Ce mémoire traite de la critique communautarienne du libéralisme et se donne deux projets. D’abord, il s’agit de formuler une position de synthèse à partir des travaux des philosophes Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre et Michael Walzer. Cette synthèse s’articule autour de trois axes, soit ontologique, sociale et méthodologique. Le deuxième projet est d’évaluer cette position pour statuer sur son rapport au libéralisme, et, plus précisément, pour déterminer si elle est seulement une critique, une alternative, ou encore une variante à l’intérieur du libéralisme. Il est conclu que le communautarisme est réconciliable avec une certaine forme de libéralisme et que sa critique permet même de l’améliorer. / In this essay about the communitarian critique of liberalism I seek to reach two goals. First, it is to form a synthesis from the works of philosophers Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer. This synthesis is articulated through three axes: ontologicial, social and methodological. Building on this, my second objective is to assess its relation to liberalism. More specifically, I seek to determine whether communitarianism is merely a critique, an alternative or a variant of liberalism. My conclusion is that communitarianism is reconciliable with a certain form of liberalism and that its critique allows to improve it.

Modernity has generally been interpreted as a radical expression of human progress in the light of the advances of modern science and technology. According to Alasdair MacIntyre, however, modernity is a project "doomed to failure". Given the progressive-linearity of the modern model of rationality, the past has, in principle, been ruled out as a source of moral-political wisdom and guidance. From the perspective of modernity, the present (as the progressive moment of the future) has therefore nothing to learn from past traditions. MacIntyre contends that the moral confusion within modernity comes from its loss of telos, mediated in terms of the past. Modernity therefore harbours a paradox based on its inability to provide a philosophical justification for establishing the possibility of human solidarity in the present, while simultaneously affirming its faith in the future. In this regard, MacIntyre's work is an important contribution to the philosophical debate on modernity. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M. A. (Philosophy)

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Submitted by Automa??o e Estat?stica (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2017-10-18T21:15:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 AlbertoLeopoldoBatistaNeto_TESE.pdf: 2275116 bytes, checksum: 48fe93fd896aa79f9e40bd1b17f8d818 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-10-24T23:27:01Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 AlbertoLeopoldoBatistaNeto_TESE.pdf: 2275116 bytes, checksum: 48fe93fd896aa79f9e40bd1b17f8d818 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-24T23:27:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AlbertoLeopoldoBatistaNeto_TESE.pdf: 2275116 bytes, checksum: 48fe93fd896aa79f9e40bd1b17f8d818 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-04-27 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior (CAPES) / A teoria das tradi??es de pesquisa racional de Alasdair MacIntyre elabora uma perspectiva metafilos?fica em que ? poss?vel avaliar os m?ritos relativos de enquadramentos rivais da racionalidade, de uma maneira que se assemelha a algumas abordagens can?nicas na filosofia da ci?ncia, evadindo-se, por?m, tanto aos problemas relativos ? compreens?o do progresso te?rico, quanto ?s restri??es pr?prias das posi??es relativista e perspectivista, de modo a permitir, por um lado, uma percep??o dos condicionamentos que operam sobre uma investiga??o e, por outro, assumir uma postura filosoficamente realista, amparada numa concep??o da verdade como adequa??o da mente ? realidade. Aproxima-se da tradi??o aristot?lico-tomista e, em sua vers?o madura, encontra nessa tradi??o seu modelo e dela se considera continuadora. Compromete-se com uma concep??o de racionalidade especificamente adaptada, argumenta-se, para a pr?tica filos?fica, sendo importante tra?ar uma distin??o, ignorada por MacIntyre, entre uma racionalidade filos?fica e uma racionalidade cient?fica, esta dedicada ? constru??o de modelos explorat?rios adequados ? predi??o e controle de fen?menos e aquela ocupada com o julgamento sobre a natureza e a estrutura da realidade como tal. Considerando a origem hist?rica dessa divis?o de caminhos e abordando a maneira como alguns fil?sofos de orienta??o aristot?lico-tomista trataram a rela??o entre ci?ncia natural e filosofia da natureza, estabelece-se a primazia de uma perspectiva filos?fica que n?o assuma simplesmente o modelo da racionalidade cient?fica para uma mais completa fundamenta??o de uma teoria da pesquisa racional em moldes macintyreanos. Essa complementa??o da teoria das tradi??es de pesquisa racional de MacIntyre permite, por sua vez, elaborar uma cr?tica ? filosofia anal?tica que encontra na admiss?o da racionalidade cient?fica como modelo para a racionalidade filos?fica o elemento capaz de atribuir ao movimento a identidade unit?ria de uma tradi??o. Tal identidade deve ser entendida antes como pressuposto operacional que como ades?o a teses ou par?metros metodol?gicos bem definidos, e ilumina as cr?ticas esparsas de MacIntyre ?quela tradi??o, apontando para a exist?ncia, nela, de uma forma de emotivismo filos?fico generalizado. / Alasdair MacIntyre?s theory of the traditions of rational enquiry elaborates a metaphilosophical perspective from which one may evaluate the relative merits of rival frameworks of rationality in a way that resembles some canonical approaches in the philosophy of science, but in such a way as to avoid as much as possible the problems relating to the understanding of theoretic progress as the restrictions proper to relativist and perspectivist positions, so that it allows, on the one hand, a clear sight of the conditionings which operate on an investigation and, on the other, to assume a strictly realist posture anchored in a conception of truth as adequation of mind to reality. It approximates to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition and, in its mature version, finds in this tradition its own model and takes itself to be its heir. It is committed to a conception of rationality specifically adapted, it is argued, to philosophical practice, being an important task to draw a distinction, ignored by MacIntyre, between a philosophical and a scientific rationality, the latter dedicated to the building of exploratory models adequate to the prediction and control of phenomena and the former occupied in judging of the nature and structure of reality as such. By considering the historical origin of this parting of ways and approaching the manner in which some philosophers of an Aristotelian-Thomistic orientation dealt with the relation between natural science and the philosophy of nature, the primacy is established of a philosophical perspective that does not simply take scientific rationality as its model, in order to furnish a fuller grounding to a theory of rational enquiry in MacIntyrean moulds. This complementation of MacIntyre?s theory of the traditions of rational enquiry, in its turn, allows for an elaboration of a criticism of analytic philosophy which finds in the adoption of scientific rationality as a model to philosophical rationality the element apt to confer the movement the unitary identity of a tradition. Such an identity should not be understood as adhesion to determinate theses or methodological patterns but rather as an operational presupposition, and it sheds light on MacIntyre?s sparse criticisms of that tradition, pointing toward the existence, in it, of a kind of generalized philosophical emotivism.

Diploma thesis deals with the analysis of the book by Alasdair MacIntyre ?After virtue. A Study in Moral Theory ? in which the author discusses the crisis of moral values at the time of Modern Period. The main part of the thesis is devoted to this book and also the views of scholars from Classical times up to the early 20th century. The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter deals with the thoughts of Alasdair MacIntyre, the second chapter discusses emotivism, the third chapter contains an essay on the topic of virtues and examines how values changed and develioped in society throught the ages. The fourth chapter questiones the Modern period and the crisis of values in this time. The fifth chapter is an essay about Friedrich Nietzsche.

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Ce mémoire porte sur l’articulation de la morale en droit. Il soulève la question de l’objectivité de la morale dans la théorie du droit de Ronald Dworkin. Celui-ci doit pouvoir établir les critères de justification de la morale pour asseoir son autorité en droit. Il conteste la validité de la règle de reconnaissance de Hart qui exclue la morale comme source et comme justification inhérente au droit. Dans son dernier livre, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin présente sa thèse de l’unité de valeur entre le droit, la morale personnelle et la morale politique. Pour réussir à intégrer la morale au droit, il doit en défendre l’objectivité. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique et de la vérité propre à la morale. Sa conception de la rationalité pratique est rapprochée de celle d’Alasdair MacIntyre. Celui-ci rejette la prétention issue des Lumières d’une rationalité pratique universelle et neutre. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique fondée sur le concept de tradition d’investigation. Il fait l’histoire des principales traditions d’investigation depuis l’antiquité jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Il considère la tradition aristotélicienne supérieure, celle-ci réussissant mieux à donner objectivité et intelligibilité à la morale. Des points de convergence ou de divergence sont identifiés dans les conceptions de la morale de Dworkin et de MacIntyre. Ce rapprochement porte sur leurs positions respectives face aux principaux fondements théoriques en philosophie morale, leurs conceptions de la rationalité pratique et leurs définitions des notions de droit et de justice. / The subject of this thesis is the relation between morals and law. It raises the question of the objectivity of morals in Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law. Dworkin has to set sound justification criteria of morals in order to establish its authority in law. He disputes the validity of the rule of recognition of Hart which negates that morality is an inherent part of law. In his last book, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin present his thesis on the unity of value between law, personal morality and political morality. To succeed in integrating morality into law, he has to defend its objectivity. He develops a particular concept of rationality and truth applicable to morality. His concept of practical rationality is drawn together with Alasdair Macintyre’s own concept of rationality MacIntyre rejects the Enlightment’s claim of a universal and neutral rationality. He develops a concept of practical reasoning based on the concept of traditions of enquiry. He makes the history of the most important traditions of enquiry from Ancient Greece to today. He considers that the Aristotelian tradition of enquiry is superior, since it gives objectivity and intelligibility to morality. Points of convergence and points of divergence are identified in the concepts of morality of Dworkin and MacIntyre. These common aspects are found in the theoretical fundamentals in philosophy, in their concepts of practical rationality and in their definition of the notions of law and justice.

Ce mémoire porte sur l’articulation de la morale en droit. Il soulève la question de l’objectivité de la morale dans la théorie du droit de Ronald Dworkin. Celui-ci doit pouvoir établir les critères de justification de la morale pour asseoir son autorité en droit. Il conteste la validité de la règle de reconnaissance de Hart qui exclue la morale comme source et comme justification inhérente au droit. Dans son dernier livre, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin présente sa thèse de l’unité de valeur entre le droit, la morale personnelle et la morale politique. Pour réussir à intégrer la morale au droit, il doit en défendre l’objectivité. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique et de la vérité propre à la morale. Sa conception de la rationalité pratique est rapprochée de celle d’Alasdair MacIntyre. Celui-ci rejette la prétention issue des Lumières d’une rationalité pratique universelle et neutre. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique fondée sur le concept de tradition d’investigation. Il fait l’histoire des principales traditions d’investigation depuis l’antiquité jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Il considère la tradition aristotélicienne supérieure, celle-ci réussissant mieux à donner objectivité et intelligibilité à la morale. Des points de convergence ou de divergence sont identifiés dans les conceptions de la morale de Dworkin et de MacIntyre. Ce rapprochement porte sur leurs positions respectives face aux principaux fondements théoriques en philosophie morale, leurs conceptions de la rationalité pratique et leurs définitions des notions de droit et de justice. / The subject of this thesis is the relation between morals and law. It raises the question of the objectivity of morals in Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law. Dworkin has to set sound justification criteria of morals in order to establish its authority in law. He disputes the validity of the rule of recognition of Hart which negates that morality is an inherent part of law. In his last book, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin present his thesis on the unity of value between law, personal morality and political morality. To succeed in integrating morality into law, he has to defend its objectivity. He develops a particular concept of rationality and truth applicable to morality. His concept of practical rationality is drawn together with Alasdair Macintyre’s own concept of rationality MacIntyre rejects the Enlightment’s claim of a universal and neutral rationality. He develops a concept of practical reasoning based on the concept of traditions of enquiry. He makes the history of the most important traditions of enquiry from Ancient Greece to today. He considers that the Aristotelian tradition of enquiry is superior, since it gives objectivity and intelligibility to morality. Points of convergence and points of divergence are identified in the concepts of morality of Dworkin and MacIntyre. These common aspects are found in the theoretical fundamentals in philosophy, in their concepts of practical rationality and in their definition of the notions of law and justice.

This diploma thesis deals with the Aristotelian virtue ethics and its renaissance in the twentieth century. Ethics is first defined generally as a separate science which belongs to the practical sciences. Subsequently, the emphasis on virtue ethics as one of the directions of normative ethics. A key part of the thesis deals with the ethics of virtue in Aristotle and interpretation corresponding more or less to the interpretation of the work of Nicomachean Ethics. The emphasis is on concepts of virtue, bliss and goodness. The development of u virtue ethics from the time of Aristotle until the twentieth century is also mentioned. The last part deals with the form of virtue ethics in the twentieth century, including the process how the ethics of virtue acquired its present form. It is also compared to the interpretation of virtue ethics in Aristotle and in the works of modern moral philosophers, particularly the work of Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue is emphasized.

Recent years have seen an influx of medical technologies capable of remotely monitoring the health and behaviours of individuals to detect, manage and prevent health problems. Known collectively as personal health monitoring (PHM), these systems are intended to supplement medical care with health monitoring outside traditional care environments such as hospitals, ranging in complexity from mobile devices to complex networks of sensors measuring physiological parameters and behaviours. This research project assesses the potential ethical implications of PHM as an emerging medical technology, amenable to anticipatory action intended to prevent or mitigate problematic ethical issues in the future. PHM fundamentally changes how medical care can be delivered: patients can be monitored and consulted at a distance, eliminating opportunities for face-to-face actions and potentially undermining the importance of social, emotional and psychological aspects of medical care. The norms evident in this movement may clash with existing standards of 'good' medical practice from the perspective of patients, clinicians and institutions. By relating utilitarianism, virtue ethics and theories of surveillance to Habermas' concept of colonisation of the lifeworld, a conceptual framework is created which can explain how PHM may be allowed to change medicine as a practice in an ethically problematic way. The framework relates the inhibition of virtuous behaviour among practitioners of medicine, understood as a moral practice, to the movement in medicine towards remote monitoring. To assess the explanatory power of the conceptual framework and expand its borders, a qualitative interview empirical study with potential users of PHM in England is carried out. Recognising that the inherent uncertainty of the future undermines the validity of empirical research, a novel epistemological framework based in Habermas' discourse ethics is created to justify the empirical study. By developing Habermas' concept of translation into a procedure for assessing the credibility of uncertain normative claims about the future, a novel methodology for empirical ethical assessment of emerging technologies is created and tested. Various methods of analysis are employed, including review of academic discourses, empirical and theoretical analyses of the moral potential of PHM. Recommendations are made concerning ethical issues in the deployment and design of PHM systems, analysis and application of PHM data, and the shortcomings of existing research and protection mechanisms in responding to potential ethical implications of the technology.