Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brown University, 2005. / Vita. Thesis advisor: Summer B. Twiss. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 184-203). Also available online.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The problem of this dissertation is to examine William James's concept of the self and to evaluate his view in the light of selected contemporary theories of the self. Because James was the first great American psychologist to show sustained interest in the self, this paper examines his view of the self for possible relationships and similarities to current theories, specifically those of Gordon Allport, Carl Rogers, and the organismic and the phenomenological theories of the self. The method employed by the dissertation has involved analysis and comparison of the various theories and an evaluation of differences. The dissertation first offers an expository analysis of James's concept of the self, followed by similar expositions of theories by Allport and Rogers and those of the organismic and phenomenological schools. For James, the subject-object self is a phenomenal experience of the organism. The unifying stream of thought, each new thought inheriting all that the preceding thought possessed, constitutes the consistent identity of the self, eliminating the need for any other explanation of the coherence and continuity of the self. The self is capable of growth and change and has constituent aspects of a material, social and spiritual nature which generate feelings and actions. The constituent facets of the self are hierarchically arranged, creating an inner harmony which is purposive in character. For Allport, the term self is applied to the gradually evolving central aspects of one's existence, the bodily sense, continuing self-identity, self-esteem, self-extension, the self-image, the self as rational coper, and the self as goal-seeker. Having unity and continuing identity, the self is an object of knowledge. It is also a knowing self and, though this aspect remains undefined, is definitely not an homunculus. For Rogers, the self is gradually differentiated from the organism's total experience and is a unique value structure resulting from interpersonal relationships. This value system and the drive toward self-preservation, maintenance, and enhancement provide for consistency and unity in the self. The sovereign drive makes growth and change possible. The self is thus a process as well as a system. Organismic theory emphasizes the unity, integrity, coherence, and consistency of the self-actualizing organism. Inherent potentiality is stressed rather than environmental effects and pressures. The object of concern is the whole person rather than part functions. Phenomenological theory sees the self as a developmental social product, capable of change and centered around its fundamental need: the sense of adequacy. The self is both object (self-experiences) and process (an aspect of the phenomenal field which determines all behavior). In comparison with Allport and Rogers, James says little about the origin and development of the self, presents no coherent, unified, motivational theory, gives little insight into the way change occurs in the self and, though in agreement with Allport and Rogers regarding the self as object, he reduces the self as knower to passing thoughts phenomenally perceived as intra-cephalic movements and sensations. The successive states of consciousness also account, functionally, for the unity and identity of the self. Because of its unsystematic nature, internal inconsistency and omissions, James's theory was seen to be lacking in explicitness and structural detail. On the basis of the analysis and comparison, certain conclusions seem warranted: (1) In its broadest terms and particularly in the spirit of its approach, James's theory was judged viable; (2) Its chief values, theoretically and practically, are its broad perspective, its tentativeness, and its emphasis on phenomenological method rather than its specific content; (3) Though viable in its perspective and spirit, James's theory was considered to be lacking in clarity and focus to the point of ambiguity. / 2031-01-01

Realizamos um estudo comparativo entre os conceitos de eu tal como formulados pelos psicólogos William James (1842-1910) e B. F. Skinner (1904-1990). No caso de James, a fonte foi o capítulo A consciência do eu de sua obra Os princípios de psicologia, a partir do qual relatamos os constituintes do eu empírico, a reflexão do autor sobre o ego puro e a descrição dos sentimentos, emoções e ações do eu. No caso de Skinner, as fontes foram a seção O indivíduo como um todo da obra Ciência e comportamento humano e o capítulo Pensamento da obra Comportamento verbal, além de alguns outros artigos; discutimos os conceitos de autocontrole e de pensamento conforme o behaviorismo radical, para em seguida definir o eu como um sistema organizado de respostas. Então traduzimos o conceito de eu de James em referências a contingências de reforço: o eu material em termos de filogênese e ontogênese, o eu social em termos de controle de estímulo, o eu espiritual como repertório modelado pela comunidade verbal e o ego puro no contexto dos três níveis de seleção do comportamento humano. Discutimos possíveis influências de James sobre Skinner a partir de relações entre suas teorias psicológicas: a conceituação de eus múltiplos, a rejeição da consciência como substância, a afinidade do empirismo radical com o behaviorismo radical e a ideia de evolução da cultura. Refletimos sobre a atitude de James e Skinner quanto a relacionar dados empíricos a princípios gerais, sobre ambos classificarem a psicologia no conjunto das ciências naturais e sobre as razões de uma suposta morte da psicologia jamesiana e do behaviorismo radical. Finalmente, sugerimos questões para pesquisas posteriores. / This is a comparative study of the concepts of self as formulated by the psychologists William James (1842-1910) and B. F. Skinner (1904-1990). The source for James concept was the chapter The consciousness of self of his book The principles of psychology, from which I described the constituents of the empirical self, the authors reflection on the pure ego, and the feelings, emotions and actions of the self. In Skinners case, the sources were the section The individual as a whole of the book Science and human behavior, the chapter Thinking of the book Verbal behavior, and a few other articles; I discussed the concepts of self-control and thinking according to radical behaviorism in order to define the self as an organized system of responses. Then I translated James concept of self into references to contingencies of reinforcement: the material self in terms of phylogenesis and ontogenesis, the social self in terms of stimulus control, the spiritual self in terms of a repertoire shaped by the verbal community, and the pure ego in terms of the three levels of selection of human behavior. I proposed possible influences of James on Skinner, based on relations between their psychological theories: the conception of multiple selves, the rejection of the conscience as a substance, the affinity of radical empiricism and radical behaviorism, and the idea of evolution of culture. I reflected on the attitude of James and Skinner towards relating empirical data to general principles, on their classification of psychology among the natural sciences, and on the reasons for a supposed death of Jamesian psychology and radical behaviorism. Finally, I suggested some questions to further investigations.

Realizamos um estudo comparativo entre os conceitos de eu tal como formulados pelos psicólogos William James (1842-1910) e B. F. Skinner (1904-1990). No caso de James, a fonte foi o capítulo A consciência do eu de sua obra Os princípios de psicologia, a partir do qual relatamos os constituintes do eu empírico, a reflexão do autor sobre o ego puro e a descrição dos sentimentos, emoções e ações do eu. No caso de Skinner, as fontes foram a seção O indivíduo como um todo da obra Ciência e comportamento humano e o capítulo Pensamento da obra Comportamento verbal, além de alguns outros artigos; discutimos os conceitos de autocontrole e de pensamento conforme o behaviorismo radical, para em seguida definir o eu como um sistema organizado de respostas. Então traduzimos o conceito de eu de James em referências a contingências de reforço: o eu material em termos de filogênese e ontogênese, o eu social em termos de controle de estímulo, o eu espiritual como repertório modelado pela comunidade verbal e o ego puro no contexto dos três níveis de seleção do comportamento humano. Discutimos possíveis influências de James sobre Skinner a partir de relações entre suas teorias psicológicas: a conceituação de eus múltiplos, a rejeição da consciência como substância, a afinidade do empirismo radical com o behaviorismo radical e a ideia de evolução da cultura. Refletimos sobre a atitude de James e Skinner quanto a relacionar dados empíricos a princípios gerais, sobre ambos classificarem a psicologia no conjunto das ciências naturais e sobre as razões de uma suposta morte da psicologia jamesiana e do behaviorismo radical. Finalmente, sugerimos questões para pesquisas posteriores. / This is a comparative study of the concepts of self as formulated by the psychologists William James (1842-1910) and B. F. Skinner (1904-1990). The source for James concept was the chapter The consciousness of self of his book The principles of psychology, from which I described the constituents of the empirical self, the authors reflection on the pure ego, and the feelings, emotions and actions of the self. In Skinners case, the sources were the section The individual as a whole of the book Science and human behavior, the chapter Thinking of the book Verbal behavior, and a few other articles; I discussed the concepts of self-control and thinking according to radical behaviorism in order to define the self as an organized system of responses. Then I translated James concept of self into references to contingencies of reinforcement: the material self in terms of phylogenesis and ontogenesis, the social self in terms of stimulus control, the spiritual self in terms of a repertoire shaped by the verbal community, and the pure ego in terms of the three levels of selection of human behavior. I proposed possible influences of James on Skinner, based on relations between their psychological theories: the conception of multiple selves, the rejection of the conscience as a substance, the affinity of radical empiricism and radical behaviorism, and the idea of evolution of culture. I reflected on the attitude of James and Skinner towards relating empirical data to general principles, on their classification of psychology among the natural sciences, and on the reasons for a supposed death of Jamesian psychology and radical behaviorism. Finally, I suggested some questions to further investigations.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 1995. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [276]-292).

Dissertação (mestrado) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Curitiba, 2010 / Bibliografia: f. 203-208 / Esta pesquisa disserta sobre o empirismo radical de William James e suas teses acerca dos estados excepcionais da consciência. Entenda-se por excepcionais, os estados mentais de exceção à regra da consciência em vigília como a histeria, os transes hipnóti / This research examines William James' radical empiricism as well as his theses concerning the exceptional states of consciousness. By the term exceptional, we refer to mental states of exception to the rule of the waking consciousness, such as hysteria, h

Most contemporary commentaries on the ethical thought of William James and John Dewey attempt to fit them into the framework of contemporary ethics. On such readings, many of James and Dewey’s most distinctive ethical concerns fade away so that they seem interested, above all, in meta-ethical questions about the nature of moral judgment and in normative questions about moral deliberation. Foregrounding the influence of Ralph Waldo Emerson on both these thinkers, this dissertation attempts to provide fresh interpretations of the ethical thought of James and Dewey. The locus of James’ most important ethical thought, I argue, comes in his religious writings, where he attempts to find ethical resources in religious belief that help us respond to the problems of suffering and uncertainty: the problem of how to acknowledge the suffering of others, and the problem of how to act with ethical conviction in the absence of social approval for one’s actions. Dewey’s most important work in ethics, I argue, is located in his rich and sophisticated theory of habit, where he reworks the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics to emphasize the contingency of our habitual systems and the importance of the ideal of growth.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3770.pdf: 1009428 bytes, checksum: de9ff4bc5f81f492e463b7906029b75f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-09-10 / This work analyzes the psychological texts of William James (1842-1910), specially his Principles of Psychology, published in 1890. We begin following an alternative itinerary of reading proposed by James in the preface of the book, which also allows us to understand how the New Psychology has influenced the construction of psychological field in 19th century. We present this in our first chapter trying to show what we call a theory of action. In the second chapter, the previous conclusions are articulated with James exposition of the thought as a stream and with his considerations of the Self. In the third, we investigate the relations between his psychology of cognition and his posterior epistemology. Finally, we postulate that The Principles must be understood as a psychology of action, which has its basis in a philosophy of action incorporated, consciously or not, by James. We emphasize onward the research the tension created between the dualistic point of view assumed by James and the conclusions suggested by a closer reading. / Esta tese investiga a porção da obra de William James (1842-1910) dedicada à Psicologia, tendo como sua fonte principal o livro The Principles of Psychology, publicado em 1890. Seu ponto de partida é um roteiro alternativo de leitura proposto pelo próprio James no prefácio do livro e que serve para acompanhar a forma pela qual os avanços da Nova Psicologia influenciaram na construção da disciplina no século XIX. Este é o tema de nosso capítulo inicial e que nos ofereceu as diretrizes do que denominamos de uma teoria da ação. No segundo capítulo, procuramos articular essas indicações com a exposição do pensamento como um fluxo e também com as considerações sobre o self. No terceiro, abordamos as relações entre aquilo que o autor trata como uma psicologia da cognição e seus desdobramentos para uma teoria do conhecimento. Finalmente, utilizamos as conclusões obtidas nesse percurso para defender a tese de que o Principles, ou a psicologia jamesiana, deve ser compreendido como uma psicologia da ação, que tem sua base em uma filosofia da ação incorporada, implícita ou explicitamente, pelo autor. Percorre toda nossa pesquisa a tensão criada entre os pressupostos dualistas assumidos inicialmente por James e as conclusões sugeridas por uma análise mais minuciosa do texto.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Eliane Azevedo da Silva.pdf: 1061236 bytes, checksum: 456553305c0afb5dd63f3126d76f955c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-09-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work studies the self constitution development in first childhood according to James W. Fowler. It s a psychological study about the religious and relationship dimension of child self. The theoretical bases are the Fowler s stages of faith and the constitution of self according Daniel N. Stern. The bibliographic research methodology maintains a dialogical connection with contemporary authors and a critical reflection about the faith development theory. It s clear the necessity to continue the theoretical and empirical studies about this theme in every stage of life. The perspective due to this work can cooperate to a practical action in educational and religious institutions / Este trabalho estuda o desenvolvimento da fé e da constituição do self na primeira infância a partir de James W. Fowler. É um estudo psicológico da dimensão religiosa e relacional do self da criança. As suas bases teóricas são os estágios da fé de Fowler e a constituição do self segundo Daniel N. Stern. A metodologia da pesquisa bibliográfica estabeleceu uma conexão dialógica com autores contemporâneos e uma reflexão crítica sobre a Teoria do desenvolvimento da Fé. Evidenciou-se a necessidade de prosseguir nos estudos teóricos e empíricos sobre este tema em todos os ciclos da vida. A perspectiva decorrente do conjunto deste trabalho pode contribuir para a atuação prática em instituições educacionais e religiosas