Thesis (Ed. D.)--West Virginia University, 2008. / Title from document title page. Vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 151-160).

Administrators often refer to "intuitiveness" in teacher evaluations. What is meant by intuitiveness? What is an "intuitive" teacher? Are the principals' perceptions consistent among themselves and with thte literature? Can they identify an intuitive teacher? This study undertook to define intuition and an intuitive teacher based on the literature, then to determine whether administrators could describe and select an intuitive teacher. The measure used was the Knowledge Accessing Modes Inventory (1988). The results call in to question the use of the word "intuitive" to describe teachers. Behaviour and personal characteristics are confused with intuition as a thinking style. Therefore, "intuitiveness" should not be used in teacher evaluations. The study also challenges tests that include personality traits and observable behaviours as indicators of thinking style. / vii, 137 leaves ; 29 cm.

The intention of this research was to gather and document qualitative data regarding young children's intuitive solution strategies with regard to multiplication and division word problems. In 1994, nineteen pupils from the Junior Primary Phase (i.e. Grade 1 and Grade 2), from a Durban school participated in this study, in which the instruction was generally compatible with the principles of the Problem-Centered mathematics approach proposed by Human et al (1993) and Murray et al (1992; 1993). Its basic premise is that learning is a social as well as an individual activity. The researcher's pragmatic framework has been greatly influenced by the views of Human et al (1993) and Murray et al (1992; 1993), on Socio-Constructivism and Problem-Centered mathematics. Ten problem structures, five in multiplication and five in division which were adopted from research carried out by Mulligan (1992), were presented to the pupils to solve. The children were observed while solving the problems and probing questions were asked to obtain information about their solution strategies. From an indepth analysis of the children's solution strategies conclusions on the following issues were drawn: 1. the relationship between the semantic structure of the word problems and the children's intuitive strategies, and 2. the intuitive models used by the children to solve these problems. The following major conclusions were drawn from the evidence: 1. Of the sample, 76% were able to solve the ten problem structures using a range of strategies without having received any formal instruction on these concepts and related algorithms. 2. There were few differences in the children's performance between the multiplication and division word problems, with the exception of the Factor problem type for the Grade 2 Higher Ability pupils. 3. The semantic structure of the problems had a greater impact on the children's choice of strategies than on their performance, with the exception of the Factor problems. 4. The children used a number of intuitive models. For multiplication, three models were identified, i.e. repeated addition, array, cartesian product with and without many-to-many correspondence. For division, four models were identified, i.e. sharing one-by-one, building-up (additive), building-down (subtractive), and a model for sub-dividing wholes. / Thesis (M.Ed.) - University of Durban-Westville, 1997

This thesis is about the arguments and the methods that can sustain the epistemic support that comes from intuitions regarding hypothetical cases vis-à-vis theories of intuition. In the past twenty years, philosophical intuitions have received new attention, spurred by fashionable experimental philosophy that empirically tests philosophers’ intuition-engendering hypothetical cases with experimental methods. The results purportedly show that intuitions are unreliable, subject to demographic variation, and error-prone. In response, philosophers have presented various theories of philosophical intuition and explanations of how intuitions are situated in the justificatory apparatus of philosophical methodology. Three types of theories prevail in the literature, each a plausible option for the explanatory sustenance of intuitions’ epistemic efficacy. Selfevidence theories depend on the understanding of the intuited proposition. Intellectual seemings theories depend on the content of the intuited proposition. Judgment theories depend on our normal capacities for making judgments. Judgment theories divide further into disposition-to-believe theories and capacity theories. I argue that, beyond objections and unique epistemic burdens that each theory faces regarding the methodologies underpinning their conception and defense, no one theory of intuition can be reasonably accepted over the others. The centrality of intuitions’ use in philosophical methodology and in philosophers’ ways of thinking and reasoning, giving an argument that supports intuitions as conferrers of epistemic status, which does not itself appeal to intuitions, is a precarious endeavor. I consider various methods to avoid engaging question-begging premises and epistemic circularity. However, none are successful when the theory at hand is characteristically a priori and countenances only intuitions that confer epistemic status. In response to the ill-fated caricature of philosophical intuitions epistemic-statusconferrers, I present my own survey evidence concerning philosophers’ conception of intuition-use in philosophical method. Surprisingly, professional philosophers are more inclined to think that intuitions operate in the context of discovery more so than they are inclined to think that intuitions operate in the context of justification. The upshot of these survey results motivates my preferred account philosophical intuitions wherein philosophical intuitions are bifurcated into epistemic (justificatory intuitions) and epistemically-related (intuitions of discovery) roles. In the light of the objections I pose regarding the proper grounding of intuitions, revising the standard conception of philosophical intuitions requires two sorts of moves in the debate. First, one must offer a proviso for sources of justification that do not epistemically depend on intuitions for the ability to confer epistemic status. This allows one to justify a theory of intuition without appeal to intuition or epistemic regress. Second, one must give an explanation for and build on the recognition that intuitions are bifurcated into justificatory and discovery roles. The added clarity of filling out the nature of bifurcation allows for a more accurate characterisation of philosophical intuitions in the methods of philosophy. Furthermore, that intuitions operate in discovery roles offers an explanation for philosophical innovation and progress.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Toronto, 2006. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 44-06, page: 2513. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-126).

Thesis (Ed. D.)--West Virginia University, 2008. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 264 p. : ill. (some col.). Vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 151-160).

Thesis (M.S.W.)--Smith College School for Social Work, Northampton, Mass., 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 46-47).

In ”Gå på feeling – att ta det osäkra före det osäkra” guitar player Simon Löfstedt investigates intuitive musical composition with the guitar in focus. Löfstedt describes his previous compositions as detailed and complex. In this project het akes a step away from this, letting himself being ruled by intuition when composing music. He achieves this by using simple, short fragments of music, playing these with a selected group of musicians. A thorough description of the process describes choosing musicians, rehearsals and listening to recordings of these rehearsals. Here Simon outlines the fragments growth from embryos to full compositions during/post rehearsals and how the other musicians affect the final outcome. He also describes setbacks during the process in form of doubt and inner conflict. Simon describes himself being determined in finding a way of mixing different types of guitar techniques and genres while still maintaining a focused artistic approach. He also describes his musical background, which mainly derives from rock’n’roll, and how this has a major influence on the final outcome. Löfstedt’s focus on guitar sound is constantly present and he presents a thorough description of guitars, effects and amplifiers. Here he explains the choices that he makes when putting together his final setup, which is customized for the final musical result. In the final reflection Löfstedt describes his musical journey from past to present and the conclusions that he has made finishing this project. / <p>Repertoar:</p><p>Someday - Simon Löfstedt</p><p>Euphoria State - Simon Löfstedt</p><p>Lightspeed - Simon Löfstedt</p><p>Bells - Simon Löfstedt</p><p>Gold - Simon Löfstedt</p><p>Swan Song - Simon Löfstedt</p><p>Valley - Simon Löfstedt</p><p>Medverkande:</p><p>Ludwig Gustavsson - trumset</p><p>Gabriel Dahl - elbas</p><p>Simon Löfstedt - elgitarr</p>

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-22T13:28:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-luanda-gomes-dos-santos-juliao.pdf: 1648356 bytes, checksum: 81c1a3de56e0243dfd03b3f8a24d956c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-22T13:29:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-luanda-gomes-dos-santos-juliao.pdf: 1648356 bytes, checksum: 81c1a3de56e0243dfd03b3f8a24d956c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-22T13:29:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-luanda-gomes-dos-santos-juliao.pdf: 1648356 bytes, checksum: 81c1a3de56e0243dfd03b3f8a24d956c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-10-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Cette recherche a l’intention de reconnaître la singularité et l’importance, en plus des hésitations et des controverses, que l’activité artistique se situe dans la philosophie de Bergson. En parcourant ses oeuvres, nous avons verifié que ses allusions à l’activité artistique nous montrent que par rapport à ses différences, l’art et la philosophie s’approchent (chacune à sa manière) en dépassant les conventions necessaires et quotidiennes de la vie, en reformulant la manière comme nous apprenons l’ordre des choses et à nous mêmes. Les allusions artistiques formulées par Bergson, nous font penser que, se il n’existe pas, par lui, la nécessité categorique d’une théorisation sur l’arte, c’est possible de regarder une décription de l’activité artistique que se construit simultanément avec la decription de la durée et 5 5 du méthode philosofique. Ça se passe grace à l’art, que selon l’auteur, elle nous insère aussi dans une expérience de connaissance. / Este estudo procura reconhecer a singularidade e a importância, para além das hesitações e das controvérsias existentes, que a atividade artística ocupa na filosofia do Bergson. Ao percorrermos as obras do filósofo, constatamos que suas alusões à atividade artística nos mostram, que a despeito de suas diferenças, arte e filosofia se aproximam na medida de que ambas, cada uma a sua maneira, se propõem de algum modo a ultrapassar as convenções necessárias e cotidianas da vida, reconfigurando o modo pelo qual apreendemos a ordem das coisas e a nós mesmos. As alusões artísticas apresentadas por Bergson nos induzem a conjeturar que, se não há, para esse filósofo, necessidade categórica de uma teorização sobre a arte, é possível vislumbrar uma descrição da atividade artística que se erige em concomitância com a descrição da duração e do método filosófico. Isso porque a arte, como sustenta o autor, nos insere também numa experiência de conhecimento.