Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / An increasing number of unmanned vehicles (UV) are being incorporated into maritime operations as organic elements of Expeditionary and Carrier Strike Groups for development of the recognized maritime picture. This thesis develops an analytically-based planning aid for allocating UVs to missions. Inputs include the inventory of UVs, sensors, their performance parameters, and operational scenarios. Operations are broken into mission critical functions: detection, identification, and collection. The model output assigns aggregated packages of UVs and sensors to one of the three functions within named areas of interest. A spreadsheet model uses conservative time-speed-distance calculations, and simplified mathematical models from search theory and queuing theory, to calculate measures of performance for possible assignments of UVs to missions. The spreadsheet model generates a matrix as input to a linear integer program assignment model which finds the best assignment of UVs to missions based on the user inputs and simplified models. The results provide the mission planner with quantitatively-based recommendations for unmanned vehicle mission tasking in challenging scenarios. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

Military command is the single most important factor in the conduct of warfare. To understand war and military success and failure, historians need to explore command structures and the relationships between commanders. In World War I, a new level of higher command had emerged: the corps commander. Between 1914 and 1918, the role of corps commanders and the demands placed upon them constantly changed as experiences brought illumination and insight. Yet the men who occupied these positions were sometimes unable to cope with the changing circumstances and the many significant limitations which were imposed upon them. Of the World War I corps commanders, William Birdwood was one of the longest serving. From the time of his appointment in December 1914 until May 1918, Birdwood acquired an experience of corps command which was perhaps more diverse than his contemporaries during this time. He is, then, an ideal subject for a prolonged assessment of this level of command. This thesis has two principal objectives. The first is to identify and assess those factors which limited Birdwood???s capacity and ability to command. The second is to explore the institutional constraints placed on corps commanders during the 1914-1918 war. Surprisingly, this is a comparatively barren area of research. Because very few officers spent much time as corps commanders on their way to higher command appointments and because the role of the corps commanders in military planning and in the conduct of operations was not immediately apparent, their role has been practically ignored. Historians have tended to concentrate on the Army and divisional levels creating a deficient view of higher military command in World War I. However, corps commanders could and did play an important part in planning operations and in military affairs generally. Birdwood???s experience at Gallipoli and in France reflect some of the changes to command structures that were prompted by the successes and failures of operations directed at the corps level. In as much as these two theatres of war were vastly different and Birdwood was confronted with dissimilar problems, it is possible to draw some general conclusions about the evolution of higher command after 1914. Using a wide range of primary and secondary sources located in Australian and British archives, this thesis traces Birdwood???s career as a corps commander at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. It also examines his tenure as G.O.C. of the A.I.F.

Military command is the single most important factor in the conduct of warfare. To understand war and military success and failure, historians need to explore command structures and the relationships between commanders. In World War I, a new level of higher command had emerged: the corps commander. Between 1914 and 1918, the role of corps commanders and the demands placed upon them constantly changed as experiences brought illumination and insight. Yet the men who occupied these positions were sometimes unable to cope with the changing circumstances and the many significant limitations which were imposed upon them. Of the World War I corps commanders, William Birdwood was one of the longest serving. From the time of his appointment in December 1914 until May 1918, Birdwood acquired an experience of corps command which was perhaps more diverse than his contemporaries during this time. He is, then, an ideal subject for a prolonged assessment of this level of command. This thesis has two principal objectives. The first is to identify and assess those factors which limited Birdwood???s capacity and ability to command. The second is to explore the institutional constraints placed on corps commanders during the 1914-1918 war. Surprisingly, this is a comparatively barren area of research. Because very few officers spent much time as corps commanders on their way to higher command appointments and because the role of the corps commanders in military planning and in the conduct of operations was not immediately apparent, their role has been practically ignored. Historians have tended to concentrate on the Army and divisional levels creating a deficient view of higher military command in World War I. However, corps commanders could and did play an important part in planning operations and in military affairs generally. Birdwood???s experience at Gallipoli and in France reflect some of the changes to command structures that were prompted by the successes and failures of operations directed at the corps level. In as much as these two theatres of war were vastly different and Birdwood was confronted with dissimilar problems, it is possible to draw some general conclusions about the evolution of higher command after 1914. Using a wide range of primary and secondary sources located in Australian and British archives, this thesis traces Birdwood???s career as a corps commander at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. It also examines his tenure as G.O.C. of the A.I.F.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 1, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis examines the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) from 1947 until it ceased to exist under that name with the release of the report of the Millar Inquiry in 1974. This thesis examines three broad areas: the organizational changes that the CMF adopted or had imposed upon it; the political decision-making surrounding the CMF; and a social analysis of the CMF which questions the viability and validity of a number of the CMF???s long held precepts. The thesis will show that the majority of circumstances and decisions surrounding the CMF were beyond its control. For example, the CMF could not change the prevailing military thought of the post-war period which emphasized increasingly the role of smaller, professional, readily-available armies. The first three chapters recount the CMF???s ???heyday??? in which the Army, assisted by National Service after 1950, was based around it and its influence at the highest levels was strongest. The next two chapters chronicle the background to Australia???s adoption of the ???Pentropic??? organization and the repercussions this had on the CMF. Chapters Six and Seven examine the consequences of the introduction of a second compulsory service scheme and the concomitant result which precluded the CMF from operational service in Vietnam. Chapters Eight and Nine deal with the Millar Inquiry, which offered the CMF a new hope, but in some regards, brought forth little beneficial gains for the CMF. The final chapters analyze some of the characteristics unique to the CMF, such as territorial affiliation, high turnover rates amongst the rank and file and the concept of the ???brilliant amateur???. This thesis concludes that, despite the mixed performance of the CMF, there is still a place for the citizen soldier in contemporary warfare, but far more consideration at the highest political and military levels must be given to the peculiar and difficult, but by no means insurmountable, problems citizen soldiering encounters in Australia.

This thesis examines the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) from 1947 until it ceased to exist under that name with the release of the report of the Millar Inquiry in 1974. This thesis examines three broad areas: the organizational changes that the CMF adopted or had imposed upon it; the political decision-making surrounding the CMF; and a social analysis of the CMF which questions the viability and validity of a number of the CMF???s long held precepts. The thesis will show that the majority of circumstances and decisions surrounding the CMF were beyond its control. For example, the CMF could not change the prevailing military thought of the post-war period which emphasized increasingly the role of smaller, professional, readily-available armies. The first three chapters recount the CMF???s ???heyday??? in which the Army, assisted by National Service after 1950, was based around it and its influence at the highest levels was strongest. The next two chapters chronicle the background to Australia???s adoption of the ???Pentropic??? organization and the repercussions this had on the CMF. Chapters Six and Seven examine the consequences of the introduction of a second compulsory service scheme and the concomitant result which precluded the CMF from operational service in Vietnam. Chapters Eight and Nine deal with the Millar Inquiry, which offered the CMF a new hope, but in some regards, brought forth little beneficial gains for the CMF. The final chapters analyze some of the characteristics unique to the CMF, such as territorial affiliation, high turnover rates amongst the rank and file and the concept of the ???brilliant amateur???. This thesis concludes that, despite the mixed performance of the CMF, there is still a place for the citizen soldier in contemporary warfare, but far more consideration at the highest political and military levels must be given to the peculiar and difficult, but by no means insurmountable, problems citizen soldiering encounters in Australia.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 8, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.