Este trabalho visa à compreensão do poder político e da legitimidade da sujeição civil, no pensamento de John Locke. O ponto chave é a análise dos sustentáculos de sua doutrina: Razão e Lei de Natureza, que delineiam uma teologia natural no seu pensamento, evidenciando a relação entre a ética e a política. Locke articula seu pensamento em função da noção de homem natural, de Deus e da Razão. O homem lockiano é um ser livre e racional, voltado a cumprir os desígnios do Criador: Deus, apresentando uma espécie de virtude natural. Necessário é explicitar o seu conceito de liberdade que é dado através da noção de igualdade, com a conseqüente ausência de subordinação entre os homens. Para isso, é necessário caracterizar o homem no estado de natureza e a sua opção voluntária e racional pela comunidade civil, através de um pacto social, voltado à instituição de um poder comum, do governo de leis e da maioria. As idéias centrais discutidas: lei natural, estado de natureza, pacto/consentimento, direito de resistência, homem virtuoso, legitimidade e fins do governo, podem evidenciar a noção de obediência como uma relação de confiança e forma de participação popular no governo de leis. / This work aims at understanding political power and legitimacy of civil liability in the thought of John Locke. The key point is the analysis of the underpinnings of his doctrine: Reason and Law of Nature, which outline a natural theology in his teaching, showing the relationship between ethics and politics. Locke articulates his thinking on the basis of the concept of natural man, God and Reason. The Lockean man is a racional and free being, dedicated to fulfill the desires of the Creator: God, presenting a kind of natural virtue. It is necessary to clarify the concept of freedom that is given through the notion of equality, with the consequent absence of subordination among men. Therefore, it\'s necessary to characterize the man in the state of nature and its rational and voluntary choice by the civil community, through a social pact, aimed at stablishing a common power, the government of laws and the majority. Central ideas discussed: natural law, the state of nature, consent agreement, right of resistance, virtuous man, legitimacy and purpose of government can demonstrate the notion of obedience as a confidence relationship and a form of popular participation in government of laws.

Dentre os debates a respeito da filosofia política de Hobbes, as relações entre lei de natureza e lei civil são objeto de grande controvérsia. Principalmente dois pontos são discutidos em relação à lei de natureza. O primeiro corresponde à sua imperatividade: a lei de natureza tem força de comando no estado de natureza ou é mera recomendação? O segundo corresponde à sua relação com a lei civil: são ambas a mesma coisa, são contrárias, são complementares? Com vistas a responder a esses questionamentos, a presente dissertação investiga três utilizações do conceito de lei de natureza por Hobbes como preceito da razão, como comando de Deus e como lei moral , duas utilizações do conceito de lei civil como comando do soberano e como medida das ações dos súditos , bem como as relações que Hobbes estabelece entre os dois conceitos. / Among the discussions concerning Hobbes political philosophy, the relations between the law of nature and the civil law raise great controversy. Two points related to the law of nature remain unsolved. The first one deals with its imperative character: does the law of nature have the force of a true command in the state of nature or is it a mere recommendation? The second point deals with its relation with the civil law: are they the same, are they contradictory, are they complementary? Aiming to answer these questions, this work analyses three different uses of the law of nature concept as a rational precept, as a command of God and as moral law , two uses of the civil law concept as a command of the sovereign and as a rule for the subjects actions , as well as the relations that Hobbes states between those two concepts.

Dentre os debates a respeito da filosofia política de Hobbes, as relações entre lei de natureza e lei civil são objeto de grande controvérsia. Principalmente dois pontos são discutidos em relação à lei de natureza. O primeiro corresponde à sua imperatividade: a lei de natureza tem força de comando no estado de natureza ou é mera recomendação? O segundo corresponde à sua relação com a lei civil: são ambas a mesma coisa, são contrárias, são complementares? Com vistas a responder a esses questionamentos, a presente dissertação investiga três utilizações do conceito de lei de natureza por Hobbes como preceito da razão, como comando de Deus e como lei moral , duas utilizações do conceito de lei civil como comando do soberano e como medida das ações dos súditos , bem como as relações que Hobbes estabelece entre os dois conceitos. / Among the discussions concerning Hobbes political philosophy, the relations between the law of nature and the civil law raise great controversy. Two points related to the law of nature remain unsolved. The first one deals with its imperative character: does the law of nature have the force of a true command in the state of nature or is it a mere recommendation? The second point deals with its relation with the civil law: are they the same, are they contradictory, are they complementary? Aiming to answer these questions, this work analyses three different uses of the law of nature concept as a rational precept, as a command of God and as moral law , two uses of the civil law concept as a command of the sovereign and as a rule for the subjects actions , as well as the relations that Hobbes states between those two concepts.

Este trabalho visa à compreensão do poder político e da legitimidade da sujeição civil, no pensamento de John Locke. O ponto chave é a análise dos sustentáculos de sua doutrina: Razão e Lei de Natureza, que delineiam uma teologia natural no seu pensamento, evidenciando a relação entre a ética e a política. Locke articula seu pensamento em função da noção de homem natural, de Deus e da Razão. O homem lockiano é um ser livre e racional, voltado a cumprir os desígnios do Criador: Deus, apresentando uma espécie de virtude natural. Necessário é explicitar o seu conceito de liberdade que é dado através da noção de igualdade, com a conseqüente ausência de subordinação entre os homens. Para isso, é necessário caracterizar o homem no estado de natureza e a sua opção voluntária e racional pela comunidade civil, através de um pacto social, voltado à instituição de um poder comum, do governo de leis e da maioria. As idéias centrais discutidas: lei natural, estado de natureza, pacto/consentimento, direito de resistência, homem virtuoso, legitimidade e fins do governo, podem evidenciar a noção de obediência como uma relação de confiança e forma de participação popular no governo de leis. / This work aims at understanding political power and legitimacy of civil liability in the thought of John Locke. The key point is the analysis of the underpinnings of his doctrine: Reason and Law of Nature, which outline a natural theology in his teaching, showing the relationship between ethics and politics. Locke articulates his thinking on the basis of the concept of natural man, God and Reason. The Lockean man is a racional and free being, dedicated to fulfill the desires of the Creator: God, presenting a kind of natural virtue. It is necessary to clarify the concept of freedom that is given through the notion of equality, with the consequent absence of subordination among men. Therefore, it\'s necessary to characterize the man in the state of nature and its rational and voluntary choice by the civil community, through a social pact, aimed at stablishing a common power, the government of laws and the majority. Central ideas discussed: natural law, the state of nature, consent agreement, right of resistance, virtuous man, legitimacy and purpose of government can demonstrate the notion of obedience as a confidence relationship and a form of popular participation in government of laws.

Στην παρούσα εργασία εξετάζεται η θεωρία για το δίκαιο και την φύσει εξουσία του ισχυρού στον Πλάτωνα και τον Θουκυδίδη υπό το πρίσμα του αντιθετικού ζεύγους νόμος - φύσις. Συγκεκριμένα εξετάζονται δύο πλατωνικοί διάλογοι, η Πολιτεία και ο Γοργίας και ένα εκτενές και πολυσυζητημένο χωρίο της θουκυδίδειας Ιστορίας, ο διάλογος Αθηναίων - Μηλίων. Αναφορικά με την Πολιτεία διερευνάται η στάση του σοφιστή Θρασύμαχου απέναντι στον νόμο, στο πρώτο βιβλίο. Εν συνεχεία, στον Γοργία, εξετάζεται η εξύψωση του φυσικού δικαίου και της φύσεως εκ μέρους του Καλλικλή, συνομιλητή του Σωκράτη στον εν λόγω πλατωνικό διάλογο. Παράλληλα, ο Καλλικλής περιγράφει τον ιδανικό τύπο ανθρώπου, αλλά και τον ιδανικό τρόπο ζωής. Τέλος, αναφορικά με τον διάλογο Αθηναίων -Μηλίων, το ενδιαφέρον μας εστιάζεται στην εξύψωση του νόμου της φύσεως εκ μέρους των Αθηναίων, στην προσπάθειά τους να πείσουν τους Μήλιους να προσχωρήσουν στην Αθηναϊκή συμμαχία κατά την διάρκεια του Πελοποννησιακού πολέμου. Σύμφωνα με τον εν λόγω νόμο, οι ισχυροί οφείλουν πάντα να καταδυναστεύουν τους αδυνάτους. Η εξέταση των άνωθι αποσπασμάτων καταδεικνύει την απήχηση που είχαν κατά την διάρκεια του 5ου αιώνα θεωρίες για το δίκαιο και την εξουσία που αντλούν οι ισχυροί, έναντι των αδυνάτων, από την φύση. / The present essay examines the theory about the right and the φύσει strength in two platonic dialogues, the Republic and the Gorgias,and in an extensive passage of the History of Thucydides, the Melian dialogue.

Certains philosophes affirment que les relations causales sont fondées sur les lois de la nature. Cette conception cadre mal avec la réalité des sciences biomédicales et des sciences humaines. Pour se rapprocher de la pratique réelle des diverses sciences, James Woodward propose une conception de la causalité et de l’explication causale fondée sur une relation beaucoup moins exigeante que celle de loi de la nature, qu’il appelle l’invariance. Le but de ce mémoire est de présenter le concept d’invariance et les autres concepts causaux qui s’y rattachent et, d’identifier certaines difficultés, dans le but de cerner l’usage approprié de cette famille de concepts. La conception causale de Woodward suppose que le but de la recherche des causes est pratique plutôt que simplement épistémique : il s’agit pour les agents de s’appuyer sur les causes pour modifier les phénomènes. Cette conception est également non-réductive; elle utilise des contrefactuels et reflète les méthodes expérimentales des diverses sciences. La cohérence de cette conception avec les généralisations causales réelles des sciences fait en sorte qu’elle abandonne l’objectif d’universalité rattaché à la notion de loi de la nature, en faveur d’un objectif de fiabilité temporaire. De plus, comme le critère d’invariance est peu exigeant, d’autres critères doivent lui être ajoutés pour identifier, parmi les relations causales (c’est-à-dire invariantes), les relations les plus susceptibles d’être employées pour modifier les phénomènes de façon fiable. / Some philosophers claim that causal relations are based on the laws of nature. This view is not consistent with the actual causal relations found in the biomedical and social sciences. In order to better reflect the actual practice in the various sciences, James Woodward puts forward a view of causation and causal explanation based on a much less demanding relation than that of law of nature, which he calls ‘invariance’. This essay presents the concept of invariance and other related causal concepts, and identifies certain problems, in order to outline the proper use of this group of concepts. Woodward’s conception assumes that the goal of causal inquiry is practical rather than merely epistemic : agents use causal relationships to modify outcomes. The conception is also non reductive ; it uses counterfactuals and is a reflection of the experimental methods of the various sciences. The fact that this conception is consistent with the actual causal generalizations found in the various sciences implies that the goal of universal truth associated with the notion of law of nature is set aside and is replaced by an objective of temporary reliability. In addition, since the invariance criterion is not very demanding, other criteria must be added to identify, among causal (i.e. invariant) relations, those relations that can be relied upon to reliably modify outcomes.

Galilée (1564-1642) a introduit dans son Il Saggiatore (1623) une nouvelle conception du corps. L’ontologie et la théorie de la connaissance des corps de Spinoza peuvent être conçues comme une réponse à Galilée. En effet, le philosophe hollandais répète de nombreuses fois que les qualités sensibles n’appartiennent pas aux corps en soi. En outre, il précise que les idées des affections sont des idées inadéquates qui représentent plutôt le corps affecté que les corps affectants. Néanmoins, Spinoza (1632-1677) donne une interprétation tout à fait particulière de cette conception galiléenne. Comme il le précise dans sa définition de l’Abrégé de physique, un corps en soi est un ensemble de parties qui sont unies par un rapport mutuel de mouvement et de repos. Ce ratio est à concevoir comme une nature, une proportion ou une loi physique d’un corps. Par sa nouvelle conception du corps, Galilée a dépassé la distinction ontologique entre les corps artificiels et les corps naturels, ouvrant la voie à l’application des modèles et des analogies. A première vue, Spinoza n’applique pas le modèle du pendule. Néanmoins, une étude plus détaillée dévoile l’importance de la physique de l’horloge pendulaire (inventée par Galilée et perfectionnée par Chr. Huygens) dans la conception spinoziste du corps. Dans sa définition du corps de l’E1, Spinoza conçoit le corps dans sa relation avec l’essence de Dieu. Néanmoins, dans sa CM, il a introduit le conatus ou l’essence d’une chose en donnant le paradigme d’un corps en mouvement. Comme Galilée l’avait démontré, le mouvement est essentiellement une force. Spinoza a généralisé cette idée de force, comme il l’a fait avec l’idée de loi de la nature. / In Il Saggiatore (1623), Galileo (1564-1642) introduced a novel conception of the body. Spinoza’s ontology and epistemology can be viewed as original responses to this. Indeed, the author of the Ethics writes repeatedly that sensible qualities do not belong to the body as such. Moreover, he clearly states that the ideas of affections are inadequate, representing much less the intrinsic properties of external bodies than the affected body itself. However, Spinoza (1632-1677) gives a very particular interpretation of the Galilean conception. As he makes clear in his Physical Interlude, a body consists in a group of parts united by a mutual relation of motion and rest. Furthermore, this relation is to conceived as a nature, proportion or physical law of the body. By means of his new conception, Galileo radically upended the ontological distinction between artificial and natural bodies, which opened the door to the application of models and analogies for the explanation of natural phenomena. At a first glance, Spinoza does not apply the model of the pendulum clock, which was a leading model of the 17th century. However, a closer look reveals the importance of the physics of the pendulum clock (invented by Galileo and perfected by Christian Huygens) for Spinoza’s conception of the body. In his definition in E1, Spinoza conceives of the body in its relation to the essence of God. In his CM, however, he had introduced the conatus, or the essence of a thing, in terms of the paradigm of the body in motion. As Galileo had shown, motion is essentially a force. Spinoza generalized this notion of force, just as he generalized the idea of the law of nature.

This thesis is a context-sensitive study of key epistemological commitments and concerns presented in Philo’s two series of exegetical writings. The major conclusion advanced in this thesis is that two theological epistemologies, distinct yet related, can be detected among these writings. The first epistemology is specific to the Allegorical Commentary. The second epistemology is specific to the ‘Exposition of the Law.’ The epistemology of the Allegorical Commentary reflects a threefold conviction: the sovereignty of God, the creaturely contingency of the human mind and its inescapable limitations. In conversation with key epistemological notions of his day, Philo develops this threefold conviction in exegetical discourses that are grounded in Pentateuchal texts portraying the God of Moses as both possessing epistemic authority and aiding the aspiring mind to gain purification and perfection in the knowledge of God. Guided by this threefold conviction, Philo enlists key metaphors of his day – initiation into divine mysteries and divine inspiration, among others –in order to capture something of the essence of Moses’ twofold way of ascending to the divine, an approach which requires at times the enhancement of human reason and at other times the eviction of human reason. The epistemology of the ‘Exposition’ reflects Philo’s understanding of the Pentateuch as a perfect whole partitioned into three distinct yet inseverable parts. Philo’s knowledge discourses in the ‘creation’ part of the ‘Exposition’ reflect two primary movements of thought. The first is heavily invested with a Platonic reading of Genesis 1.27 while the second invests Genesis 2.7 with a mixture of Platonic and Stoic notions of human transformation and well-being. Philo’s discourses in the ‘patriarchs’ segment reflect an interest in portraying the three great patriarchs as exemplars of the virtues of instruction (Abraham), nature (Isaac), and practice (Jacob) which featured prominently in Greek models of education. In the ‘Moses’ segment of the ‘Exposition,’ many of Philo’s discourses on knowledge are marked by an interest in presenting Moses as the ideal king, lawgiver, prophet and priest who surpasses Plato’s paradigm of the philosopher-king. In keeping with this view, Philo insists that the written laws of Moses represent the perfect counterpart to the unwritten law of nature. The life and laws of Moses serve as the paradigm for Philo to understand his own experiences of noetic ascent and exhort readers to cultivate similar aspirational notions and practices.