本研究旨在探討內部人股票交易與盈餘管理之關聯性，並進一步檢視我國近年來為強化公司治理所引進之獨立董監事制度是否能對內部人交易與盈餘管理間之關聯性產生抑制效果。在分析時，本研究係將全部樣本區分為賣出組及買入組，並分別進行驗證。 實證結果顯示，發生內部人異常出售股票交易之樣本公司，其管理階層將於同一期進行使盈餘降低之盈餘管理。而此一結果所隱含之意義為，內部人為降低日後回補持股之成本，會於出售持股當期進行盈餘之操弄，以求影響未來股價。然而，在發生內部人異常買入股票現象之樣本公司，卻未發現如本研究所預期之內部人為極大化未來出售持股利益而從事使盈餘提高之盈餘管理的現象，本研究推測可能原因係內部人買入本公司股票之理由眾多，因此也不必然有拉抬未來股價以求自未來出售股票交易中獲利之考量。 另外，在獨立董事與獨立監察人對於內部人異常交易及盈餘管理間關係之抑制效果的部分，在買入組或賣出組均未發現顯著之抑制效果。對此，本研究認為可能之原因係獨立董監事制度在我國實施之時間尚短，且多數公司係基於法令之要求始設置獨立董監事，而在這樣的現況下，似乎難以預期獨立董監事能有效監督公司內部人之異常股票交易行為以及盈餘管理行為。 / This thesis examines if there is an association between insider trading and earnings management. Furthermore, this thesis examines whether independent directors and independent supervisors can suppress the relationship between insider trading and earnings management. In the analytical process, the whole sample is divided into two sub samples which are sell and buy sub sample. The two sub samples are examined separately. And this thesis finds that there is a negative association between insider trading and earnings management in the sell sub sample which suggests that executives will manage earnings downward in the same period of insider selling to minimize their cost of buying stocks back in the future. And this result is consistent with the hypothesis. But no proper evidence is found about the relationship between insider trading and earning management in the buy sub sample. This may result from that there are many reasons for insiders to buy stocks of their firms. And insiders do not necessarily buy stocks of their firms to make profits by selling them in the future. Besides, in the part of the suppressing effect of independent directors and supervisors, proper evidences do not exist neither in the buy sub sample nor in the sell sub sample. A possible reason is that since the independent directors and supervisors system is still new in Taiwan, and most firms with independent directors and supervisors are just enforced by regulations to set independent directors and supervisors, it's hard to expect that independent directors and supervisors to play their roles effectively.

Abstract Based on the sequential auction model of Kyle (1985) and embedded the formulation of positive feedback traders in De Long et al. (1990), our model formulates a recursive market game of insiders, noise traders, and market makers. In particular, the submitted demands of positive feedback inertial traders are influenced by previous own trading quantities. I prove the existence and uniqueness of a recursive linear equilibrium with positive feedback inertial trades. Further, the equilibrium calibrates that the strategies of insider and market makers are also influenced by positive feedback trades. Finally, we conduct a simulation analysis to get a price-volume pattern with some empirical interesting implications. Finally, this thesis takes trading strategies to trade the individual stock in TSEC. Although the market mechanism of TSEC has no market makers, it is still expected that these trading strategies are useful for traders which implies the information is filtrated by these trading strategies.

Depois de mais de 30 anos da edição da Lei 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976 e da publicação da Instrução CVM 10, de 14 de fevereiro de 1980, volta novamente o regulador brasileiro a sua atenção para os benefícios e perigos dos negócios da companhia com ações de sua emissão. Tal se torna evidente pela publicação, em outubro de 2013, do Edital de Audiência Pública SDM 11/13, por meio do qual a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários pretende substituir a antiga regra aplicável às companhias abertas por uma nova, de conteúdo mais moderno e aderente à nova realidade. Desenvolveu-se durante o século XX e XXI o estudo dos negócios da companhia com as suas ações, admitindo-se cada vez mais numerosas exceções ao inicialmente duro e absoluto preceito proibitivo positivado originalmente pela Aktienrechtsnovelle alemã de 1870. O estudo das finanças sociais e o aprimoramento dos mecanismos de salvaguarda dos interesses protegidos no decorrer do século XX e XXI forçaram (e ainda forçam) a redefinição dos seus contornos jurídicos. No que diz respeito a estes negócios, ressaltam como interesses escudados aqueles dos credores, dos acionistas e do mercado de capitais (e os investidores que nele atuam) os grupos de referência (Bezugsgruppen) do direito societário. É na proteção de seus interesses que se fundamentam as normas que os regem: a utilização de saldo de lucros tutela os credores, o princípio do tratamento equitativo protege os acionistas e as regras de prevenção a atos manipulativos e de repressão ao insider trading salvaguardam o mercado e seus investidores. É, portanto, no confronto com tais interesses que se deve avaliar a legalidade ou ilegalidade de cada um desses negócios, e não na simples (in)existência de uma exceção legal expressa ao conceito proibitivo geral. O art. 30 da Lei das S.A. estipula condições de validade dos negócios com ações próprias, e não meramente um rol de exceções taxativas. / Thirty years after the enactment of Law 6.404, of December 15, 1976 and CVM Instruction 10, of February 14, 1980, once again have the transactions of the company in its own shares gained the attention of the Brazilian regulatory authority, especially in consideration of the benefits and perils arising from them. This is evidenced by the publication, in October 2013, by the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários of Public Hearing SDM 11/13, the purpose of which is to replace the old rule applicable to public companies by a new one, containing a more modern approach on the subject and a more reality-driven concept. The studies about the transactions a company is allowed to perform in its own shares have had a great academic and empiric development during the XX and XXI centuries, the result of which has been the gradual acceptance of an ever-increasing list of possible exceptions to the inititally absolute prohibition originally stated by the german Aktienrechtsnovelle of 1870. The study of financial economics and the improvement of the legal protective measures designed over the last century have forced (and continue to force) a broad redefinition of these transactions legal boundaries. In respect to these transactions, the interests of creditors, shareholders and the capital market itself (including the investors which act in it) arise in the center of the legal protective framework they have been denominated as the reference groups of Corporate Law. Safeguarding their interests is the main purpose of the rules revolving around them: the use of profits and profit reserves safeguards creditors, adherence to the principle of equitable treatment adresses shareholder interests and the rules preventing manipulative acts and insider trading practices sponsor the interests of the capital market and its investors. Therefore, it is mandatory that any interpretation on the legality or ilegality of any given transaction by the company in its own shares be preceded by the examination of these concrete interests; this legal analysis cannot be limited to the verification of an express exception to the general rule. Article 30 of Law 6.404/76 must therefore be read as containing a general validity framework, and not merely an exaustive list of exceptions.

In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir die Struktur von Gausschen Prozessen, die durch gewisse lineare Transformationen von zwei Gausschen Martingalen erzeugt werden. Die Klasse dieser Transformationen ist durch nanzmathematische Gleichgewichtsmodelle mit heterogener Information motiviert. In Kapital 2 bestimmen wir für solche Prozesse, die zunächst in einer erweiterten Filtrierung konstruiert werden, die kanonische Zerlegung als Semimartin-gale in ihrer eigenen Filtrierung. Die resultierende Drift wird durch Volterra-Kerne beschrieben. Insbesondere charakterisieren wir diejenigen Prozesse, die in ihrer eigenen Filtrierung eine Brownsche Bewegung bilden. In Kapital 3 konstruieren wir neue orthogonale Zerlegungen der Brownschen Filtrierungen. In den Kapitaln 4 bis 6 wenden wir unsere Resultate zur Charakterisierung Brownscher Bewegungen im Kontext nanzmathematischer Modelle an, in denen es Marktteilnehmer mit zusätzlicher Insider-Information gibt. Wir untersuchen Erweiterungen eines Gleichgewichtsmodells von Kyle [42] und Back [7], in denen die Insider-Information in verschiedener Weise durch Gaussche Martingale spezifiziert wird. Insbesondere klären wir die Struktur von Insider-Strategien, die insofern unaufallig bleiben, als sich die resultierende Gesamtnachfrage wie eine Brownsche Bewegung verhält. / In this thesis, we study Gaussian processes generated by certain linear transformations of two Gaussian martingales. This class of transformations is motivated by nancial equilibrium models with heterogeneous information. In Chapter 2 we derive the canonical decomposition of such processes, which are constructed in an enlarged ltration, as semimartingales in their own ltration. The resulting drift is described in terms of Volterra kernels. In particular we characterize those processes which are Brownian motions in their own ltration. In Chapter 3 we construct new orthogonal decompositions of Brownian ltrations. In Chapters 4 to 6 we are concerned with applications of our characterization results in the context of mathematical models of insider trading. We analyze extensions of the nancial equilibrium model of Kyle [42] and Back [7] where the Gaussian martingale describing the insider information is specified in various ways. In particular we discuss the structure of insider strategies which remain inconspicuous in the sense that the resulting cumulative demand is again a Brownian motion.

This paper investigates the signaling effect of insider trading by analyzing the market reaction to 147 insider transactions executed within the period 2014-2016 on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. We present three major findings. First, we find significant market reactions for both insider purchases and insider sales, suggesting a signaling effect of insider trading. Second, we find the signaling effect to be similar for both insider purchases and insider sales. Third, we find that firm size has an influence on the signaling effect. Our findings indicate that the market values information about insider trading and that firm size has an effect on this informative value. / Denna studie undersöker signaleringseffekten av insynshandel genom att analysera marknadsreaktionen för 147 insynstransaktioner utförda under perioden 2014-2016 på Stockholmsbörsen. Vi presenterar tre huvudsakliga upptäckter. Den första är att vi finner en signifikant marknadsreaktion för både köptransaktioner och säljtransaktioner utförda av insynspersoner vilket indikerar att det finns en signaleringseffekt av insynshandel. För det andra finner vi att signaleringseffekten är lika stark för både köptransaktioner och säljtransaktioner. För det tredje finner vi att bolagsstorlek har en påverkan på signaleringseffekten. Dessa upptäckter visar på att marknaden ser ett värde i information om insynshandel och att bolagsstorlek påverkar detta informationsvärde.

Cette thèse consiste en une série d'applications du calcul stochastique aux mathématiques financières. Elle est composée de quatre chapitres. Dans le premier on étudie le rapport entre la complétude du marché et l'extrémalité des mesures martingales equivalentes dans le cas d'une infinité d'actifs. Dans le deuxième on trouve des conditions équivalentes à l'existence et unicité d'une mesure martingale equivalente sous la quelle le processus des prix suit des lois n-dimensionnelles données à n fixe. Dans le troisième on étend à un marché admettant une infinité dénombrable d'actifs une charactérisation de la stratégie de couverture optimale (pour le critère moyenne-variance) basé sur une technique de changement de numéraire et extension artificielle. Enfin, dans le quatrième on s'occupe du problème de couverture d'un actif contingent dans un marché avec information asymetrique.

<p>Financial speculation has increased dramatically over the last 30 years. This means that a practice that used to be viewed as immoral <i>gambling</i> has become legitimate financial <i>trade</i>. This book explores the<i> genealogy</i> of the coexisting<i> insider trading laws</i>. The insider regulation prohibits trade based on privileged information in order to create equal trading conditions, and in this way uphold confidence in the financial markets among the general public. However, this study shows that the existing view of the insider regulation is <i>misleading</i> and that the regulation is best understood as a <i>game rule</i> aiming to <i>stimulate</i> financial speculation. The protection interest is therefore not primarily the general public, but the financial system as such: the professional market actors sustaining the speculative activities and a growing financial sector. </p><p>The consequence of stimulating financial speculation is that today’s authorities are attempting to make the financial markets into a lotto-like game, rather than a market for long-term investment. To make the financial markets into liquid and volatile public “games” means that the <i>risks</i> involved in the financial speculation are created by the human hand and the economic system<i> itself</i> rather than being naturally given. This places <i>desire</i> rather than rational <i>needs</i> as the fundamental ground of the economy. The concluding question is; why are we making our economy into a game? </p>

Financial speculation has increased dramatically over the last 30 years. This means that a practice that used to be viewed as immoral gambling has become legitimate financial trade. This book explores the genealogy of the coexisting insider trading laws. The insider regulation prohibits trade based on privileged information in order to create equal trading conditions, and in this way uphold confidence in the financial markets among the general public. However, this study shows that the existing view of the insider regulation is misleading and that the regulation is best understood as a game rule aiming to stimulate financial speculation. The protection interest is therefore not primarily the general public, but the financial system as such: the professional market actors sustaining the speculative activities and a growing financial sector. The consequence of stimulating financial speculation is that today’s authorities are attempting to make the financial markets into a lotto-like game, rather than a market for long-term investment. To make the financial markets into liquid and volatile public “games” means that the risks involved in the financial speculation are created by the human hand and the economic system itself rather than being naturally given. This places desire rather than rational needs as the fundamental ground of the economy. The concluding question is; why are we making our economy into a game?

FDA decisions and late-stage clinical trial results regarding new pharmaceutical approvals can cause extreme moves in the share price of small biopharmaceutical companies. Throughout the clinical trial process, many potential investors are exposed to market-moving information before such information is made available to the investing public. An investor who wished to profit from advance knowledge about clinical trial results may use the publicly traded options markets in order to increase leverage and maximize profits. This research examined options data surrounding the public release of information pertaining to the efficacy of clinical trials and approval decisions made by the FDA. Events were identified for small pharmaceutical companies with fewer than three currently approved drugs in an attempt to isolate the effect of individual clinical trial and FDA-related events on the share price of the underlying company. Option data were analyzed using logistic regression models in an attempt to predict phase II and III clinical trial outcome results and FDA new drug approval decisions. Implied volatility, open interest, and option contract delta values were the primary independent variables used to predict positive or negative event outcomes. The dichotomized version of a predictor variable designed to estimate total investment exposure incorporating open interest, option contract delta values, and the underlying stock price was a significant predictor of negative pharmaceutical related events. However, none of ii the variables examined in this research were significant predictors of positive drug research related events. The estimated total investment exposure variable used in this research can be applied to the prediction of future clinical trial and FDA decision related events when this predictor variable shows a negative signal. Additional research would help confirm this finding by increasing the sample size of events that potentially follow the same pattern as those examined in this research. / text

Univ., Diss.--Würzburg, 2004. / Literaturverz. S. 419 - 447.