Univ., Diss.--Heidelberg, 2000. / Literaturverz S. 371 - 383.

Zugl.: Luzern, Universiẗat, Diss., 2006.

This dissertation explores a family of theoretical models of humanitarian military intervention. A number of recent theorists, including Tesón, Caney, Buchanan, Orend, Moellendorf, and Wheeler, build their models from a perspective called ‘cosmopolitanism.’ They offer arguments based on the moral supremacy of human rights, the arbitrary character of territorial boundaries, and the duty to protect individual human beings exposed to serious and systematic violence by their own governments. I develop a model of intervention that recognizes the moral significance of political self-government. To the extent that international society should countenance a ‘duty to protect’ human rights, the duty ought to be constrained by a commitment to the values of self-government. The model developed in this dissertation also recognizes the significance of international law enforcement. Insofar as we should permit a role of enforcement for international human rights, that role should be constrained by formally accepted global principles and in particular by positive obligations to prevent and punish actions regarded as international crimes. These other global values are viewed with suspicion by cosmopolitan theorists, who tend to construe them in stark contrast to the vision of global responsibility for human rights protection. But I will show how these other values emerged simultaneously with cosmopolitanism and share many of its underlying intuitions. Because self-government and law enforcement are linked politically to the cosmopolitan vision, these two distinctive global values can be utilized as tools to fortify or expand cosmopolitanism by enlarging the global sense of responsibility for human rights. The aim of this project is to explain how these other values came to be neglected by cosmopolitan theorists, and why they should not be forgotten. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-25 12:11:55.056

The purpose of this thesis is to offer a comparative study of Michael Walzer and Will Kymlicka¡¦s theories on citizenship. By comparing their different perspectives on conception of person and political equality, I demonstrate that due to their differing views on the significance of culture, they, as a result, have divergent theories of citizenship. Looking from a liberal multiculturalist perspective, Kymlicka defends the centrality of personal autonomy and sees cultures as important references that allow persons to choose their respective ideal ways of life. Walzer, on the other hand, faults liberalism for its hyper-individualist assumptions and misunderstanding of the significance of culture to human agency. Walzer insists that culture is not a resource/object for humans to appropriate but a constitutive part of human self-understanding that cannot be disregarded in human actions. These two distinct ideals of citizenship, I maintain, can therefore be seen as a continuation of the liberal-communitarian debate in the 1980s.

Submitted by Automação e Estatística (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2018-05-02T23:53:26Z No. of bitstreams: 1 WendellWilliamyCristyeSilva_DISSERT.pdf: 1032933 bytes, checksum: f682fc10040e7c1a4deb77e0abdae195 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2018-05-08T21:27:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 WendellWilliamyCristyeSilva_DISSERT.pdf: 1032933 bytes, checksum: f682fc10040e7c1a4deb77e0abdae195 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-08T21:27:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 WendellWilliamyCristyeSilva_DISSERT.pdf: 1032933 bytes, checksum: f682fc10040e7c1a4deb77e0abdae195 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-06 / Esta Dissertação se propõe a discutir as problemáticas morais subjacentes ao fenômeno da Guerra, a partir de uma análise da Teoria da Guerra Justa, na forma em que a mesma é delineada na obra de Michael Walzer. A Teoria da Guerra Justa trabalha assumindo como ponto de partida que há situações em que é moralmente justificável fazer uso da guerra e da violência que obrigatoriamente acompanha esta última. Ela se divide em duas partes. A justiça do guerrear (jus ad bellum) diz respeito aos motivos que justificariam o recurso à guerra, concentrando-se na discussão sobre agressão e autodefesa. Já a justiça no guerrear (jus in bello) se concentra na discussão sobre o cumprimento ou a violação das normas de combate, normas estabelecidas tanto pelo costume quanto por instrumentos legais. Uma vez que as duas partes componentes da realidade moral da Guerra se encontram separadas de forma lógica, torna-se possível que se façam julgamentos independentes entre si. Assim, segundo Walzer, é possível travar uma guerra que seja justa, ou seja, cumpra com os requisitos do jus ad bellum, mas de forma injusta, violando as normas que conformam o jus in bello. Da mesma forma, uma guerra que não seja justa pode ser travada em conformidade com as regras. Através deste estudo, procuraremos realizar uma discussão sobre a possibilidade de que a guerra possa ser analisada à luz da moralidade, bem como se é possível determinar as condições em que uma guerra pode ser dita justa ou injusta. / This dissertation offers to discuss the moral problems underlying the war phenomenon, starting from an analysis of the Just War Theory, in the feature which is outlined inside Michael Walzer’s work. The Just War Theory starts from the perception of the situations in which it is morally justifiable to dispose the war and the violence that necessarily accompanies the latter. It is divided into two parts. Jus ad bellum concerns the motives which justify the use of war, and it is focused on aggression and self-defense discussing. Jus in bello concentrates on discussion about compliance or violation of combat rules, established rules by both custom and legal instruments. Once the two component parts of the war moral reality are logically separated, it becomes possible to make independent judgments. Thus, according to Walzer, it is possible to wage a war which is just, that is, it complies the jus ad bellum requirements, but unjust, by violating the norms which conform jus in bello. In the same way, an unjust war can be fought in accordance with the rules. Through this study, we will attempt to discuss the possibility that war can be analyzed in the light of morality, as well as whether it is possible to determine the conditions under which a war can be considered just or unjust.

[pt] A presente tese de doutorado realiza um estudo comparativo, no âmbito da teoria da justiça, envolvendo a teoria da igualdade complexa, formulada por Michael Walzer, autor inserido no rol dos comunitaristas, e a teoria da justiça como imparcialidade, formulada por John Rawls, autor inserido no rol dos liberais. Trata-se, portanto, de um estudo comparativo de autores baseado na categoria da justiça distributiva, conceito cuja formulação original remonta ao pensamento aristotélico. A tese - que contém elementos de filosofia moral, filosofia política e filosofia do direito - tem por objetivo verificar se a teoria da igualdade complexa, com sua metodologia particularista e seus princípios internos de distribuição, possibilita, como apregoa Michael Walzer, a crítica social ou se, de outra forma, esta crítica deve estar associada a uma moral universalista, como, por exemplo, a que nos é fornecida pelo modelo rawlsiano. / [en] The present doctorate thesis aims to make a comparative study, in the context of the theory of justice, involving the theory of complex equality, formulated by Michael Walzer, author inserted in the communitarians` list, and the theory of justice as fairness, formulated by John Rawls, author inserted in the liberals` list. It`s about, therefore, a comparative study of authors based on the category of distributive justice, whose concept was originally formulated by the aristotelic thought. The thesis - that contains elements of moral philosophy, political philosophy and philosophy of law - aims to verify if the theory of complex equality, with its particularistic methodology and its internal principles of distribution, makes possible, as well as Michael Walzer proclaims, the social criticism or if, on the other hand, this criticism has to be associated to an universalistic moral, as, for example, that one provided by the rawlsian model.

<p>Obemannade flygplan med attackförmåga (UCAV) används i allt större utsträckning i konflikter idag. En av de främsta fördelarna med dessa är att det inte finns någon risk att mista en pilot, då dessa är fjärstyrda. I attacker utförda av amerikanska UCAV:er i framför allt Afghanistan och Pakistan, har collateral damage inträffat vid ett flertal tillfällen. Det innebär att civila oavsiktligt fallit offer för attacker. Enligt krigets lagar kan sådana händelser rättfärdigas av att militär nödvändighet föreligger, men det är tveksamt om det går att hävda det när man inte riskerar egna förluster. Detta innebär i så fall att collateral damage alltid är krigsbrott när det orsakats av UCAV. Då är det viktigt att det går att utkräva ansvar ur obemannade system och det finns farhågor att ansvarsförhållandena blir otydligare när det inte sitter en pilot i flygplanet som ”trycker på knappen”. Men så länge den obemannade farkosten fjärrstyrs och besluten tas av en människa går det inte att se några skillnader i möjligheten till ansvarsutkrävande från bemannade system.</p> / <p>The use of Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) has seen an increasing use in modern conflicts. One of the main advantages of these is the fact that there is no risk of losing a pilot, as the aircraft are remote-controlled. The attacks carried out by U.S. UCAVs in Afghanistan and Pakistan have resultet in a number of incients with collateral damage. According to the laws of war, only military necessity can justify such incidents and it is highly doubtful if you can claim such necessity when you do not risk any loss of life yourself. This would mean that collateral damage caused by UCAVs automatically becomes a war crime. This raises the issue of accountability and wether it is possible to extract such from unmanned systems. There are fears that this would be difficult when no pilot is present in the aircraft to ”pull the trigger”. However, as long as operators remotely control the unmanned aircraft and the decision to release weapons in anger are made by humans, there are no differences to be found in terms of accountability between manned and unmanned systems.</p>

Obemannade flygplan med attackförmåga (UCAV) används i allt större utsträckning i konflikter idag. En av de främsta fördelarna med dessa är att det inte finns någon risk att mista en pilot, då dessa är fjärstyrda. I attacker utförda av amerikanska UCAV:er i framför allt Afghanistan och Pakistan, har collateral damage inträffat vid ett flertal tillfällen. Det innebär att civila oavsiktligt fallit offer för attacker. Enligt krigets lagar kan sådana händelser rättfärdigas av att militär nödvändighet föreligger, men det är tveksamt om det går att hävda det när man inte riskerar egna förluster. Detta innebär i så fall att collateral damage alltid är krigsbrott när det orsakats av UCAV. Då är det viktigt att det går att utkräva ansvar ur obemannade system och det finns farhågor att ansvarsförhållandena blir otydligare när det inte sitter en pilot i flygplanet som ”trycker på knappen”. Men så länge den obemannade farkosten fjärrstyrs och besluten tas av en människa går det inte att se några skillnader i möjligheten till ansvarsutkrävande från bemannade system. / The use of Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) has seen an increasing use in modern conflicts. One of the main advantages of these is the fact that there is no risk of losing a pilot, as the aircraft are remote-controlled. The attacks carried out by U.S. UCAVs in Afghanistan and Pakistan have resultet in a number of incients with collateral damage. According to the laws of war, only military necessity can justify such incidents and it is highly doubtful if you can claim such necessity when you do not risk any loss of life yourself. This would mean that collateral damage caused by UCAVs automatically becomes a war crime. This raises the issue of accountability and wether it is possible to extract such from unmanned systems. There are fears that this would be difficult when no pilot is present in the aircraft to ”pull the trigger”. However, as long as operators remotely control the unmanned aircraft and the decision to release weapons in anger are made by humans, there are no differences to be found in terms of accountability between manned and unmanned systems.

Univ., Diss.--Tübingen, 2003.

Ce mémoire traite de la critique communautarienne du libéralisme et se donne deux projets. D’abord, il s’agit de formuler une position de synthèse à partir des travaux des philosophes Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre et Michael Walzer. Cette synthèse s’articule autour de trois axes, soit ontologique, sociale et méthodologique. Le deuxième projet est d’évaluer cette position pour statuer sur son rapport au libéralisme, et, plus précisément, pour déterminer si elle est seulement une critique, une alternative, ou encore une variante à l’intérieur du libéralisme. Il est conclu que le communautarisme est réconciliable avec une certaine forme de libéralisme et que sa critique permet même de l’améliorer. / In this essay about the communitarian critique of liberalism I seek to reach two goals. First, it is to form a synthesis from the works of philosophers Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer. This synthesis is articulated through three axes: ontologicial, social and methodological. Building on this, my second objective is to assess its relation to liberalism. More specifically, I seek to determine whether communitarianism is merely a critique, an alternative or a variant of liberalism. My conclusion is that communitarianism is reconciliable with a certain form of liberalism and that its critique allows to improve it.