Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-05-09T11:39:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Simone Schuck da Silva_.pdf: 2512697 bytes, checksum: 4218730136d9da1b3e534b8cd4c70cea (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-09T11:39:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Simone Schuck da Silva_.pdf: 2512697 bytes, checksum: 4218730136d9da1b3e534b8cd4c70cea (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-28 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / PROEX - Programa de Excelência Acadêmica / O trabalho analisa as demandas de retificação de nome e sexo no registro civil de travestis e transexuais e a sua expressão pela gramática jurídica a partir de uma pesquisa empírica quantitativa e qualitativa nos processos judiciais do projeto “Direito à Identidade: Viva seu nome!”, do G8-Generalizando, grupo de direitos sexuais e de gênero do Serviço de Assessoria Jurídica Universitária da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (SAJU/UFRGS). Foram utilizados o método de procedimento de estudo de caso e as técnicas de pesquisa documental, em relação aos processos do grupo, e de pesquisa de campo, com a aplicação de entrevistas semiestruturadas aos agentes envolvidos nas ações. Com base na Teoria Crítica do Direito, observou-se a configuração de uma disputa dogmática sobre a forma regulatória do nome e do sexo civis e, por sua avaliação crítica, concluiu-se pela possibilidade de elaboração de outro modelo de regulação desses institutos jurídicos, uma regulação social e autônoma, capaz de oferecer maior legitimidade à operação do direito e maior autonomia para travestis e transexuais sobre suas identidades. / This thesis analyzes name and sex demands of rectification in the civil registry of travestis and transgenders and its expression on legal grammar, by means of a quantitative and qualitative empirical research of legal cases raised by Direito à identidade: Viva seu nome!, a project from G8-Generalizando – sexual and gender rights group of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) clinic legal program. It uses case study procedure method and techniques of documentary research, in relation to the group processes, and field research, with the application of semi-structured interviews with agents involved in the lawsuits. Based on the Critical Legal Theory, it is observed the configuration of a dogmatic dispute on the regulatory form of civil name and sex. By its critical evaluation, it was concluded that is possible to design another regulatory framwork of these legal institutes, a social and autonomous regulation capable of offering greater legitimacy to the operation of law and also greater autonomy for travestis and transgenders on their own identities.

In this study I try to explain the characteristics of the legal system, as it is understood in the framework of the Communicational Theory of Law (TCD). The legal system constitutes a textual totality that reflects another textual totality: the legal order. It is not a positivist reflex, by virtue of which the system would be a mere description of the order, but of a hermeneutic reflex, which supposes that the system constructs the order, and presents its better and more finished version, a more intelligent version. The relationship between order and system is not unidirectional, but between them there is a hermeneutic spiral relationship sustained over time, since they are textual totalities in perpetual change. The ordering / system duality represents the basic axis within a juridical realm, a reality that encompasses all the communicational processes and the texts produced by them: first, the communicational processes generated by the ordination and the ordinary texts; second, the communication processes of legal dogmatic, which generates the various proposals of the exhibition system; third, from the conjunction of dogmatic texts and from the jurisprudence of the courts arise the systemic texts or texts of the legal system; fourth, the communicational processes and the texts that are generated within the scope that, however, do not belong to the order or the system; and fifth, the acts (and omissions) whose legal meaning can only be understood from the frame of reference constituted by the hermeneutic axis of order / system. In all this analysis, it is necessary to differentiate - as has been pointed out - between the didactic-expository system and the legal system itself (or legal system in the strict sense). In order to carry out the proposed task, before entering into the distinction between legal order and legal system, it is convenient to deal with the differentiation between set and order. / En este estudio me propongo explicar los caracteres del sistema jurídico, tal como es entendido en el marco de la Teoría Comunicacional del Derecho (en adelante: TCD). El sistema jurídico constituye una totalidad textual que refleja otra totalidad textual: el ordenamiento jurídico. No se trata de un reflejo positivista, en virtud del cual el sistema sería una mera descripción del ordenamiento, sino de un reflejo hermenéutico, lo que supone que el sistema construye el ordenamiento, y presenta de él su versión mejor y más acabada, su versión más inteligente. La relación entre ordenamiento y sistema no es unidireccional, sino que entre ellos se produce una relación en espiral hermenéutica sostenida a lo largo del tiempo, ya que son totalidades textuales en perpetuo cambio. La dualidad ordenamiento/sistema representa el eje básico dentro de un ámbito jurídico, realidad ésta que engloba todos los procesos comunicacionales y los textos producidos por ellos: primero, los procesos comunicacionales que genera el ordenamiento y los textos ordinamentales; segundo, los procesos de comunicación de la dogmática jurídica, generadora de las diversas propuestas de sistema expositivo; tercero, de la conjunción de los textos dogmáticos y los de la jurisprudencia de los tribunales surgen los textos sistémicos o textos del sistema jurídico; cuarto, los procesos comunicacionales y los textos que se generan dentro del ámbito que, sin embargo, no pertenecen al ordenamiento ni al sistema; y quinto, los actos (y omisiones) cuyo significado jurídico sólo es comprensible desde el marco de referencia constituido por el eje hermenéutico ordenamiento / sistema. En todo este análisis, es preciso diferenciar -como ha quedado apuntado- entre el sistema didáctico-expositivo y el sistema jurídico propiamente dicho (o sistema jurídico en sentido estricto). Para llevar a cabo la tarea propuesta, antes de entrar en la distinción entre ordenamiento jurídico y sistema jurídico, es conveniente tratar de la diferenciación entre conjunto y orden.

Distinguer entre le droit commun et le droit spécial est une habitude fortement ancrée chez les juristes, dans le domaine de la théorie comme de la pratique. Les rôles attribués à cette distinction sont d’une grande diversité ; mais ils sont aussi sous la menace de deux phénomènes : la multiplication des degrés de spécialité et le développement de rapports -horizontaux - entre droits communs d'une part, et entre droits spéciaux d'autre part. Véritable "summa divisio", elle disposerait cependant toujours d’une vertu ordonnatrice très importante,tant pour le législateur que pour le juge, et tant à l’université que dans la pratique.Il y a pourtant un singulier paradoxe. Le droit commun et le droit spécial sont indéfinissables ; leur relativité est telle qu’ils ne se conçoivent pas abstraction faite l’un de l’autre. Et, toutefois, la relation qu’ils entretiennent est généralement décrite en termes d’opposition. Or, la relativité appelle bien plutôt la collaboration que l’opposition.C’est ainsi que, s’agissant de l’élaboration du droit, des influences positives sont à l’oeuvre. Le droit commun et le droit spécial se servent mutuellement de modèle. Leur évolution se déroule en contemplation l'un de l'autre. Cela permet surtout, concernant l’application du droit, de réfuter l’idée suivant laquelle le droit commun et le droit spécial s’excluraient mécaniquement. En dehors des hypothèses prévues par le droit écrit, aucun fondement ne justifie l’exclusivisme. Ce dernier ne dispose en outre que d’un régime juridique plein d’incertitude. La valeur de la solution préconisée par l’adage "Specialia generalibus derogant" n’est que celle d’une présomption, simple. « Sur-mesure », le droit spécial est supposé mieux adapté à la situation litigieuse, mais il peut concrètement se révéler moins approprié que le droit commun / Distinguishing between general and specific rules of law is a deeply rooted habit among civilist lawyers, concerning the field of theory as the practice one. The roles of this distinction are very different, but they are threatened by two kinds of phenomenas as well : the increasing degreesof specialization and the development of -horizontal- relationship between general rules of lawon the one hand, and specific rules of law in the other hand. As a genuine, it would work,however, always as a good way to order the priority of different rules of law for both legislature and judges, both in academia and in practice.There is however a singular paradox. The general and specific rules of law can't be defined,their relativity is such an obvious one that they inconceivable if the other doesn't exist. According to this idea, their relationship is usually described in terms of opposition. Yet, the meaning of "relativity" is closer to collaboration rather than opposition.Thus, as regards to the development of the law, positive influences are at work. General and specific rule of law are a model to each other. Their evolution takes place in contemplation ofeach part. This especially helps the application of law to refute the idea that the general andspecific rules of law are mechanically mutually exclusive. A part from the possibilities provided by statute law, no basis justifies exclusiveness. Furthermore, specific rules of law sometimes contain a lot of less-defined rules. The value of the solution advocated by the adage "specialia generalibus derogant " is just a presumption, a simple one. A specific rule of law is supposes to be perfectly adapted to a situation, but it may pragmatically, about some case, be less appropriate than the general rule of law.