Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Histoire--Aix-Marseille 1, 2006. Titre de soutenance : Monastères doubles, familles, propriétés et pouvoirs au Mont Liban : l'itinéraire du couvent maronite de Mar Challita Mouqbes (XVIIème-XIXème siècles). / Bibliogr. p. 483-520. Index.

Thèse (Ph. D.)--Université Laval, 2006. / "Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures de l'Université Laval comme exigence partielle du programme de doctorat en théologie offert à l'Université de Sherbrooke en vertu d'un protocole d'entente avec l'Université Laval pour l'obtention du grade de Philosophiae Doctor (Ph. D.)" Bibliogr.: f. 267-290. Publié aussi en version électronique dans la Collection Mémoires et thèses électroniques.

Situé au cœur d’un environnement hostile et instable, l’État d’Israël est confronté depuis sa déclaration d’indépendance le 14 mai 1948 à des défis existentiels, au premier rang desquels celui de son intégration régionale. Pour faire face à ce qu’il perçoit comme un encerclement, le jeune État hébreu recherche parmi ses voisins proche-orientaux des groupes confessionnels ou ethnolinguistiques susceptibles de s’allier à lui pour fractionner le bloc arabe hostile. Plusieurs éléments font de la communauté maronite du Liban un allié potentiel pour Israël. Durant huit décennies, l’État hébreu et la droite chrétienne au Liban entretiennent de bons rapports. Certains dirigeants israéliens songent à la création d’un nouveau Liban, sous contrôle chrétien et allié à Jérusalem. La relation israélo-maronite a cependant toujours été précaire. Elle est basée sur une position inconfortable pour deux communautés minoritaires dans une région dominée par les Arabes musulmans. Elle est altérée par les interactions dynamiques entre chrétiens et musulmans au Liban et par le conflit israélo-arabe. Cette thèse s’inscrit dans une interrogation sur les capacités de l’État juif à tisser des liens avec d’autres groupes minoritaires au Proche-Orient, ainsi que sur la pertinence du concept d’ « alliance des minorités ». Elle soutient que les politiques régionales d’Israël sont influencées par un certain nombre de représentations héritées de l’époque du Yichouv. Elle fournit des exemples concrets témoignant de l’influence négative que peuvent avoir certaines représentations erronées ou des idées fausses sur la politique d’un État. / Located, as it is, at the heart of a hostile and unstable environment, the State of Israel has been faced, since its declaration of independence on 14 May 1948, with existential challenges, its regional integration being one of the major ones. In order to deal with what it saw as being encircled, the young Hebrew state looked among its near-eastern neighbours for denominational or ethno-linguistic groups likely to form an alliance with it in order to divide up the hostile Arabic group. For several reasons, the Maronite group in Lebanon turned out to be a potential ally for Israel. The Hebrew state and Lebanon's Christian right have had good relations for eight decades. Some Israeli rulers have thought about the creation of a new Lebanon, under Christian control and allied with Jerusalem. Yet, the Israeli-Maronite relation has always been fragile. It is based on an uncomfortable position for the two minorities in a region dominated by Muslim Arabs. It is altered by the dynamic interactions between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon and by the Israeli-Arab conflict. This doctoral thesis aims to question the Jewish state's capacities to forge links with other minority groups in the Near East as well as the relevance of the “alliance of minorities” concept. It argues that Israel's regional policies are influenced by a certain number of representations it has inherited from the Yishuv era. It provides tangible examples illustrating the negative influence some misleading representations or false ideas may have on a state's policies.

La retraite spirituelle est une pause qui implique une rupture avec le train de vie ordinaire, dans un cadre plus ou moins isolé, silencieux et paisible, en vue de permettre une rencontre plus intime avec Dieu, au sein d’une expérience spirituelle intense. Elle est aujourd’hui un exercice spirituel présent dans toutes les Règles des ordres religieux. Ainsi en est-il dans l’Ordre libanais maronite. Qu’est-ce qui caractérise la retraite spirituelle dans cet Ordre, à la lumière des écrits de ses cofondateurs, et quelles en sont les perspectives actuelles ? Telle est la question posée dans ces pages. Pour y répondre, ce travail propose d’abord une incursion historique pour découvrir et comprendre l’émergence de cette pratique dans la tradition chrétienne proche-orientale. Suit une présentation de l’Ordre libanais maronite et de sa spiritualité. Ensuite est approfondie la lecture des écrits : Modèle des retraitants et La retraite spirituelle ou Note dans l’organisation de la retraite des retraitants que deux des cofondateurs de cet Ordre, ‘Abd Allāh Qara‘alī et Ğibrāyil Farḥāt, ont livrés sur le sujet. Enfin les caractéristiques sont présentées et mises à jour tout en les confrontant à quelques défis actuels d’ordre personnel, culturel, social et monastique. L’objectif de cette recherche est de donner des perspectives pour une retraite spirituelle, enracinée dans la tradition, actualisée et propre à l’Ordre libanais maronite. / A spiritual retreat means taking a break from one’s daily routine in an environment that is more or less isolated, silent and peaceful, in order to facilitate a more personal encounter with God through an intense spiritual experience. The retreat is now a spiritual exercise present in the Rules of all Religious Orders. This is the case with the Lebanese Maronite Order. What characterizes the spiritual retreat in that Order, in light of the writings of its cofounders, and what are its present perspectives? This is the question addressed in the following pages. To answer it, this research paper first delves into history to discover and understand the emergence of this practice in Near-Eastern Christian tradition. A presentation of the Lebanese Maronite Order and its spirituality followed. An analysis was then made of two writings — Model for retreatants [Modèle des retraitants] and The spiritual retreat, or Note for the organization of the retreat for retreatants [La retraite spirituelle ou Note dans l’organisation de la retraite des retraitants] — left by two of the co-founders of that Order, ‘Abd Allāh Qara‘alī and Ğibrāyil Farḥāt. Finally, the characteristics are presented and updated, in the context of contemporary personal, cultural, social and monastic challenges. The goal of this research paper is to offer perspectives for a spiritual retreat that is rooted in tradition yet updated and proper to the Lebanese Maronite Order.

L’Empire ottoman, au XIXe siècle, s’affaiblit sans cesse et paraît destiné à s'effondrer. Il est l’objet de convoitises et de rivalités entre les puissances européennes. Sous sa suzeraineté, la Syrie et, avec elle, la région du Mont-Liban, est une zone clé sur le plan stratégique puisqu'elle domine l’accès aux voies menant à l’Inde et à l’Asie méridionale et orientale. La France et l'Angleterre tentent toutes deux de s'y imposer par communautés locales interposées : la première à travers les Maronites, la seconde à l'aide des Druzes. Au printemps 1860, des troubles éclatent entre les deux communautés, entraînant le massacre de milliers de chrétiens. Les puissances européennes, poussées par le gouvernement de Napoléon III, s'entendent pour intervenir au moyen d'une commission d'enquête et l'envoi de troupes. Cette expédition a pour mission officielle d’aider l’Empire ottoman à rétablir l’ordre et à protéger les chrétiens. Le présent mémoire démontre que la France impériale entretenait des visées politiques et économiques à l'égard de la Syrie et du Liban. L'historiographie n'avait jusqu'à présent pas analysé en profondeur les véritables mobiles français dans cette expédition. Les ambitions politiques et économiques ont été beaucoup plus déterminantes dans la décision française de mettre en branle l'expédition que le devoir « humanitaire » de protection des chrétiens ou la satisfaction de son opinion publique. Loin de se laisser abattre par la catastrophe que représentent les massacres qui menace la survie de sa clientèle et donc de son influence en Syrie, Paris, et particulièrement son ministre des Affaires étrangères E. Thouvenel, a réussi à tourner la situation à son avantage. Se servant habilement du désir d'ingérence des autres puissances et de son rôle de protectrice des chrétiens, la France est parvenue à acculer au pied du mur l'Angleterre, qui s'opposait à l'intervention, et à justifier celle-ci sur des principes éloignés de ses objectifs réels. Les troubles ont finalement constitué pour elle une occasion d'augmenter l'autonomie de la Montagne par rapport au pouvoir central et la puissance économique et politique de sa clientèle à travers la révision du statut administratif de la région. Ce faisant, elle a renforcé son influence dans l'Est méditerranéen et fait un pas de plus vers une domination française en Syrie. / Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire grew weaker and seemed headed for collapse. It became the object of the ambitions and rivalries of the European powers. Under its suzerainty, Syria, including the Mount Lebanon region, was a key area strategically since it dominated the access routes to India and southern and eastern Asia. France and England both tried to impose their influence by way of local communities. France acted through the Christian Maronites, while Britain used the Druzes. In the spring of 1860, trouble broke out between the two communities, resulting in the massacre of thousands of Christians. The European powers, at the behest of the government of Napoleon III, agreed to intervene by sending a commission of inquiry and troops. The expedition’s official mission was to help the Ottoman Empire to restore order and to protect Christians. This thesis shows that imperial France pursued political and economic goals with regard to Syria and Lebanon. The historiography had not previously analyzed in depth the real French mobile in this expedition. The political and economic ambitions were far more important in its decision to set in motion an expedition than the "humanitarian" Christian duty of providing protection or the satisfaction of the public opinion. Far from being deterred by the catastrophe of the massacre that threatened the survival of its protégés and therefore its influence in Syria, Paris, and especially its foreign minister E. Thouvenel, managed to turn the situation to his advantage. Skilfully using the desire of interference of other powers and its role as protector of Christians, France managed to corner England, which opposed the intervention, and justify it on principles far removed from its real objectives. The troubles finally represented for her an opportunity to widen the autonomy of the Mountain vis-à-vis the central authority of the Ottoman Empire and to increase the economic and political power of its clients through the revision of the administrative status of the region. In so doing, it has strengthened its influence in the eastern Mediterranean and moved a step closer to dominating Syria.

L’immigration maronite à Montréal date de la fin du XIXe siècle, mais c’est dans les années 1970 et 1990, à la suite des guerres au Liban, qu’il y a eu les plus grandes vagues. De rite syriaque antiochien, mais d’obédience catholique romaine, les immigrants maronites n’avaient pas d’église paroissiale propre. Les autorités diocésaines montréalaises avaient rassemblé les catholiques orientaux dans une même église dont le service était assuré par l’ordre melkite du Saint-Sauveur. En 1969, le père de l’ordre maronite mariamite Élias Najjar fonde avec des Égyptiens maronites la première paroisse. Cette étude se penche sur le processus qui a mené à la naissance de cette paroisse, son évolution à travers le temps et la vie de ses paroissiens. L’approche est narrative et descriptive, elle s’inscrit dans le cadre de l’histoire sociale et religieuse. Les résultats de l’analyse mettent en lumière une église nationale et un nouveau modèle de paroisse diasporique, différent du modèle classique, recelant des diversités infranationale, internationale et interconfessionnelle. / Maronite immigration to Montreal started at the end of the 19th century. During the 1970s and 1990s, massive waves of Lebanese immigrants arrived to Montreal due to the wars in Lebanon. The Maronite Church is fully Roman Catholic but has a syriac-antiochean rite. Maronite immigrants did not have their own parish in Montreal and had to go for célébrations in the Oriental Catholic Church which was created by Montreal clerical authorities and served by Greek-Catholics (Melkites) of the Saint-Sauveur order. In 1969, Father Élias Najjar from the Maronite mariamite order, together with Maronites from Egypt, founded the first Maronite parish in Montreal. This thesis aims to study the process behind the constitution of the first parish, its evolution and the life of its parishioners by using a narrative and descriptive approach in the frame of the social and religious history. Results show a national Church and a new model of Maronite diasporic parish, different from the classical one, having subnational, international and inter-confessional diversities.

The tiny nation-state of Lebanon has been marred by political instability and violence over the past 35 years. Most scholars blame the consociational structure of the bureaucratic system as the main culprit for the precarious state of the republic. It is an understatement to say that the delicate power-sharing balance divided between the Christian and Muslim sects has been one of the most detrimental elements to government stability and socioeconomic development. Underneath these sectarian affiliations, however, lie numerous patronage systems all vying for power and control over the Lebanese system. These systems not only act to support their Lebanese sectarian leader, but many have reached across the border and found the open hands of foreign powers. The actions of these foreign entities have also constituted a divisive role in undermining the unification of the nation into a cohesive and functioning state, particularly during the post-civil war time period. The end of the 15 year civil war through the passage of the National Reconciliation Accord heralded in a sense of promise for a future free of war and political mismanagement through the abolition of the consociational system. This promise, however, has yet to be fulfilled. This thesis is an examination into the role and impact of Syrian and Saudi Arabian patronage ties in the Lebanese system. By looking at the states through the actions of their clients we can come to a better understanding of both why and how the goals of Ta'if have yet to be achieved and potentially come to understand the needs facing Lebanon's future. / text

Thesis (M.A. in Latin American Studies)--Vanderbilt University, Aug. 2006. / Title from title screen. Includes bibliographical references.

O presente estudo tem por finalidade descrever a interação conflituosa entre o nacionalismo árabe e o Líbano entre 1952 e 1967. Nesses anos ocorreu a ascensão do nacionalismo árabe, que teve na figura do presidente egípcio Gamal Abdel Nasser a sua principal liderança. Seu objetivo era promover a luta dos povos de língua árabe contra a dependência tecnológica e dominação econômica e/ou política dos países capitalistas centrais, situados na Europa Ocidental e América do Norte. Bem como desenvolver suas sociedades e combater os setores conservadores internos, aliados dos poderes capitalistas ocidentais e pouco interessados em uma modernização mais profunda ou uma grande melhoria nos padrões de vida das classes populares. O objetivo último dos nacionalistas árabes era a unidade de todos os povos árabes em algum tipo de estrutura estatal. No Líbano a ideia da unidade árabe era mais difícil de realizar, pois uma parcela importante da sua população, os cristãos maronitas, não se viam como árabes e buscaram criar um estado separado para eles no começo do século XX, com apoio de uma potência colonial europeia com quem se identificavam e tinha laços históricos: a França. No entanto, para que o Líbano pudesse existir como estado independente viável economicamente, após a II Guerra Mundial, tiveram os cristão maronitas de entrar em acordo com a população muçulmana, particularmente os sunitas, e aceitar que o Líbano tinha uma face árabe. Esse acordo, conhecido como o Pacto Nacional, garantiu a existência do Líbano e permitiu que este se tornasse um entreposto comercial e financeiro no Oriente Médio, algo desejado tanto por suas elites cristãs (maronita e outras), como pelas muçulmanas. Mas, enquanto o Líbano experimentava um grande crescimento econômico na década de 1950, as suas regiões muçulmanas eram mantida em grande parte alheias a esse crescimento. O resultado foi o seguinte: as populações muçulmanas passaram a questionar a preponderância cristã e viram em Nasser e no nacionalismo árabe um meio para isso. Suas lideranças tiverem que segui-las, enquanto a população cristã, particularmente os maronitas, sentia-se ameaçada. Estas tensões, mescladas às ambições do presidente Camille Chamoun e ao cenário da Guerra Fria, conduziram a guerra civil de 1958. Posteriormente, entre 1959 e 1964, em um governo de unidade nacional, o Presidente Fuad Chehab tentou promover a unidade nacional, fazer investimentos do estado nas regiões muçulmanas, criar um esboço de segurança social e regular o liberalismo desenfreado do país. Seu fracasso parcial e o mau tratamento da população de refugiados palestinos por suas forças de segurança abriu caminho para a grande guerra civil de 1975-1990 / The present study aims at describing the conflicting interaction between Arab nationalism and Lebanon between 1952 and 1967. Those years was the rise of Arab nationalism, which had the figure of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser your primary leadership. His goal was to promote the struggle of the Arabic speaking people against technological dependence and economic domination and / or policy of the central capitalist countries located in Western Europe and North America. As well as developing their societies and combat domestic conservative sectors, allies of Western capitalist powers and little interested in a deeper upgrade or a major improvement in living standards of the working classes. The ultimate aim of Arab nationalists was the unity of all Arab peoples in some kind of state structure. In Lebanon the idea of Arab unity was more difficult to accomplish, because a significant portion of its population, the Maronite Christians, do not see themselves as Arabs and sought to create a separate state for them in the early twentieth century, with the support of a colonial power European with whom identified themselves and had historical ties: France. However, that Lebanon could exist as economically viable independent state after World War II, Christian Maronites had to come to terms with the Muslim population, particularly the Sunnis, and accept that Lebanon was an Arab face. This agreement, known as the National Pact, ensured the existence of Lebanon and allowed it to become a commercial and financial entrepot in the Middle East, something desired by both her Christian elites (Maronite and other), and by Muslims. But while Lebanon was experiencing great economic growth in the 1950s, its Muslim regions were maintained in large part unrelated to this growth. The result was as follows: Muslim populations began to question the Christian dominance and saw in Nasser and Arab nationalism means for this. Their leaders have to follow them, while the Christian population, particularly the Maronites, felt threatened. These tensions, merged the ambitions of President Camille Chamoun and the scenario of the Cold War, led to civil war in 1958. Later, between 1959 and 1964 in a government of national unity, President Fuad Chehab tried to promote national unity, make investments state in Muslim regions, create an outline of social security and regular liberalism rampant in the country. Its partial failure and poor treatment of the population of Palestinian refugees by its security forces paved the way for the great Civil War 1975-1990

O presente estudo tem por finalidade descrever a interação conflituosa entre o nacionalismo árabe e o Líbano entre 1952 e 1967. Nesses anos ocorreu a ascensão do nacionalismo árabe, que teve na figura do presidente egípcio Gamal Abdel Nasser a sua principal liderança. Seu objetivo era promover a luta dos povos de língua árabe contra a dependência tecnológica e dominação econômica e/ou política dos países capitalistas centrais, situados na Europa Ocidental e América do Norte. Bem como desenvolver suas sociedades e combater os setores conservadores internos, aliados dos poderes capitalistas ocidentais e pouco interessados em uma modernização mais profunda ou uma grande melhoria nos padrões de vida das classes populares. O objetivo último dos nacionalistas árabes era a unidade de todos os povos árabes em algum tipo de estrutura estatal. No Líbano a ideia da unidade árabe era mais difícil de realizar, pois uma parcela importante da sua população, os cristãos maronitas, não se viam como árabes e buscaram criar um estado separado para eles no começo do século XX, com apoio de uma potência colonial europeia com quem se identificavam e tinha laços históricos: a França. No entanto, para que o Líbano pudesse existir como estado independente viável economicamente, após a II Guerra Mundial, tiveram os cristão maronitas de entrar em acordo com a população muçulmana, particularmente os sunitas, e aceitar que o Líbano tinha uma face árabe. Esse acordo, conhecido como o Pacto Nacional, garantiu a existência do Líbano e permitiu que este se tornasse um entreposto comercial e financeiro no Oriente Médio, algo desejado tanto por suas elites cristãs (maronita e outras), como pelas muçulmanas. Mas, enquanto o Líbano experimentava um grande crescimento econômico na década de 1950, as suas regiões muçulmanas eram mantida em grande parte alheias a esse crescimento. O resultado foi o seguinte: as populações muçulmanas passaram a questionar a preponderância cristã e viram em Nasser e no nacionalismo árabe um meio para isso. Suas lideranças tiverem que segui-las, enquanto a população cristã, particularmente os maronitas, sentia-se ameaçada. Estas tensões, mescladas às ambições do presidente Camille Chamoun e ao cenário da Guerra Fria, conduziram a guerra civil de 1958. Posteriormente, entre 1959 e 1964, em um governo de unidade nacional, o Presidente Fuad Chehab tentou promover a unidade nacional, fazer investimentos do estado nas regiões muçulmanas, criar um esboço de segurança social e regular o liberalismo desenfreado do país. Seu fracasso parcial e o mau tratamento da população de refugiados palestinos por suas forças de segurança abriu caminho para a grande guerra civil de 1975-1990 / The present study aims at describing the conflicting interaction between Arab nationalism and Lebanon between 1952 and 1967. Those years was the rise of Arab nationalism, which had the figure of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser your primary leadership. His goal was to promote the struggle of the Arabic speaking people against technological dependence and economic domination and / or policy of the central capitalist countries located in Western Europe and North America. As well as developing their societies and combat domestic conservative sectors, allies of Western capitalist powers and little interested in a deeper upgrade or a major improvement in living standards of the working classes. The ultimate aim of Arab nationalists was the unity of all Arab peoples in some kind of state structure. In Lebanon the idea of Arab unity was more difficult to accomplish, because a significant portion of its population, the Maronite Christians, do not see themselves as Arabs and sought to create a separate state for them in the early twentieth century, with the support of a colonial power European with whom identified themselves and had historical ties: France. However, that Lebanon could exist as economically viable independent state after World War II, Christian Maronites had to come to terms with the Muslim population, particularly the Sunnis, and accept that Lebanon was an Arab face. This agreement, known as the National Pact, ensured the existence of Lebanon and allowed it to become a commercial and financial entrepot in the Middle East, something desired by both her Christian elites (Maronite and other), and by Muslims. But while Lebanon was experiencing great economic growth in the 1950s, its Muslim regions were maintained in large part unrelated to this growth. The result was as follows: Muslim populations began to question the Christian dominance and saw in Nasser and Arab nationalism means for this. Their leaders have to follow them, while the Christian population, particularly the Maronites, felt threatened. These tensions, merged the ambitions of President Camille Chamoun and the scenario of the Cold War, led to civil war in 1958. Later, between 1959 and 1964 in a government of national unity, President Fuad Chehab tried to promote national unity, make investments state in Muslim regions, create an outline of social security and regular liberalism rampant in the country. Its partial failure and poor treatment of the population of Palestinian refugees by its security forces paved the way for the great Civil War 1975-1990