This thesis represents an attempt to explore critical issues in the national military literature and bring up findings for further studies by exploring military innovation,smart management of defense R&amp / D, critical and dual-use technologies concepts in detail. The study has two main components. The first part provides a conceptual and theoretical framework to discuss and understand military innovation, critical technology and dual-use technology. A military that fails to innovate when their contemporaries are innovating is destined to face its dire consequences. So the quest for change within military organizations is a rational and hopefully encouraged behavior. In this thesis the modes of innovation are at the center stage. However, the main intention focus is on technological innovation. As certain technologies are at the core of decisive military innovation, the initial step in innovation is normally to procure the new technology. A country that must purchase technology from abroad is arguably less likely to wield it as effectively as the country that is capable of inventing or manufacturing it, as the latter is usually better equipped to exploit and further refine technology. In order to insure the flow of technological innovations, a sound technology investment strategy must be formulated. A strategy built on a foundation of three integrated building blocks (optimal in-house R&amp / D, expanded collaborative efforts, and smart outsourcing) will enable the military to be an effective smart buyer and smart provider. The thesis proceeds with a brief discussion of critical technologies, specifically the ones that are critical for military and national importance, in order to provide guidance for identifying which technologies harbor the greatest payoff potential. Closely related to this discussion is the question of national economic growth based on technological developments in particular the development of technologies with potential for use in either the civilian or military sectors, and promotion of partnerships among actors / military, industry, academia. Such technologies are referred as dual-use technologies. The dual-use relationships among actors are spin-off, spin-on, venture capital model, and military support/pull model. The second part of the thesis develops a kind of empirical case study analysis based on a rotary-wing upgrade project about the importance of upgrade and system integration technology as a core capability. The last chapter concludes the thesis with the discussion of findings.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / This dissertation examines the influence of the treaty system inaugurated at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 upon innovation in the design of the interwar U.S. fleet. The way in which sea power was viewed by the U.S. Navy of the period combined with the Navy’s unique organizational structure to shape the Navy’s efforts in building a “treaty fleet.” In particular, the General Board of the Navy, a formal body established by the Secretary of the Navy to advise him on both strategic and other matters with respect to fleet, served as the organizational nexus for the interaction between fleet design and treaty implementation. The General Board members orchestrated the efforts by the principal Naval Bureaus, the Naval War College, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in ensuring that the designs adopted for the warships built and modified during the period of the Washington (Five Power) and London Naval Treaties both met treaty requirements while meeting strategic needs. The leadership of the Navy at large, and the General Board in particular, felt themselves especially constrained by Article XIX (the fortification clause) of the Five Power Treaty that implemented a status quo on naval fortification in the Western Pacific. The treaty system led the Navy to design a measurably different fleet than it might otherwise have done in the absence of naval limitations.

Försvarsmakten befinner sig i en transformation från ett insatsförsvar till ett invasionsförsvar. Anpassning sker vid Försvarsmaktens samtliga förband och berör all tjänstgörande personal. Denna studie har undersökt hur denna anpassning som stadfästes med försvarsbeslutet 2015 har avspeglat sig på den grundläggande officersutbildningen vid Försvarshögskolans Officersprogram. Studien har sin hemvist i de vetenskapliga fälten Military Innovation och Professional Military Education. Studien har bedrivits som en enfallstudie och har genom Michael Horowitz teorimodell Adoption Capacity Theory genomfört en tematisk analys utifrån tre övergripande teman; diffusion, resurser och organisation. Empirin i undersökningen har inhämtats genom intervjuer, officiella dokument och artiklar. Studiens resultat påvisar att ingen styrning om att anpassa den grundläggande officersutbildningen har utgått från Försvarsmakten. Vidare kan studien påvisa att Försvarsmakten och Försvarshögskolan har brister i det sätt myndigheterna kommunicerar med varandra. Studien uppfattar att det saknas en tydlig metod och en formell policy för hur denna myndighetssamverkan ska genomföras. Vidare kan studien konstatera att viss anpassning av utbildningen har genomförts, detta på initiativ av akademisk och militär personal tjänstgörande vid Officersprogrammet.

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For a military organisation capability is a central concept. The definitions vary with different nations and organizations, but here the military capability is defined as the ability of a sociotechnical system to solve military tasks performed under certain circumstances in a set environment. To create new or develop existing military capability, military innovation can be a crucial piece of the puzzle. It might be innovative systems solving tasks in the existing organization or existing technology used in an innovative manner.The aim of this thesis is to create a structure for discussing technology, innovation, and capability in a relevant way, where the capability lifecycle presents an overview of the desired capability when planning for future compositions of technology and units, instead of focusing on the individual systems. Therefore, this work is governed by a thematic aim that at least requires a multidisciplinary research approach which contains different research areas to understand how the technical systems can contribute within its context.To visualise this context, different aspects of the system is here divided into three layers. The technology level represents the technology itself, in this case Maritime Uncrewed Systems, which needs to be understood with its opportunities and limitations. The system also needs to be understood in its sociotechnical layer where the technical system is interacting with people, organization, and other units. The final layer is the governance layer with both the legal and ethical considerations in the use of the technology, in this case, an uncrewed system.The overall conclusion is that capability development is not doing things the same way as before with different technology. It is about trust in the overall system and developing how the available resources, both technical and sociotechnical, can contribute to solving a task as efficiently as possible in an altered organization. / För en militär organisation är förmåga ett centralt begrepp. Definitionerna varierar med olika nationer och organisationer, men här definieras den militära förmågan som förmågan hos ett sociotekniskt system att lösa militära uppgifter som utförs under vissa omständigheter i en bestämd miljö. För att skapa ny eller utveckla befintlig militär förmåga kan militär innovation vara en avgörande pusselbit. Det kan vara innovativa system som löser uppgifter i den befintliga organisationen eller befintlig teknik som används på ett innovativt sätt.Syftet med detta examensarbete är att skapa en struktur för att diskutera teknik, innovation och förmåga på ett relevant sätt, där förmågans livscykel ger en överblick över den önskade förmågan vid planering av framtida sammansättningar av teknik och enheter, i stället för att fokusera på det individuella systemet. Därför styrs detta arbete av ett tematiskt syfte som åtminstone kräver en multidisciplinär forskningsansats som innehåller olika forskningsområden för att förstå hur de tekniska systemen kan bidra inom sitt sammanhang.För att visualisera detta sammanhang är de olika aspekterna av systemet här indelade i tre lager. Tekniklagret representerar själva tekniken, i detta fall marina obemannade system, som måste hanteras med dess möjligheter och begränsningar. Systemet behöver också förstås i det sociotekniska lager där det tekniska systemet interagerar med människor, organisation och andra enheter. Det sista lagret är det övervakande lagret med både de juridiska och etiska övervägandena vid användandet av tekniken, i detta fall ett obemannat system.Den övergripande slutsatsen är att förmågeutveckling inte innebär att göra saker på samma sätt som tidigare fast med annan teknik. Det handlar om tillit till det övergripande systemet och att utveckla hur tillgängliga resurser, både tekniska och sociotekniska, kan bidra till att lösa en uppgift så effektivt som möjligt i en förändrad organisation. / <p>QC 230928</p>

Before 1950, the United States intervened in large scale counterinsurgencies twice as often and intervened almost exactly as long as interventions after 1950. Yet, U.S. supported states developed before 1950 tended to survive an average thirty years after U.S. withdrawal. In contrast, U.S. supported states after 1950 have tended to survive only three years. The central question of this examination is why did U.S. military counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions before 1950 produce host-nation governments and host nation security forces that tended to endure ten times longer than interventions after 1950? My central argument is that when the U.S. military deeply embeds within and inhabits host-nation institutions (institution inhabiting strategies) then, state longevity improves in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. Inversely, when the U.S. military employs strategies of lower embeddedness (institution influencing strategies) then, state longevity decreases in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. I compare cases of intervention in tabula rasa or erased governance in the Philippines 1898-1913 and Iraq 2003-2010. The former employed high degrees of embeddedness in both governance and security development and the latter low degrees in both. I also compare cases of intervention in existing governance in Nicaragua 1912-1933 and Vietnam 1964-1972. The former employed a high degree of embeddedness in host-nation security force development and a low degree in host-nation government development while and the latter employed low degrees in both. My research finds a correlation between degree of embeddedness in developing security and governance and state longevity after withdrawal of U.S. forces. The implications for this study are salient today. Where state fragility has progressed to the point where intervention by conventional military force is required to arrest it, institution influencing strategies like Advise and Assist are insufficient. And while trusteeship forms of relation have been largely dismissed since decolonization, the apparent efficaciousness of neo-trusteeships and shared sovereignty relationships in places like Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone hold out the promise of more effectual strategies for state building in counterinsurgency interventions. / PHD

Are drones revolutionary? Reading about military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or 'drones', one could be led to believe that drones are a revolutionary technology, set to fundamentally change warfare. Their fast proliferation, the association with Science Fiction, combined with the secrecy that surrounds drone use has led many to conclude that the 'Unmanned Revolution' is upon us. This thesis studies the Unmanned Revolution. It develops a framework based on the concept of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' and applies it to the study of three countries' drone uses and integration into their armed forces. It furthermore explores the role that the designation as revolutionary has played for the integration and use of UAVs in the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom. It shows that drones have proven their worth in military operations and compares the three countries' experiences. This thesis' detailed assessment of how the different countries have adopted drones and what implication this adoption has had, makes it a work of reference, in particular with regard to the German and British case studies. Assessing five types of changes - operational, doctrinal, strategic, organisational, and social and societal - this thesis argues that the most fundamental, and possibly revolutionary, change caused by military drones is social, namely, the fundamentally changed experience of war by combatants. In addition, it highlights country-specific changes. It concludes that the designation of drones as revolutionary has had an important impact in one country, Germany, although in the opposite way than initially expected. Namely, the intense debate around UAVs has hindered drone procurement and doctrinal thinking. In the other two countries, the Unmanned Revolution narrative was less prevalent and hence less influential. As drones are proliferating globally, I hope my thesis can be of use to policy-makers, military decision-makers as well as researchers worldwide.

Flygvapnets specialoperationsförband produceras i den konventionella delen av Försvarsmakten vilket innebär högre krav på byråkrati och styrning uppifrån i dess utvecklingsprocesser än okonventionella organisationer. Detta innebär att snabb operativ innovation, som är en framgångsfaktor inom specialoperationer, försvåras. Studiens syfte är att genom en kvalitativ intervjustudie utreda hur en specialoperationsenhet som utvecklas, utbildas och utrustas i en konventionell organisation ges förutsättningar till innovation till stöd för specialoperationer. Till stöd används bland annat Spulaks teori om kreativitet och innovation för specialförband. Studien visar att det går att genomföra snabb innovation nerifrån och upp under förutsättning att det finns en koherent uppdrags- och riskuppfattning samt om det råder en organisationskultur som uppmuntrar till kreativitet och innovation. Snabb anpassning kan även ske uppifrån och ner genom närhet till beslutsfattare som skapar förutsättning för att prioritet kan möjliggöra att resurser frigörs. Ett anpassat regelverk, decentraliserad ledning och förståelse för uppdraget är andra avgörande faktorer som skapar förutsättningar till snabb innovation. För att kunna uppnå detta krävs även en tydlig styrning från central nivå för att undvika att specialoperationsförbandens behov fastnar i försvarsgrenskonkurrens. / The Swedish Air Force's special operations forces is produced in the conventional part of the Armed Forces, which means higher demands on bureaucracy and control from higher hierarchy in its development processes than unconventional organizations. This means that rapid operational innovation, which is a success factor in special operations, is hampered. The purpose of the study is through a qualitative interview study to investigate how a special operations unit that is developed, trained and equipped in a conventional organization is given the conditions for innovation in support of special operations. Spulak's theory of creativity and innovation for special operations forces, alongside with other research, is used as a theoretical framework. The result show that it is possible to implement rapid innovation from the bottom up, provided that there is a coherent view of the mission and risks and whether there is an organizational culture that encourages creativity and innovation. Rapid adaptation can also take place from the top down through proximity to decision-makers, which creates the conditions for priority to enable resources to be allocated. An adapted regulatory framework, decentralized command and understanding of the mission are other decisive factors that create the conditions for rapid innovation. In order to be able to achieve this, a clear guidence from the central level is also required to avoid the requirements of the special operations forces getting caught up in intraservice competition.

Ce mémoire porte sur la question de l’innovation militaire en temps de guerre et plus particulièrement sur la transition de la guerre conventionnelle vers la contre-insurrection des forces armées américaines au cours de la guerre d’Irak. Cette transition est un cas d’innovation militaire intéressant puisqu’il s’agit d’un changement radical dans les pratiques militaires de l’Armée américaine et du Corps des marines particulièrement parce qu’ils ont régulièrement tenté d’éviter les missions de contre-insurrection au cours de leur histoire. Cette recherche tentera d’expliquer comment les forces américaines ont innové au cours de la guerre d’Irak Nous considérons que le passage de la guerre conventionnelle à la contre-insurrection des forces américaines est le résultat d’un processus d’innovation militaire en temps de guerre qui se produit simultanément à partir de la base et du sommet de l’organisation militaire américaine. Tout d’abord, à la base, nous estimons que les unités américaines de l’Armée et des marines ont développé de nouvelles capacités de contre-insurrection à la suite d’un processus d’exploration de nouvelles tactiques et de nouvelles techniques sur le champ de bataille. Ensuite, à partir du sommet, nous croyons que la contre-insurrection est le résultat d’un changement stratégique au niveau des opérations des forces américaines. Ce mémoire est divisé en quatre chapitres. Le premier est consacré aux modèles théoriques d’innovation militaire. Le deuxième présente un aperçu de la guerre d’Irak de 2003 à 2007. Les chapitres 3 et 4 analysent respectivement la contre-insurrection comme un processus d’innovation militaire par la base et par le sommet. / This master is about wartime military innovation and more precisely about the transition of the US armed forces from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency during the Iraq war. This case of military innovation is interesting because it marks a radical change in the practices of the US Army and the US Marine Corps all the more so as they both have been frequently trying to avoid counterinsurgency missions in their history. This research will try to explain how the US armed forces have innovated in the Iraq war. We consider that the transition from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency is the result of a process of innovation produced simultaneously at the bottom and at the top of the US military. First of all, from the bottom-up, we think that units from the Army and the marines have developped new counterinsurgency capacities following an exploration process of new tactics and techniques on the battlefield. Then, from the top-down, we believe that counterinsurgency is the consequence of a strategic change in the operations of the Army and the marines. This research will be divided in four chapters. The first chapter is devoted to the military innovation models. The second chapter will present a brief narrative of the Iraq war from 2003 to 2007. Chapters 3 and 4 will offer an analysis of the counterinsurgency innovation process respectively from the bottom-up and the top-down.