Spelling suggestions: "subject:"john -- 192112002"" "subject:"john -- 1921r2002""
31 |
Bases de la igualdad democrática: una revisión de la "igualdad de oportunidades" en el pensamiento de John RawlsOrellana Ramos, Edison Patricio January 2012 (has links)
Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales) / Este trabajo se divide en tres capítulos. En el primero de ellos se realiza una
presentación general, introductoria aunque no elemental, de la teoría de la justicia de
Rawls en su última versión, describiendo su marco general, dilucidando sus conceptos y
elementos básicos claves (incluyendo a los principios de justicia). Asimismo, se esbozan
las relaciones que existen entre los diferentes elementos de la justicia como equidad con
el objeto de ofrecer una visión más sistemática e integrada, evitando así presentar la teoría
de la justicia de Rawls como un conjunto de conceptos y partes aisladas entre sí.
En el segundo capítulo se aborda y analiza la idea de igualdad en la teoría de la
justicia de John Rawls y las maneras en que dicha noción se encuentra en varias partes de su teoría, atendido que la justa igualdad de oportunidades es una manifestación de tal
idea. Considerando el objeto de este trabajo, se revisará especialmente cómo la idea de
igualdad se manifiesta especialmente en la concepción normativa y política de la persona
y en todos los principios de justicia que Rawls propone (“igualdad de la libertad”, “justa
igualdad de oportunidades” y “principio de la diferencia”), las relaciones existentes entre
ellos y la forma en que operan conjuntamente, especificando así los términos equitativos
de la cooperación social, y en consecuencia sentando las bases de la “igualdad
democrática”.
Finalmente, en el capítulo III se analiza en extenso el principio de la “justa
igualdad de oportunidades”: sus distintas formulaciones, sus interpretaciones, su ámbito
de aplicación y, por último, sus implicaciones prácticas a nivel institucional. Se elabora,
además y como ya se anticipó, una justificación que prima facie es independiente y
distinta a la del argumento desde la posición originaria. En especial, se consideran las
medidas o reformas políticas, jurídicas y económicas que son compatibles con dichos
planteamientos, y el impacto que podrían tener en la sociedad chilena.
|
32 |
Rawls, the severely cognitively disabled and the person life viewSeale, Wade January 2015 (has links)
Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / A political arrangement is an arrangement for persons. Political arrangements are
assessed in terms of the extent to which they manage the affairs of persons, which
includes protecting their interests and entitlements. Political arrangements which are
unable to protect the interests of its citizens, or a group of citizens, are deemed
unacceptable, and where appropriate, alternative arrangements which do protect the interests and entitlements of its citizens are sought. In this thesis I argue that the political arrangement of John Rawls is unable to protect the interests and entitlements of the severely cognitively disabled who are regarded as full citizens by advanced political arrangements in the world today. I argue that it is the contract nature and conception of the person in Rawls’s system which excludes the severely cognitively disabled. This exclusion goes against our widely-held intuitions about the rights and entitlements of the severely cognitively disabled. I look to the Person Life View of Marya Schechtman, a conception of the person that includes the severely cognitively disabled, to see if a conception of the person that includes the severely cognitively disabled is able to solve the gap in Rawls’s system. I
argue that it is not able to do so. I then propose a new way of approaching questions of personhood and appeal to the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the basis, arguing that membership of a type of organism typically considered a person is enough to be a complete member of that type and therefore a person.
|
33 |
Achieving a realistic utopia: Rawls, realization, and the task of political philosophyTerlazzo, Rosa Elizabeth January 2010 (has links)
In this thesis I argue that the tradition of political philosophy which follows in John Rawls's footsteps is obligated to concern itself not only with the realizability, but also with the realization, of justice. Although Rawls himself expresses a commitment only to the former of these, I argue that the roles which he assigns to political philosophy require him to take on the further commitment to realization. This is because these roles are meant to influence not only political philosophers, but the citizens of the wider community as well. The realistically utopian role, which I take to be the central one, requires political philosophy to inspire in that population a hope which I argue that realizability alone cannot provide. Given the deep revisions regarding the political nature of justice as fairness which Rawls made on the basis of realizability concerns, I argue that his theory must in this case be committed to a similar revision. The hope which political philosophy is meant to provide is simply not realizable until the discipline concerns itself centrally with the task of realization.
|
34 |
Constructing a moral education theory of punishmentArtenosi, Daniel January 2003 (has links)
No description available.
|
35 |
Une critique normative de l'éducation scolaire québécoise au regard de la théorie politique de John RawlsLangis, Georges 11 April 2018 (has links)
Cette étude est une critique normative de l'éducation scolaire québécoise selon une conception de la justice sociale, celle de la théorie de la justice de J. Rawls. L'analyse emprunte la porte d'entrée de la légitimité morale de ses pratiques. Un important rappel historique, traduit dans une perspective politique, puis interprété dans les termes de la philosophie politique, compose son volet empirique et révèle notre objet d'analyse, une "philosophie publique" de l'éducation québécoise. L'analyse normative de cette dernière, prise pour représentation conceptuelle de l'éducation québécoise, scolaire et publique, et conduite en rapport avec la conception libérale égalitaire de Rawls, révèle une conception utilitariste dominante politiquement et inadéquate au regard du caractère moral des personnes. Une conception non seulement inadéquate mais injuste selon Rawls, vu la primauté kantienne des personnes qu'il défend.
|
36 |
Aux fondements de l'éthique : le rôle du contexte au sein du constructivisme rawlsienVaillancourt, François. 16 April 2018 (has links)
Dans ce mémoire, l'approche métaéthique de John Rawls est défendue comme constituant une tentative novatrice et crédible unifiant le constructivisme, le contextualisme et le cohérentisme. Ainsi, on y retrouve une armature constructiviste définissant les principes moraux comme découlant du point de vue pratique des agents, mais qui se distingue de la tentative kantienne en définissant le contenu de ce point de vue de manière contextuelle, en introduisant des notions comme celle de la culture publique commune en remplacement de la raison transcendantale. De plus, par l'équilibre réfléchi, Rawls propose une méthode cohérentiste permettant de mener les débats normatifs complexes auxquelles nous sommes confrontés dans le cadre démocratique, moderne et pluriel qui est le nôtre. Ce faisant, Rawls ouvre la voie à une utilisation plus sereine de la philosophie normative.
|
37 |
Democracy Without Secularism: A Pragmatist Critique of HabermasMullin, Daniel Michael 12 1900 (has links)
Jürgen Habermas has argued that democracy depends on all citizens recognizing the legitimacy of the law. Therefore, political argument must appeal only to public reason which is secular. Religious citizens must translate their reasons into a secular language accessible to the public. This dissertation argues that religious arguments are justified in public discourse if they refrain from dogmatism. Moreover, there is nothing inherent in secular reasons that make them publicly accessible or likely to generate consensus among members of a pluralistic society. If we treat religious arguments as simply arguments with controversial premises, it becomes less clear why religious arguments are singled out as particularly problematic for liberal democracies, since many secular political arguments share this feature. Granted, religious reasons are unlikely to secure consensus, but this does not count against them if consensus is not the goal of democratic discourse. This dissertation makes the case that Habermas, and other liberal theorists such as Rawls, have placed too much emphasis on consensus as the goal of democracy. Moreover, what they refer to is not practical consensus achieved pragmatically through compromise, but an idealized consensus that is the achievement of secular reason. This is problematic for two main reasons: there is no normative reason to think we ought to attain such consensus and such consensus is unlikely to be achieved in practice. Thus, there seems to be no normative force to the claim that religious citizens out to translate their arguments in secular language.
|
38 |
Justicia distributiva y pobreza global: alcances y límites de la teoría de John RawlsIbáñez Blancas, Franklin Ernesto 21 November 2012 (has links)
Una de las tareas políticas más importantes de inicios del siglo XXI es la implantación
de un orden de justicia mundial que dé respuesta a “los grandes males de la historia
humana –guerra injusta y opresión, persecución religiosa y denegación de la libertad de
conciencia, hambre y pobreza, genocidio y asesinato en masa–”.1
La filosofía,
frecuentemente tildada de estéril, puede ayudar en su solución. Por ello, quiero
centrarme filosóficamente en uno de esos males: la pobreza. La globalización de la
economía no ha generado mejores condiciones de vida para los países que intercambian
sus productos “imparcialmente” según el mercado, sino que ha incrementado las
desigualdades entre ellos y su relación de dependencia. / Tesis
|
39 |
Considerações sobre a teoria da justiça de John RawesVieira, Paulo Romério Lima 28 March 2006 (has links)
Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
PauloVieira.pdf: 1378807 bytes, checksum: ba7cc0eb2a06eb488175cd8c4db2784d (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2006-03-28 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / O presente trabalho tem como diretriz mestra esclarecer e analisar o pensamento
político e filosófico de John Rawls, especificamente sua Teoria da Justiça , no contexto
político moderno.
Na persecução deste objetivo são apresentados os principais problemas da justiça
nas democracias modernas, e explica-se por que a posição original sob o véu de ignorância
é necessária como forma embrionária para o nascimento de uma justiça imparcial e
eqüitativa, a partir do qual serão desenvolvidas as demais idéias do autor.
Em seguida são analisadas as idéias que iluminam a compreensão do autor, e
aquelas que comprovam a eficácia da teoria no contexto real da sociedade e da psicologia
humana, ou seja, busca-se apresentar as idéias de acordo com o método aristotélico,
apontando os problemas e apresentando soluções com a aplicação da Teoria da Justiça
|
40 |
O princípio da diferença e o Kantismo na teoria da justiça de John RawlsMichel, Voltaire de Freitas January 2007 (has links)
A tese trata do princípio da diferença na teoria da justiça de John Rawls, confrontando-o com a alegada raiz kantiana desta teoria, e sustentando que ambos – o princípio da diferença e a interpretação kantiana de Rawls – seriam incompatíveis, em razão do caráter conseqüencialista do princípio. Como resultado, nos escritos tardios de Rawls, o princípio da diferença passa a ocupar um espaço secundário na teoria da justiça, assim como a própria interpretação kantiana. / The thesis deals with the principle of difference in John Rawls’s theory of justice, facing it with the Kantian interpretation, and holds that both – the principle of difference and Rawls’s Kantian interpretation – are incompatible, due to the consequentialist character of the principle of difference. As a result, in Rawls’ later writings, the principle of difference abandoned, as well as the Kantian interpretation.
|
Page generated in 0.0644 seconds