. To be more specific, not even the official police can act effectively in these regions. To be clearer, not even the police can act effectively in these regions. It turns out that in this methodological review, valid from January 2022, the treatment given to ASROs is limited, shallow and with a high degree of discretion. Furthermore, the econometric models obtained by the Regulator present methodological inconsistencies. These two factors together lead, consequently, to the establishment of inefficient regulatory targets in many cases, especially for concessionaires that operate in the presence of ASROs. This work seeks to fill this methodological gap, that is, it proposes the development of a methodology based on panel data for the establishment of PNT regulatory targets in electricity distribution concessions that have ASRO. To this end, it is proposed to disaggregate the regulatory target between risk areas and normal areas, by recalculating the Complexity Index of the original concession.

Although the German framework of incentive-based energy regulation appears to be well-defined because it draws from international experience and eliminates several present drawbacks existing with revenue-cap regulation doubts of industry and politicians concerning the application of benchmarking techniques and more importantly, the future industry structure, remain. The regulation scheme is based on experience with energy sector reforms in the US due to it being a precursor in this regard, e.g. by introducing incentive-based regulation as early as 1994 and publishing the relevant data in a very detailed way. This thesis therefore brings together the two issues of certain efficiency measurement problems and the industry restructuring in Germany and the US in order to contribute to the current discussion of robust benchmarking and to provide political implications related to the industry’s structure. Therefore, the application of DEA and SFA constitutes the heart of the whole study. These techniques are applied on German electricity DSOs as well as on data for US electricity DSOs and US gas TSOs. The application to US data can then be used to derive information about business strategies and their success in a sector that is being restructured. The US experience will lead to relevant German policy implications with respect to the future structure of the energy industry in Germany. / Der deutsche Regulierungsansatz erscheint im Allgemeinen als ausgewogen, da er zum einen internationale Erfahrungen mit einbezieht und zum anderen bestehenden Schwächen der Erlös-Obergrenzenregulierung berücksichtigt. Dennoch bestehen Zweifel seitens Industrie- und Politvertretern bezüglich der Anwendung von Benchmarking-Techniken und noch bedeutsamer der zukünftigen Industriestruktur. Der regulatorische Rahmen basiert auf Erfahrungen aus der Regulierung der Energiewirtschaft aus den USA, da diese eine Vorreiterrolle in dieser Hinsicht innehaben, beispielsweise aufgrund der frühen Einführung der Anreizregulierung in 1994 und der sehr detaillierten Veröffentlichung der relevanten Daten. Diese Arbeit verknüpft daher diese zwei Aspekte zum einen der Existenz gewisser Problemfelder bei der Effizienzmessung als auch der Umstrukturierung der deutschen Industriestruktur in der Energiewirtschaft. Damit trägt sie zu der aktuellen Diskussion mit Bezug auf robustes Benchmarking bei und liefert zudem politische Implikationen bezüglich der Industriestruktur. Zu diesem Zweck steht die Anwendung der für die deutsche Regulierung der Energienetze relevanten Benchmarking-Techniken (Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) und Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)) im Zentrum der gesamten Studie. Die empirischen Analysen beziehen sich dabei auf deutsche Elektrizitätsverteilnetzbetreiber sowie auf Elektrizitätsverteilnetzbetreibern und Ferngasgesellschaften aus den USA. Die Analysen von US Daten können dann genutzt werden, um gehaltvolle Informationen über Unternehmensstrategien und deren Erfolg in einem restrukturierten Sektor zu gewinnen. Diese Erfahrungen münden dann in Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen für die deutsche Regulierung und Industriestruktur der deutschen Energienetzwirtschaft.