Depois de mais de 30 anos da edição da Lei 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976 e da publicação da Instrução CVM 10, de 14 de fevereiro de 1980, volta novamente o regulador brasileiro a sua atenção para os benefícios e perigos dos negócios da companhia com ações de sua emissão. Tal se torna evidente pela publicação, em outubro de 2013, do Edital de Audiência Pública SDM 11/13, por meio do qual a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários pretende substituir a antiga regra aplicável às companhias abertas por uma nova, de conteúdo mais moderno e aderente à nova realidade. Desenvolveu-se durante o século XX e XXI o estudo dos negócios da companhia com as suas ações, admitindo-se cada vez mais numerosas exceções ao inicialmente duro e absoluto preceito proibitivo positivado originalmente pela Aktienrechtsnovelle alemã de 1870. O estudo das finanças sociais e o aprimoramento dos mecanismos de salvaguarda dos interesses protegidos no decorrer do século XX e XXI forçaram (e ainda forçam) a redefinição dos seus contornos jurídicos. No que diz respeito a estes negócios, ressaltam como interesses escudados aqueles dos credores, dos acionistas e do mercado de capitais (e os investidores que nele atuam) os grupos de referência (Bezugsgruppen) do direito societário. É na proteção de seus interesses que se fundamentam as normas que os regem: a utilização de saldo de lucros tutela os credores, o princípio do tratamento equitativo protege os acionistas e as regras de prevenção a atos manipulativos e de repressão ao insider trading salvaguardam o mercado e seus investidores. É, portanto, no confronto com tais interesses que se deve avaliar a legalidade ou ilegalidade de cada um desses negócios, e não na simples (in)existência de uma exceção legal expressa ao conceito proibitivo geral. O art. 30 da Lei das S.A. estipula condições de validade dos negócios com ações próprias, e não meramente um rol de exceções taxativas. / Thirty years after the enactment of Law 6.404, of December 15, 1976 and CVM Instruction 10, of February 14, 1980, once again have the transactions of the company in its own shares gained the attention of the Brazilian regulatory authority, especially in consideration of the benefits and perils arising from them. This is evidenced by the publication, in October 2013, by the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários of Public Hearing SDM 11/13, the purpose of which is to replace the old rule applicable to public companies by a new one, containing a more modern approach on the subject and a more reality-driven concept. The studies about the transactions a company is allowed to perform in its own shares have had a great academic and empiric development during the XX and XXI centuries, the result of which has been the gradual acceptance of an ever-increasing list of possible exceptions to the inititally absolute prohibition originally stated by the german Aktienrechtsnovelle of 1870. The study of financial economics and the improvement of the legal protective measures designed over the last century have forced (and continue to force) a broad redefinition of these transactions legal boundaries. In respect to these transactions, the interests of creditors, shareholders and the capital market itself (including the investors which act in it) arise in the center of the legal protective framework they have been denominated as the reference groups of Corporate Law. Safeguarding their interests is the main purpose of the rules revolving around them: the use of profits and profit reserves safeguards creditors, adherence to the principle of equitable treatment adresses shareholder interests and the rules preventing manipulative acts and insider trading practices sponsor the interests of the capital market and its investors. Therefore, it is mandatory that any interpretation on the legality or ilegality of any given transaction by the company in its own shares be preceded by the examination of these concrete interests; this legal analysis cannot be limited to the verification of an express exception to the general rule. Article 30 of Law 6.404/76 must therefore be read as containing a general validity framework, and not merely an exaustive list of exceptions.

Le délit d’initié peut être légal ou illégal selon le moment où l’initié fait le commerce : il est illégal lorsque l’information est non publique. Effectuer une négociation tout en ayant une connaissance particulière est injuste pour les autres investisseurs qui ne disposent pas de l’accès à ces connaissances. Les dirigeants ne sont pas les seuls à être reconnus coupables du délit d’initié. Des gens comme les courtiers, et même les membres de familles peuvent en être coupables. Par contre, le délit d’initié est légal une fois l’information a été rendue publique, au moment où l’initié n’a aucun avantage direct sur d’autres investisseurs. La tendance est à la pénalisation du délit d’initié ainsi qu’à la création d’une autorité de régulation spécifique aux marchés financiers. Ce travail s’appuie donc sur une étude des différents systèmes juridiques répressifs qui tendent à assurer la transparence des marchés et veiller au respect de l’égalité entre les opérateurs par le phénomène de la régulation. On s’attachera dans une première approche à l’originalité de l’infraction, à savoir la double définition qui engendre une double poursuite : pénale et administrative. Et dans une deuxième approche, on analyse la question de l’effectivité du dispositif répressif instauré, dans lequel nous concluons que cette dualité de système répressif face à la règle non bis in idem ne peut être comprise que comme une cohérence et une complémentarité entre les deux ordres de juridictions qui forment une avancée en particulier / Insider trading can be illegal or legal depending on when the insider makes the trade: it is illegal when the material information is still non public, trading while having special knowledge is infer to other investors who don’t have access to such knowledge. Directors are not the only one who has the potential to be convicted of insider trading. People such a brokers and even family members can be guilty. Insider trading is legal once the material information has been made public, at which time the insider has not direct advantage over other investors. The tendency is to the criminalization of insider trading and the foundation of a specific regulatory authority for financial markets. The work is therefore based on a study of different law enforcement jurisdictions which trend to ensure markets transparency and ensure the respect of equity between the operators by the phenomenon of regulation. In a first approach, we study the originality of the crime including the double definition that generates a double prosecution: criminal and administrative. And in a second approach, we analyze the effectiveness of the repressive system in which we realize that this duality of the repressive system facing the non bis in idem can only be seen as coherence and complementarily between the two orders of jurisdictions

La littérature académique récente n'aborde que très peu la question du comportement, des transactions et des gains sous-jacents aux manquements d'initiés. A partir des décisions rendues par la Commission des sanctions de l'Autorité des marchés financiers entre 2001 et 2011, nous recensons les opérations d'initiés intervenues entre 1999 et 2008 sur des actions cotées en France, ayant abouti à une mise en cause des personnes concernées et éventuellement à une sanction administrative. Les informations collectées, qui concernent à la fois le statut professionnel des initiés, mais également le nombre et le montant de leurs transactions, le type d'information privilégiée utilisée, les profits obtenus, et le cas échéant les sanctions imposées, nous permettent de caractériser de manière empirique le profil type de l'initié et son comportement. Les déterminants des profits, de la probabilité de sanction et du montant de l'amende financière sont également testés économétriquement. Nous nous intéressons ensuite aux stratégies de camouflage, qui, bien qu'elles existent, semblent peu efficaces. Les déterminants de la taille des transactions illégales sont également mis en évidence au moyen d'une estimation économétrique. Enfin, dans la perspective d'une juste adéquation entre la sanction financière et la gravité du manquement commis, nous proposons une évaluation des méthodes de calcul des profits réalisés par les initiés utilisées par les régulateurs de marché en France, aux États-Unis et en Italie. Quoique beaucoup plus complexe, la méthode utilisée par la SEC fournit des résultats identiques à ceux obtenus à l'aide de l'outil de calcul de l'AMF. Ce dernier est donc à privilégier pour évaluer les profits indus car il s'avère utilisable en toutes circonstances, statistiquement tout aussi robuste et plus simple dans sa mise en œuvre. / The recent academic literature deals only very rarely with issues related to illegal insider trading behavior, deals and profits. From the decisions of the Enforcement Committee of the French financial market authority (AMF) between 2001 and 2011, we built a database that identifies insider trading operations and their instigators between 1999 and 2008, involving shares listed in France, and leading to the indictment and possibly the sanction of the concerned persons. The collected information, which refers to the professional status of insiders, but also the number and the amount of trades, the type of inside information used, the profits realized, and if any, the sanctions imposed, allows us to empirically characterize the insiders typical profile and behavior. The determinants of profits, of sanction probability and of the amount of financial penalty are also tested econometrically. We then turn to concealment strategies, which, although they exist, seem inefficient. The determinants of the size of illegal trades are also evidenced through an econometric estimation. Finally, from the perspective of a fair balance between the financial penalty and the seriousness of the breach, we propose an evaluation of insider trading profits calculation methods used by market regulators in France, the United States and Italy. Though much more complex, the method used by the SEC provides identical results to those obtained using the AMF calculation tool. The latter should thus be preferred because it seems usable in all circumstances, statistically as robust and simpler in its implementation.

This thesis analyzes and evaluates the relationship between insider trading and the long-term stock performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) in Sweden. The study looks at firms that recently conducted an IPO and how the stock performance of the firm is impacted by insiders making transactions in their own stock. An IPO is known to generate high returns on its first day on the public stock market, but to underperform the market in the long term. The characteristics of an IPO are deviant from the rest of the stock market, and with less information available to the public compared to other firms, the IPO market is hard to navigate for investors. Transactions made by insiders in the share of their own company is usually seen as guidance in public companies. An insider purchase is usually followed by a positive stock return, and insiders selling shares have the opposite impact. The aim of this thesis is to investigate if the information provided by insider transactions can be used to create a potential trading strategy for IPOs. Through statistical analysis, a negative relationship is found between the insider trading and IPO long-term stock performance, indicating that insider buying shares are connected to lesser stock performance. This contradicts previous research regarding insider trading in seasoned firms and opens up for discussion. By implementing a theoretical framework, a deeper analysis of the proposed relationship is be made. This study concludes that the negative relationship between insider trading and long-term IPO stock performance is not directly caused by insider trading itself. Instead, it is a result of insiders making poor investment decisions due to outside pressure and behavioral factors.

This dissertation aims to study the behavior of intermediaries under market imperfections and the consequences of that for the financial market's functioning. To do so, I focus on two classes of market frictions: funding constraints and information asymmetry. Chapter 1 studies how the dealers' capital constraints affect the market liquidity in the presence of imperfect competition and how recent regulations have shifted the competitive landscape of interest rate swaps. On the subject of informational frictions, Chapters 2 and 3 study empirically and theoretically the pace at which prices incorporate private information under the limited learning capacity of the informed traders. Understanding the microstructure of the swap markets is of interest to both policymakers and academics, especially for it helps in the efficient implementation of post-crisis regulations, namely the Dodd-Frank Act. An understudied dimension of the swap market microstructure is the determinants of the cost of the market-making activity. Using a proprietary regulatory dataset collected by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) on both the interest rate swap transactions and the collateral requirements at the London Clearinghouse (LCH), in Chapter 1, I study the key balance sheet constraints that affect the ability of the bank-affiliated dealers to provide intermediation service to the end-users. Most of the interest rate swaps are now mandated to be centrally cleared. This has increased the dealer's need for collateral in the form of highly liquid assets (cash and cash equivalents) to back their swap exposures. Facing capital adequacy measures such as Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR), dealers find it even costlier to increase the size of their balance sheet to fund these margins. I show that a 1-percentage point increase in SLR leads to an increase of 1.09 percentage points in the bank's cost of capital per unit of margin requirement. Furthermore, I find the funding spread of the dealers (the difference between the cost of external funding and the risk-free rate) is also a relevant factor for determining the dealer's marginal cost of swap transaction; a cost that is evidently transferred to the end-users in the form of less favorable prices. Measuring the cost of intermediation for the dealer-to-client interest rate swap market is challenging because of the high concentration in the market-- the first seven dealers intermediate more than 50% of the total notional traded. Therefore, one must consider the nontrivial effect of markups in transaction prices to estimate the marginal cost of intermediation reliably. For this reason, I model a differentiated product demand for swaps in the spirit of empirical Industrial Organization (IO) literature and structurally estimate this model to account for the markups in the transaction prices using estimated price elasticities. The demand estimations show economically interpretable heterogeneity among the end-users in their taste for duration risk hedging. The structurally estimated equilibrium model of intermediation can serve as a basis for answering counterfactual policy questions, especially in the debate on the social costs and benefits of excluding initial margins in calculating supplementary leverage ratio. In Chapter 2, I turn the focus to the impact of informational frictions on market-making activity. More specifically, we study the informed trading under random stopping time. Empirical evidence is provided based on an episode of time when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) unintentionally disclosed security filings to some investors before the public for several years. For technological reasons, the delay between the private and public disclosure was exogenously random. We exploit the variation in the time window of private information to show the intensity of trades and the speed at which market prices reach their efficiency, decrease with the expected arrival time of public announcement. In addition, we find the learning capacity of the insider determines the evolution of trading intensity over time. In Chapter 3, inspired by the stylized facts observed in the earlier chapter, I extend the Kyle (1985) model of strategic trading to a case with limited learning capacity of both the dealers and the informed traders (insiders). The insider does not perfectly observe the true value of the security, but he continues to hone his knowledge by using private information sources over time. Two classes of equilibria emerge from this model. In one class, the insider trades excessively patiently, and the market efficiency is reached only asymptotically. In the second type, the insider optimally chooses a deterministic time T, before which he trades patiently as in Kyle (1985) until the price reaches its full efficiency. After T, the insider keeps revealing every piece of new information immediately, and the market price stays efficient while the insider keeps making profits. Which equilibrium emerges depends on the insider's learning capacity, initial informational advantage, and the private source's informational content.

Bakgrund Coronapandemin har haft en global påverkan på den finansiella marknaden, inte minst på Stockholmsbörsen, som rasade 11,1 procent under en dag. När det råder en osäkerhet på marknaden ökar informationsasymmetrin mellan marknadsaktörer. Tidigare studier har visat att insiders kunde uppnå överavkastning utifrån insiderinformation under kriser. Insiderhandel kan vanligen tolkas som något olagligt och trots regleringar existerar det fortfarande på marknaden. Antalet misstänkta insiderbrott ökade från 199 till 368 under tidsperioden 2015-2017. Syfte Syftet med denna studie är att analysera om det uppstår överavkastning på Stockholmsbörsen när en vd förvärvar aktier i det egna bolaget genom att studera ett urval av bolag under coronapandemin. Vidare kommer studien även att analysera huruvida det förekommer skillnader i överavkastningen beroende på transaktionsstorlek och storleken på företaget. Metod Studien tillämpar en kvantitativ forskning genom en eventstudie. Vidare tillämpas en deduktiv ansats med sekundärdata från Finansinspektionen och Nasdaq. För att beräkna eventuell överavkastning har den justerade marknadsmodellen använts. Statistiska tester har genomförts i SPSS för att tolka och analysera studiens resultat samt huruvida transaktionsstorlek och företagsstorlek påverkar eventuell överavkastning.Slutsats Utifrån studiens resultat återfinns inga signifikanta resultat under tidsperioden 2019-2021 som visar att det uppstått överavkastning i samband med att företagets vd köpt aktier i bolaget. Studien stödjer inte heller att det återfinns ett samband mellan insiderns avkastning och transaktionsstorlek eller företagsstorlek. Resultatet indikerar på att Stockholmsbörsen kan antas vara effektiv under den studerade perioden / Background: The corona pandemic has had a global impact on the financial market, not least on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, which fell 11.1 percent in one day. When there is uncertainty in the market, the information asymmetry increases. Previous studies have proven that insiders could achieve excess returns based on insider information during crises. Insider trading can usually be interpreted as something illegal and despite regulations, it still exists. The amount of suspected insider crimes increased from 199 to 368 during the period 2015-2017.Purpose: The purpose of this study is to analyze whether there is an excess return on the Stockholm Stock Exchange when a CEO acquires shares in his own company by studying a selection of companies during the corona pandemic. Furthermore, the study will also analyze whether there are differences in the excess return depending on the transaction size and the size of the company.Methodology: The study applies a quantitative research strategy through an event study. A deductive approach is applied with secondary data from Finansinspektionen and Nasdaq OMX Nordic. To calculate excess return, the adjusted market model has been used. Statistical tests have been performed in SPSS to analyze and interpret the results of the study and whether transaction size and company size affect any excess return. Conclusions. Based on the results of the study, there are no significant results during the period 2019-2021 which show that there has been an excess return in connection with the company's CEO buying shares in the company. The study also does not support that there is a connection between the insider's return and transaction size or company size. The result takes us further to the fact that the Stockholm Stock Exchange can be assumed to be efficient during the period studied

No description available.

O objeto da dissertação é a regulamentação do uso indevido de informação privilegiada no mercado de capitais. Discute-se no texto qual seria a melhor maneira de reprimir a conduta praticada pelo insider trading, concluindo-se que o sistema ideal seria não mais a dupla repressão como ocorre atualmente, mas sim a separação entre as esferas administrativa e penal. A primeira julgaria as infrações de menor gravidade, deixando apenas as que efetivamente causassem potencialidade lesão grave ao bem jurídico sob a tutela do direito penal. Ante a necessidade de compreensão do contexto em que o delito de uso indevido de informação privilegiada ocorre, o trabalho inicia-se com um breve panorama do mercado de capitais, no qual se trata da formação do mercado de valores mobiliários, das bolsas de valores e das sociedades anônimas. Assim, no primeiro capítulo trata-se da regulamentação do mercado de capitais no Brasil, em especial, das Leis 6.385/1976, a qual regula o mercado de valores mobiliários brasileiro e traz a descrição do tipo penal do crime do insider trading no artigo 27-D, e da Lei 6.404/1976, que regula as sociedades anônimas no Brasil, e trata dos deveres de informar, de lealdade e de guardar sigilo impostos aos administradores das sociedades anônimas de capital aberto. No segundo capítulo, é feita inicialmente uma abordagem do que vem a ser o crime de insider trading e informação privilegiada, mencionando-se quais são argumentos contrários e a favor da repressão da conduta de utilização indevida de informação privilegiada. Na seqüência, faz-se uma breve análise da legislação estrangeira, com destaque para os países Estados Unidos da América, Espanha, Portugal e Itália. O terceiro capítulo trata da regulamentação do crime de insider trading no Brasil, iniciando-se com uma breve análise comparativa entre o tipo penal da legislação pátria e os das legislações estrangeiras estudadas no capítulo anterior. Em seguida, é analisada a tipicidade objetiva e subjetiva do tipo penal, concluindo-se que se trata de crime formal, que não admite tentativa e que se consuma no momento da utilização da 173 informação relevante ainda não divulgada ao mercado, independentemente da obtenção da vantagem indevida. Ainda no terceiro capítulo, trata-se do sujeito ativo e passivo do delito, concluindo-se que, de acordo com a redação do tipo penal, apenas quem tem o dever de manter sigilo pode ser responsabilizado criminalmente no Brasil pelo crime de insider trading, e que o sujeito passivo é a coletividade, a sociedade como um todo. Esse capítulo traz também o debate existente, sobretudo na doutrina estrangeira, de qual seria o bem jurídico tutelado pelo crime em comento. Dentre todas os possíveis bem jurídicos aventados, conclui-se que apenas a igualdade entre os investidores e a confiança no mercado de capitais são dignos de tutela penal e justificam a intervenção dessa esfera do direito. O quarto capítulo trata da relação existente entre o direito penal econômico e o crime de insider trading. Além de tratar das características do direito penal econômico, o capítulo traz críticas à expansão do direito penal moderno e trata da ineficiência da utilização da esfera penal para proteger de forma eficaz os delitos da moderna criminalidade econômica. O quinto e último capítulo trata justamente do título do trabalho: Direito Administrativo Sancionador e o Crime de Insider Trading. Nesse capítulo, explica-se o modelo proposto para sancionar a utilização indevida de informação privilegiada, iniciando-se por tratar da definição de direito administrativo sancionador e sua distinção entre o direito penal. Na seqüência trata-se da possível configuração de bis in idem existente atualmente com a aplicação de sanção administrativa e penal para o mesmo fato, para o mesmo sujeito e com o mesmo fundamento. Trata-se ainda do fortalecimento da CVM como agência reguladora para regulamentar, fiscalizar e punir com eficiência as utilização indevida de informação privilegiada, deixando para o direito penal apenas as infrações capazes de colocar em risco o mercado de capitais. Por fim, são expostas as conclusões do trabalho. / The object of this dissertation is the regulation of the misuse of privileged information in the capital market. It is discussed in the text which would be the best way to repress the conduct practiced by insider trading, concluding that the ideal system would be no more the double repression as currently occurs, but a single repression in administrative or criminal sphere according to the seriousness of the offense. The first would judge the lesser gravity infractions, leaving only those that actually caused any serious injury to the good under the legal protection of criminal law. Before the need to understand the context in which the offense of misuse of privileged information occurs, the dissertation begins with a brief overview of capital markets, in which it comes to the formation of the securities market, stock exchange, as well as corporations. Thus, the first chapter deals with (i) the regulation of the capital market in Brazil, in particular regarding Law 6.385/1976, which regulates the securities market of Brazil and contains a description of the type of criminal offense of insider trading, and (ii) the Federal Act 6.404/1976, which regulates corporations in Brazil and provides the duties to inform, loyalty and confidentiality imposed on directors of stock companies. In the second chapter, it is initially provided an approach of the concept of the insider trading crime, mentioning what are the arguments against and in favor of its repression. Subsequently, there is a brief analysis of foreign law, particularly the legislation of the United States of America, Spain, Portugal and Italy. The third chapter deals with the regulation of the insider trading crime in Brazil, beginning with a brief comparative analysis of criminal hyphotesis provided by Brazilian law and the foreign legislation analyzed in the previous chapter. Then, it is analysed the objective and subjective elements of the criminal hypothesis, concluding that it is a formal crime, which admits no attempt and that occurs at the time of use of relevant information not yet disclosed to the market, independently of obtaining improper benefit. The fourth chapter deals with the relationship between economic crime and insider trading crime. Besides approaching characteristics of the economic criminal law, the chapter provides critics to the expansion of modern criminal law and deals with the inefficiency of using the criminal sphere to protect society against the crimes of modern economic criminality. The fifth and final chapter deals with the relationship between punitive administrative law and insider trading crime. In this chapter it is explained the model proposed to penalize the misuse of inside information, starting with the definition of punitive administrative law and its distinction from criminal law. Following reference is to the possible configuration of bis in idem currently existing in the application of the criminal and administrative sanction for the same offense, same individual and on the same basis. In addition, it is also discussed the strengthening of the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission) as the regulatory agency authorized to regulate, inspect and punish effectively the misuse of inside information, leaving to the penal sphere only the criminal law offenses that are entitled to put the capital market in risk. Finally, the dissertation conclusions are exposed.

Insiderlagstiftning är ett lagstiftningsområde som de senaste decennierna kraftigt utvecklats i de flesta rättssystem. Insiderlagstiftning består oftast utav en komplex samling lagregler och inte sällan finns det i samlingen bestämmelser specifikt gällande för personer med insynsställning i börsnoterade bolag. I EU-rättslig och i svensk rätt har det genom åren figurerat flera olika varianter av insiderregleringar. Därmed har också de specifika bestämmelserna för insynspersoner varierat. Nuvarande bestämmelse för insynspersoner regleras i art. 19 p. 11 MAR, där det stadgas att dessa insynspersoner är förbjudna att utföra några transaktioner kopplat till det egna bolagets aktie under en period om 30 dagar före bolagets offentliggörande av en finansiell rapport. Regeln syftar till att försöka utjämna det informationsövertag insynspersoner har jämtemot andra investerare genom att förhindra insynspersoner från att utföra transaktioner under vissa tidsperioder, då icke-offentliggjord bolagsinformation kan ha ett stort monetärt värde. Det kan ifrågasättas om den nuvarande regleringen i art. 19 p. 11 MAR är utformad effektivt eller om den är i behov av förändring för att på bättre sätt uppfylla dess syfte.   Inom det amerikanska, federala rättssystemet används det parallellt flera alternativa bestämmelser för att försöka stävja samma sak som regeln i art. 19 p. 11 MAR syftar till att göra. I uppsatsen visas tre exempel på alternativa regleringar från den amerikanska rätten, som alla syftar till att minska insiderhandeln.   I uppsatsen påvisas att den nuvarande regleringen i art. 19 p. 11 MAR brister i dess utformning, då den nuvarande lydelsen kvarlämnar möjligheter för insynspersoner att undslippa bestämmelsen. För att minska risken för att insynspersoner utnyttjar bristerna i regleringen torde regleringens utformning förändras. För att vidare minska riskerna för att insiderhandel begås av personer i ledande ställningar torde också nämnda reglering kompletteras med ytterligare bestämmelser.

O objeto da dissertação é a regulamentação do uso indevido de informação privilegiada no mercado de capitais. Discute-se no texto qual seria a melhor maneira de reprimir a conduta praticada pelo insider trading, concluindo-se que o sistema ideal seria não mais a dupla repressão como ocorre atualmente, mas sim a separação entre as esferas administrativa e penal. A primeira julgaria as infrações de menor gravidade, deixando apenas as que efetivamente causassem potencialidade lesão grave ao bem jurídico sob a tutela do direito penal. Ante a necessidade de compreensão do contexto em que o delito de uso indevido de informação privilegiada ocorre, o trabalho inicia-se com um breve panorama do mercado de capitais, no qual se trata da formação do mercado de valores mobiliários, das bolsas de valores e das sociedades anônimas. Assim, no primeiro capítulo trata-se da regulamentação do mercado de capitais no Brasil, em especial, das Leis 6.385/1976, a qual regula o mercado de valores mobiliários brasileiro e traz a descrição do tipo penal do crime do insider trading no artigo 27-D, e da Lei 6.404/1976, que regula as sociedades anônimas no Brasil, e trata dos deveres de informar, de lealdade e de guardar sigilo impostos aos administradores das sociedades anônimas de capital aberto. No segundo capítulo, é feita inicialmente uma abordagem do que vem a ser o crime de insider trading e informação privilegiada, mencionando-se quais são argumentos contrários e a favor da repressão da conduta de utilização indevida de informação privilegiada. Na seqüência, faz-se uma breve análise da legislação estrangeira, com destaque para os países Estados Unidos da América, Espanha, Portugal e Itália. O terceiro capítulo trata da regulamentação do crime de insider trading no Brasil, iniciando-se com uma breve análise comparativa entre o tipo penal da legislação pátria e os das legislações estrangeiras estudadas no capítulo anterior. Em seguida, é analisada a tipicidade objetiva e subjetiva do tipo penal, concluindo-se que se trata de crime formal, que não admite tentativa e que se consuma no momento da utilização da 173 informação relevante ainda não divulgada ao mercado, independentemente da obtenção da vantagem indevida. Ainda no terceiro capítulo, trata-se do sujeito ativo e passivo do delito, concluindo-se que, de acordo com a redação do tipo penal, apenas quem tem o dever de manter sigilo pode ser responsabilizado criminalmente no Brasil pelo crime de insider trading, e que o sujeito passivo é a coletividade, a sociedade como um todo. Esse capítulo traz também o debate existente, sobretudo na doutrina estrangeira, de qual seria o bem jurídico tutelado pelo crime em comento. Dentre todas os possíveis bem jurídicos aventados, conclui-se que apenas a igualdade entre os investidores e a confiança no mercado de capitais são dignos de tutela penal e justificam a intervenção dessa esfera do direito. O quarto capítulo trata da relação existente entre o direito penal econômico e o crime de insider trading. Além de tratar das características do direito penal econômico, o capítulo traz críticas à expansão do direito penal moderno e trata da ineficiência da utilização da esfera penal para proteger de forma eficaz os delitos da moderna criminalidade econômica. O quinto e último capítulo trata justamente do título do trabalho: Direito Administrativo Sancionador e o Crime de Insider Trading. Nesse capítulo, explica-se o modelo proposto para sancionar a utilização indevida de informação privilegiada, iniciando-se por tratar da definição de direito administrativo sancionador e sua distinção entre o direito penal. Na seqüência trata-se da possível configuração de bis in idem existente atualmente com a aplicação de sanção administrativa e penal para o mesmo fato, para o mesmo sujeito e com o mesmo fundamento. Trata-se ainda do fortalecimento da CVM como agência reguladora para regulamentar, fiscalizar e punir com eficiência as utilização indevida de informação privilegiada, deixando para o direito penal apenas as infrações capazes de colocar em risco o mercado de capitais. Por fim, são expostas as conclusões do trabalho. / The object of this dissertation is the regulation of the misuse of privileged information in the capital market. It is discussed in the text which would be the best way to repress the conduct practiced by insider trading, concluding that the ideal system would be no more the double repression as currently occurs, but a single repression in administrative or criminal sphere according to the seriousness of the offense. The first would judge the lesser gravity infractions, leaving only those that actually caused any serious injury to the good under the legal protection of criminal law. Before the need to understand the context in which the offense of misuse of privileged information occurs, the dissertation begins with a brief overview of capital markets, in which it comes to the formation of the securities market, stock exchange, as well as corporations. Thus, the first chapter deals with (i) the regulation of the capital market in Brazil, in particular regarding Law 6.385/1976, which regulates the securities market of Brazil and contains a description of the type of criminal offense of insider trading, and (ii) the Federal Act 6.404/1976, which regulates corporations in Brazil and provides the duties to inform, loyalty and confidentiality imposed on directors of stock companies. In the second chapter, it is initially provided an approach of the concept of the insider trading crime, mentioning what are the arguments against and in favor of its repression. Subsequently, there is a brief analysis of foreign law, particularly the legislation of the United States of America, Spain, Portugal and Italy. The third chapter deals with the regulation of the insider trading crime in Brazil, beginning with a brief comparative analysis of criminal hyphotesis provided by Brazilian law and the foreign legislation analyzed in the previous chapter. Then, it is analysed the objective and subjective elements of the criminal hypothesis, concluding that it is a formal crime, which admits no attempt and that occurs at the time of use of relevant information not yet disclosed to the market, independently of obtaining improper benefit. The fourth chapter deals with the relationship between economic crime and insider trading crime. Besides approaching characteristics of the economic criminal law, the chapter provides critics to the expansion of modern criminal law and deals with the inefficiency of using the criminal sphere to protect society against the crimes of modern economic criminality. The fifth and final chapter deals with the relationship between punitive administrative law and insider trading crime. In this chapter it is explained the model proposed to penalize the misuse of inside information, starting with the definition of punitive administrative law and its distinction from criminal law. Following reference is to the possible configuration of bis in idem currently existing in the application of the criminal and administrative sanction for the same offense, same individual and on the same basis. In addition, it is also discussed the strengthening of the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission) as the regulatory agency authorized to regulate, inspect and punish effectively the misuse of inside information, leaving to the penal sphere only the criminal law offenses that are entitled to put the capital market in risk. Finally, the dissertation conclusions are exposed.