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This is a study about the relationship between the ethical sphere and Christianity in Kierkegaard's thought. Against the tendency among Kierkegaard scholars to emphasize the continuity between the ethical sphere and Christianity, I tried to show through this study that in Kierkegaard's writings there was a very strong emphasis on the discontinuity between these two spheres. I started by asking whether there is a difference and discontinuity between "rationalistic ethics" (the ethics of the person who is in the ethical sphere) and Christian ethics. {Chapter One} Firstly, in the examination of Abraham's act of faith in Fear and Trembling, I showed that even in this book there was a hint of a new ethics which follows from faith. To answer the question as to whether there is a clear description of this new ethics, I turned to Works of Love. In the examination of this book, I identified the ethics of Christian love, and asserted that the ethics of Christian love was different and discontinuous from merely human love. In the next section, I examined Christian ethics as the ethics of Christian discipleship. Through an examination of some parts of Philosophical Fragments and Training in Christianity I argued that Christian ethics, as understood by Kierkegaard, is different from merely ethical discipleship and semi-Pelagianism. Throughout this chapter's discussion I argued that Christian ethics was not only different from the ethics of the ethical person, but also antithetical to it. For ethics based on merely human love was criticized severely in Works of Love, and the merely ethical discipleship and semi-Pelagian discipleship were regarded as misunderstandings of Christian ethics. I turned, in the second chapter, to the consideration of the problem of becoming oneself. In this chapter, I firstly examined the second volume of Either/Or and argued that the ethical self was an autonomous self which tried to be itself by itself. In contrast, the Christian self is totally dependent on God in its becoming itself. I drew this conclusion from an examination of The Sickness unto Death. In this examination, I argued that even though there were some ambiguities in this book, despair as sin was clearly understood only by the Christian who believed in the forgiveness of sin by God and had faith. Only the existing individual who is in faith is regarded as overcoming the despair and having become a "self" (or "spirit"). I pointed out that in their understandings of the eternal, of the power of self, these two understandings of the self were different from one another. In the last section of this second chapter, I raised the question of the understanding of the self of the person in religiousness A. By an examination of the Socratic understanding of the phrase "one can be oneself in relation to God" and an analysis of Socratic inwardness, I argued that those in religiousness A had a different God, or different conception of God from the Christian God. I also argued that this difference between their respective conceptions of God was the fundamental reason for the difference between the Christian understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in religiousness A. In the third chapter, I examined the problem of epistemology. Firstly, I drew out, from Kierkegaard's various pseudonymous writings, the presuppositions and epistemological standpoint of the natural man. Then, I compared this with the Christian epistemological standpoint which was drawn from Kierkegaard's later writings. I argued that in his later writings there were very clear indications that the Christian has an epistemological standpoint which is substantially different from that of the natural man. I turned then to an examination of Kierkegaard's journal entries, and showed that even though he himself could not always think in the way which he asserted that the Christian should think, Kierkegaard did not compromise and say that it was proper and inevitable for us to mix the Christian standpoint and the natural man's standpoint. Rather, he strongly resisted the idea that such a mixture was Christian. Next I returned to one of Kierkegaard's early pseudonymous writings, philosophical Fragments, to show that Kierkegaard's ultimate intention in writing this book can be interpreted in a manner consistent with his later writings. I argued that even though, because of the ambiguity in this book, there are other ways of interpreting it, it is also possible that the Socratic standpoint and the Christian standpoint are too exclusive views of reality as a whole, and that even in this book Kierkegaard tried to show the difference and discontinuity of the Socratic (humanist) standpoint and the Christian standpoint. According to this interpretation of Kierkegaard's intention, he who has the Christian point of view should see and consider everything from the Christian standpoint; for him, there is no autonomous realm to be thought of from the Socratic (humanistic) standpoint. Based upon this examination, I concluded that for Kierkegaard Christian ethics follows on from Christian theology (his Christian theistic faith), and the understanding of becoming oneself also follows on from Christian's stance of faith (so that the Christian self is regarded as the “theological self”), and his epistemological standpoint is also Christian. In this sense, there is a wide gap between the Christian sphere and the ethical sphere, or to put this another way, their direction is different : one is theistic and one humanistic. For Kierkegaard, to be a Christian thus involves a change in one's ethics, in one's understanding of becoming oneself, and in one's epistemological standpoint. Then, I drew out some implications for Kierkegaard's theory of the existence-spheres as a whole and suggested some implications for Christian theology today.

In 1844, when Kierkegaard published his work, The Concept of Anxiety, under the pseudonym of Vigilius Haufuiensis, it constituted no mean feat for a variety of reasons. Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, was the content of the work. At that time, very little work had been done concerning the experience of anxiety and certainly no single academic work had had this issue as its formal topic. Secondly, the book was an incisive and complex theological and philosophical argument. So much so in fact, that no discussion of Haufuiensis' concept of anxiety is possible without incorporating its theological implications. Thirdly, and certainly as significant as its religious aspect, is the psychology inherent to The Concept of Anxiety. This was as innovative as the philosophical aspect, as is evinced by the pervasive influence it exercised over the development of psychology in the twentieth century. Lastly, but by no means least importantly, is the fact that Haufuiensis' work was an ingenious and derisive attack on Hegelianism, as well as a superb example of the practice of irony. The reason that I make mention of this is to briefly illustrate the depth and complexity of this "little" work. Hence, in this essay, it has been my aim to thoroughly explore all four aspects of the work and to demonstrate how each holds as much significance as the other in considering the work as a whole. In terms of methodology, I have actively refrained from limiting my investigation to one particular approach. Instead, I have endeavoured to explore Haufuiensis' The Concept of Anxiety from a myriad of different angles, including the analytical, existential, theological, linguistic and deconstructive interpretations. Furthermore, in my opinion, any sound investigation of The Concept of Anxiety cannot proceed along the lines of isolating one specific aspect of the work as being of greater significance than any other. This is in contrast to the earlier scholars of Kierkegaard, who tended to categorize him chiefly as a Christian writer, greatly at the expense of all the other facets of his work. The influence of Kierkegaard's work on the existentialist movement is well known and is encapsulated in his being cast as "the father of existentialism". In my opinion, this constitutes yet one more attempt to categorize both the man and his work, and as such constitutes a reductionism and an untenable approach to the work of this important thinker. My motivation in conducting an investigation into Kierkegaard's conception of anxiety is two-fold. Firstly, I am of the opinion that anxiety is a universal and, at the same time, intensely personal experience. As such, The Concept of Anxiety is an indispensable, and often overlooked part of Kierkegaard's philosophy. My second reason is to demonstrate, by simply concentrating on one aspect of Kierkegaard's work, the depth and scope of his corpus. The Concept of Anxiety is notoriously known as being Kierkegaard's most inaccessible work, due chiefly to the difficulty experienced in its interpretation, and the subsequent plethora of misinterpretation. It is my opinion that the principal cause of this problem is the failure on the part of readers to take heed of the fact that Haufuiensis' work is conducted by means of indirect communication and as such is fraught with irony. Finally, my conclusion after examining the conception of anxiety, as put forth by Haufniensis, as well as the reactions and influences it has elicited in the years since its publication, is that the work of the Danish author is as relevant and as important today, as it was upon being published. / Dissertation (MA (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria, 2000. / Philosophy / unrestricted

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Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

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Ce mémoire est une étude du corpus kierkegaardien. Elle tente de saisir en quoi il déplace notre conception de la vérité ; et elle y montre comment ce corpus envisage le theologique dans sa dimension de communication littéraire. Cette étude se veut une interprétation de son discours, selon deux modalités énonciatives distinctes : la première étant une reprise de son projet de cours sur la communication, la seconde étant celle de la critique textuelle. Elle posera la question de la communication de la vérité comme une occasion de réfléchir la pratique théologique.

Ce mémoire présente une analyse des influences causées par l’œuvre kierkegaardienne à l’intérieur des différentes conceptions de l’existentialisme du 20e siècle. Considérant tout d’abord deux lectures chrétiennes de l’existentialisme moderne, celle proposée dans l’Introduction aux existentialismes d’Emmanuel Mounier et celle du Court traité de l ’existence et de l ’existant de Jacques Maritain, l’auteur souligne ensuite l’héritage de Kierkegaard et met en évidence l’intérêt porté à la philosophie kierkegaardienne par ces deux penseurs de l’existence du 20e siècle. L’analyse fait ressortir les richesses et les limites de la pensée kierkegaardienne telle que l’appréhendaient Mounier et Maritain, tandis que la présentation de leurs deux conceptions de l’existentialisme aura fait voir comment l’œuvre de Kierkegaard a diversement influencé le cours de l’histoire philosophique.