Submitted by Marlene Aparecida de Souza Cardozo (mcardozo@pucsp.br) on 2016-12-19T14:57:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Natália Cançado Scarpelli.pdf: 1486317 bytes, checksum: 8b671bfdce3cb774d993981268ed7fe9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-19T14:57:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Natália Cançado Scarpelli.pdf: 1486317 bytes, checksum: 8b671bfdce3cb774d993981268ed7fe9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-11-30 / The scope of this dissertation is to analyze, through a vast bibliographic research, the interlocutory advance injunction (also called interlocutory relief) stabilization technique recently incorporated in our legal system with the edition of the 2015 Civil Litigation Code. In regards to its structure, this work is divided in five chapters. The first chapter discusses the historical evolution of the interlocutory injunction focusing in the characterization of said institute by Italian doctrine, as well as its development in the Brazilian environment analyzing the precautionary injunction introduced in our legal system with the 1939 Civil Litigation Code and the preliminary injunction introduced with the 1973 Civil Litigation Code. The second chapter presents the treatment dispensed to the interlocutory injunction by foreign legal systems, specifically Italian, German, French and Portuguese Law. The third chapter assesses Brazilian current rules related with the interlocutory injunction through examination of the applicable provisions in the 2015 Civil Litigation Code. The fourth chapter specifically analyzes the procedures involved in filing motions for interlocutory injunctions of urgent and advance natures. At last, the fifth chapter is dedicated to a thorough exam of all specifics and potential issues related with the interlocutory advance injunction stabilization technique. The objective of this work is, supported in solid doctrine, to bring solutions to questions and doubts derived from the interpretation of Article 304 of the 2015 Civil Litigation Code in its concise terms. The ultimate goal is to achieve the dynamic construction of the entire procedure required to stabilize the interlocutory advance injunction and allow the practical application of such technique to ensure that Brazilian Litigation systems may take advantage of this application / A presente dissertação possui como objeto o estudo, a partir de ampla pesquisa bibliográfica, da técnica de estabilização da tutela antecipada antecedente, inserida recentemente em nosso sistema por ocasião da entrada em vigor do Código de Processo Civil de 2015. No tocante à estrutura, o trabalho se divide em cinco capítulos. O primeiro capítulo aborda a evolução histórica da tutela provisória, com destaque no estudo e caracterização do instituto pela doutrina italiana, bem como o seu desenvolvimento dentro da realidade brasileira, mediante a análise da tutela cautelar, prevista em nosso sistema desde o Código de Processo Civil de 1939, e da tutela antecipada, introduzida na vigência do Código de Processo Civil de 1973. O segundo capítulo apresenta o tratamento da tutela provisória pelo direito estrangeiro, especificamente nos sistemas da Itália, Alemanha, França e Portugal. O terceiro capítulo explora a atual disciplina da tutela provisória através do exame dos respectivos dispositivos legais previstos no Código de Processo Civil de 2015. O quarto capítulo, por sua vez, trata especificamente sobre o procedimento da tutela de urgência antecipada requerida em caráter antecedente. Por fim, o quinto capítulo se dedica ao minucioso estudo de todas as questões que envolvem a técnica da estabilização da tutela antecipada antecedente. O objetivo deste trabalho é, com o apoio na doutrina, trazer soluções para as dúvidas interpretativas que decorrem da concisa redação do artigo 304 do Código Processual de 2015. Busca-se, assim, a construção da dinâmica de todo o procedimento necessário para se estabilizar a tutela antecipada requerida em caráter antecedente e permitir, sem qualquer receio das partes, que a técnica seja efetivamente aplicada na prática, de modo a possibilitar que o sistema processual brasileiro usufrua dos benefícios decorrentes desta aplicação.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Eduardo Jose da Fonseca Costa.pdf: 1076274 bytes, checksum: 311258a291d703faf4ae6c9a12956e77 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-11-05 / As far as the matter of granting injunctive relief is concerned there is a dead right provided in state-approved legal texts that is in disagreement with the living right of forensic practice. When ruling on the granting of urgent injunctions, the plain wording in the legislative text may give rise to an interpretation whereby the fumus boni iuris and the periculum in mora are requirements independent of each other. As a result, for the traditional scholastic doctrine which usually conforms to chiefly analytic and hermeneutic dogmatic models the absence of either one or the other of these requirements suffices to have the motion for preliminary injunction denied [= rigid and mechanistic model]. However, an empirical study of the status of the legal practice shows that justices usually take together the fumus boni iuris and the periculum in mora and that those requirements seem to have a mutually complementary relationship. In other words: a dogmatic-pragmatic model can through empiric, descriptive and inductive investigative procedures prove that in daily court practice the absence or the lean presence of one of the requirements may from time to time be offset by the exaggerated presence of the other [= fluid and adaptive model]. This is why in daily court practice it is possible to find orders granting preliminary injunctions grounded (α) merely on a near certainty of the allegation of a material right to which the plaintiff claims to be entitled, with the justice leaving out of consideration the presence of the periculum in mora [= plain extreme evidence injunction], or (β) only on the imminent danger of extreme irreparable harm, with the justice leaving out of consideration the presence of the fumus boni iuris [= plain extreme urgency injunction]. In this sense, the several types of preliminary injunction are but points of tension tugging at the strands of a rope stretched between the fumus boni iuris and the periculum in mora. The more the tension moves toward the fumus boni iuris the closer it gets to the granting of extreme evidence injunction; the more the tension moves toward the periculum in mora the closer it gets to the granting of extreme urgency injunction. Halfway between these extremes lies an infinitesimal set of possibilities all interlinked by means of a vital connection. Thus, within this infinitude eight key-types of preliminary injunction stand out: a) plain extreme evidence injunction; b) plain extreme urgency injunction; c) extreme evidence and non-extreme urgency injunction; d) extreme urgency and non-extreme evidence injunction; e) extreme evidence and extreme urgency injunction; f) non-extreme evidence and non-extreme urgency injunction; g) presumed extreme plain evidence injunction; h) presumed extreme plain urgency injunction. Therefore, it is naïve to maintain that the granting of preliminary injunctions is either a discretionary (Cândido Rangel Dinamarco), or an associative (Betina Rizzato Lara) act. As a matter of fact, it does have something of a discretionary and something of an associative quality, since it is an act of complex conditionality, an outcome of a justice s appraisal of the fundamental tension between the fumus boni iuris and the periculum in mora such as they appear in a given real case / Em matéria de concessão de medidas liminares, existe um direito morto nos textos de lei positivados pelo Estado que não coincide com o direito vivo da prática forense. No momento da concessão das medidas de urgência, o campo meramente textual dos diplomas legislativos dá a entender que o fumus boni iuris e o periculum in mora funcionam como pressupostos autônomos entre si. Portanto, para a doutrina escolástica tradicional que, em geral, segue modelos dogmáticos prevalentemente analíticos e hermenêuticos a falta de um desses pressupostos é suficiente para o provimento liminar deixar de ser concedido [= modelo rígido e mecanicista]. Todavia, um estudo empírico do plano situacional da prática judiciária revela que o fumus boni iuris e o periculum in mora costumam ser analisados em conjunto pelos juízes e que eles parecem assumir uma relação de complementação mútua . Em outros termos: um modelo dogmático-pragmático é capaz de comprovar, através de procedimentos investigativos empíricos, descritivos e indutivos, que, na experiência quotidiana dos Tribunais, a ausência ou a presença minguada de um dos pressupostos pode ser eventualmente compensada pela presença exagerada do outro [= modelo fluido e adaptativo]. Daí a razão pela qual, no dia-a-dia forense, é possível deparar-se com a concessão de liminares calcadas (α) tão apenas na quase-certeza da pretensão de direito material alegada pelo autor, sem que a presença do periculum in mora tenha sido levada em consideração pelo juiz [= tutela de evidência extremada pura], ou (β) somente no perigo iminente de um dano irreparável extremo, sem que a presença do fumus boni iuris tenha sido examinada [= tutela de urgência extremada pura]. Nesse sentido, os diferentes tipos de liminar nada mais são do que pontos de tensão ao longo de uma corda esticada entre o fumus boni iuris e o periculum in mora. Quanto mais essa tensão se dirige para o fumus boni iuris, mais se está perto da outorga de uma tutela de evidência extremada; quanto mais a tensão se dirige para o periculum in mora, mais se está perto da concessão de uma tutela de urgência extremada. Em meio às duas extremidades, existe um conjunto infinitesimal de possibilidades, todas interligadas por uma conexão vital. Assim, dentro dessa infinitude, podem destacar-se oito tipos-chave de providência liminar: a) tutela de evidência extremada pura; b) tutela de urgência extremada pura; c) tutela de evidência extremada e urgência não-extremada; d) tutela de urgência extremada e evidência não-extremada; e) tutela de evidência e urgência extremadas; f) tutela de evidência e urgência não-extremadas; g) tutela de evidência pura de extremidade presumida; h) tutela de urgência pura de extremidade presumida. Logo, é simplista sustentar que a concessão de liminares é ato discricionário (Cândido Rangel Dinamarco), ou vinculativo (Betina Rizzato Lara). Na verdade, existe nela um quid de discricionariedade e um outro de vinculatividade, visto que se trata de um ato de condicionalidade complexa, fruto da valoração que o juiz faz da tensão fundamental havida entre o fumus boni iuris e o periculum in mora, tal como configurados num determinado caso concreto

Bank demand guarantees have become an established part of international trade. Demand guarantees, standby letters of credit and commercial letters of credit are all treated as autonomous contracts whose operation will not be interfered with by courts on grounds immaterial to the guarantee or credit itself. The idea in the documentary credit transaction/demand guarantee transaction is that if the documents (where applicable) presented are in line with the terms of the credit/guarantee the bank has to pay, and if the documents do not correspond to the requirements, the bank must not pay. However, over the years a limited number of exceptions to the autonomy principle of demand guarantees and letters of credit have come to be acknowledged and accepted in practice. In certain circumstances, the autonomy of demand guarantees and letters of credit may be ignored by the bank and regard may be had to the terms and conditions of the underlying contract. The main exceptions concern fraud and illegality in the underlying contract. In this thesis a great deal of consideration has been given to fraud and illegality as possible grounds on which payment under demand guarantees and letters of credit have been attacked (and sometimes even prevented) in the English, American and South African courts. It will be shown that the prospect of success depends on the law applicable to the demand guarantee and letter of credit, and the approach a court in a specific jurisdiction takes. At present, South Africa has limited literature on demand guarantees, and the case law regarding the grounds upon which payment under a demand guarantee might be prevented is scarce and often non-existent. In South Africa one finds guidance by looking at similar South African case law dealing with commercial and standby letters of credit and applying these similar principles to demand guarantees. The courts, furthermore, find guidance by looking at how other jurisdictions, in particular the English courts, deal with these issues. Therefore, how the South African courts currently deal/should be dealing/probably will be dealing with the unfair and fraudulent calling of demand guarantees/letters of credit is discussed in this thesis. / Jurisprudence / LL.D

Bank demand guarantees have become an established part of international trade. Demand guarantees, standby letters of credit and commercial letters of credit are all treated as autonomous contracts whose operation will not be interfered with by courts on grounds immaterial to the guarantee or credit itself. The idea in the documentary credit transaction/demand guarantee transaction is that if the documents (where applicable) presented are in line with the terms of the credit/guarantee the bank has to pay, and if the documents do not correspond to the requirements, the bank must not pay. However, over the years a limited number of exceptions to the autonomy principle of demand guarantees and letters of credit have come to be acknowledged and accepted in practice. In certain circumstances, the autonomy of demand guarantees and letters of credit may be ignored by the bank and regard may be had to the terms and conditions of the underlying contract. The main exceptions concern fraud and illegality in the underlying contract. In this thesis a great deal of consideration has been given to fraud and illegality as possible grounds on which payment under demand guarantees and letters of credit have been attacked (and sometimes even prevented) in the English, American and South African courts. It will be shown that the prospect of success depends on the law applicable to the demand guarantee and letter of credit, and the approach a court in a specific jurisdiction takes. At present, South Africa has limited literature on demand guarantees, and the case law regarding the grounds upon which payment under a demand guarantee might be prevented is scarce and often non-existent. In South Africa one finds guidance by looking at similar South African case law dealing with commercial and standby letters of credit and applying these similar principles to demand guarantees. The courts, furthermore, find guidance by looking at how other jurisdictions, in particular the English courts, deal with these issues. Therefore, how the South African courts currently deal/should be dealing/probably will be dealing with the unfair and fraudulent calling of demand guarantees/letters of credit is discussed in this thesis. / Jurisprudence / LL.D