The following dissertation develops a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), and effectively manipulating the terrorist group’s (and its supporting elements’) decision-making calculus. In particular, the theory of strategic coercion has been chosen as a basis for formulating this framework, based upon: 1) the invaluable guidance it offers in dynamically drawing upon all instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, military, etc.—to accomplish politico-strategic objectives; and 2) the unique insights it provides into making strategic moves aimed at influencing the choices taken by an adversary. However, strategic coercion theory as it currently stands is inadequate for applications against substate terrorist organizations. As a quintessential cornerstone for prescriptive policy in strategic studies, such a looming deficiency vis-à-vis one the most important security threats of the modern age is unacceptable. The new theoretical framework established in this dissertation—entitled the Balance Theory of strategic coercion—addresses this deficiency. The Balance Theory stresses that three key coercive elements of strategic coercion are fundamentally important for successfully ending the hostilities posed by NSTOs, being: A) Isolation of external/international support; B) Denial; and C) Isolation of popular support. It posits that these three aspects of strategic coercion serve as the sine qua non for success in countering an NSTO’s campaign of violence and effectively manipulating its decision-making process. Implementation of these three elements, moreover, must be pursued in tandem, taking care so as not to sacrifice one aspect for the other. The Balance Theory is tested through the employment of case-study analysis. In pursuing this end, both cross-case and within-case analyses are performed, accompanied by the utilization of the methods of focused, structured comparison. The cases examined are those of: 1) The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007); and 2) Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present). The dissertation concludes with an examination of how the Balance Theory may provide insights for the formulation of counter-terrorism strategy against Al Qaeda in the current "War on Terror".

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

In 1978 the SADF carried out an airborne assault on Cassinga in Southern Angola. The South Africans claimed that Cassinga was a key SWAPO military headquarters, training camp and logistic base. SWAPO claimed it was a refugee camp and that the approximately 600 people who died in the attack were innocent civilians. The SADF said it had dealt SWAPO a significant military blow; SWAPO said the SADF had carried out a brutal massacre of old people, women and children. This dissertation focuses on the military dimensions of the raid, examining first the military situation in southern Angola and northern Namibia at the time, then looking at Cassinga itself before reviewing the airborne capability of the SADF, considering the decision that was made to launch the attack, describing the planning and preparations, the actual assault, a Cuban counter-attack and the extraction of the South African paratroopers. It concludes with the propaganda claims of both sides before assessing the military significance of the action. / History / M.A.

In 1978 the SADF carried out an airborne assault on Cassinga in Southern Angola. The South Africans claimed that Cassinga was a key SWAPO military headquarters, training camp and logistic base. SWAPO claimed it was a refugee camp and that the approximately 600 people who died in the attack were innocent civilians. The SADF said it had dealt SWAPO a significant military blow; SWAPO said the SADF had carried out a brutal massacre of old people, women and children. This dissertation focuses on the military dimensions of the raid, examining first the military situation in southern Angola and northern Namibia at the time, then looking at Cassinga itself before reviewing the airborne capability of the SADF, considering the decision that was made to launch the attack, describing the planning and preparations, the actual assault, a Cuban counter-attack and the extraction of the South African paratroopers. It concludes with the propaganda claims of both sides before assessing the military significance of the action. / History / M.A.

This thesis explores the manner in which the conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta in Nigeria is represented in western Anglophone media. Large oil reserves in the Niger Delta have contributed millions of dollars towards the growth of Nigeria's export economy. Despite this, the Niger Delta is the least developed region in the country and is characterised by high rates of inequality. Residents of the Niger Delta have been outraged by the lack of action on the part of the Nigerian government and multinational oil corporations. Their discontent over the inequalities in the region has resulted in the proliferation of armed groups and militants who often use violent and criminal tactics to communicate their disgruntlement. This thesis closely examines the representations of the violent insurgency in the Niger Delta by conducting a Critical Discourse Analysis of 145 news texts selected from four western Anglophone newspapers from 2007 to 2011. The depiction of the conflict as it appears in the four newspapers is discussed in relation to an overview of scholarly literature which explores the portrayal of Africa not only in western media, but also in other forms of western scholarship and writing. The research undertaken in this study reveals that to a significant extent representations of the Niger Delta conflict echo and reflect some of the stereotypical and age-old negative imagery that informs meanings constructed about the African continent. However, the analysis of the news texts also shows that there are certainly efforts amongst some newspapers to move beyond simplistic representations of the conflict. The disadvantage however, is that these notable attempts tend to be marred by the use of pejorative language which typically invokes negative images associated with Africa. This study argues that the implications of these representations are highly significant as these representations not only affect the way in which the conflict is understood, but also the manner in which the international community responds to it.

La thèse porte sur la mise en scène de la guerre dans les entraînements militaires aux États-Unis. Elle étudie des faux villages moyen-orientaux qui servent pour l’entraînement de pré-déploiement en Irak et en Afghanistan. On retrouve ces villages sur diverses bases militaires, comme au National Training Center (NTC) de Fort Irwin (Californie), où une douzaine de faux villages afghans et iraquiens ont été construits depuis 2007 dans le contexte de la contre-insurrection afin de préparer les troupes aux guerres de type urbaines et asymétriques. Dans ces environnements immersifs, l’armée américaine tente de reproduire les paysages socioculturel et religieux où se tiennent les missions : mosquées, salons de thé, marchés extérieurs, maisons traditionnelles forment le décor. Afin de préparer les soldats au terrain humain, une rencontre culturelle est simulée entre eux et la population locale à travers des jeux de rôle. Des acteurs, qui sont parfois d’origine afghane et iraquienne, sont embauchés pour jouer la population locale, ce qui servirait à prévenir un certain « choc culturel » anticipé sur le terrain et augmenter la sensibilité culturelle des soldats. Des experts de l’industrie du cinéma comme des pyrotechniciens et des artistes-maquilleurs participent également à ces simulations pour les rendre plus « réalistes » à travers leurs effets spéciaux. La thèse étudie les rationalités et les technologies à l'œuvre dans les faux villages et les manières dont elles soutiennent cette mise en scène « culturelle » de la guerre. Elle examine les pratiques matérielles et discursives des performances qui s’y déroulent. En quelles instances les exercices de simulation s’inscrivent-ils dans un régime de représentation racialisé? Comment l’orientalisme américain est-il articulé dans ces espaces? Quels mythes politiques et discours dominants circulent dans ces géographies fictives? La thèse problématise la représentation et la production de savoirs sur l’autre. Ce faisant, elle participe à la discussion sur l’altérité entamée par plusieurs courants théoriques et champs disciplinaires dont elle s'inspire, notamment les cultural studies, les critical race theories et la critique postcoloniale. L’analyse est basée sur une observation de courte durée au NTC. Le Centre offre des visites guidées de la base qui permettent au public d’assister à une journée d’entraînements dans les faux villages. J’ai participé à deux reprises à ces « NTC Box Tours ». J’ai également mené des entrevues semi-dirigées avec plus de vingt vétérans d’Iraq et d’Afghanistan afin de discuter avec eux de leur expérience d’entraînement de pré-déploiement et du rôle de la culture dans les simulations militaires. / The thesis looks at the performance of war in military training in the US. It studies the mock Middle Eastern villages that are used for Iraq and Afghanistan pre-deployment training. These villages are found on several military bases such as the National Training Center of Fort Irwin (California), where a dozen of oriental towns were implemented since 2007 in order to prepare the troops for urban and asymmetrical type of warfare in the context of counterinsurgency. In these immersive environments, the US military tries to reproduce overseas sociocultural and religious landscapes: mosques, tea rooms, street markets, traditional houses and so on form the set. To prepare the soldiers to the human terrain, a cultural encounter between them and the local population is simulated through role play. Actors, sometimes from Iraq and Afghanistan, are hired to enact the local population. This is said to prevent an anticipated “culture clash” on the ground and raise cultural awareness amongst the soldiers. Experts from the filmmaking industry such as pyrotechnics and makeup artists also take part in these simulations – working to make them more “realistic” through their special effects. The thesis examines the rationalities and technologies at stake in the mock villages, and the way they sustain the « cultural » mise en scène of war. The research interrogates the material and discursive practices of the performances taking place in the mock towns. In what instances are the simulation exercices anchored in a racialized system of representation; how is the American orientalism being rearticulated in these spaces; what political myths and hegemonic discourses are circulating in these fictive geographies? The thesis problematizes the ways of knowing and representing the other. Therefore, the research takes part to the discussion on otherness initiated by diverse theoritical accounts and academic fields, such as cultural studies, critical race theories, and postcolonial critique. The analysis is based on a short observation at NTC. The Center offers guided tours of the base, allowing the general public to attend to one day of training in the mock villages. I participated twice in these “NTC Box tours”. I also conducted semi-directed interviews with more than twenty Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, in which they share with me their experiences of pre-deployment training and their thoughts on the place of culture in military simulations.

This manuscript is a study of the Thirty-Third Infantry, United States Volunteers, a regiment that was recruited in Texas, the South, and the Midwest and was trained by officers experienced from the Indian Wars and the Spanish-American War. This regiment served as a front-line infantry unit and then as a constabulary force during the Philippine War from 1899 until 1901. While famous in the United States as a highly effective infantry regiment during the Philippine War, the unit's fame and the lessons that it offered American war planners faded in time and were overlooked in favor of conventional fighting. In addition, the experiences of the men of the regiment belie the argument that the Philippine War was a brutal and racist imperial conflict akin to later interventions such as the Vietnam War. An examination of the Thirty-Third Infantry thus provides valuable context into a war not often studied in the United States and serves as a successful example of a counterinsurgency.

Les guerres d’Irak et d’Afghanistan ont vu la réapparition massive de sociétés de mercenariat d’un nouveau genre.Le mercenariat occidental est ainsi passé en moins de vingt ans de structures artisanales, arrimées à la politiquepost-coloniale des grandes puissances, à un stade professionnel et industriel tendant à une transnationalisationcroissante de ses activités. Des bavures de la célèbre Blackwater à l’implication d’employés de CACI dans lescandale de la torture au sein de la prison d’Abu Grahib, en passant par les activités de la tentaculaire Aegis, lessociétés militaires privées, omniprésentes sur le champ de bataille, ont rythmé et marqué le récit de ces guerresmajeures du début du XXIe siècle. Fait crucial : c’est la première fois dans l’histoire des opérations militairesaméricaines qu’on assiste à un basculement de la démographie des forces en faveur du secteur privé. Produit del’économie de guerre permanente et ramifications expéditionnaires du complexe militaro-industriel, ces sociétésreprésentent un changement d’expression de la puissance militaire étatsunienne sans précédent. Cettemercenarisation de l’american way of war est désormais une tendance structurelle de la politique étrangère del’Empire et pourrait bien révolutionner à terme le visage même de la guerre. Cette thèse trace le récit historique deces armées privées, décrit les conditions politiques qui ont permis à ce nouveau marché de la guerre d’émerger etse propose d’analyser la portée sociopolitique de ce phénomène de mondialisation de la violence privée quant à laquestion de l’Etat. Cette question du retour du mercenariat à grande échelle dans la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis permet non seulement de former une hypothèse aiguë sur le déclin de la puissance militaire américaine maisaussi sur les évolutions de l’identité sociohistorique du monopole de la violence étatique. / Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have seen a massive return of mercenary companies of a new genre. The Westernmercenaries have transformed in less than twenty years from craft structures, linked to the post-colonial politics ofgreat powers, to a professional and industrial stage that tends to a growing transnationalization of their activities.From the blunders of the famous Blackwater to the involvement of CACI’s employees in the torture scandal inAbu Ghraib prison, through the activities of the sprawling Aegis, private military companies, everywhere on thebattlefield, have marked and labeled the story of these major wars of the early twenty-first Century. Crucial fact:this is the first time in the history of U.S. military operations that we are witnessing a shift in the demographics offorces in favor of the private sector. Product of the permanent war economy and overseas branches of themilitary-industrial complex, these companies represent an unprecedented change in expression of U.S. militarypower. This mercenarization of the American way of war is now a structural trend of the foreign policy of theEmpire and could eventually revolutionize the face of the war. This thesis traces the history of these privatearmies, described the political conditions that led to the birth of this new market of war, and analyzes the scope ofthis sociopolitical phenomenon of globalization of private violence. This return of mercenaries on a large scale inthe foreign policy of the United States not only help to form a decisive hypothesis on the decline of Americanmilitary power but also on the socio-historical changes of the identity of the State monopoly of violence.

No description available.

There is little solid research that explores counterinsurgency practices against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), not only from the standpoint of what is being done, but, rather, what should be done based on past COIN successes. Notable works on counterinsurgency in Colombia include the research of Tom Marks, who focused on operational strategy and tactics; Kevin Self, who professes the importance of controlling territory in defeating the FARC, by addressing the social and institutional ills within Colombia itself; and Dennis Rempe, who notes US involvement in shaping Colombia's COIN strategy. Using a comparative case study model, this thesis provides an analysis of Colombia?s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies and tactics through the lens of successful and unsuccessful COIN operations in Iraq, Algeria, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, Algeria and El Salvador over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. After all, no matter how successful a COIN force is militarily, their accomplishments will ultimately be fruitless if the conditions which fuel insurgency remains present. This paper begins by providing the historical context for the conditions which shaped the Colombian social order, which led to the revolutionary movement. It then follows the growth of the FARC, examining that organization?s strengths and weaknesses. The FARC is contrasted by outlining recent COIN transformation efforts within the Colombian government, to include little acknowledged failures and successes, strengths and weaknesses. An important focus is placed on Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez? Democratic Security Policy as the model for Colombia?s current COIN efforts. After next examining various ongoing factors contributing to the Colombian insurgency?to include institutional failures, illicit funding and the problem of paramilitary groups?this thesis examines past COIN efforts by other governments. Finally, after applying lessons learned from thee past COIN efforts?cross-referencing historically successful and unsuccessful tactics with tactics used and not used by Bogota in its fight against the FARC?I provide recommendations to the government of Colombia (GOC) on how to improve its COIN efforts. Although it is important to look at this problem set from an external standpoint, we must still factor in internal factors that have limited Colombia?s ability to emerge victorious, such as allowing porous borders, airspace and coastlines; placing a priority on killing or capturing the enemy and not on engaging the population; and the primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency; disregard of basic human rights; an insufficient judiciary structure; failure to halt financial support mechanisms; and the lack of an outlet for political inclusion . From this vantage point, we will be able to see that these elements?when properly implemented?have proven successful over time and may enhance GOC success and ultimately result in victory over the insurgency that has plagued their country for 40+ years