Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 2006. / Cover title. "April 2006." Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 22-25).

Severe poverty and ethnic-conflicts are the two most devastating problems of the contemporary world. Eighteen million persons die every year from causes related to poverty and a vast amount of developing countries suffer from tremendous processes of destabilization –frequently involving highly violent actions– associated to the relations between majority and minority groups. In both cases, the intervention of international powers and institutions has not been helpful enough to make a difference, and this present reality projects itself as a distressing scene for the future. Human rights and minority rights are the most powerful international tools in trying to change this sad global scenario. However, there is an extensive debate on the nature of these rights in a theory of international justice. This is often characterized as a debate between “minimalist” who seek to reduce the currently –recognized list of human rights to a bare minimum in order to accommodate non-liberal societies, and more expansive liberal approaches, which seek to expand the list of human rights to include the full set of civil and political rights characteristic of modern liberal-democracies. In this thesis, I will argue in favour of a third position. In line with some of the more minimalist approaches, I will argue that constraints of legitimacy rule out attempts to include full civil and political rights into our list of human rights. However, I will argue that these same constraints of legitimacy advocates for expanding the currently-recognized list of human rights in at least two key respects: the recognition of certain basic social and economic rights; and the recognition of certain minority rights. In short, we should be minimalist on some issues, while more expansive in others. In developing this argument, I will relay on the framework provided by The Law of Peoples of John Rawls. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-05 10:41:44.771

In Law of Peoples Rawls tries to work out a theory that will ensure a fair interaction between the world’s ‘peoples’ (synonymous with “nations”). By this he means a description of international rules that both liberal and non-liberal peoples can accept, with the purpose of eradicating political injustices in the world; which Rawls believes is the big cause of the greatest evils in the world. Furthermore, in his theory, Rawls envisions a set of international institutions (WTO, World Bank and “the UN”) that will work as the basic structure for implementing this scheme of law; global rules of trade; providing loans; facilitation of capital investment, etc. However, the theory lacks a description of which political liberties the peoples would want to secure, within the international institutions, and of what principles of distribution they should be assigned. Accordingly, I will in this essay try to establish which rights the peoples—as Rawls envisions them—would want to secure, and why they would want to be viewed as equal to everybody else, by reasons of the institutions profound and pervasive effect on peoples success. Furthermore, I will contend that this equality in political liberties, and especially the ‘principle of equal participation’, will be impaired by the inequalities in resources that Rawls accepts between the peoples. Consequently, an issue of how wealthier peoples will use their power to promote their self-interest, and the lack of belief that constitutional safeguards, within the international institutions, will constrain them from using means of agitation.

This essay presents and discusses John Rawls’s ‘The Law of Peoples’ and it’s ability to be used in practice. The theory’s ability to judge right and wrongful actions in liberal intervention is tested when applied to the current conflict in Syria, and is used to evaluate the actions made by the liberal state France, during its involvement in the crisis. The essay will discuss shortcomings in the theory, and possible solutions to these and will also come to discuss central ideas in the theory and the liberal ism. Other writers such as Michael Doyle and Simon Caney are discussed and presented more briefly. The essay will argue that the theory in The Law of Peoples is not sufficient to alone evaluate the conflict it is applied upon, and therefore not comprehensive enough to be used in practice without adjustments.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-08-20T13:17:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernando_Nunes_Oliveira_Dissetacao.pdf: 880039 bytes, checksum: b8d5a094028656deda01ac313ad984f4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-09-06 / The list of human rights present in The Law of Peoples differs from that list usually found in many democratic constitutions and it suffers accusations of not being properly justified. The fact of bringing a list of human rights with liberal roots to where certain guarantees are absent might make one theory of peace based on the Law of Peoples especially efficient, because it leaves open the possibility that non-liberal, but decent, peoples integrate the Society of Peoples, reducing the mistrust as well the resentment. Furthermore, this list of human rights is properly justified. However, in order to understand such justification is necessary to have a certain knowledge of the ideal of Justice as Fairness, especially of some of its features and assumptions such as the original position in a veil of ignorance, the use of the public reason and the reasonable pluralism, because the Law of Peoples does a diverse and analogous use of these features and assumptions. The Law of Peoples conceives peoples as free and equals and sets forth which principles ideal representatives of peoples, under a veil of ignorance, would choose in order to regulate the relations between peoples. It is an extension of a liberal theory of justice towards the international level. As such, the inclusion of non-liberal, but decent, peoples in a Society of Peoples is necessary, because it is an exigency innate of political liberalism. The foundation of a list of human rights not entirely comprehensive, have its origin justly in this necessity of tolerance towards non-liberal peoples. No doubt a list containing more rights would be desirable, but this would bring justification problems, eventually it would be seen as an imposition of liberal values in the international extent. / A lista de direitos humanos presente em O Direito dos Povos diverge daquela normalmente encontrada em muitas constituições democráticas e sofre acusações de não apresentar uma justificação adequada. O fato de trazer uma lista de direitos humanos em que estão ausentes certas garantias consideradas como de origem liberal pode fazer com que uma teoria de paz baseada no Direito dos Povos seja especialmente eficiente, pois deixa aberta a possibilidade de que povos não-liberais, mas decentes, integrem a Sociedade dos Povos, diminuindo o ressentimento e a desconfiança. Além disso, essa lista de direitos humanos é devidamente justificada. Entretanto para que o entendimento de tal justificação seja compreendido é necessário um determinado grau de conhecimento da Justiça como Eqüidade, especialmente de algumas de suas características e pressupostos, como a posição original sob um véu de ignorância, o uso da razão pública e o pluralismo razoável, pois no Direito dos Povos há um uso diverso e análogo deles. O Direito dos Povos concebe os povos como livres e iguais e estabelece que princípios representantes ideais de povos, sob um véu de ignorância, escolheriam para regular as relações entre povos, sendo uma extensão de uma teoria de justiça liberal para o nível internacional. Como tal, a inclusão de povos não-liberais, mas decentes, em uma Sociedade dos Povos é necessária, pois ela é uma exigência do próprio liberalismo político. A justificação de uma lista não tão abrangente de direitos humanos tem origem justamente nessa necessidade de tolerância aos povos não-liberais. Sem dúvidas uma lista mais abrangente seria desejável, mas traria problemas de justificação, podendo ser vista como a imposição de valores liberais no campo internacional.

John Rawls‟s stated intergenerational justice scheme, known as the just-savings principle, does not include an institutional concern for the environment and is therefore incomplete and incapable of maintaining meaningfully just relations between generations. The theory‟s emphasis on economic theory and capital accumulation demonstrates a misinterpretation of environmental issues and concerns as well as their underlying causes and repercussions. This lapse in Rawls‟s intergenerational scheme exposes flaws in his larger theory of justice by leaving the stability of society in question and placing arbitrary burdens on generations and peoples without institutional recourse. However, by supplementing justice as fairness (JAF) with Rawls‟s other writings, such as The Law of Peoples, a more satisfactory outline for justice between generations can be achieved and a more comprehensive scheme of intergenerational justice can be incorporated into Rawls‟s theory of justice

La publication de Théorie de la justice par John Rawls en 1971 a apporté un nouvel élan à la philosophie politique. Plusieurs commentaires et critiques de ce livre ont ainsi nourri la réflexion sur la question de la justice sociale dans son application à l’échelle mondiale. Dans ce livre, l’auteur a démontré entre autres que la démocratie libérale permet aux citoyens ayant diverses conceptions du bien, conceptions religieuses, philosophiques ou morales, souvent incompatibles et irréconciliables, d’avoir par ailleurs une conception politique de la rectitude morale et de la justice comme fondement de la structure de base de leur société. Ceci permet alors de soutenir l’unité politique et sociale de cette structure sur une base rationnelle et raisonnable. Par la suite, dans The Law of Peoples, Rawls a présenté un autre projet, celui d’étendre cette conception à la ‘Société des peuples’ qui, pour lui, est une idéalisation du regroupement des peuples qui respectent les idéaux et les principes du ‘Droit des peuples’ dans leurs relations mutuelles, le ‘Droit des peuples’ étant, pour Rawls, une conception politique particulière de la rectitude morale et de la justice qui s’applique aux principes et aux normes du droit et des usages internationaux. Ce projet de Rawls est, comme il l’a nommé lui-même, une utopie réaliste. Partant de cette dernière comme d’un prétexte, notre étude s’inscrit dans un champ de recherche particulier de la philosophie politique, à savoir l’éthique des relations internationales. Elle se veut une contribution à l’élaboration d’une réflexion normative portant sur les principes fondamentaux de justice dans l’ordre international tel qu’il se présente dans les institutions qui l’incarnent aujourd’hui encore, comme le système des Nations Unies, et sur les conséquences de cet ordre dans l’intégration des pays de la région africaine des Grands Lacs. D’où ces questions : Qu’est-ce que l’utopie rawlsienne change-t-elle à l’ordre mondial actuel? Ses principes fondent-ils une éthique susceptible d’améliorer les relations internationales? Quelle serait la place des pays africains, et plus spécialement ceux de la région des Grands Lacs, dans l’ordre mondial inhérent à ce projet? Les réponses à ces questions déterminent ce qui pourrait être considéré comme l’éthique de la gouvernance démocratique globale et les structures pouvant l’incarner. / The publishing of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls in 1971 brought a new impetus to political philosophy. Several comments and critical analyses of this book have thus provided food for thought on the issue of social justice in its application on a world scale. In this book, the author has demonstrated, among other things, that liberal democracy allows citizens with different conceptions of good – whether religious, philosophical or moral – often incompatible and irreconcilable, to have, otherwise, a political conception of moral rectitude and justice as the foundation of the basic structure of their society. This allows to support the political and social unity of this basic structure on a rational and reasonable basis. Subsequently, in his book The Law of Peoples, Rawls presented another project, that of extending that concept to the “Society of Peoples” which, for him, is an idealization of the regrouping of those people who respect the ideals and principles of the Law of peoples in their mutual relations, the “Law of peoples” being, for him, a particular political conception of moral rectitude and justice that is applicable to principles and standards of international law and customs. This project, as Rawls called it himself, is a realistic utopia. Based on the latter as an excuse, our study is in keeping with a particular field of research in political philosophy – namely, the ethics of international relations. It is intended as a contribution to the development of a normative reflection on the fundamental principles of justice in the international order as it is found in the institutions that still embody it nowadays – such as the United Nations Organization – and on the consequences of that order in the integration of the countries of the African region of the Great Lakes. This raises questions such as: What changes does the rawlsian utopia bring to the current world order? Are its principles the basis for an ethic susceptible of improving international relations? What would be the role of African countries, particularly those of the Great Lakes, in the world order inherent in this project? The answers to these questions determine what could be considered the ethics of global democratic governance and the structures which embody it.

La publication de Théorie de la justice par John Rawls en 1971 a apporté un nouvel élan à la philosophie politique. Plusieurs commentaires et critiques de ce livre ont ainsi nourri la réflexion sur la question de la justice sociale dans son application à l’échelle mondiale. Dans ce livre, l’auteur a démontré entre autres que la démocratie libérale permet aux citoyens ayant diverses conceptions du bien, conceptions religieuses, philosophiques ou morales, souvent incompatibles et irréconciliables, d’avoir par ailleurs une conception politique de la rectitude morale et de la justice comme fondement de la structure de base de leur société. Ceci permet alors de soutenir l’unité politique et sociale de cette structure sur une base rationnelle et raisonnable. Par la suite, dans The Law of Peoples, Rawls a présenté un autre projet, celui d’étendre cette conception à la ‘Société des peuples’ qui, pour lui, est une idéalisation du regroupement des peuples qui respectent les idéaux et les principes du ‘Droit des peuples’ dans leurs relations mutuelles, le ‘Droit des peuples’ étant, pour Rawls, une conception politique particulière de la rectitude morale et de la justice qui s’applique aux principes et aux normes du droit et des usages internationaux. Ce projet de Rawls est, comme il l’a nommé lui-même, une utopie réaliste. Partant de cette dernière comme d’un prétexte, notre étude s’inscrit dans un champ de recherche particulier de la philosophie politique, à savoir l’éthique des relations internationales. Elle se veut une contribution à l’élaboration d’une réflexion normative portant sur les principes fondamentaux de justice dans l’ordre international tel qu’il se présente dans les institutions qui l’incarnent aujourd’hui encore, comme le système des Nations Unies, et sur les conséquences de cet ordre dans l’intégration des pays de la région africaine des Grands Lacs. D’où ces questions : Qu’est-ce que l’utopie rawlsienne change-t-elle à l’ordre mondial actuel? Ses principes fondent-ils une éthique susceptible d’améliorer les relations internationales? Quelle serait la place des pays africains, et plus spécialement ceux de la région des Grands Lacs, dans l’ordre mondial inhérent à ce projet? Les réponses à ces questions déterminent ce qui pourrait être considéré comme l’éthique de la gouvernance démocratique globale et les structures pouvant l’incarner. / The publishing of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls in 1971 brought a new impetus to political philosophy. Several comments and critical analyses of this book have thus provided food for thought on the issue of social justice in its application on a world scale. In this book, the author has demonstrated, among other things, that liberal democracy allows citizens with different conceptions of good – whether religious, philosophical or moral – often incompatible and irreconcilable, to have, otherwise, a political conception of moral rectitude and justice as the foundation of the basic structure of their society. This allows to support the political and social unity of this basic structure on a rational and reasonable basis. Subsequently, in his book The Law of Peoples, Rawls presented another project, that of extending that concept to the “Society of Peoples” which, for him, is an idealization of the regrouping of those people who respect the ideals and principles of the Law of peoples in their mutual relations, the “Law of peoples” being, for him, a particular political conception of moral rectitude and justice that is applicable to principles and standards of international law and customs. This project, as Rawls called it himself, is a realistic utopia. Based on the latter as an excuse, our study is in keeping with a particular field of research in political philosophy – namely, the ethics of international relations. It is intended as a contribution to the development of a normative reflection on the fundamental principles of justice in the international order as it is found in the institutions that still embody it nowadays – such as the United Nations Organization – and on the consequences of that order in the integration of the countries of the African region of the Great Lakes. This raises questions such as: What changes does the rawlsian utopia bring to the current world order? Are its principles the basis for an ethic susceptible of improving international relations? What would be the role of African countries, particularly those of the Great Lakes, in the world order inherent in this project? The answers to these questions determine what could be considered the ethics of global democratic governance and the structures which embody it.