Trots lagar, nationella som internationella, återkommer diskussionen om etik vid militära interventioner. Uppsatsen handlar om huruvida NATO:s intervention i Kosovo levde upp till etiska lagar kring militära interventioner samt om normativa teorier fortfarande är relevanta och lämnas utrymme idag.Syftet med uppsatsen är att se om det fortfarande finns utrymme idag för normativa teorier, såsom den etiska teorin just war theory, och om dessa är rimliga att använda. Uppsatsen använder fallstudien Kosovo som exempel och analyserar samtidigt hur denna intervention lever upp till de nio punkterna i teorin.Kvalitativ textanalys samt fallstudie av Kosovo har använts som metoder och just war theory har använts som teori.Resultatet visar att sju av nio punkter helt eller till stor del levdes upp till under NATO:s intervention i Kosovo, och att de resterande två till viss del levdes upp till. Undersökningen påvisar också att normativa teorier lämnas utrymme idag, och att teorin fortfarande kan vara relevant, om än med lite modifikation.

On January 3, 2020, Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani was killed through a targeted drone strike at the authorisation of the US President Donald Trump. This thesis examines if, and in that case how, the arguments presented by the Trump administration used to justify the killing of general Soleimani are in line with the principles of Just War theory. By conducting a case study, through a qualitative content analysis, analysing four official statements made by the Trump administration during a two months period after the killing, this thesis will examine the moral discourses in the arguments presented. Drawing on insights from studies regarding the justification of War on Terror, preemptive war, and targeted killings according to the Just War theory, lays the foundation for a deeper reasoning of the legality of the argumentation based on the principles of Just War. This thesis will show that in some aspects, the arguments presented by the Trump administration can be interpreted to be in accordance with one of the principles, but none of the statements satisfy the criteria in all of the principles. Therefore, the overall conclusion of this analysis is that the Trump administration has the intention of justifying the attack, but the arguments used are not rooted in Just War theory. Further, this thesis will also show an inconsistency over time in the arguments presented. The contribution from this study lays in the analysis of the arguments on the basis of the principles of Just War theory, not from the perspective of international law. The intention from this thesis is not to analyse if the attack itself can be seen as just according to Just War theory but looking at the argumentation presented by the Trump administration.

<p>I Estland 2007 utbröt vad som kommit att kallas ”Cyberwar I”, vari ett stort antal centrala myndigheters, tillika finansiella institutioners servrar attackerades av massiva så kallade Computer Network Attacks (CNA), utfört av framförallt ryska aktörer. Estland protesterade högljutt, men frågan huruvida CNA är att beteckna som olovligt är allt annat än klar. Prövningen sker mot den folkrättsliga regimen <em>Jus ad Bellum, </em>och huruvida metoden uppfyller vissa centrala begrepp. Men hur skall denna regim<em> </em>appliceras CNA?</p><p>De frågeställningar som avses besvaras är: hur kan CNA utgöra <em>våld </em>eller <em>hot om våld</em> i enlighet med FN-stadgans artikel 2(4) samt hur kan CNA utgöra <em>väpnat angrepp</em> i enlighet med FN-stadgans artikel 51? Detta avses göras genom en studie inbegripande flertalet folkrättsliga experters teorier på området CNA och våldsanvändning, samt applicering av desamma på en fallstudie av händelserna i Estland 2007.</p><p>Sammanfattningsvis konstateras att flertalet variabler har bärighet i hur CNA kan uppfylla artiklarnas centrala begrepp, vari frågan om <em>association, effekt, aktör </em>och <em>mål</em> tydligast faller ut. I en efterföljande diskussion påvisas dock hur variablerna endast är att betrakta som indicier på hur CNA kan klassas så som olovligt, varvid endast statspraxis kan ge den slutgiltiga bedömningen.</p>

I Estland 2007 utbröt vad som kommit att kallas ”Cyberwar I”, vari ett stort antal centrala myndigheters, tillika finansiella institutioners servrar attackerades av massiva så kallade Computer Network Attacks (CNA), utfört av framförallt ryska aktörer. Estland protesterade högljutt, men frågan huruvida CNA är att beteckna som olovligt är allt annat än klar. Prövningen sker mot den folkrättsliga regimen Jus ad Bellum, och huruvida metoden uppfyller vissa centrala begrepp. Men hur skall denna regim appliceras CNA? De frågeställningar som avses besvaras är: hur kan CNA utgöra våld eller hot om våld i enlighet med FN-stadgans artikel 2(4) samt hur kan CNA utgöra väpnat angrepp i enlighet med FN-stadgans artikel 51? Detta avses göras genom en studie inbegripande flertalet folkrättsliga experters teorier på området CNA och våldsanvändning, samt applicering av desamma på en fallstudie av händelserna i Estland 2007. Sammanfattningsvis konstateras att flertalet variabler har bärighet i hur CNA kan uppfylla artiklarnas centrala begrepp, vari frågan om association, effekt, aktör och mål tydligast faller ut. I en efterföljande diskussion påvisas dock hur variablerna endast är att betrakta som indicier på hur CNA kan klassas så som olovligt, varvid endast statspraxis kan ge den slutgiltiga bedömningen.

The permissible use of defensive force is a central tenet of the traditional legal and philosophical justification for war and its practice. Just War Theory holds a nation’s right to resist aggressive attack with defensive force as the clearest example of a just cause for war. Just War Theory also stipulates norms for warfare derived from a conception of defensive force asserted to be consistent with the moral reality of war. Recently, these aspects of Just War Theory have been criticized. David Rodin has challenged the status of national defense as an uncontroversial just cause. Jeff McMahan has charged that Just War Theory’s norms that govern warfare are inconsistent with the norms of permissive defensive force. In this thesis I defend the status of national defense as a clear case of a just cause. However, my defense may require revision of Just War Theory’s norms that govern warfare.

The world has found itself in the unsatisfactory position of depending greatly upon the services of satellites, all while the risk of satellites becoming targets during conflict looms ever greater. This paper assesses the lex lata of the law of self-defence as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, focusing on the rationae materiae aspect of the armed attack concept. It thereafter applies general conclusions in this regard to the specific context of hostile acts against satellite systems, with an aim to clarify under what conditions such hostile acts justify the exercise force in self-defence.

La recrudescence des conflits internes dans le contexte post-guerre froide a permis de propulser à l’avant-plan la préoccupation pour les individus. Alors que la paix et la sécurité internationales ont historiquement constitué les piliers du système institutionnel international, une porte s’ouvrait pour rendre effectif un régime de protection des droits de l’homme par-delà les frontières. Pour les humanistes, l’intervention humanitaire représentait un mal nécessaire pour pallier aux souffrances humaines souvent causées par des divergences ethniques et religieuses. Pourtant, cette pratique est encore souvent perçue comme une forme de néo-colonialisme et entre en contradiction avec les plus hautes normes régissant les relations internationales, soit les principes de souveraineté des États et de non-intervention. La problématique du présent mémoire s’inscrit précisément dans cette polémique entre la préséance des droits de l’État et la prédilection pour les droits humains universels, deux fins antinomiques que la Commission internationales pour l’intervention et la souveraineté des États (CIISE) a tenté de concilier en élaborant son concept de responsabilité de protéger. Notre mémoire s’inscrit dans le champ de la science politique en études internationales mais s’articule surtout autour des notions et enjeux propres à la philosophie politique, plus précisément à l’éthique des relations internationales. Le travail se veut une réflexion critique et théorique des conclusions du rapport La responsabilité de protéger, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le critère de la juste cause et, dans une moindre mesure, celui d’autorité appropriée. Notre lecture des conditions de la CIISE à la justification morale du déclenchement d’une intervention humanitaire – critères issues de la doctrine de la guerre juste relativement au jus ad bellum – révèle une position mitoyenne entre une conception progressiste cosmopolitique et une vision conservatrice d’un ordre international composé d’États souverains. D’une part, la commission se dissocie du droit international en faisant valoir un devoir éthique d’outrepasser les frontières dans le but de mettre un terme aux violations massives des droits de l’homme et, d’autre part, elle craint les ingérences à outrance, comme en font foi l’établissement d’un seuil de la juste cause relativement élevé et la désignation d’une autorité multilatérale à titre de légitimateur de l’intervention. Ce travail dialectique vise premièrement à présenter et situer les recommandations de la CIISE dans la tradition de la guerre juste. Ensuite, il s’agit de relever les prémisses philosophiques tacites dans le rapport de la CIISE qui sous-tendent le choix de préserver une règle de non-intervention ferme de laquelle la dérogation n’est exigée qu’en des circonstances exceptionnelles. Nous identifions trois arguments allant en ce sens : la reconnaissance du relativisme moral et culturel; la nécessité de respecter l’autonomie et l’indépendance des communautés politiques en raison d’une conception communautarienne de la légitimité de l’État, des réquisits de la tolérance et des avantages d’une responsabilité assignée; enfin, l’appréhension d’un bouleversement de l’ordre international sur la base de postulats du réalisme classique. Pour finir, nous nuançons chacune de ces thèses en souscrivant à un mode de raisonnement cosmopolitique et conséquentialiste. Notre adhésion au discours individualiste normatif nous amène à inclure dans la juste cause de la CIISE les violations systématiques des droits individuels fondamentaux et à cautionner l’intervention conduite par une coalition ou un État individuel, pourvu qu’elle produise les effets bénéfiques désirés en termes humanitaires. / The increasing number of internal conflicts in the Post-Cold War era propelled to the foreground the concern for individuals. Though international peace and security historically constituted the pillars of the world institutional system, the opportunity arose to establish an effective and cross-boundary human rights protection regime. According to humanists, humanitarian intervention was the necessary evil to bring an end to the human sufferings caused by ethnic and religious differences. Nevertheless, this kind of interference is still nowadays perceived as a neo-colonialist action and goes against the highest international relations norms, namely the state sovereignty and the non-intervention principles. This thesis’ issue lies within the controversy between states’ rights and universal human rights, which are two conflicting ends the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) tried to reconcile along with elaborating its responsibility to protect concept. The field of this paper is political science in international studies, but the focus is above all on political philosophy notions and stakes, particularly on ethics of international relations. The goal is to build a critical and theoretical thinking about the Responsibility to Protect conclusions, particularly regarding the just cause and appropriate authority criteria. In accordance with our interpretation of the ICISS moral justification conditions for humanitarian intervention – criteria derived from the just war theory’s concern for jus ad bellum – the commission’s stance is split into a progressive cosmopolitan view and a more conservative one that promotes a world order constituted by sovereign states. On one hand the commission separates itself from international law, putting forward an ethical duty to stop the massive human rights violations beyond borders. At the same time it is afraid of excessive interferences, as shown by the establishment of a relatively high just cause threshold and the appointment of a multilateral body in charge of legitimizing the intervention. This dialectical paper’s first objective is to describe and place the ICISS recommendations into the just war tradition. Then, the purpose is to sum up the tacit philosophical premises of the ICISS report in relation to its choice to preserve a firm non-intervention norm from which no derogation is permitted, except in case of exceptional circumstances. From that we identify three arguments: the acceptance of moral and cultural relativism; the requirement of respecting political communities’ autonomy and independence on account of a communitarian conception of state sovereignty, the prerequisites for tolerance and the assigned responsibility advantages; finally, the fear of an international order disruption on the basis of classical realism postulates. Ultimately, we challenge each one of these ideas adopting a cosmopolitan and consequentialist reasoning. Adhering to the normative individualist discourse, we propose to broaden the ICISS just cause so that it includes systematic fundamental human rights violations and to support coalition or individual state intervention, insofar as it produces the desired humanitarian benefits.

La recrudescence des conflits internes dans le contexte post-guerre froide a permis de propulser à l’avant-plan la préoccupation pour les individus. Alors que la paix et la sécurité internationales ont historiquement constitué les piliers du système institutionnel international, une porte s’ouvrait pour rendre effectif un régime de protection des droits de l’homme par-delà les frontières. Pour les humanistes, l’intervention humanitaire représentait un mal nécessaire pour pallier aux souffrances humaines souvent causées par des divergences ethniques et religieuses. Pourtant, cette pratique est encore souvent perçue comme une forme de néo-colonialisme et entre en contradiction avec les plus hautes normes régissant les relations internationales, soit les principes de souveraineté des États et de non-intervention. La problématique du présent mémoire s’inscrit précisément dans cette polémique entre la préséance des droits de l’État et la prédilection pour les droits humains universels, deux fins antinomiques que la Commission internationales pour l’intervention et la souveraineté des États (CIISE) a tenté de concilier en élaborant son concept de responsabilité de protéger. Notre mémoire s’inscrit dans le champ de la science politique en études internationales mais s’articule surtout autour des notions et enjeux propres à la philosophie politique, plus précisément à l’éthique des relations internationales. Le travail se veut une réflexion critique et théorique des conclusions du rapport La responsabilité de protéger, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le critère de la juste cause et, dans une moindre mesure, celui d’autorité appropriée. Notre lecture des conditions de la CIISE à la justification morale du déclenchement d’une intervention humanitaire – critères issues de la doctrine de la guerre juste relativement au jus ad bellum – révèle une position mitoyenne entre une conception progressiste cosmopolitique et une vision conservatrice d’un ordre international composé d’États souverains. D’une part, la commission se dissocie du droit international en faisant valoir un devoir éthique d’outrepasser les frontières dans le but de mettre un terme aux violations massives des droits de l’homme et, d’autre part, elle craint les ingérences à outrance, comme en font foi l’établissement d’un seuil de la juste cause relativement élevé et la désignation d’une autorité multilatérale à titre de légitimateur de l’intervention. Ce travail dialectique vise premièrement à présenter et situer les recommandations de la CIISE dans la tradition de la guerre juste. Ensuite, il s’agit de relever les prémisses philosophiques tacites dans le rapport de la CIISE qui sous-tendent le choix de préserver une règle de non-intervention ferme de laquelle la dérogation n’est exigée qu’en des circonstances exceptionnelles. Nous identifions trois arguments allant en ce sens : la reconnaissance du relativisme moral et culturel; la nécessité de respecter l’autonomie et l’indépendance des communautés politiques en raison d’une conception communautarienne de la légitimité de l’État, des réquisits de la tolérance et des avantages d’une responsabilité assignée; enfin, l’appréhension d’un bouleversement de l’ordre international sur la base de postulats du réalisme classique. Pour finir, nous nuançons chacune de ces thèses en souscrivant à un mode de raisonnement cosmopolitique et conséquentialiste. Notre adhésion au discours individualiste normatif nous amène à inclure dans la juste cause de la CIISE les violations systématiques des droits individuels fondamentaux et à cautionner l’intervention conduite par une coalition ou un État individuel, pourvu qu’elle produise les effets bénéfiques désirés en termes humanitaires. / The increasing number of internal conflicts in the Post-Cold War era propelled to the foreground the concern for individuals. Though international peace and security historically constituted the pillars of the world institutional system, the opportunity arose to establish an effective and cross-boundary human rights protection regime. According to humanists, humanitarian intervention was the necessary evil to bring an end to the human sufferings caused by ethnic and religious differences. Nevertheless, this kind of interference is still nowadays perceived as a neo-colonialist action and goes against the highest international relations norms, namely the state sovereignty and the non-intervention principles. This thesis’ issue lies within the controversy between states’ rights and universal human rights, which are two conflicting ends the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) tried to reconcile along with elaborating its responsibility to protect concept. The field of this paper is political science in international studies, but the focus is above all on political philosophy notions and stakes, particularly on ethics of international relations. The goal is to build a critical and theoretical thinking about the Responsibility to Protect conclusions, particularly regarding the just cause and appropriate authority criteria. In accordance with our interpretation of the ICISS moral justification conditions for humanitarian intervention – criteria derived from the just war theory’s concern for jus ad bellum – the commission’s stance is split into a progressive cosmopolitan view and a more conservative one that promotes a world order constituted by sovereign states. On one hand the commission separates itself from international law, putting forward an ethical duty to stop the massive human rights violations beyond borders. At the same time it is afraid of excessive interferences, as shown by the establishment of a relatively high just cause threshold and the appointment of a multilateral body in charge of legitimizing the intervention. This dialectical paper’s first objective is to describe and place the ICISS recommendations into the just war tradition. Then, the purpose is to sum up the tacit philosophical premises of the ICISS report in relation to its choice to preserve a firm non-intervention norm from which no derogation is permitted, except in case of exceptional circumstances. From that we identify three arguments: the acceptance of moral and cultural relativism; the requirement of respecting political communities’ autonomy and independence on account of a communitarian conception of state sovereignty, the prerequisites for tolerance and the assigned responsibility advantages; finally, the fear of an international order disruption on the basis of classical realism postulates. Ultimately, we challenge each one of these ideas adopting a cosmopolitan and consequentialist reasoning. Adhering to the normative individualist discourse, we propose to broaden the ICISS just cause so that it includes systematic fundamental human rights violations and to support coalition or individual state intervention, insofar as it produces the desired humanitarian benefits.

The aim this thesis is to analyse whether or not Georgia can be considered to have had legitimate reasons for involvement in the five-day war in South Ossetia in August of 2008. This topic is relevant today for two predominant reasons one being that August of 2018 marks the 10th anniversary of the outbreak of the war between Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian forces. Who’s to blame for the outbreak of the war has, in the last decade, been widely discussed and analysed from different standpoints. This thesis’ main intention is to evaluate the Georgian point of view and find out Georgia’s responsibility for the conflict. This analysis is based on the theoretical framework called “Just War Theory”, an ancient tradition which, through centuries, have set up guidelines over how a war should be initiated, conducted and handled after ceasefire and thereafter. In this theoretical framework there is 6 criteria which establish moral, ethical and legitimate reasons for a state to wage war called “Jus ad bellum”. These 6 criteria are used as the factual theoretical base for the analysis.The condition of the chosen theoretical framework requires that all the criteria needs to be fulfilled in order for a state to be considered to have lawful reasons to wage war against another. Based on this framework, it is concluded in this thesis that Georgia did not have rightful reasons to engage in the five-day war in August 2008.

I och med Romstadgan för den internationella brottmålsdomstolen (nedan Romstadgan) finns nu, för första gången, en juridiskt bindande definition av begreppet aggression, vilken baseras på Förenta Nationernas stadga (nedan FN-stadgan) artikel 2(4). Romstadgan utgör grunden för att Internationella brottmålsdomstolen (nedan ICC), i efterhand, ska kunna utkräva ansvar av en fysisk person för aggressionsbrott. Förenta Nationerna (nedan FN) har till uppgift att bevara freden, genom att agera mot staters aggressionshandlingar, framför allt i preventivt syfte och efter beslut av säkerhetsrådet. Det är intressant att jämföra FN-stadgan och Romstadgans aggressionsbegrepp för att på så sätt förstå hur begreppet aggression behandlas i internationell rätt, både i relationer mellan stater och då fysiska personer ska hållas rättsligt ansvariga för aggressionsbrott. Det är också värdefullt att förstå hur de två definitionerna kan påverka varandra och vad det kan föra med sig för fördelar och nackdelar.                       I denna uppsats behandlas FN-stadgans och Romstadgans aggressionsbegrepp i en komparativ studie, en viktig slutsats är att det finns skillnader mellan  de båda stadgorna.                       I uppsatsen ges inledningsvis en historisk inblick i aggressionsbegreppets utveckling, som underlag för den efterföljande behandlingen, där FN-stadgans och Romstadgans begrepp aggressionshandling utreds.                       Därefter behandlas begreppet aggressionshandling enligt FN-stadgan. Utredningen följer Wienkonventionen om traktaträttens allmänna tolkningsregel. Först görs en tolkning av begreppet aggressionshandlings ordalydelse, i enlighet med FN-stadgans systematik. Sedan redogörs för hur begreppet tolkats av relevanta FN-organ och i staters praxis. Generalförsamlingens aggressionsdefinition, i resolution 3314, gås igenom och kritiseras till viss del, då den inte ger en tydlig avgränsning av vad aggressionsbegreppet innefattar. Generalförsamlingens resolution 3314 är dock central och används därmed, som grund för vidare behandling i uppsatsen där resolutionen också jämförs kritiskt med andra FN-organs praxis och med FN-stadgans lydelse. Uppsatsen visar att begreppet aggressionshandling har givits en vag formulering i FN-stadgan och att vad som anses innefattat i begreppet också skiljer sig något mellan de olika FN-organen. Hos FN-organen finns dock den gemensamma kärnan att, som aggressionshandling anses den första våldsanvändningen i en stats internationella relationer genomförd med ett specifikt aggressivt uppsåt.                        Uppsatsen utreder sedan kritiskt Romstadgans aggressionsbegrepp och dess olika delar varvid viktiga skillnader mot FN-stadgan behandlas. Ett specifikt aggressivt uppsåt saknas i Romstadgan och kan inte heller läsas in i denna, då det skulle gå emot Romstadgans ordalydelse och systematik. Romstadgan ser därmed inte heller ett specifikt aggressivt uppsåt, som en försvårande omständighet, utan Romstadgan ser enbart till det använda våldets allvar och omfattning. Vidare så innehåller Romstadgan en tröskel, i syfte att utesluta en legal gråzon från ICCs jurisdiktion, vilken saknar motsvarighet i FN-stadgan. Romstadgan utesluter därmed genom sin lydelse våldshandlingar, som inom delar av den folkrättsliga doktrinen, anses befinna sig inom en gråzon av jus ad bellum.                       I slutsatserna sammanställs sedan de huvudsakliga skillnaderna mellan aggressionsbegreppen enligt FN-stadgan, FN-organen och Romstadgan och en utredning görs av de fördelar respektive nackdelar och risker, som dessa skillnader medför samt hur skillnaderna påverkar varandra. Författaren finner att det föreligger betydande skillnader då specifikt aggressivt uppsåt saknas i Romstadgan samt då Romstadgans tröskelvärde syftar till att utesluta den legala gråzonen inom jus ad bellum. Vidare anser författaren att dessa skillnader riskerar att urholka FN-stadgans våldsförbud och således i framtiden riskera att gynna starka våldsbenägna stater på svaga staters bekostnad. / The Rome Statute for The International Criminal Court (henceforth The Rome Statute) now provides, for the first time, a legally binding definition of the concept of Aggression. The definition is based on the United Nations Charter (henceforth The UN Charter) article 2(4). The Rome Statute is the foundation on which the International Criminal Court (henceforth ICC) can prosecute individuals on crimes of aggression post the events. The United Nations (henceforth UN) has the charter to sustain the peace through acting against the acts of aggression of nations, primarily preventively and based on resolutions by the Security Council. It is interesting to compare the UN Charter and the Rome Statute definition to understand how the concept of aggression is used in international law, both in relations between nations and when individuals shall be held accountable for crimes of aggression. In addition, it’s valuable to understand how the two definitions can impact each other and what the implications might be of similarities and differences.   Hence, this thesis is a comparative study of the concept of aggression in the UN Charter and the Rome Statute. One key conclusion is that there are significant differences in how the aggression is defined in the two documents.   The use and development of the concept Aggression is first accounted for in a historic context as a foundation for the comparative study.   Then, acts of aggression in the UN Charter is thoroughly investigated in three steps. The investigation is carried out in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Firstly, through an interpretation of acts of aggression in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term in the context of the UN Charter. Secondly through an investigation of the interpretation in relevant UN bodies and in the practice of nations. Thirdly, the definition of the UN General Assembly, resolution 3314, is investigated and criticised as it does not offer a sufficiently clear delimitation of the concept of aggression.  Resolution 3314 is, however, of key importance and is used subsequently as an element of comparison. The resolution is also compared with the practice of other UN bodies and the wording of the UN Charter. The thesis proves the that aggression has a vague definition in the UN Charter and that the scope of the concept is different in different UN bodies. However, common to all UN Bodies is to define aggression as the first use of force with a specific aggressive intent in international relations.    Following on UN, the thesis provides a critical investigation of the concept of aggression in the Rome Statute where key differences relative to the UN Charter are accounted for. The Rome Statute lacks specific aggressive intent and such cannot be made part of the interpretation as it would the statutes wording and systematics. Thus, the Rome Statute does not regard a specific aggressive intent aggravating but looks solely to the gravity and scale of the force used. In addition, the Rome Statute includes a threshold with the purpose of excluding a grey zone from the jurisdiction of ICC. Such grey zone does not exist in the UN Charter. The implication of this is that the Rome Statute excludes acts of violence that, among some international lawyers, are regarded to be in a grey zone of jus ad bellum.   The conclusions include a summary of the main differences across the UN Charter, different UN Bodies and the Rome Statute. That leads into a discussion on the potential advantages and drawbacks that come out of these differences plus potential effects of the reciprocal influence. The key element of this discussion is that aggressive intent is missing in the Rome Statute and that the statute’s threshold aims to exclude the legal grey zone in jus ad bellum. The thesis concludes that these differences risk to weaken the prohibition of the use of force in the UN Charter and, as a consequence, that this may favour strong and aggressive nations at the expense of smaller and weaker nations.