Ce travail propose une réévaluation du schisme phénoménologico-analytique à la lumière des textes de Husserl et de Carnap qui en constituent l’un des fondements et qui cependant émergent d’un contexte philosophique et scientifique similaire. L’idée carnapienne de constitution comme « reconstruction rationnelle » et arbitraire du monde peut en effet paraître s’opposer terme à terme au «se-constituer» des choses que déploie la phénoménologie husserlienne, mais l’emploi par Carnap du vocabulaire de la constitution nous impose d’interroger le lien que l’entreprise de l’Aufbau entretient avec la constitution idéaliste transcendantale. La thèse de ce travail revient à affirmer que l’opposition Husserl/Carnap ne peut être interprétée dans les termes d’une opposition entre phénoménologie et analyse logique, ni non plus sur la base des concepts d’idéalisme transcendantal, de logicisme ou de phénoménalisme. Comprendre l’opposition entre les deux auteurs (et donc plus lointainement entre les deux mouvements dont ils endossent, au moins partiellement, la paternité) implique de se pencher sur les textes de jeunesse où l’un et l’autre élaborent leur concept respectif de constitution, en s’intéressant notamment au modèle logico-mathématique du formel dont ils héritent, et dont leur système de constitution présente le déploiement. Cette confrontation nous amène à définir la constitution comme l’élaboration d’un modèle continu de la discontinuité atteinte par la description phénoménologique pré-constitutive du monde – ce qui nous conduira à interroger la pertinence du modèle topologique pour la constitution. / In this PhD thesis, I attempt to reevaluate the opposition between analytical and phenomenological philosophy through the study of Husserl’s and Carnap’s systems of constitution. Carnap’s idea of constitution as a “rational” and arbitrary “reconstruction” of the world seems to be radically antithetical to Husserl’s descriptive account of the “self-constitution” of the things themselves. Yet, Carnap’s use of the language of constitution, as well as his attempt to translate it into the language of logistics, lead us to question the links between his own enterprise and Husserl’s transcendental idealist constitution. What I am trying to demonstrate in this work is that the opposition between Husserl and Carnap cannot be interpreted either in terms of “phenomenology” and “analytical philosophy” or in terms of transcendental idealism, logicism and phenomenalism. In order to understand the opposition between Husserl and Carnap (and therefore, between continental and analytical philosophy), it is necessary to ask how and why, in their very first works and articles, they both conceived philosophy as a system of constitution. This leads us to give an account of Husserl’s and Carnap’s logico-mathematical models of the formal dimension of experience, and to define constitution as the elaboration of a continuous model for the discontinuity of the world – this discontinuity being given by the phenomenological and pre-constitutive description of the world. Would this imply then that topology is a suitable model for the construction of the world ?

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:24:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009-08-12Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:52:49Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 gomes_rr_me_rcla.pdf: 970847 bytes, checksum: f1f63ef47745a8d3404205c27335f1b1 (MD5) / Neste trabalho apresentamos e analisamos o conceito fregiano de função, presente nos três livros de Frege: Begriffsschrift, Os Fundamentos da Aritmética e Leis Fundamentais da Aritmética. Discutimos ao longo dele o que Frege entendia por função e argumento, as modificações conceituais que tais noções sofreram no período de publicação de seus livros e a importância dessas noções para a sua filosofia. Para tanto, analisamos a linguagem artificial do primeiro livro, a definição de número do segundo, e os casos particulares de funções que são definidos no terceiro, bem como as considerações contidas em outros escritos do filósofo alemão. Verificamos uma caracterização puramente sintática de função em Begriffsschrift, uma distinção entre o sinal de uma função e aquilo que ele denota em Os Fundamentos da Aritmética, e a associação de dois elementos distintos a uma expressão funcional em Leis Fundamentais da Aritmética: o seu sentido e a sua referência. Finalmente, constatamos que a originalidade do sistema fregiano reside na possibilidade de considerar esse ou aquele termo de uma proposição como o argumento (ou os argumentos) de uma função. / In this work we present and analyze the fregean concept of function, present in the three books by Frege: Begriffsschrift, The Foundations of the Arithmetic and Fundamental Laws of the Arithmetic. We discuss what Frege understood by function and argument, the conceptual modifications that such notions suffered in the period of publication of those books and the importance of these notions for his philosophy. For so much, we analyze the artificial language of the first book, the definition of number in the second, and the particular cases of functions that are defined in the third, as well as the considerations contained in other works by the philosopher. We verify a purely syntactic characterization of function in Begriffsschrift, a distinction between the sign of a function and what it denotes in The Foundations of the Arithmetic, and the association of two different elements to a functional expression in Fundamental Laws of the Arithmetic: its sense and its reference. Finally, we verify that the originality of the Frege´s system is based on the possibility of considering one or other term of a proposition as the argument (or the arguments) of a function.

Applying Occam's razor in order to minimize ontological commitments is among the central methods of Bertrand Russell's philosophy after 1905 and onwards. The year 1905 was specially significant for Russell in that respect, as he published in this year the groundbreaking paper titled 'On Denoting'. In this paper, he introduced, for the first time, the today widely acknowledged semantical theory, Theory of Descriptions. According to the canonical interpretation of Russell, which is represented, for the most part, by W. V. O. Quine's paper 'Russell's Ontological Development' (1966), Russell tended to embrace 'Meinongian' ontological commitments: these were ontological commitments to coherent and non-actual entities such as the present king of France (possibilia) and ontological commitments to incoherent entities such as the round square. In Quine's view, Russell could not dodge such commitments until he discovered Theory of Descriptions. This interpretation has been challenged recently and it is the main objective of this essay to defend Quine against his opponents. I provide a detailed account of those parts of Russell's philosophy before 'On Denoting' which precluded him from refuting conclusively the problematic ontological commitments. In order to provide such an account, we dive deep into the...

Distinktionen mellan analytiska och syntetiska sanningar spelade en viktig för filosofer som Leibniz, Hume och Kant. Men det var först med Frege som begreppet analyticitet fick en definition som inte bara tycks vara explicit utan som också hade en bred tillämpbarhet. Den förmodade distinktionen analytiskt/syntetiskt har dock senare ifrågasatts av filosofer såsom Quine. Denna uppsats avser i första hand att visa att Quines argument, i artikeln Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951), mot analyticitet inte är tillräckligt starka för att bevisa att den fregeanska definitionen av analyticitet är cirkulär. I detta sammanhang har uppsatsen även undersökt kronologiskt viktiga epoker där Quine engagerar sig i den analytiska/syntetiska distinktionen i sitt arbete före liksom efter 1951. Den mer moderna traditionen, som delar in analyticitet i två kategorier – metafysisk och epistemisk analyticitet – går tillbaka till Boghossian (1996). Boghossian försvarar en uppdaterad version av Wittgensteins och Carnaps åsikt att analyticitet skall anges i termer av implicita definitioner I motsats till Boghossian anser Williamson att det inte finns något sätt att uppfatta analytiska sanningar som gör analyticitet användbar inom filosofin. Inom ramen för uppsatsens syfte kommer även dessa ’post-quineanska’ försök att beskriva analyticitet och den analytiska förklaringen av a priori att redovisas och kritiskt granskas. / The distinction between analytic and synthetic truths has played an important role for philosophers such as Leibniz, Hume and Kant. However, it was Frege who gave the notion of analyticity a definition that not only appears to be unambiguous but is also widely applicable. However, the supposed analytic/synthetic distinction was later challenged by philosophers such as Quine. This thesis aims primarily to show that Quine’s arguments, in the article Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951), against analyticity are not sufficient to show that Frege’s definition of analyticity is circular. In this context, the paper has also examined chronologically important periods where Quine is engaged in the analytic/synthetic distinction before and after 1951. The more modern tradition, which separates analyticity into two broad categories – metaphysical and epistemic analyticity – goes back to Boghossian (1996). Boghossian defends an updated version of Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s view that analyticity should be stated in terms of implicit definitions. In contrast to Boghossian, Williamson believes that there is no way of understanding analytic truths that makes analyticity useful in philosophy. Within the scope of this thesis, these ‘post-Quinean’ attempts to describe analyticity and the analytic explanation of a priori will also be presented and critically reviewed.