The changing security environment in Asia has led to a renewed interest in the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). However, the SDF itself remains a black box: assessed either in terms of its problematic legal standing or physical military capacity, but with limited understanding of the people within; who they are, what they do, and how they think. This dissertation opens up the black box and brings the SDF officers into the analysis of civil-military relations in post-war Japan. I present a theoretical framework inspired by principal-agent theory, in which I hypothesize that the type of control (ex-ante or ex-post) and preference divergence between the civilians and the military produces four different outcomes in civil-military relations: containment, auto pilot, conflictual, and cooperative (possibly excessive). I examine how civil-military relations in Japan evolved over time and across three realms of defense policy making, budget, personnel, and use of force; utilizing the findings from an opinion survey conducted among SDF officers and civilian elite addressing the "civil-military gap," oral history records of former SDF leaders and civilian defense officials, and interviews with active duty SDF officers and civilian officials. My research shows that civil-military relations in Japan was generally calm, not because the ex-ante constraints were strong and suppressed the opposing views of the SDF, but because the policy preferences of SDF officers and civilian bureaucracy converged in support of the alliance relationship with the United States. Such preference convergence made it possible for the politicians to continue "auto-pilot control" of the SDF, which was convenient for politicians who preferred to avoid dealing with military matters in face of the anti-militaristic public. However, this led to two paradoxical outcomes: (1) the SDF came to enjoy their relative autonomy within the ex-ante constraints, and (2) the ex-ante constraints turned out to be self-binding for politicians, possibly hampering their ability to control the SDF ex-post. Institutional changes through the electoral and administrative reforms in the 1990s along with the perceived changes in the security environment surrounding Japan enhanced both the incentive and capacity of politicians to release the ex-ante constraints and to control the SDF in their own hands. Re-interpretation of the constitution to allow for collective self defense is a step in the same direction. Looking towards the future, the shift from ex-ante to ex-post control may result in tension between the civilians and SDF officers, in cases where their preferences diverge.

The continued existence of the Russian defence and arms industry, known as the Oboronnyi Promyshennyi Kompleks (OPK), was called into question following the disintegration of the Soviet Empire in 1991. Industry experts cited the lack of a domestic market, endemic corruption, and excess capacity within the industry as factors underpinning its predicted demise. The most telling factor was the sudden removal of considerable government subsidies and high defence industry wages that had traditionally buttressed the industry's economic viability and encouraged the cream of Russia's workers into the sector. It was a crippling blow. However, the industry's export customers in China, India and Iran during those early years became the OPK's saving grace. Their orders introduced hard currency back into the industry and went a long way to preventing the forecasted OPK collapse. Although pessimistic predictions continued to plague the OPK throughout the 1990s, the valuable export dollars provided the OPK the breathing space it needed to claw back its competitive advantage as an arms producer. That revival has been further underpinned by a new political commitment, various research and development initiatives, and the restoration of defence industry as a tool of Russian foreign policy. In order to gauge the future prospects for the OPK, it is necessary to examine the domestic and external drivers that have either underwritten its success to date or are still required to ensure its long term endurance. Domestically, continued success demands a closer collaboration between the OPK and the Russian armed forces. It also requires serious efforts to curb endemic corruption, further consolidation of the defence industry and continued development of the Russian domestic market for arms. Externally, the strength of the state arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, global market diversification and joint military ventures with strategic partner countries are essential ingredients for long term OPK success. Cultivating and maintaining the economic and political momentum vital for the OPK's progress will be a daunting undertaking for Russia. However, Russia's accomplishments in these key areas since 2000 suggest that continued success is a genuine prospect and that the OPK could potentially grow to be the proverbial 'phoenix from the ashes'. China and India constitute approximately eighty percent of the total Russian arms transfer market. Trading and cooperation with these two countries has provided Moscow with the finances to sustain its defence industry through continued orders and valuable finance for research and development programmes for military hardware. However, post 2015, the Chinese market will be nearing total saturation and the Indian market will have contracted somewhat, as the indigenous defence industries of these nations can be expected to usurp the demand for Russian equipment. This scenario, together with a more active foreign policy under Putin has seen Russia launch aggressive marketing campaigns into the Middle East, South East Asia and Latin America. The strategy has already begun to pay dividends with large contracts being signed by Algeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela. The Russians hope that large sales to these countries will trigger further sales within the respective regions. The realised or potential contracts for arms from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Brazil suggest that this strategy is producing the desired result. The short term future of the Russian OPK looks promising. The rising domestic defence order is beginning to challenge the export market as the OPK's most important customer. Meanwhile, exports will be safeguarded by continued foreign demand for niche Russian defence products such as cruise missiles and air defence systems as well as cost effective and user friendly Russian aircraft, ships, submarines and land systems. Flexible financing options offered by Rosoboronexport will stimulate demand in new markets such as Algeria and Indonesia and sustain the economic viability of the OPK for at least the next decade.

This thesis makes an assessment of the factors influencing the involvement of the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) in homeland security roles since 11 September 2001 (9/11). This is approached on a largely empirical basis, using document analysis and case studies supported with interviews with key individuals and experts. The thesis commences with an Introduction that provides brief context for the thesis and specifies its central question as ???what factors have shaped the role of the ADO in Australia's response to the homeland security environment that has emerged since 11 September 2001.??? Chapter One provides an historical and theoretical context for the key concepts of homeland security and the challenges confronting Western governments in the homeland security arena. Chapter Two explores the implications of those challenges for Australia, before outlining the research method and providing a literature review. Chapter Three is an historical exposition of homeland security in Australia from British settlement in 1788 until 2001. The Chapter examines events in increasing detail in the 30 years immediately prior to 2001, including a detailed case study of ADO support to the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games, before drawing some broad conclusions on the Australian experience of the involvement of its Defence Organisation in homeland security pre-9/11. Chapter Four establishes the pre-9/11 status quo in relation to the ADO???s involvement in homeland security role before analysing the general pattern of those roles. Chapter Five analyses and draws conclusions about the reasons for the ADO???s pre-9/11 involvement in homeland security roles, introducing an hypothetical construct to explain causal factors. Chapter Six examines the ADO???s involvement in homeland security roles post-9/11, including cases studies of ADO support to the conduct of the 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games. Chapter Seven analyses and identifies the factors led to the ADO???s pattern of involvement in homeland security post-9/11, further developing the hypothetical construct introduced in Chapter 5. Chapter Seven also contains supporting case studies on the ADO???s contribution to Australia???s national chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response capability and on the state of New South Wales??? homeland security capabilities. Chapter Eight draws overall conclusions, including recommendations for Australian policy development and areas for further research. The essential conclusion reached is that the ADO???s involvement in homeland security roles, both before and since 9/11, has been shaped mostly by pragmatic political and managerial considerations of governments. Developments have normally occurred in an episodic and incremental fashion in response to ???trigger events,??? although 9/11 altered this pattern somewhat by acting as a ???threshold??? event that re-calibrated demands and expectations for ADO involvement. Supporting Appendices provide detail on the Australian Government???s strategic guidance on ADO involvement in homeland security since 1973; on Australia???s policy for Defence Assistance to the Civilian Community and Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authorities; and on the involvement of former Department of Defence employees in non-Defence homeland-security related roles. A Bibliography provides details of sources used.

<p>This dissertation addresses one of the most vexing issues in American foreign policy: Under what circumstances should the United States use military force in pursuit of national interests? Despite not having a policy upon entering office or articulating one throughout its first term, the Reagan administration used military force numerous times. Two-weeks following Reagan's landslide reelection victory, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger articulated six tests for when and how to use military force, which surprisingly seemed to call for restraint. Through the examination of three case studies, the Reagan administration's decisions are found to have been influenced by the assimilation of lessons from Vietnam, the reading of public pulse, the desire to placate Congress, and the need to protect the nation's strategic interests. All these factors, ultimately codified by Weinberger, were considered by the leaders in the Reagan administration as they tried to expand the military's ability to help the U.S. meet an increasingly wider range of threats. Thus this dissertation will show that, contrary to what one finds in contemporary scholarship, the Weinberger doctrine was intended as a policy to legitimize the use of military force as a tool of statecraft, rather than an endorsement to reserve force as a last resort after other instruments of power have failed.</p> / Dissertation

In this paper I will offer an overview the evolution of civil liberties in the United States. These liberties, I argue, were meant to protect individuals from unwarranted exercises of power from the government, but ultimately were not intended to hamper the government’s ability to carry out basic government functions, such as self defense. Next, I examine the parallel evolution of the ability of the executive to exercise broad ranging powers in pursuit of foreign policy, especially in regard to self defense. After that I argue that the current policy not necessarily represent the administration choosing self defense over an individual’s civil liberties. Rather, it represents the notion that at a fundamental level, a state will always choose to pursue foreign policies designed to protect itself, and that even the domestic legal institutions that have evolved in the United States recognize that fact. / text

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When do militias---whose power, riches, and legitimacy depend on the continuation of civil wars---accept negotiated settlements? An unexplored and crucial dimension of militia decision-making is the process of militia institutionalization. Militias create institutions to improve their odds of winning the war and project legitimacy internally as well as externally. / Militia institutions affect the strategic choice of decision-makers. They create financial and organizational interests that modify the preferences of the militia leadership. The modified preferences increase the win-set of militia leaders at the negotiating table. Militia institutions also change the decision-making context. Institutions unleash three dynamics that decrease a militia's ability to withstand fluctuations in the military balance of forces. Institutions can lead to factionalism, increased visibility (and hence vulnerability to attack), and strains in relations with patrons. / Using the logic of two-level games, I argue that leaders evaluate peace settlements with an eye on two boards. Externally, they evaluate their position vis-a-vis other protagonists in the conflict. Internally, leaders are concerned with their positions in power. Institutionalization results in a tension between "raison de la revolution" (ideological motivations) and "raison d'institution" (institutional preservation). Embattled leaders who increasingly find it difficult to withstand changes in the balance of forces find that their institutional interests are better preserved by peace. They agree to compromise on their ideological preferences thus opening a window of opportunity for the attainment of sustainable peace settlements. / Employing the comparative case-study method, the dissertation examines the attitudes of the Lebanese Forces and the Bosnian Serbs respectively toward conflict-resolution schemes that sought to bring the Lebanese and Bosnian civil wars to an end. / By focusing on leaders' incentives to settle, the research allows us to predict a priori which settlements are more sustainable. Theoretically, it refines the concept of "ripeness" for negotiations by specifying both its intra-communal and its extra-communal dimensions. In terms of practical policy implications, the research argues that militias are prime candidates for the role of spoilers. Thus, it is important not only to understand their incentives to settle but also to craft peace agreements that give even such radical factions a vested interest in peace.

United States military interventions commonly attempt to generate a post-conflict political order congenial to American national interest, that is, to shape a usable peace. The Clausewitzian imperative, that the use of force must serve policy, points to the strategic significance of the postconflict environment. The civil dimension is the arena where US policy succeeds or fails. This study examines US military doctrine and practice of civil affairs in order to address a strategic problem: how to translate the use of force into a usable peace? Civil affairs or civil military operations cope with civilians during operations, control populations and facilitate US military exit. This study offers theoretical, historical, and policy analysis of US civil affairs. Theoretically, if war is a continuation of policy by other means, civil affairs effect a transition back to a mode of policy. Over time, US doctrine adjusted to different conflict environments and policy imperatives provided by civilian leadership, shifting emphasis to military government, civic action, counterinsurgency, and finally, to peace operations. Because US military culture disdains involvement of soldiers in governance, and in order to expedite transitions, two principles are consistent features of the US approach: civilianization, to transfer authority to civilian agencies; and indirect rule, to nurture friendly indigenous regimes. Civil affairs implements policy. US interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) imperfectly translated political goals into military objectives; suffered from inconsistent goals from Washington; and failed to plan adequately for the civil dimension. The study identifies a number of factors that influenced the American approach to civil affairs in these cases, including analogical reasoning behind the US interventions, orientation toward low-intensity conflict at the time of the intervention, the impact of combat operations during interventions, and the availability of local resources for reconstruction after intervention. The civil dimension of military operations has become more prominent in last decade of intervention in internal conflicts, under limited rules of engagement, in the service of humanitarian objectives. As operations have become more multilateral and multi-agency, cultural tensions have become more pronounced. This study provides a basis for further exploration of the fundamental, but increasingly complex strategic imperative for US military forces, to shape a usable peace.

This thesis examines French policies and attitudes towards the problems of national defence in the nuclear age. Its purpose is to explain certain policy outputs in terms of reactions to an environment or milieu. [...]

The objective of this thesis is to determine why Canada, a state that pioneered nuclear technology, and that faced, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet threat to its national security, consistently rejected any opportunity to convert its latent nuclear capability into an indigenous nuclear weapons program. The answer to this research question must address a number of explicit contradictions in Canadian foreign policy. While Canada has, on the one hand, rejected the bomb, it has, on the other hand, pursued defence and industrial policies based upon intimate involvement with nuclear weapons. Moreover, Canada espouses, on the one hand, a clearly realpolitik view of international relations, while, on the other hand, committing to forging for itself a role as an international peace broker. It becomes, therefore, unclear which theory of international relations could adequately explain this dualism in Canadian policy formulation. This thesis argues that power and self-interest are not separable from Canada's decision to reject the bomb, and that by modifying certain precepts of realist theory, we may substantiate the hypotheses that two disincentives to proliferation are at the root of Canada's policies: first, Canada's political and geographical proximity to the United States and thus a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella; and second, prestige, where Canada interpreted both the rejection of its nuclear option and its internationalist policies as a sign of independence vis-a-vis the United States.