Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-12-19T11:33:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo Marques Kussler T_.pdf: 1699687 bytes, checksum: d4b35ee869b4ba79ca0e639fd189ef72 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-12-19T11:33:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo Marques Kussler T_.pdf: 1699687 bytes, checksum: d4b35ee869b4ba79ca0e639fd189ef72 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-08-30 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A investigação ora aventada versa sobre a possibilidade de se retraçar a Filosofia para suas práticas originárias, que visavam não apenas o desenvolvimento teórico, mas o processo dialético existencial, que se mostrava na vida prática de cada filósofo, promovendo a Filosofia como um modo de vida. Assim, a presente tese tem como objetivo principal explicitar o conceito de experiência a partir de seu radical grego, μετοίκησις [metoíkēsis], cujo significado primário é mudança da morada [do ser]. Ao traçar elementos da experiência filosófica que alia discurso filosófico ao modo de vida filosófico, inicia-se uma investigação de prenúncios da referida metodologia filosófica em três diálogos de Platão, passando pela recondução do conceito na fenomenologia do idealismo hegeliano e, por fim, culminando na proposta contemporânea da Escola de Kyoto, que, ao nosso ver, é representante contemporânea dessa vertente. O primeiro capítulo aborda a filosofia a partir da noção metafórica de experiência de morte, com base nos diálogos platônicos Apologia, Críton e Fédon. A relevância de reinterpretar e retraduzir esses textos está na possibilidade de renovar a compreensão destes, seja pela metodologia utilizada ou pela instauração de um novo paradigma hermenêutico, de modo que seja possível evitar alguns paradigmas interpretativos que se atêm aos subtítulos latinos dos diálogos platônicos. O segundo capítulo, por sua vez, propõe uma ponte conceitual do conceito grego supracitado ao conceito de Erfahrung conforme aparece na Fenomenologia do Espírito de Hegel. A proposta aqui advogada é que o que se compreende como experiência da consciência descrita no projeto da fenomenologia hegeliana pode ser compreendido como um exercício dialético do sujeito que busca transformar seu modo de ser-no-mundo, tal como na proposta grega recém-referida. Além do texto de Hegel, há seções de comentadores de primeira instância de Hegel, especialmente Heidegger e Gadamer, que corroboram nossa defesa interpretativa. O terceiro capítulo aborda o conceito de μετανοεῖν [metanoeîn], retomado pela tradição da Escola de Kyoto sob a perspectiva da experiência filosófica, em que propomos relação direta com a perspectiva desenvolvida nos capítulos anteriores. Aqui, mostramos como Kitarō Nishida e Hajime Tanabe destacam-se enquanto especialistas na fenomenologia de Hegel e na ontologia heideggeriana, das quais unem conceitos do budismo japonês e propõem uma forma de filosofia como forma de vida, ressaltando o fim da filosofia como algo que requer o comprometimento existencial e a autoimplicação do filósofo. / The research now proposed deals with the possibility of retracing Philosophy to its original practices, which aimed not only at the theoretical development, but at the existential dialectic process, which was shown in the practical life of each philosopher, promoting Philosophy as a way of life. Thus, the main objective of this thesis is to explain the concept of experience from its Greek root, μετοίκησις [metoíkēsis], whose primary meaning is change of the abode [of being]. In tracing elements of the philosophical experience that combines philosophical discourse with the philosophical way of life, we begin an investigation of foreshadowing the aforementioned philosophical methodology in three dialogues of Plato, going through the renewal of the concept in the phenomenology of Hegelian idealism, and, finally, culminating in contemporary proposal of the Kyoto School, which, in our view, is a contemporary representative of this. The first chapter approaches philosophy from the metaphorical notion of the experience of death, based on the Platonic dialogues Apology, Crito and Phaedo. The relevance of reinterpreting and retranslating these texts in the possibility of renewing their understanding, either by the methodology used or by the establishment of a new hermeneutic paradigm, so that it is possible to avoid some interpretative paradigms that follow the Latin sub-titles of the Platonic dialogues. The second chapter, in turn, proposes a conceptual bridge of the Greek concept mentioned above to the concept of Erfahrung as it appears in Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit. The proposal advocated here is that what is understood as the experience of consciousness described in the project of Hegelian phenomenology can be understood as a dialectical exercise of the subject that seeks to transform its way of being-in-the-world, as in the Greek proposal just mentioned. In addition to Hegel’s text, there are two main sections of Hegel’s first-instance commentators, mainly Heidegger and Gadamer, which corroborate our interpretative defense. The third chapter approaches the concept of μετανοεῖν [metanoeîn], resumed by the tradition of the Kyoto School from the perspective of philosophical experience, in which we propose a straight relation to the perspective developed in previous chapters. Here we show how Kitarō Nishida and Hajime Tanabe stand out as specialists in Hegel’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s ontology, which unite concepts of Japanese Buddhism and propose a form of Philosophy as a way of life, emphasizing the end of Philosophy as something that requires the existential commitment and the self-involvement of the philosopher.

日本京都學派的西谷啟治曾表示，對他而言其哲學的根本課題就是「通過虛無主義的虛無主義之超克」。然而，「虛無主義」一詞並非單純只表示某種失去生命中最重要的價值時所產生的「虛無感」；在哲學上它還指向在特定時期，即產生於19世紀歐洲地區的精神危機，以及試圖解答此危機的各種哲學思想。但更重要的問題是：既然虛無主義是歐洲所產生的思想產物，為何會成為身為日本人的西谷啟治的哲學起點？虛無主義與西谷啟治的思想彼此之間的關係是什麼？ 若從外在的動機而論，雖然歐洲虛無主義並非產生於東亞，然而對西谷啟治而言，在日本明治維新之後，盲目追求西化的結果，導致自身的精神與文化的傳統被忽視，逐漸地失去生命力。同時對於西化的嚮往也反過來導致了自我厭惡。如何在這西化的潮流中，回顧自身的傳統，找到自身的定位，同時得到內在的安心，從而迎向未來，就成了西谷對歐洲虛無主義的關注動機。此外，西谷啟治選擇了禪佛教作為他的解答：從禪佛教的立場，重新檢視歐洲虛無主義產生的原因，並且對西方的種種哲學思想提出批判。

This paper examines the role played by death in the philosophy of Nishitani Keiji, through the nondual logic of contradictory identity developed by his teacher and founder of the Kyotoschool of philosophy, Nishida Kitarō. I explore Nishitani’s understanding of how Nothingness, nihility, through our awareness of death penetrates and nullifies existence itself, how the irreality of all being comes to the fore to make being itself unreal. The nullifying nothingness of nihility, however, is still nothingness represented as a something; it is a reified nothing, defined as the antithesis to being and thus still seen as a corollary of being itself. A truly absolute nothingness, what Nishitani calls Śūnyatā, emptiness, must be a nothingness so devoid of being as to not even be nothing; it must be absolutely nothing at all, and thus nothing else than being itself. The final chapter of my paper seeks to apply this nondual understanding of being and nothingness to the question of death itself; to understand the ontological meaning of death - the passage from being to non-being - when being and non-being have been one from the very beginning. The paper also seeks to blur the lines between what has traditionally been considered philosophy and religion, using the thinking of the Kyoto school to point to the deeper ties between the two in the borderland that is buddhist philosophy.