The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Philosophy, Aug. 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis--Copenhagen. / "Resumé paa dansk" (1 leaf) laid in.

A disjunction is an expression using ‘or’, such as ‘Anne has a Ford or a Tesla’. From such a statement, we cannot usually infer either disjunct, for example, that ‘Anne has a Ford’. However, in choice situations like ‘You may have coffee or tea’ we can infer either option. The problem of free choice disjunction is to determine why these choice inferences are legitimate (von Wright 1968, Kamp 1973, Meyer 2016). Central to this discussion is the observation that a modal possibility operator ranging over a disjunction sometimes implies a conjunction of possibilities. In the case of permission, we express this as the choice principle ‘May (P or Q)’ entails ‘May P and May Q’ (Zimmerman 2000). Unfortunately, this inference cannot hold in a logical language without significant modification of the systems involved. I explore the history of proposed solutions to this problem, including semantic solutions that assign a distinctive meaning to free choice disjunctions and pragmatic solutions that use features of their utterance to solve the problem. I draw connections between semantics and pragmatics and, using the tools of dynamic logic (Baltag et al. 1998, van Benthem 2010), I present a formal account of one major (Gricean) approach to the problem (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002). Ultimately, I explore the role of logic in this debate and argue that we should formally represent the meaning of these expressions directly as conjunctions of possibilities. Thus, rather than trying to account for the choice principle within a logical system, we must instead account for the fact that, in choice situations, the meaning of ‘May (P or Q)’ translates into logical formalism as (May P & May Q). / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / A disjunction is a statement using ‘or’, like ‘Anne has a Ford or a Tesla’. From such a statement, we cannot infer either disjunct—e.g. ‘Anne has a Ford’. In choice situations like ‘You may have coffee or tea’ we can infer either option. Why this choice inference is legitimate is the problem of free choice disjunction. I explore the history of solutions to the problem, including semantic solutions that propose a special meaning to choice disjunctions and pragmatic solutions that appeal to the circumstances in which they are uttered. I draw connections between semantics and pragmatics and present a formal account of one major pragmatic approach to the problem. Where others have sought to explain how 'May(P or Q)' entails 'May P and May Q', I argue instead that the meaning of ‘May (P or Q)’ in choice scenarios translates directly into logical formalism as ‘May P & May Q’.

Orientador: Walter Alexandre Carnielli / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-19T13:14:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_AntonioMarmodaCunha_M.pdf: 7643012 bytes, checksum: 1904b2b114fcf86253069cc0fe63eedb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Resumo: Neste trabalho investigaremos, do ponto de vista da lógica e da filosofia, os fenômenos pragmáticos conhecidos como pressuposição e implicatura, relacionando-os a traços mais gerais da racionalidade humana, como economia e consistência, e ao pluralismo da lógica atual, incluindo alguns tópicos de contenda entre a tradição clássica e as propostas alternativas recentes. Grice articulou uma análise destes fenômenos assentes em princípios para a conversação ou interação entre entes racionais e cooperativos. Divergimos da tradição griceana, postulando que as implicaturas são processadas por "clivagem de informações", ou por verificação de outros critérios lógicos, ao invés da mera exploração de máximas. Partindo de conceitos precisamente definidos, como pressuposição e implicatura, é possível construir um arcabouço lógico, a denominar sistemas pressuposicionais, que estendem outros sistemas lógicos (como, por exemplo, o cálculo proposicional) e cujos resultados exporemos / Abstract: In this work we shall, from the logical and philosophical standpoint, investigate two pragmatic phenomena known as presupposition and implicature, associating them to more general features of human rationality, such as economy and consistency, and to the current logical pluralism, including some controversies between the classical tradition and more recent alternative approaches. Grice has articulated an analysis of such phenomena based on principles governing conversation or interaction between cooperative and rational beings. We dissent from the gricean tradition, and proposing that implicatures are processed by the 'sieving of information', rather than by the mere exploitation of maxims. By providing precise definitions to the concepts of presupposition and implicature, it is possible to build a logical framework, to be called presuppositional systems, which either extend or generalise other logical systems (such as the propositional calculus, for instance), the results of which we shall present hereinafter / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

There have been recent explosions of interest in two fields: Madhyamaka-Pyrrhonism parallels and Pyrrhonism itself, which seems to have been misunderstood and therefore neglected by the West for the same reasons and in the same ways that Madhyamaka traditionally has often been by the West and the East. Among these recent studies are several demonstrating that grounding in Madhyamaka, for example, reveals and illuminates the import and insights of Pyrrhonean arguments. Furthermore it has been suggested that of all European schools of philosophy Pyrrhonism is the one closest to Buddhism, and especially to Madhyamaka. Indeed Pyrrho is recorded to have studied with philosophers in Taxila, one of the first places where Madhyamaka later flourished, and the place where the founder of Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, may have received hitherto concealed texts which became the foundation for his school. In this dissertation I explore just how similar these two philosophical projects were. I systematically treat all the arguments in the Pyrrhonist redactor Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against Dogmatists and compare them to the most similar arguments available in the Madhyamaka treatises and related texts. On this basis, I ask whether the Pyrrhonists and the Buddhists would satisfy each other’s self-identifying criteria, or what characteristics would disqualify either or both in the other’s eyes. I also ask what questions arise from the linguistic and historical evidence for interactions between the Pyrrhonist school and the Madhyamaka school, and how sure we can be of the answers. Did Pyrrho learn Buddhism in Taxila? Was Nāgārjuna a Pyrrhonist? Finally I bring the insights of the living commentarial tradition of Madhyamaka to bear on current scholarly controversies in the field of Sextan Pyrrhonism, and apply the subtleties of interpretation of the latter which have developed in recent scholarship to Madhyamaka and its various difficulties of interpretation, to scrutinize each school under the illumination of the other. With this hopefully illuminated view, I address for example whether Sextus was consistent, whether living Pyrrhonism implies apraxia, whether Pyrrhonism is philosophy at all, and whether Madhyamaka is actually nihilism.

<p>U radu nastojimo da pokažemo da Hegelovi pojmovi spekulativne logike, povesti i objektivnog duha omogućuju da se u potpunosti shvati Aristotelov pojam praktičkog i njegovo razvijanje. Aristotelova praktčka filozofija bivstvo praktičkog dovodi do pojma=logosa, te vladajući pojam=logos praktičkih stvari, koji nije izvan onog alogičkog=žudnje, omogućuje delatnost=energeiju praktičkog. Pojam=logos praktičkog u Aristotela stoga nema teorijski i retrospektivni karakter u samom praktičkom kako to izvodi hermeneutička filozofija, već upravo jeste su&scaron;tina praktičkog odno&scaron;enja koju izlaže i ističe Aristotelova praktička filozofija. Spekulativni pojam onog praktičnog je tačka jedinstva Aristotelove i Hegelove filozofije. Hegel u pojmu političke=unutra&scaron;nje države kao običajnosnog organizma prevladava uz očuvanje Aristotelov logos entelehije polisa=pojam dejstvenosti grada-države. Razlika Aristotelove i Hegelove filozofije o praktičkom je povesna, sistemska i logička. Povesna razlika leži u Hegelovom situiranju modernog principa subjektivnosti kao prava posebnosti subjekta na zadovoljenje u pojam građanskog dru&scaron;tva sistema filozofije prava, te u sledstvenom specifičnom podru&scaron;tvljenju kako privatne sfere tako i sfere države. Logička razlika leži u Hegelovom određenju ideje praktičkog saznanja=ideje objektivnog duha i apsolutne ideje u sistemu spekulativne logike.</p> / <p>In the paper we are trying to show that Hegel&#39;s concepts of speculative logic, history and objective spirit are enabling us to fully understand Aristotle&#39;s concept of practical and its development. Aristotle&rsquo;s practical philosophy brings the being of practical down to the concept=logos, and the ruling concept=logos, that is not beyond the a-logical=desire, enables the effectiveness=energy of the practical. Therefore, with Aristotle, the concept=logos of practical does not have a historical and retrospective nature in the practical itself the way hermeneutic philosophy derives it, but it is the very essence of the practical relation proposed and accented by Aristotle&rsquo;s philosophy of practical.<br />Speculative concept of the practical is the point of unity between Aristotle&rsquo;s and Hegel&rsquo;s philosophy. Hegel, in the concept of political=inner state as ethical life overrules with retention Aristotle&rsquo;s logos of polis entelechy=concept of the effectiveness of the city-state. The difference between Aristotle&rsquo;s and Hegel&rsquo;s philosophy on practical is historical, systematic and logical. The historical difference is in Hegel&rsquo;s placement of modern principle of subjectivity as the right of one&rsquo;s individuality to satisfaction into the concept of civil system of the philosophy of right, and in the specific consequential socialization as both a private affair and a state one. Logical difference is in the Hegel&rsquo;s specification of the idea of practical cognition=idea of the objective spirit and an absolute idea in the system of speculative logic.</p>

In the last 30 years there has been growing interest in and a greater appreciation of the unique contributions that medieval authors have made to the history of logic. In this thesis, we compare and contrast the modal logics of Robert Kilwardby and John Buridan and explore how their two conceptions of modality relate to and differ from modern notions of modal logic. We develop formal reconstructions of both authors' logics, making use of a number of different formal techniques. In the case of Robert Kilwardby we show that using his distinction between per se and per accidens modalities, he is able to provide a consistent interpretation of the apodictic fragment of Aristotle's modal syllogism and that, by generalising this distinction to hypothetical construction, he can develop an account of connexive logic. In the case of John Buridan we show that his modal logic is a natural extension of the usual Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, and that this modal logic can be shown to be sound and complete relative to a proof-theoretic formalisation of Buridan's treatment of the expository syllogism.

The quest for epistemic liberation remains an important project in the post-colonial era of Zambia, and entails challenging the existing inequalities in knowledge representation at the epistemic front in the country. At the core of this quest is the position that the continued dominance of Western knowledge and the corresponding marginalisation of indigenous knowledges amount to an epistemic injustice that affects the contemporary existence of the peoples in the country. This study critically examines the problem of epistemic injustice in Zambia while reflecting on the country’s uncompleted project of decolonisation. It traces the problem from the theoretical assumption of modernity that Western knowledge is universal and that it should, therefore, be applied to all societies in the world. It is submitted that the current education system in Zambia is based on this assumption, and, consequently, favours Western knowledge to the exclusion of indigenous knowledges. This practice is identified as a conduit for accelerating epistemic injustice and its intensity in the country. The study approaches this problem from an African philosophical standpoint, and draws its current from the history of the political struggle against domination on the continent. To adequately confront the problem of epistemic injustice in Zambia, the study suggests parity and equilibrium in representation between indigenous knowledges and Western knowledge in the country. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)