Many analysts believe that problems in the United States housing market initiated the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgage origination, data as well as bank bailouts. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the sequel, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). Furthermore, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), trustees, underwriters and credit enhancement providers (CEPs). Also, the insurers involved in the subprime market are originator mortgage insurers (OMIs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory, bailout or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned banks and agents are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The three main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgage origination, data and bailouts - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of SORs' capital, information, ratings, risk and valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete-time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as loan losses. Furthermore, a constrained optimal valuation problem for SORs under mortgage origination is solved. In addition, we show how high loan-to-value ratios curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 2 also explores the relationship between Basel capital regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under Basel regulation. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of subprime mortgages as well as credit ratings under Basel capital regulation. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 3 contains subprime data not presented in Chapters 2. We present other mortgage data that also have connections with the main subprime issues raised. In Chapter 4, a troubled SOR's recapitalization by G via subprime bank bailouts is discussed. Our research supports the view that if SOR is about to fail, it will have an incentive not to extend low risk mortgages but rather high risk mortgages thus shifting risk onto its creditors. Here, for instance, we analyze the efficiency of purchasing toxic structured mortgage products from troubled SORs as opposed to buying preferred and common equity. In this regard, we compare the cases where SORs' on-balance sheet mortgages are fully amortizing, voluntarily prepaying (refinancing and equity extraction) and involuntarily prepaying (defaulting). If bailing out SORs considered to be too big to fail involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these SORs are encouraged ex-ante to invest in high risk mortgages and toxic structured mortgage products. Contrary to the policy employed by G, purchasing common (preferred) equity is always the most (least) ex-anteand ex-post-efficient type of capital injection. Our research confirms that this is true irrespective of whether SOR volunteers for recapitalization or not. In order to understand the key results in Chapters 2 to 4, a working knowledge of discrete-time stochastic modeling and optimization is required. The work presented in this thesis is based on a book (see [103]), 2 peer-reviewed international journal articles (see [51] and [105]), 2 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [104] and [110]) and 4 peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [23], [106], [107] and [109]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

The real estate sector is a capital-intensive industry, where the combination of debt and equity is used to finance the property investment. Companies tend to increase the loan-to-value ratio, to use financial leverage. However due to banks being more restrictive with their lending as well as having different ways of assessing risk in different property companies, there is a belief that the loan-to-value ratio is affected by the property segment distribution in a company. Based on previous research, there are many factors that could affect the loan-to-value (LTV) in a company such as size, profitability, revenue growth and cost of debt. This paper aims to examine these factors, as well as the operational risk that might be visible in the property segment distribution. The study was done through using a quantitative approach by investigating the largest real estate companies in each Swedish municipality. 614 Swedish real estate companies were investigated and pooled into an OLS regression model. Based on the regression, there is enough evidence in this paper that shows that factors such as size, profitability, revenue growth and cost of debt all have significant impact on the LTV. Furthermore, no general conclusion regarding the relationship between property segment distribution and LTV was found in this paper. Although, there is evidence that residentials- and small house units affect the LTV positively while industrial units affect the LTV negatively. / Fastighetssektorn är en kapitalintensiv bransch där kombinationen av skuld och eget kapital används för att finansiera fastighetsinvesteringar. Företag tenderar att öka belåningsgraden för att använda finansiell hävstång. Däremot på grund av att bankerna på senare år blivit mer restriktiva med sin utlåning och att de har olika sätt att bedöma risker på i olika fastighetsbolag, finn fog att förutsätta att belåningsgraden påverkas av fördelningen av fastighetssegment i ett företag. Baserat på tidigare forskning finns det många faktorer som kan påverka belåningsgraden (LTV) i ett företag, såsom storlek, lönsamhet, intäktsökning och kostnad för lånat kapital. Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka dessa faktorer samt den operativa risk som kan synliggöras i fördelningen av fastighetssegment. Studien gjordes via ett kvantitativt tillvägagångssätt genom att undersöka de största fastighetsbolagen i alla Sveriges kommuner. 614 svenska fastighetsbolag undersöktes och analyserades i en OLS- regressionsmodell. Baserat på regressionen finns det tillräckligt med bevis i denna uppsats på att faktorer som storlek, lönsamhet, inkomsttillväxt och kostnad för lånat kapital har en betydande inverkan på LTV. Vidare hittades ingen allmän slutsats angående sambandet mellan fördelning av fastighetssegment och LTV i denna uppsats. Det finns dock bevis för att bostäder och småhusenheter påverkar LTV positivt medan industriella enheter påverkar LTV negativt.

房屋貸款保證保險制度可移轉部分違約風險予保險公司。然而，保險公司與金融機構在共同承擔風險之際，因房貸保證保險制度之施行，於提高貸款成數後，產生違約風險提高之矛盾現象；而估計保險之預期損失時，以目前尚無此制度下之違約數據估計損失額，將有錯估之可能。 本研究以二元邏吉斯特迴歸模型(Binary Logistic Regression Model)與存活分析(Survival Analysis)估計違約行為，並比較各模型間資料適合度及預測能力，進而單獨分析變數-貸款成數對違約率之邊際機率影響。以探討房貸保證保險施行後，因其對借款者信用增強而提高之貸款成數，所增加之違約風險。並評估金融機構因提高貸款成數後可能之違約風險變動，據以推估違約率數據，並根據房貸保證保險費率結構模型，計算可能之預期損失額，估算變動的保險費率。 實證結果發現，貸款成數與違約風險呈現顯著正相關，貸款成數增加，邊際影響呈遞增情形，違約率隨之遞增，而違約預期損失額亦同時上升。保險公司因預期損失額增加，為維持保費收入得以支付預期損失，其保險費率將明顯提升。故實施房屋貸款保證保險，因借款者信用增強而提高之貸款成數，將增加違約機率並對保險費率產生直接變動。 / Mortgage insurance system may transfer part of the default risk to insurance companies. However, the implementation of mortgage insurance system, on increasing loan to value ratio, the resulting increase default risk. And literatures estimate the expected loss without the default data, there will be misjudge. Our study constructs the binary logistic regression model and survival analysis to estimate the mortgage default behavior, and compare the data between the model fit and the predictive power. Analyzes the effect of loan to value ratio on the marginal probability of default rate. Furthermore, assess the financial institutions in the risk of default due to loan to value ratio changes. According to the estimated default rate data, we employ the mortgage insurance rate structural model to calculate the expected amount of loss and the changes in premium rates. Empirical results found loan to value ratio have a significant positive effect on borrowers’ default. Loan to value ratio increase, the marginal effect progressively increase, along with increasing default rates and expected default losses. Due to the ascendant expected loss, insurance companies increase premiums to cover the expected loss, the premium rate will be significantly improved. Therefore, the implementation of mortgage insurance, credit enhancement for the borrower to improve loan to value ratio, will increase the probability of default and insurance rates.

Many analysts believe that problems in the U.S. housing market initiated the 2008–2010 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination and securitization that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the thesis, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), SOR mortgage insurers (SOMIs), trustees, underwriters, credit rating agencies (CRAs), credit enhancement providers (CEPs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). Furthermore, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned agents and banks are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of subprime SORs' risk and profit as well as their valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete–time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as mortgage losses. In addition, we show how high loan–to–value ratios due to declining housing prices curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 3 investigates the securitization of subprime mortgages into structured mortgage products such as subprime residential mortgage–backed securities (RMBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In this regard, our discussions focus on information, risk and valuation as well as the role of capital under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. Our research supports the view that incentives to monitor mortgages has been all but removed when changing from a traditional mortgage model to a subprime mortgage model. In the latter context, we provide formulas for IB's profit and valuation under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. This is illustrated via several examples. Chapter 3 also explores the relationship between mortgage securitization and capital under Basel regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under the Basel II paradigm where risk–weights vary. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of RMBSs, RMBS CDOs as well as capital under Basel regulation. Furthermore, we investigate subprime RMBSs and their rates with slack and holding constraints. Also, we examine the effect of SMC–induced credit rating shocks in future periods on subprime RMBSs and RMBS payout rates. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 4 explores issues related to subprime data. In particular, we present mortgage and securitization level data and forge connections with the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The work presented in this thesis is based on 2 peer–reviewed chapters in books (see [99] and [104]), 2 peer–reviewed international journal articles (see [48] and [101]), and 2 peer–reviewed conference proceeding papers (see [102] and [103]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Many analysts believe that problems in the U.S. housing market initiated the 2008–2010 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination and securitization that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the thesis, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), SOR mortgage insurers (SOMIs), trustees, underwriters, credit rating agencies (CRAs), credit enhancement providers (CEPs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). Furthermore, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned agents and banks are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of subprime SORs' risk and profit as well as their valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete–time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as mortgage losses. In addition, we show how high loan–to–value ratios due to declining housing prices curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 3 investigates the securitization of subprime mortgages into structured mortgage products such as subprime residential mortgage–backed securities (RMBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In this regard, our discussions focus on information, risk and valuation as well as the role of capital under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. Our research supports the view that incentives to monitor mortgages has been all but removed when changing from a traditional mortgage model to a subprime mortgage model. In the latter context, we provide formulas for IB's profit and valuation under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. This is illustrated via several examples. Chapter 3 also explores the relationship between mortgage securitization and capital under Basel regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under the Basel II paradigm where risk–weights vary. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of RMBSs, RMBS CDOs as well as capital under Basel regulation. Furthermore, we investigate subprime RMBSs and their rates with slack and holding constraints. Also, we examine the effect of SMC–induced credit rating shocks in future periods on subprime RMBSs and RMBS payout rates. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 4 explores issues related to subprime data. In particular, we present mortgage and securitization level data and forge connections with the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The work presented in this thesis is based on 2 peer–reviewed chapters in books (see [99] and [104]), 2 peer–reviewed international journal articles (see [48] and [101]), and 2 peer–reviewed conference proceeding papers (see [102] and [103]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

房地產市場與銀行放款業務間，因為存在著密不可分之關係，本研究主要目的為釐清貸款利率與貸款成數對住宅價格是否具有顯著影響，進而探討中央銀行之選擇性信用管制政策，對於貸款利率、貸款成數與住宅價格之間，是否具有政策效果，最後再針對不同的需求族群，給予購屋行為選擇之參考或為銀行選擇貸款客群之參考。 本研究透過實證分析發現，貸款成數對於住宅價格為正向顯著影響，但貸款利率對住宅價格，則未呈現顯著影響。而政府之選擇性信用管制措施，在實證結果中，並未達到抑制房價之目的。但是在實施信用管制之後，購屋者對與貸款利率，相對更為敏感。在需求族群的分析上，發現高所得族群相對較重視貸款利率，而中所得與低所得族群，則相對較重視貸款成數。低年齡族群較高年齡族群而言，相對較為重視貸款利率之增加。 對於持續關心貸款利率、成數與住宅價格關聯之研究者，本研究建議後續研究者在資料取得之允許下，可嘗試拉長研究期間，及考慮增加了解政策鬆綁後之影響。在資料完整度許可下，建議可以增加個人屬性變數，並考量都更效應之變數。 / There is an inextricably linkage between the real estate market and the bank lending business. The main purpose of this study is to identify the relationships among mortgage interest rate, loan to value (LTV) ratio, and housing price. Further, we discuss the policy effect among them, due to the central bank's selective credit control policy. Finally, the supply-demand sides, our study hopes to give the choice of purchase behavior on demand groups or the selection of bank on loan-customers In our study, we found that the loan to value ratio has a significant positive effect on the housing price, but the mortgage interest rate has no significant effect on the housing price. In the empirical results, we found that the government's selective credit control policy did not achieve the purpose of curbing housing prices. However, after the implementation of selective credit control policy, the housing-buyer is relatively more sensitive to the mortgage interest rate. In the analysis of demand groups, the study found that high-income groups pay more attention to the mortgage interest rate. However, the middle-income and low-income groups emphasize on loan to value relative to the high-income groups. Finally, the young age groups relatively emphasize on the increase of the mortgage interest rates. For the researchers who continue to care about the relationships among mortgage interest rate, loan to value ratio, and housing price, the study suggests that follow-up researchers, with the permission of the data, may attempt to lengthen the study period and consider increasing the impact of easing the policy. Under the data integrity permission, it is advisable to add personal attribute variables and take into account the variables of the urban renewal effect.

Diploma thesis deals with the procedures for valuation of property according to the methodologies used by banks UniCredit Bank and ČSOB. This diploma thesis describes the principles of valuation of assets. In this thesis there are mentioned basic concepts of banking. It carries out a detailed analysis, description and comparison of selected valuation methodologies used by banks and methodologies used in appraiser´s work, who prepares evaluations for banking institutions. Based on the findings an analysis of the different methodologies is made.

The aim of this master’s thesis is to find the best type of mortgage loan for several kinds of borrowers. The first part describes personal housing financing, use of loans, use of mortgages in general. At the end of this theoretical part the value analysis is explained as a tool for mortgage lender (or the type of mortgage loan) selection and the way of reaching this goal is defined. Second part is a practical example of how to make decision and find the best choice. It selects the most important criteria and real cash flow is simulated to asset the price of each possibility. Using the discrimination method and efficiency rate the possibilities are ranked. Results are commented on and recommendations are set to every type of client. In conclusion, general method for selection before getting a mortgage is proposed.