Submitted by Cristiane Shirayama (cristiane.shirayama@fgv.br) on 2011-08-20T18:18:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERT_ANGELA RITA FRANCO DONAGGIO.pdf: 1000950 bytes, checksum: f69778021e74ed12cdb3b807fd561313 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-08-22T12:12:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERT_ANGELA RITA FRANCO DONAGGIO.pdf: 1000950 bytes, checksum: f69778021e74ed12cdb3b807fd561313 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-08-22T12:23:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERT_ANGELA RITA FRANCO DONAGGIO.pdf: 1000950 bytes, checksum: f69778021e74ed12cdb3b807fd561313 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-26 / This dissertation investigates the effectiveness of the corporate governance practices contained in the Regulations of the Novo Mercado (RNM), a premium listing segment introduced by BM&FBOVESPA in 2000 in order to segregate companies who committed themselves with higher corporate governance standards. In theory, RNM would assure effective protection to investors of companies listed in this segment. However, some cases taking place throughout the 2000’s decade involving companies belonging to Novo Mercado (NM) casted doubt on the effective respect of their shareholders’ rights. Among these cases, two stand out: Cosan in 2007 and Tenda in 2008. Specifically, this research provides an in-depth and qualitative analysis of both cases in order to assess whether RNM and the institutions responsible for their enforcement have successfully protected investors. Methodologically, we employ the 'corporate crisis' and 'institutional autopsy' approach developed by MILHAUPT and PISTOR (2008). W e observe that NM is a product of a legal transplant and that the adoption of rules by the NM was not enough to assure effective protection to investors. We also conclude, as the main result, that the corporate transactions carried out by the controlling shareholders of Cosan and Tenda counteracted the RNM (and the corporate governance principles that have guided its creation) as well as could have transgressed items of the Brazilian regulation. As a result, we observe the lack of adequate supervision by BM7FBOVESPA on the compliance with the rules, as well as CVM’s insufficient attitude when potential infractions to Brazilian regulations took place. On the other hand, such transplant has been at least indirectly responsible for the improvement of the Brazilian legal framework with the subsequent incorporation of new instruments of investors’ protection. This research can be used as a basis for reforms in both the regulation and self-regulation aimed at increasing the firms’ surveillance and the enforcement of the current rules. These reforms could increase the credibility of the securities markets which could, in turn, stimulate the development of the Brazilian capital markets. This is a fundamental debate, since the credibility of the stock market’s premium listing segment depends on the effective investor’s protection, the real reason behind the creation of the Novo Mercado. / Esta dissertação investiga a efetividade das práticas de governança corporativa contidas no Regulamento do Novo Mercado (RNM), segmento especial de listagem da BM&FBOVESPA criado em 2000. Em tese, tais práticas deveriam assegurar a proteção efetiva dos direitos dos investidores de companhias desse segmento. Contudo, alguns casos ocorridos ao longo da primeira década do Novo Mercado lançaram dúvida sobre o respeito aos direitos dos acionistas de suas companhias. Entre eles, dois casos se destacam: Cosan, em 2007, e Tenda, em 2008. Especificamente, a presente pesquisa analisa qualitativamente e em profundidade ambos os casos a fim de verificar se as regras do RNM e as instituições responsáveis por sua aplicabilidade foram suficientes para proteger os investidores. Metodologicamente, utilizou-se a abordagem de estudo de caso de 'crise corporativa' e 'autopsia institucional' baseada em MILHAUPT e PISTOR (2008). Observou-se que o Novo Mercado foi resultado de um transplante jurídico e que a mera adoção de regras do segmento não foi suficiente para garantir a proteção efetiva aos investidores. Como resultado principal, concluiu-se que as operações societárias lideradas pelos controladores das companhias não só contrariaram regras do segmento (e princípios de governança que nortearam sua criação) como também podem ter infringido a regulação. Com isso, evidencia-se a falta de fiscalização do cumprimento das regras e de punição por parte da BM&FBOVESPA, bem como uma atitude insuficiente da CVM quando de potenciais infrações a dispositivos do ambiente regulatório brasileiro. Por outro lado, o Novo Mercado foi, no mínimo, indiretamente responsável pelo aprimoramento do arcabouço regulatório brasileiro na incorporação de novos instrumentos de proteção aos investidores. Os resultados deste trabalho podem auxiliar na elaboração de reformas na regulação e autorregulação a fim de facilitar a executoriedade das normas já existentes, a qual pode proporcionar maior credibilidade ao mercado de valores mobiliários e fomentar, em última instância, o desenvolvimento do mercado de capitais brasileiro. Trata-se de discussão fundamental, haja vista que a credibilidade do segmento mais exigente quanto às práticas de governança da Bolsa depende da proteção efetiva aos investidores, razão de criação do Novo Mercado.

Les imperfections des marchés financiers et l'incomplétude des contrats financiers compliquent la conclusion d'ententes entre les firmes et les parties prenantes. Plusieurs solutions sont proposées pour réduire ces problèmes et faciliter la conclusion des contrats financiers. Les contrats étant enveloppés par un cadre institutionnel, ils en sont imprégnés et affectés. Les institutions sont donc une des solutions aux imperfections des marchés et à l'incomplétude des contrats. Les résultats de notre étude le prouvent clairement. Cette étude montre que le niveau de développement et la structure du système financier (en particulier la part relative des financements bancaires et de marché), les conditions de régulation du système bancaire (les formes et l’étendue de la supervision) et certaines caractéristiques des systèmes juridiques (la protection des créditeurs), ont un effet significatif sur les contraintes d'investissement. Il apparaît que la bonne qualité des institutions facilite l'accès aux financements et qu'elle renforce les garanties exigées pour l'octroi de la dette. De fait, la piètre qualité des institutions d’un pays constitue une entrave à l'accès au financement par le secteur privé. / The imperfections of financial markets and the incompleteness of financial contracts cause commitments between firms and stakeholders to become more complex. Several solutions are suggested in order to reduce such problems and to facilitate the conclusion of financial contracts. Contracts evolve within an institutional structure, an environment by which they are conditioned. Institutions are one of many solutions to market imperfections and to contract incompleteness. Results bring out relevant effects of the financial system’s development and structure (particularly the amount of banking over market financing), banking regulation (the supervisory methods and their extent) and some characteristics of the legal systems (such as creditor protection) on investment constraints. It appears that sound and healthy institutions facilitate access to funding and strengthen the collateral required to secure bank financing. Consequently, poor quality of a country’s institutions hinders access to financing by the private sector.