This thesis approaches the reasons behind the success of insurgencies in conflicts against greater nations. Why is it that a small group with limited resources can triumph against a great military power. This study seeks to analyze the conflicts in Afghanistan 1979-1989 and Chechnya 1994-1996 with the use of an adapted version of the SWORD-model in order to conclude whether the model can elucidate the separate outcomes. The original model is based on seven dimensions which all explains different aspects on how a state ought to combat insurgents in order to succeed, and has predominantly been used to analyze conflicts involving the US, not Russia or the USSR. A case study is then realized on the two conflicts in order to strengthen or weaken the analytic prowess of the adapted SWORD-model. The analysis concludes that the insurgents had the advantage in four and three respectively, out of the four adapted dimensions in Afghanistan and Chechnya, which indicates that the insurgents should have succeed in both conflicts which they did. Based on this, it can be argued that the analytic power of the adapted SWORD-model has been strengthened by explaining two additional partly unique conflicts involving alternative states.

The diploma thesis presents an alternative to the traditional representation of terrorism in the field of international relations. Terrorism is interpreted through the Fukuyamian-Hegelian prism of thymos, which allows it to be integrated into the framework of an anormatively defined global civil society. On a strategic-tactical level contemporary terrorism is identified with guerilla. On these foundations new primary and secondary categories for terrorism analysis are laid out, and possibilities of optimizing its strategies and tactics are suggested. The attention is then focused on the overlaps of such alternative conception on states - which so gain new possibilities in counter-strategies, adoption of methods or silent cooperation - and the non-governmental organizations. Both the analytical and political applications of the proposed approach are demonstrated in the two appendices to the thesis.

This thesis seeks to answer the question of why some rebel movements choose to take on a religious character, and why some do not, even in cases where they share many characteristics. This thesis argues that a religious or secular framing is a tool that can be tactically utilised by rebel groups in order to further their goals and strengthen their position.   Given the fact that rebel groups usually start out at an inherent resource disadvantage, securing external support is paramount for any rebel group to stand a fighting chance. External actors need to be talked into supporting these rebel groups, and are more likely to support rebel groups with whom they share certain characteristics. This thesis argues that one of the main ways in which insurgent groups can seek to lobby or appease external actors is through aligning its religiosity to fit that of the external actor. Through examining the lifespan of two separate ethnic insurgencies in Pakistan, that of the Baloch and of the Pashtun, and tracing that to the religiosity of the latest iterations of insurgent groups within these long-standing conflicts, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP), which have taken very different paths when it comes to religiosity despite their similar origins, and examining their potential external backers and the influence they may have had, this thesis found that foreign backer religiosity might be a powerful determinant in influencing insurgent religiosity.

While transnational rebellion and rebel recruitment have received much attention in previous literature, the combination of the two, transnational rebel recruitment, has been relatively understudied. This study aims to cover this research gap by further developing Jeremy Weinstein’s theory on resource endowments to test their effect on transnational rebel recruitment. It seeks to answer the research question: “How do resource endowments impact transnational rebel recruitment?”. A distinction will be made between domestic and transnational rebel groups to test the theoretical argument. It will be argued that rebel groups can have a variation in their economic and social endowments, which both have a domestic an transnational variant. The main hypothesis reads: transnational rebel groups that have much transnational resource endowments are more likely to recruit transnationally. This study will employ a structured focused comparison on strategically picked cases using Mill’s method of difference. The selected cases that will be compared are the transnational rebel group NPFL in Liberia (1989-1995) and the domestic rebel group NRA in Uganda (1981-1986). This study finds support for the theory and the main hypothesis.

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Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / Since World War II, the Philippines has confronted threats from communist insurgents, Muslim secessionists, and a few other agitators. Recently, however, a new threat has emerged-- this time coming from a terrorist organization known as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Although the ASG is a relatively small group, it has wrought great injury to the Philippine image as of late. Common among the groups presenting a threat to internal security are that their strategies and tactics tend to be unconventional and asymmetric. This thesis seeks to determine how special operations can improve the AFP's capability to address internal security threats. The study begins by examining the security environments in which the AFP currently operates, and then proceeds to study emerging security environments in which it will likely operate. The current special operations capability of the AFP is explored and assessed, while inquiring whether it needs enhancing. Case studies of past AFP special operations against groups which posed major internal threats are analyzed to determine whether or not the doctrine and strategy of the AFP was correct, especially regarding its use of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Furthermore, this study considers the United States (U.S.) model for special operations, namely the U.S. Special Operations Forces, in proposing a special operations strategy for the AFP that is feasible, suitable, and sustainable. It is suggested that such an examination will produce a strategy that is relevant, adaptable, and responsive to dealing with the internal security environments likely to be encountered by the Philippine government. / Major, Philippine Army

The purpose of this thesis is to assess Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan before and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. I argue that the nature of the relationship was transformed by the region becoming the centre of Cold War conflict, and show how Pakistan’s role affected the development of the mujahidin insurgency against Soviet occupation. My inquiry begins by assessing the historical determinants of the relationship, arising from the colonial legacy and local interpretations of the contested spheres of legitimacy proffered by state, tribe and Islam. I then map the trajectory of the relationship from Pakistan’s independence in 1947, showing how the retreat of great power rivalry following British withdrawal from the subcontinent allowed for the framing of the relationship in primarily bilateral terms. The ascendance of bilateral factors opened greater possibilities for accommodation than had previously existed, though the relationship struggled to free itself of inherited colonial disputes, represented by the Pashtunistan issue. The most promising attempt to resolve the dispute came to an end with the communist coup and subsequent Soviet invasion, which subsumed bilateral concerns under the framework of Cold War confrontation. Viewing the invasion as a major threat, Pakistan pursued negotiations for Soviet withdrawal, aligned itself with the US and gave clandestine support to the mujahidin insurgency. External support enhanced mujahidin military viability while exacerbating weaknesses in political organization and ideology. Soviet withdrawal in 1989 left an unresolved conflict. Faced with state collapse and turmoil across the border, heightened security concerns following loss of US support, and intensified links among non-state actors on both sides of the frontier, the Pakistan government drew on its recently gained experience of working through non-state actors to attempt to maintain its influence in Afghanistan. There would be no return to the relatively stable state-state ties prevailing before 1979.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Nigeria’s ability to play a regional stabilizing role in the Gulf of Guinea is severely thwarted due to unresolved conflict in the Niger Delta. Stemming from agitation by local communities, it evolved from peaceful rallies into an armed insurgency with the youth as the vanguard, and the conflict has subsequently spread into neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Benin. The aim of this study was to analyse the conflict in the Niger Delta, southern Nigeria in order to assess its impact on the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. Taking the form of a political risk analysis, a means of forecasting potential pitfalls for an investing client to mitigate or manage risk, the study postulated that a country specific risk analysis would not be sufficient to analyse an integrated system like the Gulf of Guinea. Many scholars have suggested that regional analysis has become more important than national. In the context of Africa contagion effects, the spill over, positive as well as negative from one country to another, casts doubt on the value of assessing only a country specific risk analysis. Taking this phenomenon into account, a regional risk index was created in order to assess the regional implications of the conflict in the Niger Delta. The index consists of six variables chosen from four political risk frameworks, namely the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Business Environment Risk Intelligence, The Brink Model, and finally the International Country Risk Guide. The variables were chosen on their utility for regional political risk analysis and their status as major risk variables, universal risk variables employed by various risk frameworks. In the subsequent political risk analysis, the first four variables were rated as having a high risk while the latter two garnered a medium risk rating. As such the overall rating for the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea was found to be high. This study finds that conventional country specific risk models are still very much the preferred means of analysing risk, but that regional risk analysis would have to take a larger role in political risk analysis in the future. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Nigerië se vermoë om ‘n streeks-stabiliserende rol in die Golf van Guinea te speel, word ernstig gedwarsboom deur die onopgeloste konflik in die Niger Delta. Die oorsprong van die konflik in vreedsame gemeenskaplike protestaksie vir meer regverdige verdeling van olie inkomste het uitgekring na gewapende konflik, beide in die Delta self en in buurlande Kameroen, Ekwatoriale Guinee en Benin. Hierdie studie het gepoog om die konflik in die Nigeriese Delta te bestudeer om die impak van politieke risiko op die Golf van Guinea te assesseer. Die studie het die vorm van ‘n politieke risiko analise aangeneem, ‘n middel van vooruitskatting om potensiële valstrikke aan ‘n kliënt wat wil belê uit te wys om sodoende konflik te verlig of te beheer. Die studie veronderstel dat ‘n landspesifieke konflik analise onvoldoende is om ‘n geïntegreerde sisteem soos die Golf van Guinea te analiseer. Met menige akademici wat voorstel dat streeksanalise belangriker geword het as die nasionale, word daar in die konteks van die gevolge van Afrika-besmetting, die oorloop daarvan van een land na ‘n ander, positief sowel as negatief, ‘n skaduwee gegooi op die waarde van die assessering van slegs ‘n landspesifieke konflik analise. Met hierdie fenomeen in gedagte, is ‘n streek risiko inhoud geskep om die implikasies vir die konflik in die Niger Deltastreek, te assesseer. Die inhoud is saamgestel uit ‘n verskeidenheid van ses variante gekies uit vier politieke risiko raamwerke, nl die ‘Ekonomist Intelligence Unit’, die ‘Business Environment Risk Intelligence’, die ‘Brink Model’ en ook die ‘International Country Risk Guide’. Die variante is gebruik vir hulle waarde vir streekspolitieke risiko analise, asook die belangrikheid van hulle hoof risiko veranderlikheid, ‘n universele Hoof risiko variant wat gebruik word in verskillende risiko raamwerke. In die gevolglike politieke risiko-analise, is die vier variante beskou as ‘n baie hoë risiko, terwyl die laaste twee as medium risiko beskou word. Dus is die algemene taksering vir die politiese risiko in die Golf van Guinea baie hoog. Die studie vind uiteindelik dat lande se spesifieke risiko modelle steeds die verkose manier is om risiko’s te analiseer, alhoewel politieke risiko analise ‘n groter rol sal speel in toekomstige streek risiko analise.

Au cours des dernières décennies, l’augmentation du nombre de guerres irrégulières place les armées modernes dans une situation délicate. Pour pouvoir relever ce nouveau défi, ces organisations militaires, avant tout destinées à mener des guerres interétatiques, se doivent d’innover. Plusieurs cas historiques montrent comment, face à de nouvelles formes de conflit, certaines armées se sont lancées dans un processus d’innovation. Le cas de l’armée française en Algérie en est un. L’objectif de ce mémoire est de comprendre comment l’innovation a émergé lors du conflit, et comment elle s’est diffusée au sein de l’organisation militaire. Un survol de la stratégie française en Algérie va permettre de dégager trois principales innovations : La mise en place de la doctrine de la guerre révolutionnaire, la création des Sections Administratives Spécialisées et l’approche de David Galula. L’étude de ses trois cas nous montre que, durant la Guerre d’Algérie, l’innovation provenait principalement des militaires, plus précisément du sommet de la hiérarchie. Cependant, certains exemples d’innovation par le bas existent. Dans ces cas-là, la diffusion se fera via la doctrine informelle. L’exemple de Galula nous prouve néanmoins qu’une innovation se diffuse beaucoup plus difficilement lorsqu’elle émane des hommes de terrain. / During the last decades, the increasing number of irregular wars brought the modern armies into a delicate situation. In order to overcome this new challenge, these military organizations primarily designed for interstate wars had to innovate. Many historical cases show how certain armies have launched into innovation processes because of new forms of conflict. The case of the French army in Algeria is a good example. The main goal of this paper is to understand how innovation has emerged during the conflict, and how it has diffused within the military organization. A glance at the French strategy in Algeria will allow us to highlight three main innovations: the development of the Revolutionary Warfare doctrine, the creation of “Sections Administratives Specialisées, and the David Galula approach. The analysis of these three study cases shows that innovation came mainly from militaries during the Algerian war, particularly those on top of the hierarchy. However, certain examples of bottom-up innovations do exist. In these cases, diffusion will take place via the informal doctrine. Nevertheless, the Galula example demonstrates that an innovation will diffuse with more difficulty when it comes from people on the ground.