Using historical firm financial and insider trading information, this paper examines whether high-level insiders manipulate earnings ahead of their own 10b5-1 equity transactions. The empirical evidence suggests that high-level executives appear to manipulate earnings through real activities such as abnormal discretionary expenditures and abnormal cash flows from operations to influence equity prices ahead of their own transactions under Rule 10b5-1. Evidence also suggests that executives appear to be unlikely to engage in earnings management through highly scrutinized means such as accruals. An interpretation of these results is that high-level executives may be using 10b5-1 plans as an offensive tool to trade with the knowledge of inside information, which appears to be in direct opposition to the defensive mechanism that 10b5-1 plans are intended to represent.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Würzburg, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-209).

Thesis (doctoral)--Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [343]-364) and index.

Submitted by Automa??o e Estat?stica (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2018-01-15T21:22:29Z No. of bitstreams: 1 AletheiaJanuariaZanowDeGouvea_DISSERT.pdf: 2640321 bytes, checksum: 4effc1a8ac549bf16281afc937c5f047 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2018-01-17T12:16:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 AletheiaJanuariaZanowDeGouvea_DISSERT.pdf: 2640321 bytes, checksum: 4effc1a8ac549bf16281afc937c5f047 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-17T12:16:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AletheiaJanuariaZanowDeGouvea_DISSERT.pdf: 2640321 bytes, checksum: 4effc1a8ac549bf16281afc937c5f047 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-12 / Frequentemente s?o destaques na m?dia novos esc?ndalos de executivos envolvidos em negocia??es com informa??o privilegiada (insider trading). No contexto dos crimes de colarinho branco, o insider trading ? um dos que mais amea?a a credibilidade do mercado financeiro. Em meio ao exposto, o objetivo desse estudo foi investigar as opera??es de insider trading julgadas pela Comiss?o de Valores Mobili?rios (CVM), observando os ind?cios de retorno anormal e a aplica??o da lei. Para isto, buscou-se ind?cios de retornos anormais em 32 casos julgados pela Comiss?o de Valores Mobili?rios (CVM) entre 2002 a 2015 por suspeita de insider trading. Foi utilizado o Estudo de Eventos como m?todo para estimar o retorno normal, analisando o efeito de um evento informacional de determinada empresa sobre os pre?os de suas a??es ao longo de uma s?rie de tempo. Os resultados encontrados apontam que: (i) 19 casos (59% da amostra) apresentam ind?cios de retorno anormal significativos na janela do evento; no entanto, (ii) 11 casos (34% da amostra) foram condenados ? multa e apenas 2 casos tiveram a inabilita??o tempor?ria acrescida na pena. Testando a distribui??o de probabilidade, nota-se que a chance do acusado ser absolvido ou punido ? independente da evid?ncia de retorno anormal. Ou seja, o que se observa ? a dificuldade da CVM em caracterizar a inten??o do acusado em obter ganhos anormais. No Brasil, em 2011, o ?nico caso que teve a pena de pris?o decretada a dois executivos pelo crime de insider trading foi o caso da Perdig?o. O que mostra a dificuldade da justi?a brasileira em aplicar a lei (enforcement). Outras hip?teses de pesquisa foram testadas: (iii) as vari?veis explicativas tamanho da empresa e ?ndice book-to-market apresentam um baixo poder explicativo do retorno efetivo da a??o, mas n?o foram retiradas do modelo; (iv) a chance de retorno anormal em negocia??es de compra de 4,54 vezes maior do que em negocia??es de venda. Este estudo contribui de forma pr?tica para apontar a import?ncia da amplia??o de regula??o mais restritiva da pr?tica de insider trading bem como sua execu??o, de forma a garantir maior equidade nas informa??es ao mercado e maior efici?ncia do mercado de capitais, ampliando as fontes de investimento e crescimento do mercado financeiro brasileiro.

O objetivo da dissertação é analisar a estrutura de proteção das companhias brasileiras de capital aberto em relação ao insider trading que, consiste na utilização de informações relevantes sobre as empresas, por pessoas que, por força de sua atividade profissional, conhecem aspectos fundamentais dos negócios das companhias e usam essa vantagem para negociar as ações dessas empresas antes que tais informações sejam de conhecimento do mercado em geral. A proposta do estudo está em responder a seguinte questão: tendo em vista os casos de insider trading julgados pela Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) entre 2002 e 2014, de que forma as práticas de governança corporativa das companhias abertas brasileiras influenciaram na decisão da autarquia de punir/absolver os seus administradores? Desta forma, analisam-se os processos administrativos sancionadores instalados pela CVM, nos quais administradores de companhias de capital aberto brasileiras foram acusados de negociar ações com informação privilegiada e, assim, evidencia-se o papel da estrutura de governança corporativa das sociedades no processo de punição ou absolvição dos agentes. As consequências econômicas para as companhias abertas que possuem agentes envolvidos na prática de insider trading justificam o presente trabalho. Quando há a ocorrência deste tipo de evento relacionado à determinada companhia, fica clara a fragilidade dos mecanismos de governança corporativa desta empresa e, consequentemente, o mercado precifica tais condições através da desvalorização das ações. Além disso, os escândalos gerados pela publicidade dos casos de insider trading podem, no limite, impactar os resultados operacionais de uma empresa, tendo em vista o tamanho dos impactos tangíveis e intangíveis, ligados ao nome, marca e reputação das companhias. No que tange ao posicionamento de uma empresa brasileira de capital aberto em relação ao insider trading, constatou-se, através da análise dos julgados da CVM entre 2002 e 2014, que ele se materializa nas efetivas práticas das sociedades e não, simplesmente, no nível de governança corporativa no qual a companhia transaciona seus valores mobiliários. A adoção das práticas sugeridas que, por sua vez, permeiam as faces preventivas, de monitoramento e de reação ao ilícito, mitiga consideravelmente o risco de dano à reputação das companhias que as adotarem e, concomitantemente, evita a responsabilização individual de conselheiros e diretores. A experiência brasileira, do período de 2002 a 2014, indica que a compreensão da atuação da CVM no combate ao insider trading aumenta na medida em que o número de processos sancionadores expande e, consequentemente, se amplia a base de dados de precedentes sobre o assunto. Por fim, o constante monitoramento das discussões sobre o assunto, a ampliação da análise estatística de casos julgados de insider trading no país e do comportamento do órgão regulador brasileiro, munem os responsáveis pela gestão das companhias de capital aberto de direcionamentos estratégicos para a elaboração de planos de ação eficientes, a fim de mitigar o risco a que administradores estão expostos em função de seus cargos. / The objective of this thesis is to analyze the protection structure of Brazilian publicly-held companies against insider trading, which consists of using relevant information about companies by people who, due to their professional activity, are aware of fundamental aspects of the companies' businesses and use this advantage to trade shares of such companies before such information is disclosed to the market. The study proposal is to answer the following question: considering the cases of insider trading judged by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) between 2002 and 2014, how the corporate governance practices of Brazilian publicly-held companies influenced the decision of the CVM in punishing/acquitting their executives? Thus, the administrative sanctioning processes installed by the CVM were analyzed, in which managers of Brazilian publicly-held companies were accused of dealing with insider information. Therefore, the role of the companies’ corporate governance structure in the decision-making process of punishment or acquittal of the executives is evidenced. The economic consequences for companies that have executives involved in insider trading justify this study. When this type of event is related to a particular company, the fragility of the corporate governance mechanisms of this company is highlighted and, consequently, the market evaluates such conditions through the shares pricing. At worst, the backlash generated by insider trading may impact the operating results of a company, given the considerable tangible and intangible impacts linked to the companies' name, brand and reputation. Regarding the position of a Brazilian publicly-held company in relation to insider trading, it was verified through the analysis of CVM judgments (2002-2014) that it materializes in the effective practices and not simply in the level (BM&FBOVESPA criteria) of corporate governance in which the company transacts its securities. The adoption of prevention, monitoring and reaction suggested practices, mitigates considerably the risk of damaging the reputation of companies and, at the same time, avoids individual liability for directors and officers. The Brazilian experience, from 2002 to 2014, indicates that the understanding of the CVM's action in combating insider trading increases as the number of sanctioning processes expands and, consequently, the database of precedents on the subject is expanded. Finally, the constant monitoring of the discussions on the subject, the expansion of the statistical analysis of insider trading cases in Brazil and of Brazilian regulator behavior provide the managers strategic directions to the elaboration of efficient action plans in order to mitigate the risk to which managers are exposed based on their positions.

O objetivo da dissertação é analisar a estrutura de proteção das companhias brasileiras de capital aberto em relação ao insider trading que, consiste na utilização de informações relevantes sobre as empresas, por pessoas que, por força de sua atividade profissional, conhecem aspectos fundamentais dos negócios das companhias e usam essa vantagem para negociar as ações dessas empresas antes que tais informações sejam de conhecimento do mercado em geral. A proposta do estudo está em responder a seguinte questão: tendo em vista os casos de insider trading julgados pela Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) entre 2002 e 2014, de que forma as práticas de governança corporativa das companhias abertas brasileiras influenciaram na decisão da autarquia de punir/absolver os seus administradores? Desta forma, analisam-se os processos administrativos sancionadores instalados pela CVM, nos quais administradores de companhias de capital aberto brasileiras foram acusados de negociar ações com informação privilegiada e, assim, evidencia-se o papel da estrutura de governança corporativa das sociedades no processo de punição ou absolvição dos agentes. As consequências econômicas para as companhias abertas que possuem agentes envolvidos na prática de insider trading justificam o presente trabalho. Quando há a ocorrência deste tipo de evento relacionado à determinada companhia, fica clara a fragilidade dos mecanismos de governança corporativa desta empresa e, consequentemente, o mercado precifica tais condições através da desvalorização das ações. Além disso, os escândalos gerados pela publicidade dos casos de insider trading podem, no limite, impactar os resultados operacionais de uma empresa, tendo em vista o tamanho dos impactos tangíveis e intangíveis, ligados ao nome, marca e reputação das companhias. No que tange ao posicionamento de uma empresa brasileira de capital aberto em relação ao insider trading, constatou-se, através da análise dos julgados da CVM entre 2002 e 2014, que ele se materializa nas efetivas práticas das sociedades e não, simplesmente, no nível de governança corporativa no qual a companhia transaciona seus valores mobiliários. A adoção das práticas sugeridas que, por sua vez, permeiam as faces preventivas, de monitoramento e de reação ao ilícito, mitiga consideravelmente o risco de dano à reputação das companhias que as adotarem e, concomitantemente, evita a responsabilização individual de conselheiros e diretores. A experiência brasileira, do período de 2002 a 2014, indica que a compreensão da atuação da CVM no combate ao insider trading aumenta na medida em que o número de processos sancionadores expande e, consequentemente, se amplia a base de dados de precedentes sobre o assunto. Por fim, o constante monitoramento das discussões sobre o assunto, a ampliação da análise estatística de casos julgados de insider trading no país e do comportamento do órgão regulador brasileiro, munem os responsáveis pela gestão das companhias de capital aberto de direcionamentos estratégicos para a elaboração de planos de ação eficientes, a fim de mitigar o risco a que administradores estão expostos em função de seus cargos. / The objective of this thesis is to analyze the protection structure of Brazilian publicly-held companies against insider trading, which consists of using relevant information about companies by people who, due to their professional activity, are aware of fundamental aspects of the companies' businesses and use this advantage to trade shares of such companies before such information is disclosed to the market. The study proposal is to answer the following question: considering the cases of insider trading judged by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) between 2002 and 2014, how the corporate governance practices of Brazilian publicly-held companies influenced the decision of the CVM in punishing/acquitting their executives? Thus, the administrative sanctioning processes installed by the CVM were analyzed, in which managers of Brazilian publicly-held companies were accused of dealing with insider information. Therefore, the role of the companies’ corporate governance structure in the decision-making process of punishment or acquittal of the executives is evidenced. The economic consequences for companies that have executives involved in insider trading justify this study. When this type of event is related to a particular company, the fragility of the corporate governance mechanisms of this company is highlighted and, consequently, the market evaluates such conditions through the shares pricing. At worst, the backlash generated by insider trading may impact the operating results of a company, given the considerable tangible and intangible impacts linked to the companies' name, brand and reputation. Regarding the position of a Brazilian publicly-held company in relation to insider trading, it was verified through the analysis of CVM judgments (2002-2014) that it materializes in the effective practices and not simply in the level (BM&FBOVESPA criteria) of corporate governance in which the company transacts its securities. The adoption of prevention, monitoring and reaction suggested practices, mitigates considerably the risk of damaging the reputation of companies and, at the same time, avoids individual liability for directors and officers. The Brazilian experience, from 2002 to 2014, indicates that the understanding of the CVM's action in combating insider trading increases as the number of sanctioning processes expands and, consequently, the database of precedents on the subject is expanded. Finally, the constant monitoring of the discussions on the subject, the expansion of the statistical analysis of insider trading cases in Brazil and of Brazilian regulator behavior provide the managers strategic directions to the elaboration of efficient action plans in order to mitigate the risk to which managers are exposed based on their positions.

A necessidade de tutela eficiente do Mercado de Capitais é, atualmente, indiscutível. O advento de novas tecnologias e o tráfego internacional de capital cada vez maior; tornam o Mercado de Capitais, contemporaneamente, sujeito a amplos riscos e danos. Nesse contexto, o legislador tem respondido com a incriminação de condutas ofensivas ao mercado, contudo a formulação de tipos penais nem sempre se mostra adequada. Dessa forma, questiona-se qual o bem juridicamente tutelado pelos crimes contra o Mercado de Capitais, referente material necessário à intervenção penal do Estado; bem como quais os critérios adequados para verificação da legitimidade de tal intervenção. A dissertação está dividida em quatro capítulos. No primeiro capítulo tem lugar a análise dos dilemas do direito penal clássico frente aos novos riscos decorrentes da sociedade pós-moderna, com especial destaque à expansão dos Mercados de Capitais em uma sociedade globalizada; bem como os efeitos da chamada Globalização no direito penal e o incremento do direito penal econômico. O segundo capítulo destina-se a uma verificação das bases jurídicas e legais da regulação do Mercado de Capitais fundamentais para uma melhor compreensão de sua tutela penal , nomeadamente quanto ao seu controle no âmbito administrativo. Cumpre, ainda, no segundo capítulo, uma delimitação dos critérios científicos, externos ao bem jurídico, capazes de possibilitar um juízo de legitimidade da tutela penal do Mercado de Capitais. O terceiro capítulo trata do processo de criminalização da tutela dos Mercados de Capitais, passando por uma análise crítica acerca da utilização simbólica do direito penal e de sua internacionalização desprovida de critérios dogmáticos; e se encerra com um panorama acerca do tratamento penal dado aos Mercados de Capitais nos Estados Unidos da América e Europa Continental. Por fim, o capítulo quarto versa acerca da tutela penal do Mercado de Capitais no Brasil. Nesse contexto, partindo-se da Teoria pessoal do bem jurídico desenvolvida por Hassemer, foram identificados os interesses patrimoniais do público investidor como referente material limitador da intervenção penal do Estado. Uma vez identificado o bem jurídico tutelado, é realizada uma análise dos tipos penais relativos às operações do Mercado de Capitais, notadamente, a manipulação de mercado e o uso indevido de informação privilegiada; bem como acerca da utilização de tipos penais excessivamente abertos e crimes de perigo abstrato. Nesse capítulo também é apresentada uma proposta de adequação típica aos crimes de manipulação de mercado e uso indevido de informação privilegiada. Ao final, são expostas as conclusões do trabalho. / The need for efficient protection in the current Capital Market cannot be disregarded. The advent of new technologies and increasing international capital movements have rendered the contemporary Capital Market subject to extensive risks and damages. In this context, legislators have responded by criminalizing offensive conducts to the market, albeit through the establishment of criminal types that are not always adequate. Therefore, this thesis questions which legal good is legally protected by crimes against the Capital Market, in relation to the necessary State criminal intervention, and which are the adequate criteria for the verification of the legitimacy of such intervention. The thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter refers to the assessment of the dilemmas in classic criminal law in relation to the new risks arising out of post-modern society, especially regarding the expansion of the Capital Markets in a globalized society, in addition to the effects of the phenomenon referred to as Globalization in criminal law, and in economic criminal law. The second chapter focuses on the verification of the legal and judicial grounds for Capital Market regulation essential for the better understanding of its criminal protection specifically in relation to its control within the administrative scope. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the scientific criteria, external to the legal good, capable of providing for a legitimacy judgment of criminal protection of Capital Markets. The third chapter refers to the criminalization process of protection in Capital Markets, including a critical assessment of the symbolic use of criminal law and its internationalization without any dogmatic criteria. The chapter ends with the panorama on the criminal treatment given to Capital Markets in the United States of America and Continental Europe. Finally, the fourth chapter assesses criminal protection of the Capital Market in Brazil. In this context, beginning with the theory of the legal good developed by Hassemer, the asset interests of the investing public were identified as limiting material reference for the States criminal intervention. Once the protected legal good has been identified, an assessment on the criminal types in relation to the Capital Market is carried out, especially in reference to market manipulation and insider trading, as well as in regard to the use of excessively open criminal types and abstract danger crimes. This chapter also shows a proposal for the adequate typifying of market manipulation crimes and insider trading. Conclusions on the subject are drawn at the end.

This thesis presents three essays, with the first two focusing on the insider role of M&A advisors and the effectiveness of insider trading rule, while the third essay looks into the effects of product market competition on corporate cash holdings. The main hypothesis of the first and second essay is that the advisory banks that are privy to non-public deal information might have high motivation to exploit this privileged information by taking a position in a takeover target ahead of a deal and realise an excess return upon deal announcement. This motivation for and act of “insider trading” might be attenuated by the insider trading rules Rule10b5-1 and Rule10b5-2, which were released in 2000.The first essay examines the presence of acquiror advisors’ holdings in targets and their trading strategy on such holdings before deal announcement. Using an aggregate level of stake-holding in the target firm by a financial conglomerate/brands with which the advisor to the acquiror is affiliated, we find that advisory brands start to take and accumulate holdings in targets at least seven quarters before deal announcement through to announcement quarter. The stake-holding is significantly larger than that of a non-advisory brand group that is defined. We argue that these results imply the direct link between advisory holdings, advisor identity and the strong intentions of trading on private deal information. However, this tendency is markedly attenuated in the post-rule period after 2000. This change in advisory brand trading strategy on target stocks ahead of a deal with the passage of rules suggests a positive deterrence effect of the insider trading rule. In the second essay, we investigate the profitability of this trading strategy by advisory brands to acquirors taking stake in targets ahead of a deal. Results suggest that both the level and the build-up (increase) of an advisory stake between the last two quarters immediately preceding deal announcement are positively related to the target return. These results are consistent with the view that advisory brands trade on their privileged deal information by taking and increasing holdings in targets ahead of deals to profit from the increase in target share price. In our sub-period analysis, results suggest that all the coefficients become much smaller and insignificant for the post-rule period after 2000. This again indicates a strongly positive deterrent effect of regulation, which further confirms the conclusion of the first essay. The third essay is related to both the static and dynamic effect of product market competition on firm cash holdings. We find that the intensity of product market competition measured by product similarity from Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2011) has a significant positive effect on firm cash holdings, after controlling for other measures including the Industry Herfindahl Index and industry fluidity. This suggests that firms in a more competitive industry reserve more cash as their war chest or preemptive tool against competitors. Further, Vector Autoregression (VAR) and analyses of shock show that when there is a sudden increase in product similarity/competition level (shock), firms use cash to fight off competition, leading to a decrease in cash holdings.

LL.M. / Die doel van hierdie verhandeling is om die reguleringsisteem in Suid-Afrika te beskryf soos wat dit betrekking het op termynkontrakte. Termynkontrakte vorm deel van 'n groep finansiele instrumente algemeen bekend as afgeleide instrumente. Die term 'afgeleide instrumente' is 'n generiese begrip wat gebruik word om verskeie finansiele instrumente te beskryf wie se waarde afgelei word van 'n onderliggende kommoditeit, wisselkoers of indeks. Termynkontrakte word op die Suid-Afrikaanse termynbeurs (SATEB) verhandel. Ter inleiding sal die sleutelaspekte rondom termynkontrakte en termynhandel kortliks bespreek word ten einde die leser 'n oorsig te bied. Die aspekte word egter in die loop van die verhandeling, onder die toepaslike hoofstukke, meer volledige verduidelik.

In the first essay I examine the relation between firm advertising and tax aggressiveness. Advertising increases firm visibility in both the product and the financial market. While investors would appreciate more tax savings, they are aware of the negative impact of tax aggressiveness on consumers’ views of the firm and hence its competitive positions in the product market. We find that firms that spend more on advertising have fewer tax sheltering activities, lower book-tax differences, and higher cash effective tax rates. Specifically, an increase of 1% on Advertisingi,t (ADVGPi,t), the firm pays an additional tax of $0.70 million ($10.92 million). However, the negative impact of advertising on tax aggressiveness becomes weaker (and even reverses) for firms having great transparency, more public scrutiny, or strong external monitoring. We control for endogeneity using propensity score matching and an instrumental variable approach. Our findings are consistent with the argument that advertising enhances corporate reputation and is an important determinant in firms’ tax planning. In the second essay I document a significant increase in opportunistic insider trades when retail investors are paying greater attention to the stock. Using Google SVI to proxy for their level of attention, we find that a higher (lower) SVI on a stock is associated with more insider sales (purchases) of the stock and greater abnormal returns on the sales (purchases). A value-weighted long-short portfolio mimicking insider trades would earn an abnormal return of 1.19% per month (14.28% per year), excluding transaction costs. We also fund that the SVI-related insider traders tend to be non-independent directors who have long tenures but no senior executive positions in their firm and the firm tends to exhibit weaker governance, lower reputation, and poorer social responsibility. Our results are more pronounced for lottery-type stocks but are weaker for stocks with large attention of local investors. Interestingly, the risk of SEC investigation and litigation is lower on SVI-related insider sales and this type of sales actually rises following an increase in news releases of SEC enforcement action. Overall, certain insiders appear to engage in trades to take advantage of variations of retail investors’ attention to their stock.