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To make sense of why states are dramatically shifting their agendas to focus on their diasporic population abroad, this project builds a theoretical model which makes sense of decisive shifts in political behavior between states and their external populations. A two-fold argument is presented to explain these shifts. First, analyses of diaspora should treat diaspora not as a bounded entity but as a process or social practice. This allows for a multi-level analysis which neither negates the role individuals play in the formation of diasporic identity nor denies the agency of states which actively engage in their own unique approach to identify, label or shape what constitutes their diaspora. Second, state-diasporic engagement practices can be better understood as an institutional practice, which in turn allow us to explain state behavioral change in terms of their diasporic populations and what factors elucidate diaspora to respond. It also allows us to ask two-fold questions - a) who the sending state targets, why they are targeted and when states increase their engagement with their diasporic populations abroad; and b) what policy tools states develop to encourage dependable contributions of the diaspora to its political agenda. These theoretical arguments are then applied to address the modern Indian state's approach and its shifting agenda to its diaspora. The intent is to provide a historical foundation from which to make sense of why the Indian diaspora evolved from a political liability under Jawaharlal Nehru to an instrument of strength in the early 1990s. This thesis concludes with an exploration of the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi's discourse and state practices and suggests that India's accelerated engagement of the Indian diaspora to be representative of a muscular Hindu nationalist agenda. In short, Modi's engagement of the Indian diaspora should be understood as part of a nation-building project which seeks to communicate to both domestic and international audiences alike that India and Indians are first and foremost Hindu. / Graduate

The study of the relationship between Hindu nationalism and Hindu activist traditions of seva (selfless service) has been principally organised into three approaches: firstly, the instrumentalist deployment of the practice, secondly, the political appropriation of traditions of seva, and thirdly, that these related associational spaces are internally homogenous and distinct from alternative ‘legitimate’ religious arenas. These frameworks largely reflect approaches to Hindu nationalism which place emphasis on its forms of political statecraft and relationship to spectacular violence. These approaches raise manifold concerns. This thesis retheorizes the relationship between Hindu nationalism and seva with reference to primary and secondary sources, together with field research in the seva projects of the Vanavasi Kalyan Kendra (VKK), a Hindu nationalist association. Through deploying a reworked understanding of Fraser’s (1990) approach to associational space and Butler’s (1993, 2007) theorisation of performative acts and subject formation, this thesis contributes to rethinking Hindu nationalism and seva. I demonstrate firstly that the colonial encounter worked to produce a series of social imaginaries which were drawn upon to transform traditions of seva. Through their articulation in shared religious languages, practices of seva were productive of porously structured Hindu activist spaces in which the tradition was contested with regard to ‘radical’ and ‘orthodox’ orientations to Hinduism’s boundaries. Increasingly, articulations of seva which invoked a sangathanist ‘orthodoxy’ came to gain hegemony in Hindu activist arenas. This influenced the early and irregular Hindu nationalist practices of seva. Fractures in Hindu nationalist articulations developed as a result of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s (RSS) sangathanist organisational idioms, allowing the association to inscribe its practices with pro-active meanings. In the post-independence period the alternative arenas of Hindu nationalist seva projects expanded greatly, a point evident in the degrees of dialogue between the Sangh and the sarvodaya movement. The importance of porous associational boundaries is further demonstrated through noting how engagement in visibilized arenas of popular Hindu religiosity worked to both broaden the fields of reference and vernacularize Hindu nationalist practices of seva. With reference to field research, I demonstrate that central to the expansion of the VKK’s arenas of service into spaces associated with Ayurvedic care is the incorporation of both refocused and transgressive practices. In the educational projects of the VKK, I note how seva works to inscribe daily practices of hygiene, the singing of bhajans and daily assemblies with Hindu nationalist meanings, and so works to regulate conduct through the formation of an ‘ethical Hindu self’. However, arenas of seva are also a location where we can witness subjects negotiating power. I demonstrate this through examining how participants in the VKK’s rural development projects rearticulate Othering practices of seva, with actors using the discourse to position themselves as active subjects, break gendered restrictions on public space, and advance an ‘ethically Hindu’ grounded claim on development and critique of power. This work illustrates that far from being of inconsequence to the circulation of Hindu nationalist identities, alternative arenas of seva operate as spaces where discourses are performatively enacted, refocused, transgressed and rearticulated. These acts contribute to the consolidation and disturbance of Hindu nationalist subject formations.

The aim of this paper is to analyze how the Mumbai-based Hindu nationalist and regionalist/nativist political party Shiv Sena communicates about minorities through the Hindi version of its daily newspaper Saamana. After giving a brief introduction to Shiv Sena and the Hindu nationalist movement in India, the editorial articles published in the period Mon. 8/2-Sun. 14/2 2016 are analyzed within a theoretical framework based on Foucault and the idea that the public discourse itself is a field of battle where different actors can and do contest what is socially possible to express. The articles – as far as they are concerned with minorities – are found to be mainly preoccupied with Muslims, which are associated with Pakistan and terrorists and pictured as potentially fanatic and disloyal to the nation. / <p>Kandidatuppsats i indologi</p>

The purpose of this paper is to analyse how India’s Minister of Home Affairs, Amit Shah, constructs the image of minorities and refugees in articles, speeches, and on social media platforms. The analysis is performed with the method of qualitative content analysis within a theoretical framework of propaganda put against the backdrop of Hindu nationalism. The main analysis is divided into four categories, based upon Jowett and O'Donnell’s model of analysing propaganda, going into the themes of: context surrounding the speech; communalism; values; and target audience. This paper argues that Amit Shah’s speech in the upper house of the parliament of India, is a part of a larger Hindu nationalist campaign concerning questions of Indian identity that dates back to, at least, the early 20th century.

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Many scholars have discussed the sociopolitical consequences of belief in karma but few have investigated such relationships quantitatively. This study aims to establish empirical patterns concerning the connection between karmic beliefs and attitudes related to (i) political ideology, (ii) ableism, and (iii) views on the death penalty. The study’s theoretical framework is based on a Weberian approach to the study of beliefs (viewing beliefs as having attitudinal implications) and the theory of motivated social cognition. It uses original survey data from an MTurk sample of 330 Indians, which is analyzed through a series of regression models. When using demographic variables as controls, karmic beliefs are shown to correlate significantly (p&lt;0.001) with three conservative dispositions (status quo conservatism, laissez-faire conservatism, authoritarianism); political approval of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party; ideological self-placement; ableist attitudes, and with disapproval of the death penalty. Karmic beliefs are also shown to correlate significantly with social class, and with right-wing views across both social classes and castes. Given these findings, I argue that karmic beliefs are likely to affect various political outcomes in India via their role in shaping the moral and political frameworks of the Indian population.