Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-11-09T10:25:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcos Nakano Daniel.pdf: 1603078 bytes, checksum: e111d6912cad6c64425d363c3749e8ef (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-09T10:25:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcos Nakano Daniel.pdf: 1603078 bytes, checksum: e111d6912cad6c64425d363c3749e8ef (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-09-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Our main objective, in this thesis, is to compare the idea of Logic of consequence, introduced, for the first time, in Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929), and the conceptions adopted by Edmund Husserl in the Logical Investigations. We try to show, firstly, the role that have, in the Logical Investigations, the notions of signification, fulfilling, intuitions and categorial intuitions, in order to determine the way Husser conceives the epistemological foundations of Logic. Next, we describe the concept of Logic of consequence in Formal and transcendental Logic. This level of Logic, between Morfology and Formal logic of truth, is determined by the exclusion of the concepts of truth and falsity, as determining concepts of its thematic field. Through this process of analysis, we arrive, then, at the conclusion that the idea of Logic of consequence was not present in the Logical Investigations. Rather, the conceptions adopted in the Logical Investigations, are such that they are incompatible with the notion of Logic of consequence / Nosso objetivo principal, neste trabalho, é a realização de uma comparação entre a ideia de Lógica da consequência, introduzida, pela primeira vez, em Lógica Formal e Lógica Transcendental (1929), e as concepções adotadas por Edmund Husserl em Investigações Lógicas. Mostramos, em primeiro lugar, qual o papel das noções de significação, preenchimento, intuições e intuições categoriais em Investigações Lógicas, para uma delimitação do modo como Husserl concebe a fundamentação da Lógica formal, nas Investigações Lógicas. Em seguida, passamos a uma descrição do conceito de Lógica da consequência em Lógica formal e Lógica Transcendental. Este nível da Lógica, entre a Morfologia e Lógica formal da verdade, se caracteriza pela exclusão dos conceitos de verdade e falsidade como partes de seu domínio temático. Através deste processo de análise, chegamos, então, à conclusão de que a ideia de Lógica da consequência não estivera presente nas Investigações Lógicas, e mesmo, que ela é incompatível com esta última

Sze Man-hung, Stephen. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong. / Bibliography: leaves 68-70.

Law, Ki Fung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese.

Typescript (photocopy). / Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries / Department: Computer Science.

Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

Thesis. 1978. M.S.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ENGINEERING. / Bibliography: leaf 99. / M.S.

Typescript (photocopy). / Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

My research examines the social and material life of gnosis for the contemporary Sufi community in post-revolutionary Iran. In contrast to literatures which confine Sufism to the literary and poetic realms, I investigate the ways in which gnosis (mystical epistemology) is re-configured as a series of techniques for navigating the realm of the everyday. In particular, I focus on the ways in which mystical knowledge (ma'arifat-e 'erfani) is utilized by the Sufis to position themselves as outside of the socio-political areana, a move that, within the context of the Islamic Republic, in and of itself possesses vast political and social repercussions. I approach gnosis in two ways: both as object of study but also as critical lens, utilizing the Sufis' own mystical epistemology to guide me in understanding and interpreting my ethnographic case studies. In my dissertation, I address the following questions: What is the role of the Sufis, a group positioned on neither side of the orthodoxy-secular divide, within post-revolutionary Iran? How does a religious group attempt to create and maintain a disavowal of the political realm in a theocracy? More broadly, what is the role of mysticism within late modernity, and how might such a question be answered anthropologically? At the heart of my dissertation is the analysis of four ethnographic case studies. In each instance, I illustrate the way that the Sufis' own concept of mystical knowledge may be used to interpret topics as varied as the relationship between commemorative (dhikr) rituals and national identity to the negotiation of state interference to the practice of youth-organized poetry readings to the spatial organization of meeting places. I trace the affective and sensory dimensions of gnosis as it influences the mystics' understanding of the body, memory, place, language, and their socio-theological position within Iranian modernity more broadly. By analyzing the question of the "apolitical," my dissertation intervenes into the presumed distinction between the aesthetico-epistemological and the political divide, tracking a group that favors not direct resistance or outright evasion, but a more elusive engagement. My dissertation may be utilized by those interested in questions of knowledge production, aesthetics and affect, and alternatives to the religious-secular divide.

This study focuses on the history of school mathematics through the discourse surrounding the function concept. The function concept has remained the central theme of school mathematics from the emergence of both obligatory schooling and the science of mathematics education. By understanding the scientific discourse of mathematics education as directly connected to larger issues of governance, technology, and industry, particular visions for students are described to highlight these connections. Descriptions from school mathematics focusing on expert curricular documents, developmental psychology, and district reform strategies, are meant to explain these different visions. Despite continued historical inquiry in mathematics education, few studies have offered connections between the specific style of mathematics idealized in schools, the learning theories that accompanied these, and larger societal and cultural shifts. In exploring new theoretical tools from the history of science and technology this study seeks to connect shifting logic from efforts towards rational organization of capitalist society with the logic of school mathematics across the discursive space. This study seeks to understand this relationship by examining the ideals evinced in the protocols of educational science. In order to explore these architectures, the science of mathematics education and psychology are examined alongside the practices in the New York City public schools--the largest school system in the nation. To do so, the discourse of the function concept was viewed as a set of connections between mathematical content, psychology, and larger district reform projects. Four architectures--the mechanical, thermodynamic, cybernetic, and network models--are examined.

This thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V' involve a free relative complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of ability to answer the question of how to do it.