This dissertation contributes to the philosophy of empathy and biomedical ethics by drawing on phenomenological approaches to empathy, intersubjectivity, and affectivity in order to contest the primacy of the intersubjective aspect of empathy at the cost of its affective aspect. Both aspects need to be explained in order for empathy to be accurately understood in philosophical works, as well as practically useful for patient care in biomedical ethics. In the first chapter, I examine the current state of clinical empathy in medicine including professional opinions about empathy, the dominant definition being employed, and the problems that arise from this definition. By trying to define empathy in a way that is useful to the current presuppositions in medicine, clinical empathy aligns with simulation theory, which has three problems: the discrepancy between the way empathy is defined and the way it is explained, the lack of diversity that this theory of empathy allows in our understanding of others, and the lack of affective understanding and affective engagement involved in the patient-physician interaction. These three problems are used to derive three questions that are important for any theory of empathy: (1) What is the phenomenon being explained? (2) What is the intersubjective context of empathy? (3) What is the affective dimension of empathy? The best theory of clinical empathy can be formulated by answering these three questions as they relate to phenomenological theories, which are more attuned to overcoming presuppositions. Chapters two and three each examine a different phenomenological approach to empathy from opposite extremes in their theories of intersubjectivity. Husserl and Stein begin from an isolated, transcendental subject that needs empathy to bridge the gap between itself and others, while Scheler begins from a primary intersubjectivity in which self and other are undifferentiated, making empathy a largely unnecessary skill. Despite their strongly opposed positions, and the acknowledgement that their theories of intersubjectivity necessitate their theories of empathy, I argue that both fail to understand the affective dimension of empathy. Husserl and Stein leave no room in empathy for it to be an affect, while Scheler prioritizes affects that reunite subjects, but leaves empathy itself as a non-affective skill. Chapter four explains Gallagher’s interaction theory as a more moderate approach to the relation between empathy and intersubjectivity. He draws on the insights of the other two theories, but conceives of empathy as a multi-leveled phenomenon that allows for an understanding of others. While this theory does aid in addressing the intersubjective context of empathy in a way that best solves the first two problems with clinical empathy, interaction theory still fails to fully address the affectivity of empathy, maintaining empathy as a largely cognitive ability. Gallagher does acknowledge the affective core of empathy, but he does not explain the way in which it is affective. In response to this problem, I explain Anya Daly’s application of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of reversibility to affectivity as a possible solution to the problematic gap in Gallagher’s theory. Chapter five focuses on theories of clinical empathy in order to address the neglected affective aspects of empathy, and respond to the problem of detached concern. The problems caused by detached concern are explained, as well as why the theories discussed in the middle chapters are still unable to solve them. This is done in two parts. In the first part, I explain the basis of this issue in the cognitive/feeling divide, as explained in the philosophy of emotion. Then, I give a brief overview of the phenomenology of affectivity to be used as a guide to the affectivity of empathy. In the second part, I examine three theories of clinical empathy that attempt to solve the problem of detached concern, noting their strengths and weaknesses based on their similarities to phenomenological approaches to empathy and affectivity.

Magister Psychologiae - MPsych / This study focused on trauma and seeked to demonstrate that the application of a Buberian understanding to the experience of trauma can help shed light on the impact of trauma on a sufferer's life. The aim of the study was to gain an understanding of the impact of trauma on interpersonal relationships as well as to determine components of psychotherapy found most helpful in the recovering process. / South Africa

This essay examines the role of intersubjectivity in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. For Fichte, the ultimate ground of philosophy is the infinite self-positing activity of the I. However, this self-positing activity must have as its product a determined I, and therefore it must establish a limit to the I’s original infinity. Further, such a limit is only thinkable as a relation to that which lies beyond it: the negation of the I, or the not-I. By this characterization of the nature of the I, Fichte establishes it as a paradoxical concept that is at once infinite and finite. To solve this paradox, he introduces the concept of a “check” (Anstoβ) that puts a halt to the outward-striving activity of the I. In experiencing this check, the I is not limited by something outside of itself, which would negate its position as the ultimate ground of its own being, but rather is given the task of positing its own limit. In Grundlage des Naturrechts, Fichte develops this idea through another concept: that of a “summons” (Aufforderung) given to the I by another subject. Since the I is characterized by containing the ground of its own being, the intersubjective relation to the other is conditioned by the I limiting itself, so that the self-grounding character of the other can be recognized. In experiencing the summons of the other, though, the I does not only posit a limit for itself, but also becomes conscious of its own nature as a free, self-positing subject. Intersubjectivity, therefore, must be considered a fundamental element of the I as such. In Fichte’s own words: “No I, no Thou; no Thou, no I.”

Abstract: Aim: There is limited understanding of therapeutic relationships in community occupational therapy from a psychodynamic perspective. I explored community occupational therapists’ lived experiences of therapeutic relationships with special attention to countertransference. Methods: Interpretive and descriptive phenomenology was used. Eight occupational therapists with experience providing occupational therapy to people in their homes completed two qualitative interviews. Epoche and reduction analysis methods were applied during the thematic analysis and phenomenological writing phases of the study. Findings: Themes related to the therapeutic relationship illuminated tensions therapists experienced between 1) the need to obtain “buy-in” from clients and insecurity regarding their expertise and the potential effectiveness of occupational therapy; 2) self-disclosure and self-protection, and 3) “planting the seed” and feeling responsible for immediate therapeutic outcomes. Therapists voiced difficulty understanding the concept of countertransference but were able to provide powerful examples. They experienced objective, subjective, positive, and negative countertransference. Themes included: 1) fear: experiencing physical vulnerability; 2) sadness: experiencing emotional vulnerability; and 3) frustration: experiencing social vulnerability, all of which impacted therapists’ conscious and unconscious behaviours. Discussion: When reflected upon, countertransference appeared to be a powerful source of information during therapeutic clinical reasoning. It informed the therapists’ use of therapeutic skills including boundary setting, self-disclosure, compassion, empathy, and containment in a diverse array of therapeutic relationships. Significance: Occupational therapy may benefit from a more transparent discussion and acceptance of the emotional dimensions of practice. Integrating a greater awareness and understanding of the intersubjective dynamics of the therapeutic relationship in practice may be beneficial for community occupational therapists.

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This thesis is concerned with the philosophical problem of the universal and the particular and its application to identity and difference, specifically in relation to cultural identity. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy mediates between the extremes of a modernist view that seeks to subsume all difference in identity and a postmodem perspective that only validates our essential differences. Neither position offers a viable option for ethical relations or action. While the conclusion reached in the present work affirms the superiority of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological view of difference and identity over either a modernist or a postmodemist perspective, initially Merleau-Ponty's notion of intersubjectivity is criticized. In the Phenomenology of Perception, MerleauPonty makes the claim that we can only ever live in one linguistic/social and cultural world. This claim does not account for the experience of immigrants, which attests to a borderland between worlds. In fact this claims seems to suggest that cultural worlds are to be viewed as hermetic localities. However, if Merleau-Ponty's earlier works are read in relation to the ontology of The Visible and the Invisible, the problems of subjectivism in his earlier works may be resolved. The notions of Flesh and Reversibility illustrate that Merleau-Ponty viewed identities as creative enterprises and by extension the intersubjective (t.e cultural and social ) world as one that is constantly re-creating boundary limits. This thesis explores the hermeneutical implications of the notions of Flesh and Reversibility in relation to cultural identity through the use of personal narrative. Identities are posited as imaginary idenitites and cultures are shown to be mutually implicated with each other. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

The lack of literature and studies concerning the role and functionality of the ellipsis, not only as a rhetorical figure but also as a narrative tool of analysis, is a fact that deserves to be addressed, questioned and repaired. Yet the question arises how to do this. In the following thesis, the resource of the narratological method is applied, which allows us to immerse ourselves in the elliptical depths of Borges's fictionality. The different types of ellipses (explicit, implicit, and hypothetical) present in the text were surgically extracted, and anachronies and focalizations were also indicated. Next, we moved on to the analysis and interpretation of the material. The results obtained after the analysis were revealing and their contributions were an emulating incentive for future research. Especially in this new and paradigmatic era of hypertexts and mutants, of ghostly identities and digital avatars, the in-depth study of the ellipsis, due to its philosophical scope and, why not, indispensable for the emergence of new theories in accordance with current reality.

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