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Yes / Peoples’ judgments and decisions often change when made in their foreign language. Existing research testing this foreign language effect has predominantly used text-based stimuli with little research focusing on the impact of listening to audio stimuli on the effect. The only existing study on this topic found shifts in people’s moral decisions only in the audio modality. Firstly, by reanalyzing the data from this previous study and by collecting data in an additional experiment, we found no consistent effects of using foreign language on moral judgments. Secondly, in both datasets we found no significant language by modality interaction. Overall, our results highlight the need for more robust testing of the foreign language effect, and its boundary conditions. However, modality of presentation does not appear to be a candidate for explaining its variability. Data and materials for this experiment are available at https://osf.io/qbjxn/.

This study explores the intersection of two major conceptions in higher education: professors' folk pedagogies and teaching's moral dimension. Folk pedagogy is the accumulated set of beliefs, conceptions and assumptions that professors personally hold about the practice of teaching (Bruner, 1996). When these beliefs and conceptions are enacted as a teaching practice, they are conceivably undertaken on behalf of students as the means to a good end. Professors, in the course of enacting their folk pedagogies, make educational decisions -- value determinations in essence -- about what they believe are in the best interests of their students. In so doing they have entered moral territory. To make these decisions, issues related to moral perception, moral imagination, and moral responsiveness are present. This moral dimension of teaching was found in this study to be an inherent feature of the participants' folk pedagogy. Pursuing tangible exemplars of these ideas, this study accomplished three key objectives. First, it explored and described some key features of professors' folk pedagogies. Second, it examines the discourse that emerged from the folk pedagogy investigation for its moral expressions and the insights it offered toward understanding how professors conceive of teaching as a moral endeavor. Finally, using narrative analysis as the guiding methodology, it retold professors' personal narratives - their discursive practices - as a unified story of moral agency and moral discourse in university teaching. These objectives were satisfied through case study investigations of three professors, wherein each participant professor was interviewed and observed teaching over the course of nine weeks. Although this investigation sought to explore moral discourse, four additional discourses were discovered interacting with the moral discourse - the personal discourse, a professional discourse, an academic discourse, and the institutional discourse. It was found that rather than there being one singular moral discourse, each independent discourse possessed its own moral substance. A full view of the moral discourse, therefore, can only be achieved by looking across all of the independent discourses themselves. Interestingly, the nature of the moral discourse and moral agency varied for each professor depending upon which independent discourse dominated her or his practice. For example, those professors engaged in professional disciplines (i.e., business and engineering) exhibited practices dominated by what is termed here a professional discourse. In contrast, the practice of the philosophy professor was dominated by the academic discourse. In each case, however, the moral discourse revealed itself most often when professors' engaged in closer, more personal interactions with students and during their consideration of students in their course planning. Moral discourse and moral agency for the professors in this study played an important role in their overall folk pedagogy and in many instances served as an unintentional pedagogical tool. / Ph. D.

In organizations, it is inevitable that some business activities might seem unfair to subordinates. Social accounts—the explanations managers give their subordinates for those decisions—are known to be a useful tool for managing subordinates’ fairness concerns. Over three decades of research, we learn that social accounts are effectiveness in improving subordinates’ fairness perceptions and reducing their negative reactions. Yet, we have only limited understanding about how social accounts affect the perceptions and behaviors of managers—those who construct and give them. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the extent to which constructing accounts affects account-givers’ perceptions and behaviors. Drawing on research in social account and behavioral ethics, a model was developed to test the positive effect of constructing accounts on unethical behavior (direct effect) through moral disengagement and guilt (indirect effect). In respect to account types, it was hypothesized that constructing justifications would lead to higher moral disengagement, less guilt, and more unethical behavior, compared with constructing excuses. Account feedback was hypothesized to moderate the indirect effects of justifications and excuses on unethical behaviors such that account acceptance would strengthen moral disengagement and weaken guilt, and in turn, increase unethical behavior. Two experimental designed studies were conducted to test these hypotheses. In Study 1, utilizing a sample of 128 management students, constructing accounts was found to have a positive effect on unethical behavior (i.e., nepotism) with guilt but not moral disengagement explaining some of the variances in this relation. In contrast to my hypotheses, constructing excuses was found to increase guilt more than constructing justifications. Using a sample of 136 management students, Study 2 generally replicated the results found in Study 1: constructing accounts was found to increase unethical behavior (i.e., dishonesty) through guilt, with excuses having a greater effect. This dissertation concludes with a discussion on contributions, practical implications, limitations, and the direction for future research on social accounts and behavioral ethics. / Ph. D.

Tableau d'honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdorales, 2014-2015 / Plusieurs philosophes estiment que le réalisme moral est incompatible avec la reconnaissance du rôle majeur joué par l'évolution dans le façonnement de la moralité. Sharon Street formule ce problème sous la forme d’un « dilemme darwinien ». Le problème pour les réalistes consiste à expliquer la relation entre les vérités morales indépendantes dont ils supposent l’existence et les pressions évolutionnistes. Deux options s’offrent à eux: nier ou affirmer l'existence d’une telle relation. La première option mène, selon Street, à la conclusion selon laquelle nos jugements moraux sont probablement faux puisqu'ils sont déformés par les pressions évolutionnistes. La seconde option est indéfendable sur le plan scientifique. Deux stratégies argumentatives ont été déployées à ce jour par les réalistes afin de résoudre le dilemme, soit la réponse naturelle et l'explication par un troisième facteur. Nous soutenons dans le mémoire qu'aucune de ces stratégies ne constitue une réponse satisfaisante au dilemme darwinien.

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1933 H83

This historical study attempts a thorough revision of some current assumptions about Fielding's moral 'philosophy'. It endorses the orthodox view that Latitudinarian Anglicanism was a decisive influence, but questions whether the Anglican moralists can usefully be described as exponents of 'benevolism' - their sermons are distinguished most notably by an overriding concern with the inculcation of prudence, and by persistent hortatory appeals to self-interest. 'Prudentialism' is arguably a better term for Latitudinarian ethics, and indeed for that dimension of Fielding's work which is attributable to Anglican influence - above all, the reiterated emphasis on the coincidence of virtue and interest. The Latitudinarian connexion is important. But there were other formative influences, including the 'negative' influence of philosophies with which Fielding disagreed, such as ethical rationalism and psychological egoism. The moral 'philosophy' of Tom Jones is not a rigid conceptual structure: it is a dynamic, and sometimes polemical, response to contemporary ethical debate. This study therefore analyzes Fielding's moral vocabulary by relating it to various other contemporary moral vocabularies. Making constant, detailed reference to chosen contextual sources, it explores Fielding's views on a range of 'live' moral and moral-psychological issues: on the functions of prudence and the grounds of prudential obligation; on the relations between prudential obligation and other moral duties; on benevolence, self-love, and 'disinterestedness'; on the relative status of 'private' and 'public' virtues; on the moral functions of reason and the passions; and on the psychology of moral judgment. This study suggests that Fielding's writings embody a complex and uneasy synthesis of two historically divergent ethical traditions: in his didactic emphasis on interest and his concern with the enlightenment of self-love, Fielding is a literary heir of Anglican prudentialism; in his esteem for the 'heart', he can be seen as an ally of the newer 'sentimental' school of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume.

Human rights education (HRE) is a growing pedagogical force that lacks conceptual theorisation and awareness of an emerging postsecular context. This hampers the extent to which it can accomplish its aims of encouraging friendship between people of different religious and philosophical traditions while advancing a universal culture of rights. The thesis analyses the role of religion within HRE literature, both at an international and theoretical level, and in the curriculum documents for English schools, finding parallel weaknesses resulting from this shallow theoretical base. The thesis contributes to HRE literature with a distinctive analysis of the foundational concept of dignity and the meaning-giving narratives that contributed to the concept’s development. It unravels the complexities surrounding an often mentioned but seldom explained concept, identifying relationships between inherent worth, human flourishing and societal recognition. It demonstrates that taking an inclusive approach to this conceptual framework allows for two crucial ingredients in contemporary society: different meaning-giving narratives may be held, while a common ethical understanding of rights based on dignity is adhered to. It argues that the concept of dignity is a foundation for a particular pedagogical approach that advances a commitment to the inherent worth of the human person. The approach consists of two reflexive elements: a self-reflective enquiry into the faiths and philosophies of the individual learners and a dialogue with and for others. These elements are essential if the colonial mistakes of earlier human rights movements are to be avoided, and they identify the significance of religious education in HRE. A proposal for a recontextualised form of HRE that is theologically and religiously literate presents a distinctive offering to guide policy and practice. The proposal acknowledges the overlap between educational movement and theological thought and makes specific reference to contributions from contemporary Catholic thinking. The thesis aims to motivate further research to carry forward the HRE proposal and develop new thinking about postsecular education.

The aim of this study is to show what was Rotrou's conception of the tragic, which is concomitantly to point out in what ways it differed from the conception of tragedy held by his precursors, such as Hardy, and his contemporaries.

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