Dissertation (Ph.D. in Security Studies)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010. / Dissertation supervisor: Knopf, Jeffrey. "March 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 28, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Reassurance Strategy, Deterrence Strategy, Contingent Generalizations, "Structured, Focused Comparison," Level of Analysis, Tit-for-Tat, GRIT, Leader's Perceptions, Domestic Politics, Alliance Politics, Balance of Power, Interdependence, Identity, Motivating Factors, South Korea, North Korea, Sunshine Policy, Six-Party Talks, Gorbachev, Reagan, the End of the Cold War. Includes bibliographical references (p. 474-516). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 1974. / Bibliography: p. 219-232.

No description available.

xvi, 341 p. : ill. A print copy of this title is available through the UO Libraries under the call number: KNIGHT GN855.K6 R6 1997 / The primary purpose of this dissertation is to reconstruct sociocultural development in the North Han River Valley in Korea during the prehistoric and proto historic periods ( ca 6000 B .C.-A.D. 300). Based on theoretical ideas about the close relationship between cultural behavior and the natural environment as well as synthetical observation of archaeological data in the North Han River Valley, I have proposed the following testable hypothesis in regard to 'sociocultural development in the North Han River Valley : that its unique ecosystem brought about a subsistence pattern unique to the region. The North Han River Valley's specific geographical formation, connected with the Lower Han River Basin by way of the river system, brought it under the crucial influence of the latter's more advanced cultural elements. The circumscribed environment derived from the distinctively developed geomophological formation of the North Han River Valley influenced autochthonous sociocultural development in the region. Enumerating the most basic factors, the affluent riverine resources of the Valley enabled Chiilmun period inhabitants be heavily dependent on riverine fishing supplemented by the hunting and gathering of wild vegetation. Riverine fishing as well as hunting and gathering richly supplemented the agrarian economy which became dominant in the Valley after the appearance ofMumun people in later prehistoric times. Due to population saturation of limited arable lands, Mumun agrarian people became increasingly circumscribed and could not evolve into a state-level society. In association with this factor, the geographical proximity of the Valley to the Lower Han River inevitably brought it under the influence of advanced cultures emerging in the Lower Han River Basin. This process, which began in the later Mumun period, actually has continued to the present, passing through the protohistoric State Formation period and Paekche kingdom. / Committee in charge: Dr. C. Melvin Aikens, Chair; Dr. Song Nai Rhee; Dr. William S. Ayres; Dr. William G. Loy; Dr. Philip Young

The thesis deals with the Six-Party Talks on North Korean nuclear program between the U.S., the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In the first part the theoretical bases -- multilateralism and the non-proliferation regime - are presented. In the second part the situation in North Korea is being analyzed with respect to the political regime of the country and to its nuclear program. In the last part the most important diplomatic initiatives aimed at dismantling North Korean nuclear sites are being presented with emphasis being put on the Six-Party Talks. In the conclusion of the thesis a change of the approach towards North Korea is proposed with regard to the change of the priorities that could lead to more successful diplomatic negotiations in the future.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North Korea's record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most agree North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a solution. This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons: lack of trust, DPRK reluctance to permit transparency, and the difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive diplomacy. Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's question must be answered: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" If Washington is unwilling to back a threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy. Likewise, U.S. leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons. / Major, United States Air Force

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The United States of America (USA) has a new president in the White House - a president whose rhetoric appears to distance himself from the policies of the previous administration. This also appears to hold true for his approach with regard to nuclear nonproliferation. The overarching research aim of this study is to explore whether the Obama administration’s policy with regard to nuclear non-proliferation will differ significantly from that of the Bush administration. The broader subject of nuclear non-proliferation will be subdivided into three themes, namely: disarmament, proliferation by non-nuclear states and nuclear terrorism. In order to sketch the international context within which the USA’s policy must be viewed, an overview of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is provided. This will be followed by an exploration of disarmament, proliferation by nonnuclear states (with Iran and North Korea as case studies) and nuclear terrorism. In each case, a comparison between the Bush administration and the Obama administration’s policies will be done. Finally, an analysis will be done of the main similarities and differences between the two administrations’ approaches, with a focus on the use of hard, soft and smart power. The study concludes that the primary difference between the Bush and Obama administration’s approaches is that Bush pursued only one policy option (hard power) at a time, while Obama intends to use many different policy options (smart power) at the same time, with a focus on increasing the use of soft power. This sort of pragmatism may just be what the USA needs right now in order to address the problem of nuclear proliferation. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Verenigte State van Amerika (VSA) het ‘n nuwe president in die Withuis – ‘n president wie se uitsprake hom van die beleide van die vorige administrasie blyk te distansieer. Dit wil ook voorkom asof dit van toepassing is op sy benadering tot kernwapen versperring. Die oorhoofse navorsingsdoelwit van hierdie studie is om te ondersoek of die Obama administrasie se beleid ten opsigte van kernwapen versperring aansienlik van die van die Bush administrasie gaan verskil. Die breër onderwerp van kernwapen versperring kan in drie temas opgedeel word, naamlik: ontwapening, proliferasie deur nie-kernwapenstate, en kernwapen terrorisme. Ten einde die internasionale konteks te skets waarin die VSA se beleid moet geskied, begin die studie met ‘n oorsig van die kernwapen versperring regime. Dit word gevolg deur ‘n ondersoek van onderskeidelik ontwapening, proliferasie deur nie-kernwapenstate (met Iran en Noord-Korea as gevallestudies) en kernwapen terrorisme. By elkeen van die drie temas word ‘n vergelyking tussen die Bush administrasie en die Obama adminstrasie se beleide getref. Laastens word ‘n analise van die hoof verskille en ooreenkomste tussen die twee administrasies se benaderings onderneem, met die klem op die gebruik van harde, sagte en slim mag. Die bevinding van die studie is dat die hoof verskille tussen die Bush en Obama administrasies se benaderings behels dat Bush slegs een beleidsopsie (harde mag) op ‘n slag nagevolg het, terwyl Obama beoog om terselfdertyd van verskillende beleidsopsies (slim mag) gebruik te maak, met veral ‘n fokus op ‘n toename in die gebruik van sagte mag. Die soort pragmatisme mag dalk net wees wat die VSA tans nodig het om die probleem van kernwapen proliferasie aan te spreek.

Avec l’échec des négociations entre les États-Unis et la Corée du Nord, menées depuis le début des années 1990, sur la question du nucléaire, le problème est devenu graduellement l’affaire des pays voisins, tous soucieux de l’avenir de la région du sud-est asiatique. Présentée comme le seul allié de la Corée du Nord, la China a été invitée à participer à des négociations à trois, à quatre (1997-1998), et à six (2003-2007), dans l’espoir de faire entendre raison au régime isolé, mais jusqu’à maintenant, aucune des tentatives n’est parvenue à satisfaire chacun des membres à la table. Alors que la tension monte et que la politique américaine se fait de moins en moins flexible, la Chine quant à elle, continue d’encourager le retour des négociations à six (Six-Party Talks) dans l’optique de dénucléariser la péninsule coréenne, tout en travaillant à maintenir ses liens avec la Corée du Nord. Le fil conducteur de cette présente recherche est d’abord d’essayer de comprendre pourquoi la Chine continue de soutenir la Corée du Nord, fournissant dons alimentaires et financiers. L’idée est donc d’analyser, selon les principes du réalisme néoclassique, la politique étrangère de la Chine. L’hypothèse principale de cette théorie renvoie à l’idée que la distribution du pouvoir dans le système international influence la politique étrangère des États, mais que des variables au niveau de l’état et/ou de l’individu interviennent dans la formulation et l’application de celle-ci. Il est proposé ici que le lien entre l’unipolarité du système international et la politique nord-coréenne de la Chine, est façonné par des variables intermédiaires telles que : a) la perception des leaders de la distribution du pouvoir et de leur place dans le système international; b) l’idéologie du régime politique, et; c) le type d’unité responsable de la prise de décision en politique étrangère. L’analyse de chacune des variables permettra de faire la lumière sur les intérêts politiques et économiques de la Chine dans l’entretien de cette relation avec la Corée du Nord. / Since the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula failed to produce any effective outcome in the 1990s, China was brought to the table and agreed to play its part as a mediator in the Four Party Talks (1997-1998) between both Koreas and the United States, as well as in the Six-Party Talks (2003-2007), with the addition of Russia and Japan as negotiators. While the American policies toward the DPRK have taken a tough and inflexible turn with former President George W. Bush declaring, at the end of January 2002, that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq “constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world”, China’s DPRK policy, however, reflects long-lasting terms of friendship and collaboration between the two countries. With concerns mounting over the aggressive policies of the North Korean regime and its determination to keep its nuclear arsenal, the question is: why does China insist on preserving its good ties with its neighbour, even when those policies are said to hinder its political and economical interests? To address this question, the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism will be tested within a three-level – systemic, state, and individual level – analysis, with consideration of the propositions that the relative distribution of power shapes China’s North Korea policy, and intervening variables at the state and individual levels are filtering the systemic pressures and thus, shaping decisions related to North Korea. These variables include: a) leadership’s perception of power; b) regime type and ideology, and; c) type of foreign policy decision-making unit. This in-depth analysis will then provide grounds in defining China’s core interests in backing up the secluded regime.

Avec l’échec des négociations entre les États-Unis et la Corée du Nord, menées depuis le début des années 1990, sur la question du nucléaire, le problème est devenu graduellement l’affaire des pays voisins, tous soucieux de l’avenir de la région du sud-est asiatique. Présentée comme le seul allié de la Corée du Nord, la China a été invitée à participer à des négociations à trois, à quatre (1997-1998), et à six (2003-2007), dans l’espoir de faire entendre raison au régime isolé, mais jusqu’à maintenant, aucune des tentatives n’est parvenue à satisfaire chacun des membres à la table. Alors que la tension monte et que la politique américaine se fait de moins en moins flexible, la Chine quant à elle, continue d’encourager le retour des négociations à six (Six-Party Talks) dans l’optique de dénucléariser la péninsule coréenne, tout en travaillant à maintenir ses liens avec la Corée du Nord. Le fil conducteur de cette présente recherche est d’abord d’essayer de comprendre pourquoi la Chine continue de soutenir la Corée du Nord, fournissant dons alimentaires et financiers. L’idée est donc d’analyser, selon les principes du réalisme néoclassique, la politique étrangère de la Chine. L’hypothèse principale de cette théorie renvoie à l’idée que la distribution du pouvoir dans le système international influence la politique étrangère des États, mais que des variables au niveau de l’état et/ou de l’individu interviennent dans la formulation et l’application de celle-ci. Il est proposé ici que le lien entre l’unipolarité du système international et la politique nord-coréenne de la Chine, est façonné par des variables intermédiaires telles que : a) la perception des leaders de la distribution du pouvoir et de leur place dans le système international; b) l’idéologie du régime politique, et; c) le type d’unité responsable de la prise de décision en politique étrangère. L’analyse de chacune des variables permettra de faire la lumière sur les intérêts politiques et économiques de la Chine dans l’entretien de cette relation avec la Corée du Nord. / Since the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula failed to produce any effective outcome in the 1990s, China was brought to the table and agreed to play its part as a mediator in the Four Party Talks (1997-1998) between both Koreas and the United States, as well as in the Six-Party Talks (2003-2007), with the addition of Russia and Japan as negotiators. While the American policies toward the DPRK have taken a tough and inflexible turn with former President George W. Bush declaring, at the end of January 2002, that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq “constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world”, China’s DPRK policy, however, reflects long-lasting terms of friendship and collaboration between the two countries. With concerns mounting over the aggressive policies of the North Korean regime and its determination to keep its nuclear arsenal, the question is: why does China insist on preserving its good ties with its neighbour, even when those policies are said to hinder its political and economical interests? To address this question, the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism will be tested within a three-level – systemic, state, and individual level – analysis, with consideration of the propositions that the relative distribution of power shapes China’s North Korea policy, and intervening variables at the state and individual levels are filtering the systemic pressures and thus, shaping decisions related to North Korea. These variables include: a) leadership’s perception of power; b) regime type and ideology, and; c) type of foreign policy decision-making unit. This in-depth analysis will then provide grounds in defining China’s core interests in backing up the secluded regime.